20 mars 2019 | International, Aérospatial

Turkey targets defense and aerospace exports to counter growing national deficit

By:

ANKARA, Turkey — The Turkish government is pressuring its defense and aerospace industries to boost exports as part of an aggressive strategy aimed at addressing the country's account deficit and plunging national currency.

In an annual ambassadors conference in August, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan urged Turkey's diplomatic missions in more than 150 countries to work harder to win contracts for Turkish manufacturers. The president told Turkish ambassadors to fully utilize diplomacy in marketing homegrown equipment. He has also since repeatedly ordered procurement and industry officials to find new markets to target.

“Exports are increasingly important for the sustainability of the [local] industry,” said Murat Ceran, head of the International Cooperation Department at the Presidency of Defence Industries, the government's procurement agency.

"Globally speaking, there are three main tiers of exporters: The United States and Russia together account for nearly 60 percent of all exports. The second group consist of exporters like China, France, Germany and the U.K. Turkey, along with Italy, Spain South Korea and Israel, make the third group,” Ceran explained.

In recent years, Turkey's defense and aerospace industries reported an average export increase of 8 to 10 percent annually. Only in the past six years, Ceran said, have defense and aerospace exports risen by 61 percent, while Turkey's overall exports rose by 10.5 percent.

“We are working to boost exports in a total of 130 countries. We are monitoring over 500 programs in 70 countries,” he said.

Turkey's defense and aerospace exports have risen from an annual $1.388 billion in 2013 to $2.035 billion in 2018, according to the Turkish Exporters' Assembly. In comparison, total sales (both foreign and domestic) grew from $5.076 billion in 2013 to $6.693 billion in 2017 (sales growth for 2018 was unavailable via the Turkish Exporters' Assembly by press time).

Full article: https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2019/03/13/turkey-targets-defense-and-aerospace-exports-to-counter-growing-national-deficit/

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