16 mai 2018 | International, Aérospatial

Saab Held Today its Annual Gripen Seminar

Seminar can be viewed at: http://saab-seminar.creo.se/180516/annual_gripen_seminar_2018

Article on Skies Magazine:

Saab positions Gripen E as Canada's next-generation fighter

Saab Group is confident that its single-engine Gripen E remains a viable contender for Canada's next generation fighter aircraft fleet, even though there are currently no immediate plans for Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) pilots to actually fly the aircraft.

This was according to Richard Smith, head of Gripen marketing and sales during a May 16 briefing on Gripen market opportunities worldwide.

He confirmed the planned visits included “site surveys and also some more senior visits as well, but at the moment, no plans for a flight evaluation.”

He offered no details on who specifically would be visiting, but welcomed a suggestion that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau could be on the list.

Canada is one of a number of countries Saab is targeting as a customer for the Mach 2 delta wing/canard fighter, the first variation of which entered service with the Swedish Air Force in 1997.

Development of the Gripen E, featuring a General Electric F414G engine and an upgraded electronic warfare system (EWS), began about 2014 and it was first flown in June 2017. It is now said to be on track for delivery to the Swedish and Brazilian air forces.

Smith said he expected that “continued dialogue so far this year” with Canadian government representatives was setting the stage for an early draft proposal, possibly in the third quarter of 2018, followed by the government's request for proposal for 80 aircraft early next year.

He said the Gripen is suitable for all RCAF operations, including the high north, the Arctic and forward operating bases, which he said are “very similar to what we have in Sweden.”

He later added that Saab would “tailor” its offering to Canada, as it would to other prospective customers with different operating environments.

“Value for money, the industrial packages, that's what makes the Gripen rather unique and rather attractive.”

On the seminal Canadian question about the reliability of a single-engine aircraft in Arctic and maritime missions, Gripen test pilot Mikhal Olsson said it had never been an issue.

“I've been flying fighter aircraft since 1996 and I've been stationed . . . up in the Arctic,” he said.

“I've been flying over the Atlantic, I've been flying across the sea eastbound to India (Saab is proposing the Gripen for the India Air Force), and every time I've been in a single-engine jet. I've never, ever, been worried about the engine [due to built-in redundancies]. “We have a really reliable system.”

Olsson also said that as a “smart fighter” with net-centric technologies, a new sensor suite and long-range weapons, the E model is tailored to an “much more hostile and . . . much more unpredictable” operational environment where “new conflicts arise and disappear much quicker that we've seen before.”

Gripen EWS sales director Inga Bergstrom added that electronic warfare was not the aircraft's primary function.

Rather, EWS was “an enabler to . . . a successful mission” and because it was upgradeable software, it could deal with evolving threats.

Asked about having to compete in some markets with used aircraft, Smith said these were, at best, an interim solution.

“We're going to operate it for 30 to 40 years,” he replied. “Second-hand fighters . . . need to be replaced after maybe 10 years, and the capability that we bring is somewhat different to those old fighters. . . . Even though there has been, as you say, some headwind recently, I remain very optimistic about the outlook for Gripen both short term and longer term.”

Jonas Hjelm, head of Aeronautics at Saab, acknowledged that although the company can't compete with used fighters because of the price difference, he agreed that the upgradeable Gripen could be operated for potentially more than 40 years without having to go through a new acquisition process, so the total package “makes sense for very many of the countries that are now in process of actually selecting a new fighter system.”

Asked how the Gripen could compete with “stealth” platforms, Hjelm declined comment on competitors' aircraft but conceded that it was a difficult challenge.

Calling stealth a “fashion word,” he said that while the newest Gripen variants have “stealth features,” Saab has chosen “different paths to have a low signature.”

Besides, with “every smart technique you come up with to defend yourself, there will be a pushback from the other side to detect you . . . . We continue all the time to see what we can develop . . . to become more invisible.”

https://www.skiesmag.com/news/saab-positions-gripen-e-canadas-next-generation-fighter/

Sur le même sujet

  • Guam’s air defense should learn lessons from Japan’s Aegis Ashore

    31 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Guam’s air defense should learn lessons from Japan’s Aegis Ashore

    By: Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark The head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said last week his top priority is establishing an Aegis Ashore system on Guam by 2026. New air defenses will help protect U.S. citizens and forces in Guam; but as Japan's government found, Aegis Ashore may not be the best option to protect military and civilian targets from growing and improving Chinese and North Korean missile threats. Guam is pivotal to U.S. and allied military posture in the Western Pacific. Home to Andersen Air Force Base and Apra Harbor, it is far enough from adversaries like China and North Korea to negate the threat from more numerous short-range missiles but close enough to support air and naval operations throughout the Philippine Sea and South and East China seas. Although the current Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery on Guam can defend against some ballistic missiles, its single AN/TPY-2 radar is vulnerable and cannot provide 360-degree coverage. Moreover, THAAD's focus on high altitudes makes it a poor fit to defeat lower-flying aircraft or cruise missiles that would likely be used by China's military against Guam. The island needs a new air defense architecture. Aegis Ashore is highly capable, but has its own limitations. Designed primarily to counter small numbers of ballistic missiles, its fixed missile magazine and radar would be vulnerable to attack and would fall short against the bombardment possible from China. Instead of installing one or more Aegis Ashore systems on Guam, a more effective air and missile defense architecture would combine the latest version of the Aegis Combat System with a disaggregated system of existing sensors, effectors, and command-and-control nodes. A distributed architecture would also be scalable, allowing air and missile defenses to also protect U.S. citizens and forces operating in the Northern Marianas. Guam's geography enables longer-range sensing than would be possible from a ship or a single Aegis Ashore radar. Fixed, relocatable and mobile radio frequency sensors should be positioned around the island's perimeter, such as compact versions of SPY-6 or Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor radars and the passive Army Long-Range Persistent Surveillance system. During periods of heightened tension, passive and active radio frequency and electro-optical/infrared sensors could also be deployed on unmanned aircraft and stratospheric balloons to monitor over-the-horizon threats. This mixed architecture would provide better collective coverage and be more difficult to defeat compared to one or two fixed Aegis Ashore deckhouses. To shoot down enemy missiles and aircraft, the architecture should field mobile, containerized launchers for long-range interceptors like the SM-6 and SM-3 rather than Aegis Ashore's finite and targetable in-ground vertical launch magazines. They should be complemented by medium- to short-range engagement systems to protect high-value targets such as the Patriot, the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System or the Army's planned Indirect Fire Protection Capability, as well as non-kinetic defenses such as high-powered microwave weapons and electronic warfare systems that could damage or confuse the guidance systems on incoming missiles. Today, destroyers patrol the waters around Guam to provide ballistic missile defense capacity beyond that available with THAAD. A new distributed architecture would place more capacity ashore to free surface combatants from missile defense duty. In a crisis or conflict, the architecture could add capacity with surface action groups and combat air patrols capable of intercepting threats at longer ranges. Instead of Aegis Ashore's large, single C2 node, a distributed architecture would virtualize the Aegis Combat System to allow multiple facilities or mobile vehicles to serve as miniature air operations centers. The mobility of sensors, effectors and C2 nodes in this architecture would enable the employment of camouflage, concealment and deception, including decoys, to complicate enemy targeting and increase the number of weapons needed to ensure a successful attack. INDOPACOM's plan for implementing new Guam air defenses should also apply lessons from Japan's aborted Aegis Ashore program, whose accelerated timeline contributed to the selection of the least expensive and technically risky option — two fixed Aegis Ashore systems — and the discounting of alternatives. Adm. Phil Davidson's 2026 goal of improving Guam's defenses faces a similar risk. Bound by an iron triangle, Guam's air and missile defenses can be good, fast or cheap — but not all three. If 2026 is held as a rigid constraint, the only solution able to meet the schedule and requirements may be the familiar, and ineffective, fixed Aegis Ashore architecture. Compared to one or two Aegis Ashore sites, a distributed architecture may require slightly more time to develop or funds to field. But a phased approach could introduce new systems as funding becomes available and allow expanding the system's capability to meet the evolving threat. For example, SPY-6 radars, C2 bunkers and composite THAAD-Patriot-NASAMS batteries could be fielded before 2026, quickly followed by the introduction of mobile assets. Guam and the Northern Marianas are essential to U.S. strategy and operations in the Western Pacific. Their defenses have long been ignored, and Adm. Davidson should be lauded for charting a path forward. A disaggregated architecture, however, will be more likely to realize INDOPACOM's vision of resilient and scalable air and missile defense. Timothy A. Walton is a fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, where Bryan Clark is a senior fellow. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/30/guams-air-defense-should-learn-lessons-from-japans-aegis-ashore/

  • Space acquisitions chief wants more authority to blacklist contractors

    1 mai 2024 | International, Aérospatial

    Space acquisitions chief wants more authority to blacklist contractors

    Frank Calvelli told lawmakers that while the Contractor Responsibility Watch List is a helpful tool, he'd like to see its authorities expanded.

  • Turkey’s removal from F-35 program to cause hike in engine price

    26 avril 2021 | International, Aérospatial

    Turkey’s removal from F-35 program to cause hike in engine price

    By the end of the year, Turkey will no longer supply parts for the F-35's engine.

Toutes les nouvelles