Pentagon space strategy stresses need to protect commercial satellites

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  25 juillet 2018 | International, Naval

  Navy, Marine Corps Racing to Increase Amphibious Fleet as Demand Rises

  By: Ben Werner CAPITOL HILL — The Navy and Marine Corps are running up against a deadline to add more amphibious warships to the fleet before older hulls start retiring, Marine Maj. Gen. David Coffman told lawmakers and shipbuilding industry representatives at a congressional forum Tuesday. Recognizing this is a moment when the Hill is pushing to build more ships faster, Coffman said he's focused on ensuring these new ships are designed to accommodate changing technologies and remain useful for 50 years. “We're trying to make sure we have the full ability to take advantage of a multi-year buy,” Coffman, the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval operations' staff (OPNAV N95), said. Coffman was referring to the possibility of the Navy buying 13 San Antonio-class LPD Flight II ships in a block buy contract. These ships are intended to replace Whidbey Island-class LSD ships. As an example, Coffman cited the need to prepare future ships to handle the networking needs of unmanned and autonomous surface and undersea vehicles, which will be incorporated into the amphibious forces of the future. Unmanned surface and undersea vehicles have the potential to dramatically change the way amphibious forces operate, he said. “We have a moonshot idea for amphibious assault, which says it'll be a long time before you see a Marine step off of something because we're going to go autonomous,” Coffman said. “Get autonomous and unmanned to do a lot of the work.” Also, incorporating the networking needs of the F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter into ship design is critical to the Marine Corps ability to use the aircraft, Coffman said. Future amphibious assaults will most likely occur in contested, even urban areas. Since the Marine Corps is counting on the F-35 playing an important role securing such contested locations, Coffman wants to continually ask what can be done better and how to improve the ship class' capabilities instead of just settling on a single design. “No one else on the planet can do what we do in the littoral space,” Coffman said. But the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps to perform in the littoral space currently outpaces the nation's amphibious warship capacity, said Rep. Rob Wittman (R-Va.). The Navy's shipbuilding plan, which calls for building a 355-ship fleet, is a good start, but the critical number Wittman said is the 38 amphibious ships included in that plan. Previously, Wittman has criticized the slow pace of the Navy's shipbuilding plan. USS Wasp (LHD-1) is expected to reach the end of its anticipated working life by 2030. The concern is older ships such as Wasp will retire before the Navy reaches the goal of 38 amphibious ships, making it nearly impossible for the shipbuilding pace to ever increase the total number of amphibious hulls in use. “Marines can do almost anything, Wittman said.”But until they can walk on water we better be building them more ships.” https://news.usni.org/2018/07/24/navy-and-marine-corps-racing-to-increase-amphibious-fleet

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  5 octobre 2023 | International, Terrestre

  Germany to provide Ukraine with an additional Patriot air defence system | Reuters

  Germany is working on the supply of an additional Patriot air defence missile system to Ukraine in the winter months, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said on Thursday.

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  18 mars 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  The Pentagon is handling cyber vulnerabilities inconsistently

  Mark Pomerleau The Department of Defense has not consistently mitigated cyber vulnerabilities identified in a 2012 report, according to the department's inspector general. The DoD IG issued a follow-on report to its 2012 report, issued March 13 and made public March 17, that determined cyber red teams didn't report the results of assessments to organizations and components didn't effectively correct or mitigate the identified vulnerabilities. The new report discovered that components didn't consistently mitigate or include unmitigated vulnerabilities identified in the prior audit and during this audit by red teams during combatant command exercises, operational testing assessments and agency-specific assessments in plans of action and milestones. “Ensuring DoD Components mitigate vulnerabilities is essential to achieve a better return on investment,” the report stated. “In addition, we determined that the DoD did not establish a unified approach to support and prioritize DoD Cyber Red Team missions. Instead, the DoD Components implemented Component-specific approaches to staff, train and develop tools for DoD Cyber Red Teams, and prioritize DoD Cyber Red Team missions.” The report found that DoD didn't establish a unified approach because it didn't assign an organization with responsibility to oversee and synchronize red team activity based on priorities, it didn't assess the resources needed for each red team and identify requirements to train them to meet priorities and it didn't develop baseline tools to perform assessments. “Without an enterprisewide solution to staff, train and develop tools for DoD Cyber Red Teams and prioritize their missions, DoD Cyber Red Teams have not met current mission requests and will not meet future requests because of the increased demands for DoD Cyber Red Team services,” the report said. “Until the DoD assigns an organization to assess DoD Cyber Red Team resources, it will be unable to determine the number of DoD Cyber Red Teams and staffing of each team to support mission needs, which will impact the Do D's ability to identify vulnerabilities and take corrective actions that limit malicious actors from compromising DoD operations.” The DoD IG issued seven recommendations the secretary of defense assign an organization responsibility for. They include: Review and assess red team reports for systemic vulnerabilities and coordinate the development and implementation of enterprise solutions to mitigate them; Ensure components develop and implement a risk-based process to assess the impact of identified vulnerabilities and prioritize funding for corrective actions for high-risk vulnerabilities; Ensure components develop and implement processes for providing reports with red team findings and recommendations to organizations with responsibility for corrective actions; Develop processes and procedures to oversee red team activities, including synchronizing and prioritizing red team missions, to ensure activities align with priorities; Perform a joint DoD-wide mission-impact analysis to determine the number of red teams, minimum staffing levels of each team, the composition of the staffing levels needed to meet current and future mission requests; Assess and identify a baseline of core and specialized training standards, based on the three red team roles that team staff must meet for the team to be certified and accredited; and Identify and develop baseline tools needed by red teams to perform missions. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/2020/03/17/the-pentagon-is-handling-cyber-vulnerabilities-inconsistently/