The Army roughs out its $1B cyber training contract

Sur le même sujet

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  16 janvier 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - January 15, 2020

  AIR FORCE F.K. Horn GmbH & Co., Kaiserslautern, Germany (FA5613-20-D-0001); SKE Support Services GmbH, Goldbach, Germany (FA561320D0002); Mickan GmbH & Co., Amberg, Germany (FA5613-20-D-0003); BB Government Services GmbH, Kaiserslautern, Germany (FA5613-20-D-0004); J&J Worldwide Services, Austin, Texas (FA5613-20-D-0005); and Wolff & Müller Government Services GmbH & Co., Stuttgart, Germany (FA5613-20-D-0006), have been awarded an estimated $425,000,000 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for the multiple award construction contract. This contract provides for a broad range of design-build, sustainment, maintenance, repair, alteration, renovation and minor construction projects to include residential and commercial work for the Kaiserslautern Military Community, Spangdahlem Air Base, as well as supporting installations throughout Germany. Work will be performed primarily at Headquarters U.S. Air Force in Europe (USAFE); Ramstein Air Base; Spangdahlem Air Base; and USAFE geographically separated units in Germany. The contract will expire on Jan. 14, 2025. This contract is the result of a competitive acquisition and seven offers were received. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of 1,000 Euros are being obligated for each awardee at the time of the award. The 700th Contracting Squadron, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, is the contracting activity. L3Harris Technologies Inc., Colorado Springs, Colorado, has been awarded a $12,929,064 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification (P01033) to a previously-awarded contract F19628-02-C-0010 for the National Space Defense Center (NSDC) sustainment effort. This modification provides sustainment support for the NSDC at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, which is housed within the Distributed Space Command and Control – Dahlgren program of record. Work will be performed at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, and is expected to be completed by June 30, 2020. The total cumulative face value is $12,929,064. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $12,929,064 are being obligated at time of award. The Space and Missile Systems Center, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, is the contracting activity. ARMY F3EA Inc.,* Savannah, Georgia, was awarded a $245,000,000 hybrid (cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost-sharing, and firm-fixed-price) contract for special operations forces requirements analysis, prototyping, training, operations and rehearsal IV. Bids were solicited via the internet with 10 received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 14, 2027. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Orlando, Florida, is the contracting activity (W900KK-20-D-0005). Rogers, Lovelock & Fritz, Orlando, Florida, was awarded a $100,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for architecture and engineering design services. Bids were solicited via the internet with 13 received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of July 14, 2030. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City, Missouri, is the contracting activity (W912DQ-20-D-4000). Bechtel National Inc., Reston, Virginia, was awarded a $35,709,723 modification (P00184) to contract W52P1J-09-C-0012 for the increased permitting requirements request for equitable adjustment at Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant as a result of additional work in the sample management office, waste plan analysis and odor monitoring. Work will be performed in Pueblo, Colorado, with an estimated completion date of July 12, 2020. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation, Army funds in the amount of $35,709,723 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, is the contracting activity. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, Oak Brook, Illinois, was awarded a $10,723,250 firm-fixed-price contract for coastal storm risk management work. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed in Southampton, New York, with an estimated completion date of March 31, 2020. Fiscal 2018 flood control and coastal emergencies, civil works funds in the amount of $10,723,250 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New York, New York, is the contracting activity (W912DS-20-C-0006). NAVY Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems, Syracuse, New York, is awarded a $19,330,296 firm-fixed-price modification to previously-awarded contract N00024-19-C-6269 to exercise options for the procurement of eight multi-function modular masts for new-construction Virginia-class submarine Block V hulls. Work will be performed in Nashua, New Hampshire (70%); and Syracuse, New York (30%), and is expected to be completed by September 2023. Fiscal 2020 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funding in the amount of $19,330,296 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity. Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona, is awarded a $9,075,931 firm-fixed-price delivery order (N00019-20-F-0499) against a previously awarded indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (N00019-15-D-0034). This delivery order provides for repair and sustainment services for 155 high-speed anti-radiation missiles in support of the Air Force, the government of Morocco and the government of Turkey. Work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona, and is expected to be completed in December 2020. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance (Air Force) funds in the amount of $8,824,266; and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) funds in the amount of $251,665 will be obligated at time of award, $8,824,266 of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This order combines purchases for the Air Force ($8,824,266; 97.2%); and FMS customers ($251,665; 2.8%). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. *Small Business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2058353/source/GovDelivery/

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  6 août 2018 | International, Naval, C4ISR

  Navy satellite system approved for expanded use

  By: Maddy Longwell   U.S. Strategic Command has approved the Navy's new narrowband satellite communication system for expanded operational use, which could begin as early as this fall, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command announced Aug. 2. “MUOS' acceptance for operational use is an important milestone for the Navy, and it's one step closer for significant communications improvements for all our forces,” Rear Adm. Carl Chebi, the Navy's program executive officer for space systems, said in the release. The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), built by Lockheed Martin, is a five-satellite constellation, which includes four operational satellites and an on-orbit spare, that works with ground relays to operate like a global military cellular network. The first satellite launched in 2012. The system can transmit voice, video and mission data on an Internet Protocol based system that can connect to military networks. Users can connect to Department of Defense communications networks such as the Global Information Grid and Defense Switched Network. Full Article: https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2018/08/03/navy-satellite-system-approved-for-expanded-use

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  3 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Securing the final frontier: Digital twins, satellites and cybersecurity

  Kevin Coggins The United States and our allies are increasingly dependent on unfettered access to space. However, it has become abundantly clear that our space systems have significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities that our adversaries are eager to exploit. Earlier this year, William Akoto wrote about the growing constellations of satellites operated by private industry, led by SpaceX, Blue Origin and others: “If hackers were to take control of these satellites, the consequences could be dire. On the mundane end of scale, hackers could simply shut satellites down, denying access to their services. Hackers could also jam or spoof the signals from satellites, creating havoc for critical infrastructure. This includes electric grids, water networks and transportation systems.” Space Policy Directive 5, recently issued by the White House, notes that “cybersecurity principles and practices that apply to terrestrial systems also apply to space systems” and that we must integrate these principles and practices into every phase of the space system life cycle. SPD-5 is charting the right course toward assuring our cybersecurity in the space domain. This article highlights the unique vulnerabilities of space systems and how innovative solutions like “digital twins” can help us protect systems in orbit today and design more secure ones for the future. Cyberattacks on space systems — comprised of satellites, ground control stations, and user terminals (e.g., GPS receivers) — are appealing to nation-states, criminal groups, hackers and other bad actors. It's a tremendous opportunity to breach data and disrupt operations in a low-risk way with a low cost of execution. The different components that make up space systems each come with their own set of cyber vulnerabilities, the ground segment in particular. Some space systems were built with speed to market rather than cybersecurity in mind. In contrast, for traditional defense-focused space systems, a slower design and development process has introduced vulnerabilities as well. Space systems operating today may have taken a full 20 years to go from paper to launch and lack the capabilities to recognize or respond to today's cyberthreats. Space systems are increasingly interconnected — a malicious attack can easily spread from a single point of vulnerability in a ground station to the satellites. Cybersecurity in space systems has struggled to keep pace with the rapid evolution of threat actors and exploits. Given these challenges, how can organizations with space systems stay ahead of cyberthreats and protect their missions and users? The older approach of paper-based assessments has significant limitations, like the inability to duplicate reactions to all possible scenarios. At the other end of the spectrum, full-scale replicas are expensive and time-consuming to build. In the middle is the “digital twin” concept — a virtual mirror model that synchronizes a physical object with a cyber representation. With this approach, organizations can test a satellite in different scenarios to identify vulnerabilities and develop protection strategies, even before the satellite is built. One specific project that demonstrated digital twins' strengths and capabilities: testing Air Force GPS space systems for vulnerabilities after the passage of Section 1647 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. Starting with a model-based system engineering review of thousands of pages of design documents, we built a digital replica of critical GPS Block IIR satellite components launched between 1987 and 2004 that ran on a single laptop with lightweight applications. Our digital twin created the foundation for a flexible cyber test bed — a suite of scalable software applications to demonstrate and validate cyber vulnerabilities and protection strategies as the system is designed or modified. The test bed can connect with assets beyond the network to generate data, provide war-gaming support and explore attack scenarios. We need this flexibility and functionality for future space system protection. The next generation of satellites will encounter more extreme service conditions and increased, simultaneous cyberattack vectors over longer periods of time. To respond to these challenges, these space systems will need increasingly complex designs, and with such complexity comes potentially greater vulnerability to cyberattacks and threats. Digital twins and model-based system engineering approaches can strengthen security throughout the acquisition and sustainment phases. Use them to: Develop system requirements and analyze design trades. Create test scenarios for requirements clarification and reference systems. Simulate threats, anomalies and impacts without risk to critical infrastructure. Assess the impact of new threats or operational scenarios on an on-orbit system design. What can space system acquisition professionals, developers and operators learn here? Digital twins offer an innovative approach that can streamline and strengthen the testing and design process of our space assets. They can also provide insights on as-built systems and enable the buydown of risks across the space system life cycle, enabling affordability across the entire system life cycle. Now is the time to leverage their capabilities, to ensure that the space infrastructure so vital to our security and American way of life has the protection it requires. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/11/02/securing-the-final-frontier-digital-twins-satellites-and-cybersecurity/