U.S. Army Awards BAE Systems $148.3 Million Contract for M88A2 HERCULES Armored Recovery Vehicles

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  4 février 2019 | International, Naval

  Italian row with France unsettles naval industry cooperation

  By: Tom Kington ROME — A series of diplomatic rows between France and Italy, culminating in the exchange of insults between leaders, is casting doubt on naval industry cooperation between the countries. Moves by France's Naval Group and Italy's Fincantieri to integrate their shipyard work has coincided with a crescendo of acrimony between Rome and Paris following the election last year of Italy's first populist government. Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini and French President Emmanuel Macron have battled over who should take responsibility for migrants that sail to Europe from Africa, with Salvini last month calling Macron a “terrible” president who deserved to be voted out of office. Italy's second deputy prime minister, Luigi Di Maio, who leads the anti-establishment Five Star party, has meanwhile openly backed the so-called Yellow Vest protesters who have rioted on the streets of France in protest at Macron's government and its policies. Asked about the verbal attacks from Rome on Jan. 27, Macron replied: “Italy is a great people; the Italian people are our friends and deserve leaders worthy of their history.” Underlying the row is the Italian government's new nationalism, which has put it at loggerheads with the European Union and Macron, who is seen by Rome as a pro-globalism politician. The spat is expected to increase as both Italy's ruling parties — Five Star and Salvini's League party — get on the campaign trail ahead of European parliamentary elections in May. Pierside troubles Analysts fear fallout for defense industry collaboration between the countries, which starts with the well-established satellite and space joint venture between Italy's Leonardo and France's Thales. But the main concern is the naval deal, which was signed last October, under which Fincantieri and Naval Group created a 50-50 joint venture to build and export naval vessels. Fincantieri CEO Giuseppe Bono said he hopes the deal is the start of wider collaboration. Speaking at the launch of Italy's ninth FREMM frigate on Jan 26, Bono played down the frictions with France, telling reporters, “We are part of the same alliance, we have common history,” and adding that the diplomatic tensions “will not influence the work we are doing with Naval Group.” But one analyst was less sanguine. “It's a complicated deal, and as it gets more complicated, external events become more influential,” said Jean Pierre Darnis, scientific adviser at Rome's IAI think tank. “If ministers from the two countries don't meet, and we are waiting for [the] next bilateral [meeting], problems won't get resolved. Right now the Italian-French business community is very concerned,” he added. The naval deal was spurred by an earlier accord for Fincantieri to take control of French shipyard Chantiers de l'Atlantique. That deal, too, was up in the air when France and Germany referred the agreement to the European Commission for anti-trust scrutiny last month. “What has happened is extremely serious, France and Germany behaved wrongly. It throws into doubt all accords,” Italy's Salvini said. Bono said he was confident the EU would not oppose the deal, given it is “in the interests of Europe,” echoing claims that a consolidated European shipbuilding industry would enable competition since it could compete with large players outside Europe. But Europe's ability to consolidate industry was again thrown into doubt in January when Macron and German leader Angela Merkel agreed to forge closer ties between Germany and France to head off the political challenge in Europe from populist governments like Italy, Hungary and Poland. One consequence, warned Italian IAI analyst Michele Nones, was that closer Franco-German ties could squeeze Italy out of access to defense industry funding provided by the new European Defence Fund. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/02/01/italian-row-with-france-unsettles-naval-industry-cooperation

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  17 juillet 2024 | International, Aérospatial

  How the Swedish Air Force is finding its flow as part of NATO

  Interview: Swedish Air Force chief Maj. Gen. Jonas Wikman talks next-gen fighters, his service's take on drones, and Russian aircraft near Scandinavia.

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  8 juin 2020 | International, Terrestre

  China could lose 95% of ballistic, cruise missiles under strategic arms control pact, says new analysis

  By: Mike Yeo MELBOURNE, Australia — China could stand to lose almost all of its ballistic and cruise missiles if it were to sign a new strategic arms control treaty, according to a new regional security assessment. The analysis, titled “The End of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty: Implications for Asia,” is one of the chapters of the annual Asia-Pacific regional security assessment published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank. IISS' report was released June 5 and covered regional security topics such as Sino-U.S. relations, North Korea and Japanese policy. China could lose 95 percent of its ballistic and cruise missile stockpile if it signs a treaty similar to the 1980s Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, according to the chapter's co-authors Douglas Barrie, a senior fellow focused on military air power; Michael Elleman, the director of the Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Program; and Meia Nouwens, a research fellow focused on Chinese defense policy and military modernization. The treaty, signed between by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, banned all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles systems with ranges between 310 and 3,420 miles (500-5,500 kilometres). The U.S. withdrew from the INF Treaty in August 2019, citing Russian violations of the agreement with its development and fielding of the 9M279 missile, although Russia denies that the missile violated range restrictions. However, the IISS report suggested the U.S. withdrawal was done with an eye toward China's missile arsenal, which has grown to what is believed to be the world's largest inventory of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. IISS' own figures estimate China possesses more than 2,200 missiles that fall under the INF Treaty's restrictions. These short- and medium-range missiles are important assets in exerting pressure on Taiwan, which China sees as a rogue province and has vowed to reunite with the mainland, by force if necessary, although it continues to describe its fielding of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles as solely for defensive purposes. Given these missiles provide China with what Barrie described as a “comparative advantage” in the region, it's unlikely the country would willingly sign a potential arms control treaty like the INF Treaty. The U.S, for its part, has already started testing missiles previously prohibited by the treaty, and there have been suggestions that the country might deploy such missiles to the Asia-Pacific region to address an imbalance in such weapons between itself and its rivals without solely relying on air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. (Those cruise missiles existed under the INF Treaty, as they did not violate the pact.) The report cautioned there is a two-fold risk in deploying such weapons to the Asia-Pacific. Chief among those: exacerbating Chinese concerns that the missiles will be positioned for use against it, increasing the potential for a response from China that could lead to an “action-reaction cycle of weapons development and deployment” and continued regional instability. The U.S. is also faced with the quandary of basing any potential INF-busting systems, with regional allies and partners unlikely to accede to locating such missiles on their territory, partly because of the diplomatic and economic reprisals Beijing could inflict on them. And there's precedent here: China targeted South Korea's economy in response to and expressed its distaste at the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system on South Korean soil in 2017. As for the U.S. territory of Guam, basing missiles there would limit their utility due to the distances involved. The IISS report also raised questions about whether U.S. moves to develop and deploy weapons previously prohibited by the INF Treaty will bring China to the arms control negotiating table. However, the think tank conceded that not deploying such weapons is also unlikely to persuade China, noting that that Beijing has shown little appetite for participating in any form of strategic and regional arms control. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/06/05/china-could-lose-95-of-ballistic-cruise-missiles-under-strategic-arms-control-pact-says-new-analysis/