16 juin 2024 | International, Terrestre
Poland's defence group PGZ now boasts Eastern Europe's only hardware-in-the-loop laboratory after an offset from Lockheed Martin under Wisła.
17 octobre 2023 | International, Terrestre, Sécurité
Thales and the Royal Netherlands Air Force strengthen their partnership with the delivery of the System Lifetime Extension Program (SLEP) on 13 Instrument Landing Systems and Distance Measuring Equipment.
1 novembre 2019 | International, Naval
By: Tom Kington ROME – Italy's Fincantieri and France's Naval Group announced the name of their new naval joint venture will be ‘Naviris' on Wednesday, the day after Fincantieri lashed out at reports that its takeover of French ship yard Chantiers de l'Atlantique faces EU anti-trust opposition. The new name for the JV was announced after a quarterly steering committee meeting of the 50-50 alliance, which was launched in June and is set to be incorporated by year's end. The two state-controlled shipbuilding firms aim to use the joint venture to build and market naval vessels, as well share supply chains, research and testing. As part of the deal, France is using an Italian design for its new logistics vessel, while the two yards will work together on upgrading the Horizon frigates jointly built by Italy and France and operated by both countries. There are also plans for the JV to work on a new European Patrol Corvette. The two yards have promoted the JV as a way to create synergies in Europe's fractured naval industry to allow it to compete globally, and it came on the heels of Fincantieri's takeover of France's Chantiers de l'Atlantique shipyard — a deal which will allow the two yards to share work on cruise ships. This month the drive for more synergy appeared be bearing fruit when Fincantieri said that it would be building forward sections for the new French logistics ships. The four vessels, part of the FLOTLOG (Flotte logistique) program, which are based on the Italian Vulcano design, are being built by a temporary consortium between Chantiers de l'Atlantique and Naval Group. Fincantieri said it would build the sections at its Castellammare di Stabia shipyard in southern Italy, with deliveries to Chantiers de l'Atlantique, which it controls, scheduled between 2021 and 2027. The only potential hitch to the cross-border cooperation is the European Union, which is studying the Fincantieri takeover of Chantiers de l'Atlantique for anti-trust violations, and has yet to give a green light. On Tuesday Fincantieri attacked press reports suggesting the anti-trust probe had been extended, claiming it “strongly disapproves of such rumors, which have also negatively affected its share price today.” In a statement, Fincantieri said that if the rumors were true, it would “firmly” disapprove of such a decision by the EU. The company challenged reports that the deal would cut the number of cruise ship builders in Europe to two, claiming the real number would be three. Correction: This story was updated on Nov. 1 to correct the name of the new joint venture. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/10/31/fincantieri-naval-group-dub-their-joint-venture-navaris
23 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité, Autre défense
Mark Gunzinger Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Hyten recently announced a new U.S. Department of Defense joint war-fighting concept will summarize capabilities needed for future all-domain operations and eliminate artificial lines on the battlefield used to deconflict U.S. operations in the past. Hyten also noted the concept will seamlessly integrate “fires from all domains, including space and cyber,” to overwhelm an enemy. While these aspirations are laudable, there are indications the concept could fall short of what is needed to inform cross-service trade-offs that must be made in an era of flat or declining defense budgets. The DoD creates operating concepts to define preferred approaches to perform specific missions or execute a campaign to defeat an enemy. They also provide a foundation for the services to assess new technologies, force alternatives and resource priorities. Said another way, they are the tissue that connects top-level National Defense Strategy guidance to actual plans and programs. While a joint all-domain war-fighting concept is urgently needed, Hyten has not made it clear the one in development will lead to trade-offs that maximize the DoD's war-fighting potential. For instance, Hyten has said it will call for every service to conduct long-range strikes: “A naval force can defend itself or strike deep. An air force can defend itself or strike deep. The Marines can defend itself or strike deep. ... Everybody.” This could mean the concept will support a degree of redundancy across the services that has never existed. Setting aside tough trade-offs that eliminate excessively redundant programs will waste defense dollars and reduce capabilities available to U.S. commanders. More specifically, the concept might endorse the Army's plan to buy 1,000-mile-plus, surface-to-surface missiles that cost millions of dollars each. Doing so would ignore analyses that have determined using large numbers of these weapons would be far more expensive than employing bombers that can strike any target on the planet for a fraction of the cost, then regenerate and fly more sorties. Furthermore, the Army's long-range missile investments could be at the expense of its ability to defend U.S. theater air bases against missile attacks. Not only has air base missile defense long been an Army mission — it has long neglected and underfunded the mission. Chinese or Russian strikes against under-defended air bases could cripple the United States' primary combat sortie-generation operations. If the concept does not consider these kinds of trade-offs, it could be due to the approach used to create it. The Joint Staff's doctrine development process is notorious for seeking consensus instead of making cross-service trade-offs necessary to maximize the DoD's war-fighting potential. Assuring bureaucratic service equities versus optimizing combat lethality can lead to operating concepts that fail to create clear priorities or — worse yet — declare everything a priority. If everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. Moreover, each service was asked to develop a subordinate concept that will be integrated into the whole. This piece-part approach could result in the services ladening their subordinate concepts with their own equities instead of working together to develop the most effective, decisive options. In short, a bottom-up, consensus-driven concept for all-domain warfare would not be an effective baseline to compare the DoD's force structure and capability alternatives. Three things could help to avoid this mistake. First, the secretary of defense should approve a new all-domain war-fighting concept, and the secretary's staff should be deeply involved in its development. Some say the latter is inappropriate, believing the military, not DoD civilians, should create war-fighting concepts. However, it is entirely appropriate for the secretary's staff to be part of the concept's creation if its purpose is to shape the DoD's plans and programs. Second, DoD leaders should rigorously examine the services' existing roles and missions during the concept's development, and make changes to reduce excessively redundant responsibilities, forces and capabilities. This may need to be driven by congressional language. Finally, the DoD should jettison the word “joint” as part of the concept's title. This would stress the concept is focused on integrating operations across all domains, not on the services that provide forces to combatant commanders. The point is not for all to participate, but instead for all options to be considered, and those that provide best combat value be prioritized. Otherwise, it becomes a case analogous to all the kids chasing a soccer ball. The 2018 National Defense Strategy was the beginning of the effort to shift the DoD toward preparing for peer conflict. Given that dollars and time are short, the DoD must now get a concept for all-domain warfare right. Like the National Defense Strategy, the concept must be top-down driven, not a bottom-up, consensus-driven product that fails to make trade-offs across the services and provides a rationale that supports what each service desires to buy. Rather, its ultimate objective should be to seek best-value capabilities and expand theater commander options to defeat peer adversaries. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/09/22/a-consensus-driven-joint-concept-for-all-domain-warfare-will-fall-short/