26 avril 2018 | Local, Aérospatial
The Canadian government is still a year away from issuing a request for proposals for its next fighter jet, but the general leading the future fighter capability project has indicated what capabilities may drive the Royal Canadian Air Force's (RCAF's) eventual statement of requirements.
In a presentation to the Aerospace Innovation Forum in Montreal last week, MGen Alain Pelletier, chief of the Fighter Capability Program, emphasized the importance of a platform with the flexibility to adapt to changing threats over a period of at least 30 years.
Setting the future fleet of 88 jets in the context of NATO and NORAD missions, he emphasized the challenge of anticipating, adapting and acting in a threat environment where potential adversaries are investing heavily in longer-range “anti-access/area denial” capabilities, surface-to-air missile systems, exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum, and cyber weapons.
Pelletier, a CF-188 Hornet pilot with two tours in the Balkans, noted the “operational disadvantage” Canadian pilots currently face from anti-aircraft and surface-to-air threats. In recent NATO air policing missions over Romania and Lithuania, “we fly to a potential threat area knowing that our location and number is known by the adversaries while the intent and willingness...to employ their weapon systems remains unknown,” he said.
This was especially true during the CF-188 deployment on Operation Impact over Iraq and Syria. Though the theatre was considered a semi-permissive environment, “had the Syrian government intent changed regarding the use of their airspace, only effective self-protection systems and exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrums could have protected our fighters against a 20 second engagement by a surface-to-air missile,” he observed.
The current NATO environment features a range of advanced surface-to-air systems that “are mobile, digitized, passive, and carry missiles with a cruise speed capability and a classified range in excess of 300 kilometres,” he said.
A sortie might begin in a permissive environment but end in a contested one, so the “capabilities of the aircraft at the beginning of the mission [will] define if the future fighter will have an operational advantage.”
The NORAD picture is equally challenging. Russian activity in the North has increased in the past several years, Pelletier noted, “with Russian bombers potentially armed with low observable cruise missiles being escorted by fighters...like the advanced [Sukhoi] Su-35 and eventually the Su-57 [first seen] in the Syrian theatre of operations.”
“Exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum allows Russian platforms to know where Canadian NORAD fighters are,” limiting Canadian options to respond, he added. “The bottom line remains that the defence of Canada and North America requires a future fighter that can adapt and act decisively.”
Consequently, a critical requirement of the next fighter jet will be interoperability with NORAD and NATO partners. In particular, Pelletier underscored the importance of being able to share intelligence among 2 Eyes and 5 Eyes partners collected by their respective national assets.
The 2 Eyes partnership of Canada and the United States, and the 5 Eyes group of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., has been essential to understanding and operating in conflict zones.
He also emphasized that operations are heavily dependent on the systematic collection, coordination, fusion, production and dissemination of defence intelligence.
“In a fighter aircraft, all systems employ or exploit this information for the use of mission data files, threat libraries, all of which allow the pilots to effectively conduct their mission. Commonality and a growth path are required to ensure the seamless fusion of all systems through the life of the fleet to 2060 and beyond.”
NATO and NORAD systems and intelligence interoperability requirements are not new, but the RCAF's demand for 2 Eyes/5 Eyes compatibility could present a barrier for countries and manufacturers that are not part of those closed groups.
Several times during his presentation, Pelletier also repeated the need for an aircraft and mission and weapons systems that could be “continuously” upgraded well into the 2060s.
Given the innovation forum's focus on disruptive technologies, Pelletier noted the opportunities and threats posed by autonomous systems operating in an integrated and networked fashion, swarming unmanned systems, advanced exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum, hypersonic speed, directed energy, quantum technology, and artificial intelligence.
All may eventually be part of the next fighter, but he cautioned industry that any advantage would only happen if the technology could be rapidly implemented and integrated and supported by government policy and rules of engagement.
https://www.skiesmag.com/news/rcaf-hints-capabilities-may-guide-future-fighter-acquisition/
5 décembre 2024 | Local, Terrestre
First of all, good afternoon friends. May I also extend a warm welcome to all of you who have travelled here to Halifax.
25 avril 2019 | Local, Aérospatial
DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN Charles Bouchard announced his decision Wednesday to retire as Chief Executive, Lockheed Martin Canada effective April 30. Bouchard, a retired lieutenant general, served in the role for nearly six years. He had a 37-year career in the Royal Canadian Air Force. “I have thoroughly enjoyed serving Lockheed Martin Canada and Lockheed Martin Corporation and while the time has come for me to retire, I will remain an ardent supporter and advocate of the work Lockheed Martin does to deliver the best equipment to today's modern warfighter, the F-35 being a primary example,” Bouchard said in a statement. Lorraine Ben will serve as Interim Chief Executive. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/charlie-bouchard-steps-down-from-lockheed-martin-canadas-top-job
5 novembre 2019 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By Brian Mersereau Defence Watch Guest Writer During the recent federal election, the issue of considering a new Defence Procurement Agency or DPA surfaced again. The Liberals made such an organization part of their defence platform this time around as part of their plan to improve military procurement. While positive outcomes could result from a new organizational structure, simply installing one will not in and of itself create an efficient procurement model. It most certainly will not address in any substantive manner why taxpayers pay far too much to acquire the defence capabilities Canada needs to protect our sovereign interests in a world that has become increasingly unstable in recent years. It appears that, in many cases, Canada pays more per unit of capability to satisfy its defence needs than most of its allies. Unfortunately, though quite logically, this phenomenon has effectively shrunk the size of our armed forces as the number of platforms we can afford to acquire continues to dwindle due to high costs. While this approach can create short-term jobs, they are ultimately unsustainable since there is no international market for our higher-priced solutions. This is not the direction in which Canada should be headed. Before Canada decides to move ahead with a new procurement agency, it should assemble a “smart persons” panel or forum to thoroughly review the existing system and establish the mandate and objectives of whatever type of organization results from said review. Such a review group must be composed of people from the public and private sector with significant experience, not skewed with staff whose procurement experience primarily consists of exposure to the Canadian “way”. During this review, the panel must examine various issues which are currently perceived to be an impediment to the efficiency of Canada's procurement system. Based on my own years of experience on both the buy and sell sides of the procurement equation, the following areas merit some serious thought: Organizational Structure The fewer individuals, departments and oversight committees with their fingers in the “procurement pie”, the quicker and more coherently things will get done. Even at today's interest rates, time really is money for all involved in the process. Adding more time to a schedule for another management review quite often has a negative impact. While I understand governance and oversight committees have their place, their overinvolvement can produce negative outcomes if mandates are not absolutely clear and if individuals on these committees have limited experience with respect to the issue at hand. Risk Canada's ongoing method for defence procurement is that it will not assume any risk on their side of a contract. If Canada insists the private sector must accept all risk, the private sector will so oblige – but at a significant price and to the detriment of schedules and timelines. As contract prices necessarily increase, so do governments costs to manage the contract. In reality, the most efficient procurement solution for Canada would see some elements of risk managed by the buyer, rather than entirely borne by the seller. More consideration needs to go into balanced risk-sharing formulas. Process Canada has an extremely hands-on procurement process for major systems during the competitive phase, as well as during the implementation of the contract. Even in this digital age, Canada hamstrings its own progress with the sheer degree of detail and bureaucracy it requires; unbelievably, freight trucks are still required to deliver proposals. It seems as though, on occasion, the buyer thinks it knows more about designing and engineering the defence systems Canada needs than the actual designers and engineers for whom it is a primary occupation. Requirements of little or no consequence are painstakingly spelled out in the greatest of detail. Such an approach has a tremendous impact on the amount of time consumed by both the buyer and seller, again driving up costs and extending schedules. Less “hand holding” by the customer must be seriously considered. Sole Source In the procurement world, “sole source” is often viewed as a dirty phrase. Frequently, Canada attempts to run competitions in scenarios where the chances of achieving any meaningful savings or benefits related to competition are low at best. This takes years and drives costs higher at no measurable gain for the buyer. The parameters of when and under what circumstances Canada should move directly to a sole source should be thoroughly reviewed. Significant resources are being wasted managing nearly meaningless processes. Skills Canada's internal skill set for managing large, complex defence procurements does not appear to be adequate. As a result, it turns more and more often to the expertise of external third parties in order to keep up with large private sector firms at the negotiation table from a knowledge and experience standpoint. While there will always be a need for some third-party expertise, project managing many external suppliers in the negotiation phase – each of whom have their own agendas – only further complicates the already convoluted procurement process. Canada would be much better off with an enhanced internal core staff. If Canada takes the time to review the appropriateness of some form of DPA model, it must cast the net wider and review other critical aspects of the procurement process – or else any organizational changes will inevitably succumb to the systematic inertia of the overall process. A failure to do so means Canada will continue struggling mightily to stand-up the level of defence and security necessary to secure its citizens in an increasingly turbulent world. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/a-new-defence-procurement-agency-would-it-solve-anything