15 novembre 2023 | International, Aérospatial
Russian arms makers appear to have been kept to a low profile at this week's Dubai Airshow, underscoring how the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has sought to balance its ties with the West and Moscow.
19 novembre 2024 | International, Aérospatial
The agreement, which falls under AUKUS Pillar II, aims to leverage the three nations’ combined hypersonics funding, facilities and experience.
31 juillet 2018 | International, Terrestre
By: Todd South As Russia beefs up its Arctic presence with new units, equipment and weaponry for the cold weather fight, the Army has slowly begun to shift some resources to improving its own capabilities — though it lags behind its Arctic allies and lacks large-scale capacity to train or provide high numbers of troops for a potential Arctic battle. Melting polar ice is opening a region once thought nearly impenetrable to competition for shipping traffic, natural resources and potential land grabs some experts think could start a new Cold War. In recent years, Canada, Norway and Russia have realigned their focus to improving and expanding their Arctic capabilities. Along with those neighboring nations, which include Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the United States and United Kingdom all have varying levels of competing claims on Arctic resources. It wasn't always so. As recently as 2012, experts such as Siemon Weizeman with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute were analyzing cooperative efforts between Russia, the United States and other Arctic nations. In the U.S. Department of Defense 2013 Arctic Strategy, Russia is barely mentioned. But following the 2014 war in Ukraine, stoked by Russia, leaders have shifted their view about the nation's role in the Arctic. In that time, Russia has pushed resources in that direction. Its 2014 Russian Military Doctrine paper for the first time included the task of “protecting Russian interests in the Arctic.” So far, that's included building up to 40 heavy icebreaking ships, more than a dozen new airfields, 16 deep-water ports, a broad range of tactical airpower, dedicated training centers, and stationing of paratroopers, counterterrorism, electronic warfare and other forces in the region, said Maj. Gen. Laurie Hummel, adjutant general of the Alaska National Guard, at a June conference on Guard interests in the Arctic. The talk was put on by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Those ground forces include naval infantry and two army brigades on the Kola Peninsula, with aims to guard the Northern Sea route. And all of that is tied together under a recently established Russian Arctic Strategic Command, Hummel said. In addition, although China does not border the Arctic, it has “aspirational” goals for the region and wants to exploit sea lane passages for shipping and fishing waters, she said. In January, China released its first Arctic strategy white paper titled the “Polar Silk Road.” The paper focuses on Arctic shipping routes and states a cooperative goal for infrastructure and other development. China's polar strategy echoes its One Belt One Road policy in Africa, which seeks partnerships to provide natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals. The Chinese government is looking to a liquefied natural gas project in northern Russia called Yamal to supply it with millions of tons of fuel a year upon program fruition. These and other factors are pushing key U.S. military and government leaders to look at how to shore up Arctic capabilities. “It is time for our nation to have a comprehensive and overarching arctic strategy,” Hummel said at the Wilson Center conference. Shifting priorities Right now, the U.S. military's ground forces under U.S. Army Alaska, which falls under Indo-Pacific Command, includes a combined force of only 25,000 active duty, National Guard and Reserve troops. That's about 2.5 percent of the entire force. In recent years, the Army has increased unit training in the Arctic, including airborne operations in 2014, armored vehicle deployment exercises in 2015, and the return of the 75th Ranger Regiment to Alaska for training for the first time since 2001. As of 2016, the Northern Warfare Training Center hosted an estimated 1,400 troops annually for training in an arctic region. The Northern Warfare Training Center in Alaska provided the following numbers of troops trained there over the past decade: Cold Weather Leaders Course — 3,025 Cold Weather Orientation Course — 1,188 Basic Military Mountaineering Course — 1,440 Advanced Military Mountaineering Course — 150 Mountain Warfare Orientation Course — 360 Military Ski Course — 36 Total all events (some not listed) — 7,100 NWTC focuses on small units and training unit leaders in effective cold weather and mountaineering skills. It seldom hosts large units, said John Pennell, spokesman for U.S. Army Pacific Command. Other training areas are available, though they are more accurately classified as subarctic than Arctic, and that has major implications. In 2015, Fort Drum, New York, home of the 10th Mountain Division, was reclassified from Zone 5 to Zone 7, which put it in the ranks of Fort Wainwright, Alaska, and Camp Ethan Allen in Jericho, Vermont. The shift pushed an additional $12.5 million in funding for equipment and infrastructure to the site. Some Army funding has also gone to upgrade individual equipment for soldiers at Fort Drum, Fort Wainwright and in Italy. New items include new gloves, headgear, sleds and skis. In June, the Army posted a Request for Information from industry on building an over-the-snow vehicle capable of operating in 50-below conditions. Dubbed the Joint All Weather All Terrain Support Vehicle, or JAASV, it would replace the decades-old Small Unit Support Vehicle, or SUSV, a tracked vehicle that typically supports an infantry platoon-sized element. How cold is too cold? New equipment, even a new vehicle, doesn't necessarily equal a force ready to perform in truly Arctic conditions. Capt. Nathan Fry, the officer-in-charge of the U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School's training division, told Army Times that people unfamiliar with Arctic environments often confuse “northern training,” which can be cold weather or high-altitude focused, with Arctic training. But the two are not equal. As Fry noted, gear that works well in freezing conditions can fail spectacularly when temperatures drop to minus-50 Fahrenheit. He would know. For the past few years, he's been one of the U.S. representatives on the Guerrier Nordique team that spends weeks in Arctic and sub-Arctic areas of Canada. The exercise began in 2012 and was, in some ways, a small-scale attempt to recapture lost lessons of Arctic warfare that were explored regularly and in depth by the U.S. military throughout the 1940s and 1950s, as the United States prepared for a potential Cold War through operations such as Ice Cap in Greenland, Nanook, Snow Chute, Snow Drop, Snow Fall and Snow Storm. There must be a better understanding of the differences between cold weather and Arctic training, Fry said. Some think that if soldiers can fight in minus-10-degree weather, then they can do it at 60 degrees below zero. “That's just not true,” Fry said. “It's just like the mountain warfare fight, it's really tricky.” Fry left active duty Army service in part to go to his current post at the Guard-run mountain warfare school and push for more work and preparation in the Arctic sphere. Outside of the annual Arctic Eagle Exercise with U.S. Army Alaska and the recent Fort Drum conference, Fry said he's not seen a lot of improved Arctic policy. “From my foxhole, I haven't seen a whole lot of forward progress,” Fry said. But the interest is there. Fry said that his school has seen a drastic increase in demand for mountain and cold weather training, and they began running extra classes to meet the need. And next year's calendar is filling quickly. Though a byproduct of the school's mountain and cold weather training can better inform soldiers on how to plan, survive and fight in some ways in extreme conditions, it is not Arctic focused. Items that are simple in normal weather conditions — how much fuel will people and vehicles need to stay warm and conduct operations? What rate of travel can be expected for either mounted or dismounted soldiers? How much water will soldiers need? — are complicated in extreme cold weather. Soldiers can have a frozen 5-gallon water jug but not be able to use it. “If I can't melt it, then I can't drink it,” Fry said. “Lack of fuel will absolutely shut you down.” While some cold weather training teaches students to use snow, the amount of water yield from snow is far less than ice. And leaders must plan for fuel use to melt the snow or the ice in ways they wouldn't have to in a desert or woodland environment. Fitting it all in And most training, from that being done in Alaska, Vermont or New York, is at the small unit, tactical level. “We are not thinking in terms of a staff exercise,” Fry said. “We're not testing brigade staff on how to conduct resupply missions in cold weather environments.” And that's a problem when soldiers are in extreme, austere environments where the only resources are those that they bring with them. Fry pointed to work that the Marines have long done with the Norwegians as something the Army should consider. Marines rotate a force of 300 to Norway for extended joint training. That number was recently more than doubled to 700. One suggestion the captain has might be to value Arctic training the same way the Army does airborne qualifications, including with a Skill Qualification Identifier. That number makes it easier for leadership to track how many soldiers have the appropriate training. And that mentality, coupled with an integrated Arctic focus similar to that given to airborne training, would help commanders prioritize unit training to emphasize those qualifications and seek more training opportunities. For example, the 10th Mountain Division is designated as a light infantry unit. That means that although its soldiers have access to mountain training and the current commander has emphasized “putting the mountain back into 10th Mountain,” without Army-directed prioritization those skills can fall to the bottom of the checklist. Small changes, such as a Skill Qualification Identifier, can direct the focus of commanders and resources, Fry said. “It's like being in the 82nd Airborne Division,” Fry said. “Do we do range time or refresher jumps? Somehow they fit it all in.” https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/07/30/a-new-cold-war-how-the-army-is-preparing-for-a-fight-in-the-arctic/
12 décembre 2019 | International, Naval
By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy's new top officer is doubling down on the service's commitment to field the new generation of nuke-launching submarines. Adm. Michael Gilday, who assumed office as the chief of naval operations in August, visited General Dynamics Electric Boat in Quonset Point, Rhode Island, on Tuesday. He reiterated in a release alongside the visit that the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine remains the Navy's top priority. “The Navy's first acquisition priority is recapitalizing our Strategic Nuclear Deterrent — Electric Boat is helping us do just that,” Gilday said. “Together, we will continue to drive affordability, technology development, and integration efforts to support Columbia's fleet introduction on time or earlier.” The service has been driving toward fielding the Columbia's lead ship by 2031, in time for its first scheduled deployment. Construction of the first boat will begin in October 2020, though the Navy has been working on components and design for years. Two generations of submariner CNOs have emphasized Columbia as the service's top priority. Gilday has made clear that having a surface warfare officer in charge has not changed the service's focus. In comments at a recent forum, Gilday said that everything the Navy is trying to do to reinvent its force structure around a more distributed concept of operations — fighting more spread out instead of aggregated around an aircraft carrier — would have to be worked around the Columbia class, which will take up a major part of the service's shipbuilding account in the years to come. “It's unavoidable,” Gilday said, referring to the cost of Columbia. “If you go back to the '80s when we were building Ohio, it was about 35 percent of the shipbuilding budget. Columbia will be about 38-40 percent of the shipbuilding budget. “The seaborne leg of the triad is absolutely critical. By the time we get the Columbia into the water, the Ohio class is going to be about 40 years old. And so we have to replace that strategic leg, and it has to come out of our budget right now. Those are the facts.” The latest assessment puts the cost of the 12 planned Columbia-class subs at $109 billion, according to the Congressional Research Service. Having nearly 40 percent of the shipbuilding budget dominated by one program will impact the force, which will force the Navy to get creative, the CNO said. “I have to account for that at the same time as I'm trying to make precise investments in other platforms,” he explained. "Some of them will look like what we are buying today, like [destroyer] DDG Flight IIIs, but there is also an unmanned aspect to this. And I do remain fairly agnostic as to what that looks like, but I know we need to change the way we are thinking.” Renewed push for 355 While the 12-ship Columbia-class project is set to eat at 40 percent of the Navy's shipbuilding budget for the foreseeable future, acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly has renewed calls to field a 355-ship fleet. The 355-ship goal, the result of a 2016 force-structure assessment, was written into national policy and was a stated goal of President Donald Trump. “[Three hundred and fifty-five ships] is stated as national policy,” Modly told an audience at the USNI Defense Forum on Dec. 5. “It was also the president's goal during the election. We have a goal of 355, we don't have a plan for 355. We need to have a plan, and if it's not 355, what's it going to be and what's it going to look like?” “We ought to be lobbying for that and making a case for it and arguing in the halls of the Pentagon for a bigger share of the budget if that's what is required,” Modly added. “But we have to come to a very clear determination as to what [355 ships] means, and all the equipment we need to support that.” In a memo, he said he wants the force to produce a force-structure assessment to get the service there within a decade. Modly went on to say that the Navy's new Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment, while will incorporate Marine Corps requirements, should be presented to him no later than Jan. 15, 2020. The Navy plans to look at less expensive platforms to reach its force-structure goals, which will likely include unmanned systems. But Congress has shown some reluctance to buy into the concept because of the sheer number of unknowns attached to fielding large and medium-sized unmanned surface vessels. The newly released National Defense Authorization Act halved the number of large unmanned surface vessels requested by the service, and skepticism from lawmakers toward the Navy's concepts appears unlikely to abate by the next budget cycle. That means the 10 large unmanned surface vessels, or LUSV, the Navy programmed over the next five years seem unlikely to materialize at that rate. The Navy envisions the LUSV as an autonomous external missile magazine to augment the larger manned surface combatants. But the drive to field less expensive systems to execute a more distributed concept of operations in large areas such as the Asia-Pacific region is being pushed at the highest levels of the government. In his comments at the Reagan National Defense Forum over the weekend, Trump's national security adviser said the military must rethink how it buys its equipment. “Spending $13 billion on one vessel, then accepting delivery with elevators that don't work and are unusable is not acceptable,” O'Brien told the audience, referring to the troubled aircraft carrier Ford. “The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy are clear: We must be ready for an era of prolonged peacetime competition with peer and near-peer rivals like Russia and China. ... The highest-end and most expensive platform is not always the best solution.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/12/10/nuclear-deterrent-still-the-us-navys-top-priority-no-matter-the-consequences-top-officer-says/