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  22 septembre 2020 | International, Naval

  US Marines wants to move fast on a light amphibious warship. But what is it?

  David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The U.S. Marine Corps is moving as fast as it can to field a new class of light amphibious warship, but it remains unclear what it will do, where it will be based or what capabilities it will bring to the fight. The idea behind the ship is to take a commercial design or adapt a historic design to make a vessel capable of accommodating up to 40 sailors and at least 75 Marines to transport Marine kit over a range of about 3,500 nautical miles, according to a recent industry day presentation. While the presentation noted that the ship should have few tailored Navy requirements, that also creates a problem: If the Navy is going to pay tens of millions to develop, build, crew and operate them, should it not provide some additional value to the fleet? Analysts, experts and sources with knowledge of internal discussions who spoke to Defense News say the answer to that question is a source of friction inside the Pentagon. The idea of the warship arrived on the scene in 2019 with the ascension of Gen. David Berger as commandant of the Marine Corps. His planning guidance called for a smaller, more agile amphibious force that could operate inside the Chinese anti-access, area denial window in the South China Sea. In a recent virtual meeting of the Surface Navy Association, the chief of naval operations' director of expeditionary warfare, Maj. Gen. Tracy King, emphasized that above all, the platform must be cheap and come online quickly. “I see the efficacy of this [light amphibious warship] is really to help us in the phases and stages we're in right now,” King said Aug. 27. “We need to start doing things differently, as an extension of the fleet, under the watchful eye of our Navy, engaging with our partners and allies and building partner capacity: We ought to be doing that right now. I think we're late to need with building the light amphibious warship, which is why we're trying to go so quickly.” When asked whether the ship should contribute to a more distributed sensor architecture to align with the Navy's desire to be more spread out over a large area during a fight, King answered in the affirmative. "[But] I really see it benefiting from [that architecture] more,” he said. “We need to build an affordable ship that can get after the ability to do maritime campaigning in the littorals.” The unstated implication appeared to be that if the ship is loaded up with sensors and requirements, it will slow down the process and increase the cost. Analysts who spoke to Defense News agreed with that, saying the Navy is likely trying to put more systems on the platform that will make it more complex and more expensive. The Navy has said it wants to keep the price under $100 million per platform and begin purchasing them as early as the latter half of 2022. “The hardest part is going to be appetite suppression, especially on the part of the Navy,” said Dakota Wood, a retired Marine officer and analyst with The Heritage Foundation. "This is what we saw in the littoral combat ship: It started out as a very light, near-shore, small and inexpensive street fighter. And then people started adding on requirements. You had ballooning costs, increasing complexity of the platform, and you get into all kinds of problems. “The Marine Corps wants this quickly. It needs it to be inexpensive so you can have 28-30 of them over a three- to four-year period.” There is the additional challenge of where the ships will be based, since they will probably not be built to the kinds of standards of normal Navy vessels built to last for 30-40 years in service. The minimum service life for the light amphibious warship will be about 10 years, according to the industry day presentation. Wood said that would be a challenge for the Marines and the State Department to work out in parallel with the effort to get the hulls quickly built. Jerry Hendrix, a retied Navy captain and analyst with the Telemus Group, agreed with that assessment, saying the Marines are eager to move forward to get something fielded, in part to make sure this transition to a lighter, more distributed force being pushed by Berger actually happens. "The commandant can't divest of some of the legacy platforms he's building — these big, expensive and vulnerable platforms — until he has something that replaces it in the water. And so he's anxious to get going with something else so he then has a reason to move away from what he has. “The commandant is well aware he has a four-year clock and its ticking. So if he's going to make changes, he's got to get moving to get those changes in place and commit the Marine Corps to them to make sure it's going to last. And right now I'm not sure there's a lot of high confidence that they are going to last.” Hendrix acknowledged that the Navy has good reason to want the light amphibious warship to have more capability, but added that the Corps is more interested in something simple than something costly and elaborate. “What that does,” Hendrix said, “is drive up unit cost and drive down the numbers that can be purchased.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/09/21/us-marines-wants-to-move-fast-on-a-light-amphibious-warship-but-what-is-it/

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  26 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Stop the budgetary bleeding to get the Air Force we need

  By: Douglas Birkey In 2018, then-Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson sounded the alarm regarding the size of her service: “The Air Force is too small for what the nation expects of us.” Her response was direct: The service needed to grow from 312 to 386 operational squadrons. Given the concurrent demands presented by China and Russia at the high end of the threat spectrum, Iran and North Korea in the middle, and the continued danger posed by nonstate actors at the lower threat tier, this imperative for growth was grounded in clear requirements. However, instead of marking a positive turning point for the service, subsequent years saw the Air Force grow smaller, older and more fragile. The burgeoning security environment demands that this downward spiral end now. This is exactly why the Senate's version of the fiscal 2021 National Defense Authorization Act includes specific aircraft inventory floors for the Air Force. With positive intentions having fallen short year after year, it is time for legislation to stop the bleeding. No form of power projection is possible without the capabilities afforded by the Air Force. Ships at sea, forces on land and rear echelon operating locations will not survive long if not defended from aerial attack. Long-range strike affords the unique ability to hit critical targets deep behind enemy lines. Air mobility empowers joint force operations. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance was the most in-demand mission area over the past two decades, and remains so today. Added to this, the Air Force also provides two-thirds of the nuclear triad. Despite the value provided by these missions, the Air Force has struggled to earn its fair share of the defense budget. It absorbed the largest fiscal cuts out of all the services in the years after the Cold War. Between 1989 and 2001, the Air Force saw procurement funding drop by over 52 percent — nearly 20 percent more than the other services. FY13 saw aircraft procurement funding hit the lowest levels in Air Force history. To add insult to injury, the Air Force also sees nearly 20 percent of its top-line budget diverted to the intelligence community — enough money to buy over 400 F-35 fighter jets a year. No other service gets hit like this. With budget pressures a perennial problem, the Air Force has continually sought to divest aircraft to free up cash. The problem is that the demand for Air Force missions never went away. Quite the opposite, it increased. In 1990, the Air Force had 2,893 fighters; today it has around 1,800. This same period saw bombers drop from 327 to 157. Combat operations have been unending since 1991, which means a smaller number of aircraft and crews simply get spun harder to meet demand. This is an unsustainable pattern, with the B-1B bomber standing as a cautionary tale. It has been flying combat missions on a nonstop basis since the 9/11 attacks. The Air Force retired a third of the B-1B inventory in the 2000s to save money that could be reinvested in the remaining aircraft. Budget pressures in subsequent years saw these savings evaporate, maintenance dollars run too thin and the aircraft pressed to the limit. They hit the breaking point last year, with less than 10 percent of the Air Force's B-1Bs mission-capable. With nearly every mission area in the Air Force inventory labeled as “high demand, low density,” expect to see similar challenges proliferate. These stresses are also a major driver behind the pilot crisis. Shrinking the Air Force in the hopes that expected savings could fund modernization has served as a continual mirage for Air Force planners. Indeed, the Air Force's answer to funding the Advanced Battle Management System and other priorities in the FY21 budget submission was to retire more aircraft. Better networks are of little use without the ability to complete the kill chain, and that takes aircraft. Presumed areas of growth hang precariously years into the future. There's little chance that cash will remain protected given COVID-19 budget pressures. The problem is that even when divestiture plans appear plausible on internal spreadsheets, service officials are not the ultimate arbiters of their resources. The broader Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and Congress each have a vote on how funds are managed. This pattern clearly has not worked for the Air Force for the past 30 years. Playing this losing hand again will break the force at fundamental levels. That is why the Senate's proposed aircraft floor is not just a good idea — it is a necessity. A prudent negotiator does not enter a meeting with a high-risk position as the starting point, but that is exactly what the Air Force has done for far too long. The time has come to openly articulate what is required to meet national security requirements. That is what the 386 operational squadron goal is all about. It comes down to acknowledging what airmen will need to fly into harm's way, get the job done and come home safe. This takes both capability and capacity. It is time to rebuild the Air Force we need. Douglas Birkey is the executive director of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, where he researches issues relating to the future of aerospace and national security. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/11/25/stop-the-budgetary-bleeding-to-get-the-air-force-we-need/

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  19 décembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  NATO Members Drive Fastest Increase in Global Defence Spending for a Decade, Jane’s by IHS Markit Reveals

  Spending rose by nearly 5 percent in 2018 to reach USD1.78 trillion, driven by budget increases in North America and Europe December 18, 2018 03:00 AM Eastern Standard Time LONDON--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Global defence expenditure grew by 4.9 percent in 2018, the fastest growth rate since 2008, according to the annual Jane's Defence Budget report, released today by business information provider IHS Markit (Nasdaq: INFO). Global defence spending grew for the fifth consecutive year to reach a total of USD1.78 trillion in 2018, significantly exceeding the post-Cold War record of USD1.69 trillion in 2010, according to the report. Fueling this global growth was a 5.8 percent boost to NATO spending, which totaled USD54 billion, largely due to higher defence spending in the US. Jane's by IHS Markit forecasts that overall NATO defence expenditure will exceed USD1 trillion in 2019. “Following a challenging period for NATO members in the wake of the global financial crisis, countries have begun to increase defence spending again, in response to emerging threats,” said Fenella McGerty, principal analyst, Jane's by IHS Markit. “This has slowed the rebalance in defence expenditure toward emerging markets.” Jane's by IHS Markit projects that global defence spending growth will moderate to a level of around 2 percent per year over the next five years as budget increases in Europe and North America slow and emerging markets again become the key source of growth. “In 2018, we've seen a reversal of recent trends with Western states driving growth,” said Craig Caffrey, principal analyst at Jane's by IHS Markit. “Going forward we still see Asia and the Middle East as the key sources of sustainable increases in defence spending.” NATO members increase spending In 2010, NATO member spending accounted for two thirds of global defence expenditure. As emerging markets expanded and developed economies implemented cuts over the decade, the balance of global defence expenditure shifted dramatically. The NATO share of expenditure steadily declined to just 55 percent in 2017 with non-NATO spending on track to surpass NATO expenditure by the early-2020s. “As 24 of the 29 NATO members increased their defence budget in 2018, the decline in the NATO share of global spending has stalled,” McGerty said. “The recommitment to defence in Western states means the global balance of expenditure between NATO and non-NATO markets is now more likely to shift from the mid-2020s.” Nine NATO members will reach the 2 percent of GDP benchmark for defence expenditure in 2019 – compared to just four members in 2014. These countries are the US, Greece, Estonia, Lithuania, United Kingdom, Poland, France, Latvia and Romania. US continues to invest in modernisation US defence spending increased by USD46 billion in 2018 to reach USD702.5 billion as the Pentagon sought to improve military readiness and bolster missile defence capabilities. The 7 percent boost to the Pentagon's budget represents the largest increase in US defence spending since 2008. “Modernisation accounts will reach USD244.1 billion in FY19 – the highest level of investment funding since the period FY07-10, which experienced the maximum Overseas Contingency Operations and maximum US Department of Defense (US DoD) spending levels,” said Guy Eastman, senior analyst at Jane's. “The funding levels for FY18 and FY19 have enabled the US DoD to start on the road to improved readiness and acquire improved warfighting capabilities.” Eastern European budgets continue to expand, while Germany's 11 percent spending boost will bolster Western Europe's total Six of the ten fastest growing defence budgets in the world in 2018 were situated in Eastern Europe. Defence spending in the region grew by almost 9 percent in 2018 with Poland, Romania and the Ukraine driving increases. Notably, spending on military equipment has more than doubled in the region since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Western European defence spending increased for the third consecutive year in 2018 to reach USD248 billion – 2.4 percent higher than 2017. In 2019, regional spending should exceed pre-financial crisis levels as growth accelerates to 3.6 percent driven by a major 11 percent increase in the German defence budget. “As fiscal balances have improved, countries are able to respond to a markedly poorer security environment and address the capability gaps that have emerged,” McGerty said. “European defence cooperation is also a driving factor as countries look to bolster domestic capabilities but also partner on new technologies, all of which requires greater investment.” While the outlook for defence spending growth in Europe appears on an upward trend, this hinges on a stable UK defence budget and therefore upon the outcome of Brexit negotiations and the impact on the UK economy. Strong economic conditions in Asia-Pacific drive accelerated growth Growth in Asia-Pacific accelerated to 3.6 percent in 2018 but remains below the average 4.8 percent rate seen over the past decade. Total regional spending reached a record high of USD465 billion in 2018. Despite security concerns, economic growth continues to be the primary driver of defence budget growth in Asia. “Strategic drivers are undoubtedly becoming more important, but trends continue to be dictated by economic and fiscal conditions. Strong underlying economic fundamentals mean that Asia is where we expect the majority of the sustainable long-term growth will come from,” Caffrey said. “From a budgetary perspective, we're still seeing very few indicators that an arms race is underway in Asia.” Saudi surpasses France as fifth largest defence spender Higher oil prices over the course of 2018 contributed to an uptick in growth in the Middle East and North Africa with total spending in the region reaching USD180 billion. Saudi Arabia increased its defence outlay by 7 percent to hit USD56 billion, making the Kingdom the fifth largest spender on defence globally. “The large increase in Saudi Arabia's defence budget drove trends in MENA,” Caffrey said. “With oil prices falling again in the latter part of the year, regional growth is likely to remain relatively conservative in the short term.” Brazil dominates defence spending in Latin America Latin America's defence spending grew by 10.4 percent in 2018, reaching a new high of almost USD62 billion. Brazil's allocation of USD29.9 billion accounted for 48.3 percent of this total. “The recovery in Latin American defence budgets continued this year, but aside from Venezuela, where hyperinflation necessitated massive spending supplements, growth was markedly slower than in 2017,” said Andrew MacDonald, senior analyst at Jane's by IHS Markit. Top 20 defence budgets - 2017 and 2018 (USD billion) Position Country 2017* Position Country 2018* 1 USA 656.7 1 USA 702.5 2 China 191.2 2 China 207.6 3 India 61.2 3 India 62.1 4 UK 57.0 4 UK 58.4 5 France 52.5 5 Saudi Arabia 56.0 6 Saudi Arabia 52.1 6 France 53.6 7 Russia 50.9 7 Russia 51.6 8 Japan 48.3 8 Japan 45.1 9 Germany 43.5 9 Germany 44.5 10 South Korea 38.0 10 South Korea 39.1 11 Australia 32.1 11 Australia 32.0 12 Brazil 28.9 12 Brazil 29.9 13 Italy 26.7 13 Italy 27.2 14 UAE 19.3 14 UAE 21.4 15 Canada 16.5 15 Iran 17.4 16 Israel 16.4 16 Canada 16.1 17 Iran 16.2 17 Israel 16.0 18 Taiwan 14.6 18 Spain 15.3 19 Spain 14.4 19 Taiwan 14.5 20 Pakistan 12.0 20 Turkey 13.0 *Figures in constant 2018 USD billions. The intelligence cutoff for this report is 13 December 2018. About IHS Markit (www.ihsmarkit.com) IHS Markit (Nasdaq: INFO) is a world leader in critical information, analytics and solutions for the major industries and markets that drive economies worldwide. The company delivers next-generation information, analytics and solutions to customers in business, finance and government, improving their operational efficiency and providing deep insights that lead to well-informed, confident decisions. IHS Markit has more than 50,000 business and government customers, including 80 percent of the Fortune Global 500 and the world's leading financial institutions. IHS Markit is a registered trademark of IHS Markit Ltd. and/or its affiliates. All other company and product names may be trademarks of their respective owners © 2018 IHS Markit Ltd. All rights reserved. About the Jane's Annual Defence Budgets Report The Jane's Defence Budgets team produces the annual Jane's Defence Budgets Report every December. The report examines and forecasts defence expenditure for 105 countries and captures 99 percent of global defence spending. The Jane's Annual Defence Budgets Report is the world's most comprehensive, forward-looking study of government's defence budgets. Tracking 99 percent of the global defence expenditure from 105 of the world's largest defence budgets, data is compiled from Jane's Defence Budgets online solution platform. It includes five-year forecasts, historical data, budget charting, trend evaluation and in-depth analysis by country. In this study, values are based on constant 2018 US dollars. Contacts Freya Lewis IHS Markit +44 203 159 3255 freya.lewis@ihsmarkit.com Press Team +1 303 858 6417 press@ihsmarkit.com https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181218005033/en/NATO-Members-Drive-Fastest-Increase-Global-Defence