Thanatologie forensique: Apport de cerveaux au Québec

Sur le même sujet

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  13 juin 2019 | Local, Sécurité, Autre défense

  Canada should think again about having the ability to use offensive cyber weapons: Expert

  Howard Solomon Canada's electronic spy agency will soon get new authority to launch cyber attacks if the government approves legislation that is in the final stages of being debated. There's a good chance it will be proclaimed before the October federal election. But a discussion paper issued Wednesday by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute says Canadians need to debate the pros and cons of using this new power. “This direction not only opens up new possibilities for Canadian defence, it could also represent significant new risks,” says the report. “Without good answers to the difficult questions this new direction could raise, the country could be headed down a very precarious path.” Among the possible problems: Cyber retaliation. Another: While Canada might try to target a cyber attack, the impact might be bigger than expected — in fact, it might boomerang and smack us back. Third is the lack of international agreement on the use of cyber weapons (although this is a double-edged sword: Without an agreement there are no formal limits on what any country is forbidden from doing in cyberspace). “To move forward at this point to implement or even formally endorse a strategy of cyber attack would be risky and premature,” concludes the report's author, computer science professor Ken Barker, who also heads the University of Calgary's Institute for Security, Privacy and Information Assurance. “There are challenging technical controls that must be put in place as well as a critical international discussion on how cyber weaponry fits within the rules of war.” Barker's paper is in response to the 2017 strategy setting out Defence Department goals, where the possibility of Canada having a cyber attack capability first raised. It wasn't written with Bill C-59 in mind — now in its final stage before Parliament — which actually gives Canada's electronic spy agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the power to use what's called “active” as well as defensive cyber operations. In an interview Tuesday, Barker said “in the desire to push this thing they need to have more carefully thought about the questions I raise in this paper.” “Maybe it's late, but at least it's available.” He dismisses the argument that by announcing it has an offensive cyber capability Canada will cause other countries to think twice about attacking us with cyber weapons. “They would attempt to find out what Canada is doing to create cyber attack capabilities,” he argued. “One of the risks once we do endorse this,” he added, “is we open ourselves up to other countries to using Canada as a launching pad for cyber attacks to cover up their involvement, and [then] say ‘That was done by Canada.'” Nation states are already active in cyberspace. Ottawa has blamed China for the 2014 hack of the National Research Council, Washington suspects China was behind the massive hack of employee files at the Office of Personnel Management, and there is strong evidence that Russia mounted a sophisticated social media attack against the U.S. during the 2016 federal election. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The U.S. the U.K. and Australia say they have used offensive cyber operations against the Islamic State. The U.S.-based Council on Foreign Relations notes that Germany increased its offensive cyber capability after a 2016 attack on the country's legislature blamed on Russia. Last year the New York Times reported the U.S. Cyber Command has been empowered to be more offensive. Meanwhile in April the CSE warned it's “very likely” there will be some form of foreign cyber interference during the run-up to October's federal election here, The most commonly-cited interference in a country were two cyber attacks that knocked out electrical power in Ukraine — in December 2015 and again in December 2016 — largely believed to have been launched from Russia. All this is why some experts say Canada has to have an offensive cyber capability to at least keep up. In January, Ray Boisvert, former assistant director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), told a parliamentary committee that “the best defence always begins with a good offense ... “When more than five dozen countries are rumoured to be developing active cyber capabilities, in my view that means we must develop capabilities to respond and in some cases that includes outside our borders.” Background In 2017 the Trudeau government announced a new defence strategy that included the promise of “conducting active cyber operations against potential adversaries in the context of government-authorized military missions.” The same year the government introduced Bill C-59, which in part would give the CSE, which is responsible for securing government networks, the ability to take action online to defend Canadian networks and proactively stop cyber threats before they reach systems here. This would be done as part of new legislation governing the CSE called the Communications Security Act. That act would give CSE the ability to conduct defensive and “active” cyber operations. Active operations are defined as anything that could “degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.” Both defensive and active cyber operations can't be used against any portion of the global information infrastructure within this country. And they have to be approved by the Minister of Defence. C-59 has been passed by the House of Commons and slightly amended by the Senate. It was scheduled back in the House last night to debate the Senate amendments. Despite all the cyber incidents blamed on nation states, Barker is reluctant to say we're in an era of low-level cyber war right now. Many incidents can be characterized as cyber espionage and not trying cause harm to another state, he argues. https://www.itworldcanada.com/article/canada-should-think-again-about-having-the-ability-to-use-offensive-cyber-weapons-expert/418912

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  5 septembre 2023 | Local, Terrestre

  How a parts shortage and corporate infighting hamper efforts to repair Ukraine's Leopard tanks | CBC News

  High prices, corporate rivalries and a shortage of spare parts hobbled efforts this spring to set up a new repair facility in Poland for Ukraine's Leopard tanks — and in some cases have limited the usefulness of the donated Western vehicles, CBC News has learned.

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  25 mai 2020 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Defence procurement won't be so easy to cut in a time of COVID-19

  As governments around the world reassess national security, Ottawa could find it harder to delay plans for new ships, helicopters and fighter jets. Jeffrey F. Collins May 22, 2020 A few months into the COVID-19 pandemic, the first signs of impact on Canada's defence procurement plans are showing. The government has been following an ambitious multi-decade blueprint, starting in 2010, to kick-start the domestic shipbuilding sector, but some yards have had to scale back their workforces under public health orders. What this means for the National Shipbuilding Strategy and its more than $85 billion (by my calculations) in ongoing and planned construction of large ships is as yet unclear. The $19-billion Future Fighter Capability project, designed to replace the four-decade-old CF-18 fighter with 88 new jets, could also be affected. Government officials were adamant until early May that the June submission deadline for bids remained unchanged — before granting a 30-day extension. But with industry and public sector workers largely stuck at home, it is difficult to see how even the new July deadline can be met. In earlier times of economic strain, Ottawa found defence spending an easy target for cuts. This time could be different, as governments around the world reassess what national security means and how best to achieve it. Heading into 2020, things were still looking up for the capital spending plans of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The Trudeau government's 2017 Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) defence policy had allocated $108 billion in capital expenditures over a 20-year timeframe, 2017-37. Then came the pandemic. There were more than a million job losses in March alone, and as of early May, the Parliamentary Budget Office was predicting a $1-trillion debt by 2021. Given the rapid drop in both domestic and global consumer demand, the price collapse in the country's key commodity, oil, and the accompanying decline in the Canadian dollar, the country is now in a recession for an unknown period. If past is prologue and the virus persists without a vaccine for the foreseeable future, the likelihood of the government delaying or cancelling projects or trimming its orders for ships and planes is growing. When faced with economic pains in the past, federal governments scaled back procurement plans. The staggering debt and deficit in the late 1980s and 1990s led the Brian Mulroney government to drop its ambitious bid to acquire up to a dozen nuclear submarines in 1989, a mere two years after announcing the project in the 1987 defence White Paper. In 1993 the Jean Chrétien government infamously scrapped the contract to replace the 1960s-vintage Sea King helicopter (at a cost of $478 million in penalties). The following year's defence White Paper outlined $15 billion in delays, reductions and cancellations to the DND's procurement budget; this was in addition to large-scale base closures and 20 percent reductions in both CAF regular force personnel and the overall defence budget. The ostensibly pro-military Stephen Harper Conservatives announced 20-year funding plans, as ambitious as the SSE, in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy but deviated from them in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global recession. With a goal of returning to balanced budgets after $47 billion in stimulus spending, the Harper government delayed or cut over $32 billion in planned procurement spending and laid off 400 personnel from DND's procurement branch. Among the casualties was the army's $2.1-billion close-combat vehicle. There are several reasons why this pattern has repeated itself, but two stand out. First, defence is a tempting target for any government belt-tightening drive, typically accounting for a large share of discretionary federal spending. With most federal money going to individual citizens (employment insurance, pensions, tax benefits) and provinces (health and social transfers), there simply is little fiscal room left outside of defence. To remove money from these politically popular programs is to risk voter resentment and the ire of provincial governments. In short, when past federal governments confronted a choice between cutting tanks and cutting transfers, they cut the tanks. Second, Canada's geostrategic position has helped. Sitting securely atop North America in alliance with the world's pre-eminent superpower has meant, in the words of a defence minister under Pierre Trudeau, Donald Macdonald, that “there is no obvious level for defence expenditures” in Canada. Meeting the terms of our alliances with the United States and NATO means that Canada has to do its part in securing the northern half of the continent and contributing to military operations overseas, but generally in peacetime Ottawa has a lot of leeway in deciding what to spend on defence, even if allies growl and complain. Yet it is this same geostrategic position that may lessen the impact of any cuts related to COVID-19. Unlike the Mulroney and Chrétien governments, who made their decisions amid the end of Cold War tensions, or the Harper government, which was withdrawing from the combat mission in Afghanistan, this government must make its choices in an international security environment that is becoming more volatile. The spread of the virus has amplified trade and military tensions between the world's two superpowers and weakened bonds among European Union member states as they fight to secure personal protective equipment and stop the contagion at their borders. Governments worldwide are now unabashedly protectionist in their efforts to prevent the export of medical equipment and vital materials. As supply chains fray, pressures mount for each country to have a “sovereign” industrial capability, including in defence. In fact, the Trump administration has turned to the 1950 Defense Production Act to direct meatpacking plants to remain open or to restrict the export of health products (three million face masks bound for Canada were held up, then released). The pandemic is intensifying the Trump administration's skepticism of alliances and international institutions; in late March, there was even discussion of stationing US troops near the Canadian border (the plan was eventually abandoned). Smaller powers like Canada that have traditionally relied on American security guarantees will have to maintain their defence spending, or even increase it, as they try to strengthen old alliances and create new ones. As Timothy Choi, a naval expert at the University of Calgary, has told me, an irony of the pandemic is that it may see the National Shipbuilding Strategy become a “major destination for stimulus spending in times of recession.” Either way, by the time the pandemic subsides, Canadians may yet find out that there is indeed an “obvious level” to defence spending. This article is part of the The Coronavirus Pandemic: Canada's Response special feature. Photo: The Halifax-class navy frigate HMCS Fredericton in the waters of Istanbul Strait, Turkey. Shutterstock.com, by Arkeonaval. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2020/defence-procurement-wont-be-so-easy-to-cut-in-a-time-of-covid-19/