See inside a $340 million Boeing military transport jet that keeps American troops and supplies moving around the world

Sur le même sujet

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  7 août 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Les nouveaux systèmes de défense sol-air de l'armée bientôt testés

  L'armée suisse va démarrer prochainement les essais des systèmes radar destinés à renouveler sa défense sol-air de longue portée. Deux systèmes sont dans la course: le Patriot de la société américaine Raytheon et le SAMP/T du consortium français Eurosam. L'achat de ces systèmes est lié au programme d'acquisition des nouveaux avions de combat. Les essais auront lieu sur l'ancienne place d'exercice de Menzingen dans le canton de Zoug, a indiqué mercredi le Département fédéral de la défense (DDPS). Les détecteurs du Patriot seront testés du 19 au 30 août et ceux du SAMP/T du 16 au 27 septembre. Au total, dix missions spécifiques seront réalisées pour évaluer les aspects techniques et opérationnels de ces appareils. Il s'agira d'effectuer des mesures au sol et de sonder l'espace aérien à la recherche d'avions des Forces aériennes. Pas d'essais de tir Les deux candidats accompliront le même programme d'essai afin d'assurer l'égalité de traitement, a expliqué Marc Dürr, de l'Office fédéral de l'armement armasuisse, responsable des essais. Aucun essai n'aura lieu les jours fériés ou le week-end. Et il n'y aura pas de tir. Les tests ont lieu en Suisse car la topographie a une influence sur les détecteurs, a ajouté M. Dürr. La situation n'est pas la même dans le massif alpin ou dans une zone côtière. Le choix se portera sur un modèle qui sera utilisé tel quel et qui ne nécessitera pas d'adaptations pour la Suisse. Les résultats de chaque candidat seront ensuite comparés. Suivra alors un deuxième appel d'offres comme pour le nouvel avion de combat. Le Conseil fédéral tranchera à fin 2020 ou début 2021 sur la base des évaluations et des rapports des experts de l'armée. Huit milliards au total La surface à couvrir par la défense sol-air doit être de 15'000 km2 au moins. Le système doit atteindre une altitude d'engagement de plus de 12'000 m et une portée supérieure à 50 km. Il n'est pas nécessaire de disposer d'une capacité de défense contre des missiles balistiques. L'achat d'un système de défense sol-air se fera dans le cadre des programmes d'armement ordinaires. L'acquisition des avions de combat sera en revanche soumise au vote, probablement en septembre ou novembre 2020. La facture totale ne devait pas dépasser 8 milliards de francs. L'arrêté de planification doit comporter un volume de financement maximal pour les avions de 6 milliards, le reste étant dévolu à la défense sol-air. L'achat des avions et du système de défense sol-air sera coordonné sur le plan technique et du point de vue du calendrier. Quatre avions en lice Quatre jets ont été évalués entre avril et juin à Payerne pour remplacer les Tiger et les F/A-18 de l'armée. Le français Rafale (Dassault), l'européen Eurofighter (Airbus) et les deux avions américains: le successeur du FA-18, le Super Hornet de Boeing, et le F-35A de Lockheed-Martin. Le suédois Saab a retiré le Gripen E de l'évaluation. Les deux derniers projets d'achats de jets avaient été marqués par un scrutin populaire. L'acquisition de F/A-18 avait été rendue possible après l'échec en 1993 de l'initiative populaire s'y opposant. L'achat de Gripen a été rejeté en 2014 après un référendum contre le fonds qui aurait dû être mis sur pied pour le financer. https://www.rtn.ch/rtn/Actualite/economie/Les-nouveaux-systemes-de-defense-sol-air-de-l-armee-bientot-testes.html

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  29 octobre 2021 | International, Aérospatial

  Air Force research lab signs agreement with 'gas-stations-in-space' company

  The agreement will allow AFRL and Orbit Fab to share information as the company prepares to launch its orbital refueling operations.

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  22 mai 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Opinion: Aviation’s Cybersecurity Imperative

  Remzi Seker May 22, 2020 With the expansion across the aviation industry of connectivity and computing services, cybersecurity has become ever more important. Connecting people, processes and assets creates new vulnerabilities and multiple attack points—from flight-critical avionics to passenger inflight entertainment networks and airline backend operations. Information about systems, protocols and technologies such as software-defined radio are now readily available well beyond the industry. Demand for greater efficiency meanwhile continues to increase connectivity and accelerate computerization within aviation infrastructure, including aircraft. Fortunately, ongoing efforts to protect aircraft, airlines and passengers from cybersecurity threats have been largely unaffected by the global pandemic, suggesting an opportunity for the industry to ramp up cybersafety programs and training amid the current slowdown. The comprehensive, coordinated nature of aviation cybersecurity initiatives means committees have long carried out their work primarily through virtual meetings, so those efforts are able to continue in full swing. With slowdowns taking place in other areas, the industry can address cybersafety at a more rapid pace. The aviation industry and its stakeholders have been working hard to tackle cybersecurity challenges comprehensively—from the supply chain and the maintenance of aircraft to operations. Such efforts remain essential so that cyberthreats affecting safety can be mitigated before they materialize, whether that happens during flight through physical access to a bus, by interfering with equipment through Wi-Fi or remotely disrupting operations. The need to weigh cyberthreats according to their safety impact, a practice referred to as “cybersafety,” requires a different perspective than that of IT cybersecurity. Cybersafety differs from traditional IT cybersecurity because of the need for safety certification, which relies on guaranteeing a system's behavior, or “determinism.” This unique characteristic of aviation cybersafety means that solutions widely used across traditional computing systems may pose serious certification challenges. Imagine rolling out security patches for every avionics component on a commercial aircraft. Tackling cybersafety challenges requires a coordinated, comprehensive, global effort. Multiple agencies are cooperating to establish much-needed standards. For example, the U.S. FAA and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency have been working with the RTCA and the European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment to set harmonized cybersecurity standards. Efforts to secure the aviation ecosystem also include dedicated committees such as the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee Aircraft System Information Security/Protection working group. Similarly, the Aerospace Industries Association has established the Civil Aviation Cybersecurity Subcommittee. In the U.S., the Aviation Cyber Initiative (ACI) is led by the Defense Department, Department of Homeland Security and FAA. The ACI includes experts representing government, defense, industry and academia who collaborate to tackle aviation cybersecurity threats. The Aviation Information Sharing and Analysis Center shares global threat intelligence among aviation companies. Globally, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) leads this work. Its Trust Framework Study Group (TFSG) includes experts from the FAA, EASA, commercial industry and academia and has established three important working groups. Academic institutions play a critical role in advancing cybersecurity research and training, too. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, for example, develops engineering solutions and provides degree, certification and training programs in aviation cybsersecurity. Faculty researchers contribute expertise to cyberdefense and preparedness efforts by serving on national and international committees and working groups and by organizing the annual Aero-Cybersecurity Symposium. Aviation's impeccable safety culture positions it well to combat and defeat cybersafety risks. In the years ahead, the industry will need to invest in expanded education and training as well as research to secure high-assurance systems that can be updated with minimal impact on certification. Computerization and Cyberphysical Systems As computing becomes ever more affordable, functions that were traditionally implemented through hardware are now being realized through software, and inclusion of software has supported increased customization. Cyberphysical systems are designed to perform a set of functions with limited impact on the physical environment, such as temperature control, welding and parts assembly. One feature of cyberphysical systems is a failsafe property that involves shutting down—an approach that is clearly not desirable midflight. Connectivity Inexpensive and ubiquitously available computing, combined with advancements in networking, have accelerated the networking of devices. The Internet of Things concept does not require any form of certification or service-quality assurance, let alone any safety requirement or oversight. Rather than leveraging the Internet of Things, the aviation industry might consider using “networked wings” to underscore its safety commitment. Remzi Seker is the associate provost for research at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. The views expressed are not necessarily those of Aviation Week. https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-regulation/opinion-aviations-cybersecurity-imperative