27 avril 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By: Thomas G. Mahnken
The massive price tag associated with the response to the new coronavirus, COVID-19, coupled with the inevitable impact of the pandemic on the U.S. economy, threatens to blow a hole in the defense budget at a time when the challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran and North Korea show no signs of abating. Leaders in both the executive and legislative branches will need to make tough strategic choices to keep the United States strong in these challenging times.
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, his predecessor Jim Mattis and the bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission all agree that annual increases in the defense budget on the order of 3-5 percent are required to implement the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Even absent the pandemic, the chances of getting such resources seemed uncertain at best. The Trump administration's own budget projections show the defense budget in the coming years as flat or declining. Now, a flat budget more and more appears to be the rosiest scenario.
More worrisome, and increasingly likely, is the possibility of major cuts to the defense budget. Indeed, cuts on the order of 20-25 percent are not unthinkable. Merely pointing out that such a move would jeopardize U.S. security is unlikely to prevent it. Similarly, noting — correctly — that defense spending is one of the most stimulative forms of federal spending may prove insufficient to forestall cuts.
How can the United States realize the greatest economic and military benefit from the defense budget in the coming years? Below are a half-dozen guidelines to help the United States get the maximum strategic benefit from defense spending in this challenging time:
1. Keep production lines going.
Now is not the time to be cutting back on defense production. To the contrary, keeping existing weapons production lines active makes both military and economic sense. The U.S. military is in many ways still living off the Reagan-era defense buildup of the 1980s and is sorely in need of modernization.
Keeping defense production going also makes good economic sense. In a period of rising unemployment, employing as many Americans as possible will help the United States weather the economic storm brought on by COVID-19. The government should also be flexible in administering the cost and schedule of contracts, given the pandemic's impact on the defense-industrial base.
2. Stock up.
Now is also the time to increase orders of things we know that we need but have not purchased enough of, such as munitions. As the NDS Commission found in 2018, the United States has under-invested in precision munitions such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range and Long Range Anti-Ship Missile. Ramping up production of munitions and other expendables will not only boost employment but also help the United States better prepare for a future conflict where such munitions will be in high demand.
3. Be selective in divesting.
The United States should also divest itself of aging capabilities but be thoughtful in doing so. It makes sense to retire old ships and aircraft because the cost of maintaining those systems goes up considerably as they age. It makes much less sense to divest relatively new systems that have plenty of life left in them. For example, the Air Force has proposed shutting down production of the MQ-9 Reaper and retiring more than two-thirds of its RQ-4 Global Hawk fleet.
4. Get the most out of what we have.
Whereas economic conditions may have changed, the external threats that we face have not. As a result, there is an urgent need to develop new ways of war, particularly those that use more effective capabilities that we have. For example, as I have argued elsewhere, non-stealthy unmanned aerial systems such as the MQ-9 and RQ-4 offer a cost-effective way to deter opportunistic aggression by China in the Western Pacific or Russia in Eastern Europe.
5. Keep promoting innovation.
A downturn in the defense budget should not become an excuse for conservatism. To the contrary, it should spur innovation. For example, fiscal austerity provides an opportunity to reform the military health care system and downsize basing infrastructure. Now is also the time to explore ways to make military training more effective and cost-efficient through the adoption of approaches such as live, virtual, constructive training. There are also opportunities to realize savings through greater outsourcing of maintenance and logistics.
Whereas the defense primes employ the most workers, in a number of cases smaller companies have been the source of some of the most innovative approaches to defense in areas such as unmanned systems, expendable aircraft, space innovations, networked solutions and cyber. Supporting smaller, innovative companies should thus be a priority.
The Defense Department and Congress should also take an active role in supporting key segments of the defense-industrial base. Areas such as hypersonics, directed energy and unmanned systems that hold the key to effectiveness tomorrow will need support today.
6. Share costs.
Finally, the United States should take every opportunity to promote arms exports, which both create jobs and increase the security of our allies. Much more should be done to increase the speed and predictability of the arms export process. In addition, with few exceptions, U.S. weapons should be developed with export in mind. We should avoid a repetition of the case of the F-22 aircraft, which was designed from birth never to be exported.
We need to learn from the past in developing the next generation of weapons. For example, in recent months, Australian defense analysts have discussed the attractiveness of the B-21 Raider stealth bomber for Australia's defense needs. Export of the B-21 to a close ally such as Australia, should Canberra so desire, should be given serious consideration.
The current situation is challenging, with even more difficult times to come. If we are smart, however, we can both keep Americans at work and get what we need for national defense.
Thomas G. Mahnken is president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments think tank. He is also a senior research professor at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.
21 avril 2021 | International, Terrestre
Rheinmetall’s South African subsidiary Rheinmetall Denel Munition and Northrop Grumman signed a 10-year strategic partnership agreement to this effect in February 2021
25 mai 2023 | International, Aérospatial
This contract follows the selection of the solution offered by Leonardo announced last October, and includes the supply of two ATR Special Mission aircraft in Maritime Patrol configuration plus the...
21 mai 2020 | International, Naval
By: Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton The U.S. Navy's award this month of the contract for its new class of frigates starts the very necessary process of rebalancing the U.S. surface fleet, but the competition also highlighted the U.S. shipbuilding-industrial base's increasing fragility. If they lost, two of the four shipyards bidding on the frigate were at risk of either going out of business or joining the underemployed ranks of U.S. commercial shipbuilders. Due to specialization, only one or two yards construct each class of Navy combat ship with workforces, equipment, and infrastructure that would be expensive and difficult to adapt. A decision on any single ship class, as with the frigate, can shut down a shipyard and send its workers to the unemployment line. Specialization is also a problem when orders increase. The Navy's two submarine shipyards, General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries' Newport News division, shrank the time needed to build subs by 20 percent during the past decade while increasing production to two per year. The rising sophistication of Virginia-class submarines has now reversed this trend, however, and submarine builders' challenges are only increasing. They recently started a new contract to build up to 10 of the larger Block V Virginia submarines and are in negotiation with the Navy on a block-buy contract for the first two Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines. Supplier challenges abound U.S. shipbuilders may be fragile, but their suppliers are on life support. After decades of being whipsawed by changes to shipbuilding plans and budget uncertainty, a shrinking number of suppliers are able and willing to stay in business. The Navy's recent initiatives to improve supplier production capacity and resilience don't go far enough to address its rising dependence on sole-source suppliers, which now provide more than 75 percent of submarine parts. For example, when problems with Columbia missile tubes led the Navy to seek new suppliers, it replaced the existing, sole source — BWXT — with another — General Dynamics — that will assemble tubes at the same facilities that are constructing parts for the Virginia and Columbia submarines. Last year, the Trump administration used the Defense Production Act to establish new suppliers for military missile fuel. The Navy should build on this effort to identify sole-source items for which an additional supplier is appropriate. In selecting additional suppliers, the Navy should prioritize attributes other than cost. Sole-source items by definition are important enough to justify seeking out or creating a single supplier rather than adapting the ship's design to use an existing item. Therefore, the Navy should emphasize the provider's track record in conducting similar or other challenging engineering; its ability to adjust to what will likely be variable demand and changing specifications; and the likelihood of quality production that avoids rework. Planning for resiliency The Department of Defense could help address the shipbuilding-industrial base's fragility with its current study of the number and mix of ships needed in the future fleet. Although the primary goal of this analysis should be determining the most effective fleet possible within likely budget constraints, it must also ensure the industrial base can build and sustain the future Navy. Industrial base considerations are not new to Navy force structure planning. During the last decade, the Navy or Congress added amphibious ships, submarines, destroyers and auxiliary vessels to maintain hot production lines or keep a shipyard afloat until the next order. Each of the Navy's new combatant ships are expected to cost more than $1 billion to build, constraining the Navy's ability to spread ship construction to other qualified shipyards to fill production gaps or extend classes to keep a shipyard in operation. The Navy could better support shipbuilders by rebalancing its fleet architecture to increase the number of smaller vessels such as corvettes or tank landing ships, and reduce the number of larger destroyers and amphibious warships. Smaller, less-expensive ships could be built in larger numbers per year, providing more flexibility in shipbuilding plans to stabilize the workload for shipbuilders and providing more scalability to align shipbuilding expenditures with changing budgets. Smaller ships could also be built at a wider range of shipyards, including those that only build commercial vessels and noncombatant government ships like Coast Guard cutters and oceanographic research vessels. These “dual-use” shipbuilders suffer today from a lack of coordination between commercial and government shipbuilding, which creates a feast-or-famine cycle of orders. The Navy and nation depend on a healthy shipbuilding-industrial base. To foster the industrial base in the face of natural and man-made challenges, the Navy should change its fleet design and shipbuilding plans, while investing to establish and qualify new suppliers. Without deliberate action, the U.S. shipbuilding industry will become increasingly fragile, limiting the Navy's ability to build the ships it needs and respond when today's competitions turn to conflict. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, where Timothy A. Walton is a fellow. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/20/shipbuilding-suppliers-need-more-than-market-forces-to-stay-afloat/