10 mars 2020 | International, C4ISR

Pentagon Seeks New SatCom Tech For ‘Fully Networked C3’

"Our fully networked C3 [Command, Control, & Communications] will look completely different" from current satellites and terminals, said OSD's Doug Schroeder.

By THERESA HITCHENS

SATELLITE 2020: The Pentagon wants industry ideas on how to craft a “fundamentally new architecture” for command, control and communications (C3) that will allow “any user using any terminal to connect to any other user using any other terminal,” says Doug Schroeder, who oversees the effort under the Office of Research and Engineering (R&E).

This kind of omnipresent, all-service connectivity across land, sea, air, and space is essential for the Pentagon's rapidly evolving of future war, known as Joint-All Domain Operations.

“Our Fully Networked C3 communications will look completely different. We have a new vision. We're crafting it with the help of industry,” he said. “We're relying on very heavily on industry, starting with this Broad Agency Announcement dated March 6,” which asks for companies to submit white papers in short order.

According to Schroeder, the Space Development Agency (SDA) will be the funding authority. Vendors whose short, 10 to 15 page white papers are chosen will be invited at the end of April to a Pitch Day. Winners then will be given three months to develop a proposal; contracts for prototypes will be granted 24 months later.

Speaking to a relatively sparse audience here at the annual commercial satellite industry conference, Satellite 2020 — which is underway despite the threat of the COVID-19 Coronavirus — Schroeder stressed: “We are going to take our new direction from you.”

The new strategy, called Fully Networked C3 (FNC3), is being spearheaded by R&E director Mike Griffin and his assistant director for FNC3, Michael Zatman. According to the BAA, the first issued under the effort, the new strategy is being designed to “enable the DoD to reliably communicate with all its tactical and strategic assets.” C3 is one of Griffin's Top Ten areas of technology innovation for which DoD is developing an agency-wide development strategy.

Specifically, DoD now is looking for “Beyond-Line-Of-Site (BLOS) communications systems for airborne, surface, and subsurface systems that is [sic] compatible with both FNC3 enabled systems and legacy systems,” the BAA states.

The BAA calls for White Papers to be submitted by March 30 for three different types of BLOS technologies:

1. Protected Radio Frequency (RF) BLOS Communications.
2. Multi-User/Multi-Point High-Data-Rate Laser Communications.
3. Communications with submerged assets.

R&E intends to “develop, prototype, and demonstrate each innovative communications capability with the goal of transitioning the technologies into programs of record,” the BAA said. To ensure speedy results, DoD will use Other Transaction Authority (OTA) for prototyping (found under 10 U.S. Code § 2371b.)

Much of the detail about the effort is contained in classified annexes.

What we do know: Beyond-Line-Of-Sight communications relayed through satellites generally require equipping platforms — such as aircraft, ships, and ground vehicles — with high-throughput voice and data links, capabilities all of the services have expressed interest in. In particular, after years of little progress, Griffin has reinvigorated DoD interest in optical communications via laser links, in large part due to fears about Russian and Chinese RF jamming. Commercial industry has been rushing to develop optical links to enable satellite-to-satellite data transmission, and the Space Development Agency is interested in that capability for its so-called transport layer of small satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

Radio-frequency communications with submarines when underwater are generally limited to terse text messages, transmitted at very low frequencies (three to 30 kilohertz) and extremely low frequencies (three to 300 hertz) and requiring very large antennas to receie them. Research work is ongoing at MIT on how to link traditional underwater sonar to airborne RF receivers, a methodology called Translational Acoustic-RF) communication. Research also is ongoing, including at MIT's Lincoln Lab, on using narrow-beam lasers to allow one underwater vehicle to communicate with another.

BLOS communications can also be accomplished without using satellites. Alternative method include tropospheric scatter using microwave radiation, high frequency (HF) wireless, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) relays, and passive reflector systems.

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/03/pentagon-seeks-new-satcom-tech-for-fully-networked-c3

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  • Congress to buy 3 more LCS than the Navy needs, but gut funding for sensors that make them valuable

    19 septembre 2018 | International, Naval

    Congress to buy 3 more LCS than the Navy needs, but gut funding for sensors that make them valuable

    WASHINGTON — Congress loves buying littoral combat ships, but when it comes to the packages of sensors and systems that make the ships useful, lawmakers have been less enthusiastic. In the 2019 Defense Department funding bill that just left the conference committee, lawmakers have funded a 33rd, 34th and 35th littoral combat ship, three more than the 32-ship requirement set by the Navy. But when it comes to the mission modules destined to make each ship either a mine sweeper, submarine hunter or small surface combatant, that funding has been slashed. Appropriators cut all funding in 2019 for the anti-submarine warfare package, a variable-depth sonar and a multifunction towed array system that the Navy was aiming to have declared operational next year, citing only that the funding was “ahead of need." The National Defense Authorization Act had authorized about $7.4 million, still well below the $57.3 million requested by the Navy, citing delays in testing various components. Appropriators are also poised to half the requested funding for the surface warfare package and cut nearly $25.25 million from the minesweeping package, which equates to about a 21 percent cut from the requested and authorized $124.1 million. Nor are this year's cuts the only time appropriators have gone after the mission modules. A review of appropriations bills dating back to fiscal 2015 shows that appropriators have cut funding for mission modules every single year, and in 2018 took big hacks out of each funding line associated with the modules. The annual cutting spree has created a baffling cycle of inanity wherein Congress, unhappy with the development of the modules falling behind schedule, will cut funding and cause development to fall further behind schedule, according to a source familiar with the details of the impact of the cuts who spoke on background. All this while Congress continues to pump money into building ships without any of the mission packages having achieved what's known as initial operating capability, meaning the equipment is ready to deploy in some capacity. (The surface warfare version has IOC-ed some initial capabilities but is adding a Longbow Hellfire missile system that will be delayed with cuts, the source said.) That means that with 15 of the currently funded 32 ships already delivered to the fleet, not one of them can deploy with a fully capable package of sensors for which the ship was built in the first place — a situation that doesn't have a clear end state while the programs are caught in a sucking vortex of cuts and delays. “This is a prime example of program issues causing congressional cuts which lead to further delays, then more cuts in a vicious cycle," said Thomas Callender, a retired submarine officer and analyst with The Heritage Foundation. The Navy has been pursuing a strategy of buying 32 littoral combat ships and then 20 more lethal frigates now in development. Surface warfare boss Vice Adm. Richard Brown told Defense News in August that both the surface warfare package and the anti-submarine warfare package were on track to be ready in 2019, but that future is now in doubt, Callender said. “The appropriators' FY19 cuts of zeroing out ASW module and cuts to the MCM [mine countermeasures] module will likely delay IOC and operational testing,” Callender said. But the appropriators shouldn't take all the heat, he added. The development of the different modules have hit technical issues and are all drastically behind schedule. The minesweeping package, for example, was initially supposed to deliver in 2008, but now isn't slated to IOC until 2020, a date that will be further in doubt if Congress passes the appropriations bill as it left committee, sources agreed. “The technical development issues and subsequent delays with several modules, especially the ASW and MCM mission packages, contributed to congressional angst and some of these cuts,” Callender said. “Many of these cuts, including the cuts recommended from the House Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee for FY19 were reductions in the number of initial modules purchased until they have successfully completed operational testing.” Both authorizers on the House and Senate Armed Services committees and the Appropriations committees have taken hacks at the funding to the modules, but ultimately the National Defense Authorization Act from the services committees is more of a guide for appropriators than a set of handcuffs. Appropriators can fund what they want to fund. A statement from the office of Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., said the committee works with the Navy on these programs and funds what is ready to be funded. “The Committee has worked with the Department of the Navy to understand the mission system test requirements — which have often changed due to variety of reasons — and focused on funding those requirements that are ready for production,” said Blair Taylor, Shelby's communications director. Merry-go-round Part of the reason the program is vulnerable to these cuts in a way that, for example, the Arleigh Burke destroyers are not to the same extent is because of the program's structure. The ships were to be purchased separately and designed to be highly versatile, switching out in a matter of days when pierside from anti-surface systems to countermine systems to anti-submarine systems as the missions changed. But a reorganization of the program in 2016 ordered by Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson and led by then-head of the Naval Surface Force Pacific Adm. Thomas Rowden changed each of the ships to single-mission ships, with the first few ships slated to be surface warfare variants. But the warfare packages are still being developed under separate programs, leaving them as low-hanging fruit for cuts. “The separation of the mission modules from specific LCS hull procurement does leave them more vulnerable to these type of programmatic cuts,” Callender said. The whole issue is taking on increasing urgency as LCS builders Fincantieri in Marinette, Wisconsin, and Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama, begin pushing ships to the fleet by the handful each year. As of August, the Navy had 15 LCS vessels delivered, with 29 awarded and 11 in various stages of construction. But as the development modules has devolved into a merry-go-round, where cuts beget delays that beget more cuts, the fix in which this puts the Navy becomes more real by the day. The fleet needs the capabilities the LCS modules are supposed to deliver. For example, the Navy is slated to decommission its last Avenger-class minesweeper in the 2020s. This means the minesweeping package really can't suffer too many more delays without greatly increasing the threat posed to the Navy by cheap marine mines, leaving the fleet with only ad hoc solutions for combating them until the minesweeping package can be fielded in numbers. And while there are other ships in the fleet such as the DDGs that can do anti-submarine and anti-surface missions, it's the minesweeping package that has Bryan McGrath, a retired destroyer skipper and consultant with The FerryBridge Group, worried. “I'm concerned that there aren't enough MCM modules coming along fast enough, and I am concerned that there aren't enough LCS in the current plan (four on each coast) dedicated to the MCM mission,” he said. “I'd like to see the LCS plan re-evaluated and more of them devoted exclusively to MCM.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/09/18/congress-to-buy-3-more-lcs-than-the-navy-needs-but-gut-funding-for-sensors-that-makes-them-valuable

  • Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - October 28, 2019

    29 octobre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - October 28, 2019

    NAVY Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is awarded a $7,027,643,109 modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price, fixed-price-incentive-firm-target, cost-reimbursable contract (N00019-17-C-0001). This modification provides for the procurement of 114 F-35 aircraft for Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy; non-Department of Defense (DoD) participants, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers. Specifically the modification procures 48 F-35A aircraft for the Air Force, 20 F-35B aircraft for the Marine Corps, nine F-35C aircraft for the Navy, 12 F-35A aircraft for the government of Norway, 15 F-35A aircraft for the government of Australia, and eight F-35A and two F-35B aircraft for the government of Italy. The above U.S. aircraft quantities are inclusive of fiscal 2019 (Lot 13) plus up aircraft. In addition, this modification adds scope for the Air System Diminishing Manufacturing Sources integration, software data loads, critical safety items, red gear, non-recurring engineering, recurring engineering and the Joint Strike Fighter Airborne Data Emulator. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas (57%); El Segundo, California (14%); Warton, United Kingdom (9%); Cameri, Italy (4%); Orlando, Florida (4%); Nashua, New Hampshire (3%); Baltimore, Maryland (3%); San Diego, California (2%); Nagoya, Japan (2%); and various locations outside the continental U.S. (2%), and is expected to be completed in March 2023. Fiscal 2019 aircraft procurement (Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy); non-DoD participants; and FMS funds in the amount of $7,027,643,109 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This modification combines purchases for the Air Force ($2,812,512,346); Marine Corps ($1,297,487,314); Navy ($612,389,812); non-DoD participants ($2,243,321,947); and FMS ($61,931,690) customers. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. IAP Worldwide Services Inc., Cape Canaveral, Florida, is awarded an $84,573,278 modification (P00058) to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price, cost-reimbursable contract (N00019-15-C-0120). This modification exercises an option to provide logistics services in support of the E-6B aircraft and the requirement for parts industry management and support equipment maintenance for the E-6B Take Change and Move Out and Airborne Command Post aircraft. Logistics support to the aircraft weapon system as well as systems engineering, associated support sites, and supporting organizations. Work will be performed in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (70%); Bellevue, Nebraska (10%); Fairfield, California (10%); and Patuxent River, Maryland (10%), and is expected to be completed in November 2020. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance (Navy) funds in the amount of $26,592,990 will be obligated at time of award, all of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. Lockheed Martin Rotary Mission Systems, Owego, New York, is awarded a $43,439,773 modification (P00015) to a previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N00019-18-C-1066). This modification increases the scope and ceiling of the contract to provide electronic warfare capability development and integration in support of the design, development, and integration of the advanced digital receiver/processor upgrade to the existing E-2D AN/ALZ-217 electronic support measures receiver/processor, active front end, and receive antenna weapons replaceable assemblies. Work will be performed in Owego, New York (99%); and Clearwater, Florida (1%), and is expected to be completed in September 2023. Fiscal 2019 research, development, test and evaluation (Navy) funds in the amount of $9,382,120 will be obligated at time of award, all of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. The Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., Greenbelt, Maryland, is being awarded a $30,464,008 firm-fixed-price task order (N62473-20-F-4023) under a multiple award construction contract for an applied instruction facility, a training facility, and site utility infrastructure at Naval Base Coronado, California. The work to be performed provides for construction of two facilities and utilities infrastructure to support the Special Operations Forces Naval Special Warfare Center Advanced Training Command mission to train Maritime Special Operations Forces to meet operational requirements. The options, if exercised, provide for recycled water plumbing, additional parking area with permeable pavers, exterior trellis structures, additional floor area for the training facility, aircraft fuselage trainer and concrete pads and helicopter training fuselages. The planned modifications, if issued, provides for furniture, fixtures, and equipment, audio-visual equipment and physical security equipment. The task order also contains 11 unexercised options and six planned modifications, which if exercised would increase cumulative task order value to $37,782,887. Work will be performed in Coronado, California, and is expected to be completed by May 2022. Fiscal 2019 military construction (Defense-wide) contract funds in the amount of $30,464,008 are obligated on this award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Three proposals were received for this task order. Naval Facilities Engineering Command Southwest, San Diego, California, is the contracting activity (N62473-17-D-0822). Jopana Technologies Inc.,* Oxnard, California, is awarded an $11,474,563 firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost reimbursable, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. This contract provides for the procurement of AN/ALQ-231(V) Intrepid Tiger (IT II) family of systems hardware and incidental engineering services for the Electronic Warfare and Electronic Attack communications jamming, airborne (Fixed Wing, Rotary Wing, and Unmanned Air Systems), ground based systems, and laboratories. Work will be performed in Oxnard, California (95%); Point Mugu, California (2%); Yuma, Arizona (2%); and China Lake, California (1%), and is expected to be completed in October 2024. No funds will be obligated at the time of award. Funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1). The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, California, is the contracting activity (N68936-20-D-0003). AIR FORCE The Superior Forge & Steel Corp., Lima, Ohio (FA8681-20-D-0020); and Ellwood National Forge, Irvine, Pennsylvania (FA8681-20-D-0021), have been awarded $90,000,000 multiple award, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts. These contracts provided for the procurement of GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators BLU-J 27C/B Penetrator warhead case assemblies with associated components. Work will be performed at Lima, Ohio; and Irvine, Pennsylvania, and is expected to be complete by Oct. 28, 2027. This award is the result of two sole source acquisitions. Fiscal 2018 ammunition production funds in the amount of $3,000 per contractor for the initial delivery order are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is the contracting activity. Industries of the Blind and Visually Impaired, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has been awarded an estimated $30,000,000 firm-fixed-price requirements contract for the customization and distribution of Air Force Sales Promotional Items (SPIs). This contract provides for the customization and distribution of SPIs. Work will be performed at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and is expected to be complete by Oct. 31, 2024. This award is the result of a sole source acquisition. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds are being used and no funds are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Installation Contracting Center, the 338th Specialized Contracting Squadron, Joint Base San Antonio-Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, is the contracting activity (FA3002-20-D-0004). ARMY Vigor Marine LLC, Portland, Oregon, was awarded an $8,074,147 firm-fixed-price contract for dredge vessel Essayons ship repair and overhaul. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed in Portland, Oregon, with an estimated completion date of Feb. 28, 2020. Fiscal 2020 revolving funds in the amount of $8,074,147 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Portland, Oregon, is the contracting activity (W9127N-19-G-0002). *Small Business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2001094/source/GovDelivery/

  • How did the two offerings competing to be the US Army’s future engine measure up?

    10 juin 2019 | International, Aérospatial

    How did the two offerings competing to be the US Army’s future engine measure up?

    By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — Cost appears to have played a major role in the Army's decision to pick GE Aviation's T901 engine for its future helicopter engine, based on a look at documents laying out the service's post-award analysis, obtained by Defense News. Yet, other factors not shown could have also contributed to the Army's choice, which the Government Accountability Office upheld following a protest from losing team Advanced Turbine Engine Company (ATEC) — a partnership between Honeywell and Pratt & Whitney. The GAO is expected to release a redacted version of its decision next week, which could shed more light on how the Army decided to move forward with GE. While the cost of GE'S engine seems to have been a deciding factor, the document outlining the service's criteria to determine a winning engine design to move into the engineering and manufacturing development phase states that “all non-cost/price factors when combined are significantly more important than cost/price factor.” According to that chart, the Army said it would primarily measure the engine submissions against its engine design and development, followed by cost/price, followed by life-cycle costs and then small business participation in order of importance. The Army assessed ATEC's and GE's technical risk as good and gave ATEC a risk rating of low while it gave GE a risk rating of moderate when considering engineering design and development for each offering. Both GE and ATEC had moderate risk ratings when it came to engine design and performance. And while GE received a technical risk rating of moderate for component design and systems test and evaluation, ATEC received low risk ratings for both. Almost all other technology risk assessments and risk ratings were the same for both engine offerings. GE scored “outstanding” in platform integration capabilities. Based off the chart, it appears ATEC won, so its likely the documents are not an exhaustive representation of how the Army decided to move forward with GE. While both ATEC and GE offered prices within the Army's requirements, GE came in 30 percent lower in cost. And according to Brig. Gen. Thomas Todd, the program executive officer for aviation, in an interview with Defense News in April, GE was also working on trying to shrink the timeline within the EMD phase by roughly a year. But, in ATEC's view, the charts show it had offered the best value product to the Army. ATEC's president, Craig Madden, told Defense News that the company took the Army's selection criteria laid out in the request for proposals seriously across the board from engineering design and development factors to cost to even small business participation, where it scored higher than GE in the analysis chart. “We did come in higher in cost but this was considered a best value evaluation and not lowest price, technically acceptable,” Madden said. “I think low price is good for a plastic canteen or a bayonet, it's not good for a highly technical turbine engine.” And despite coming in at a higher cost, Jerry Wheeler, ATEC's vice president said, the up front cost in the EMD phase will be higher but the delta would shrink when considering life-cycle costs of both engine offerings. Both ATEC and GE received good technical ratings and were given risk ratings of low. When just going by the chart, GE's four moderate risk ratings in key categories means “they could have disruption in schedule, increased cost and degradation of performance,” Madden said. He added ATEC was also focused on lowering risk, so that, although the Army offered incentives to finish the EMD phase earlier than 66 months, ATEC presented a plan to complete at 66 months with a plan to look at acceleration wherever possible. ATEC is now pushing to be a part of the EMD phase, essentially extending the competition, so that more data on engines can be garnered. The Army had periodically weighed keeping the EMD phase competitive with two vendors, but ultimately chose to downselect to one. For GE, the Army made the right decision and had enough data to do so. “The U.S. Army competitively selected GE's T901 engine over ATEC T900 engine after more than 12 years of development,” David Wilson told Defense News in a statement. “Those 12 years included the Advanced Affordable Turbine Engine (AATE) program, during which both companies ran tow full engine tests,” he said. Additionally, both companies executed a 24-month technology maturation and risk reduction contract where GE self-funded and successfully completed and tested a third engine, a full-sized T901 prototype engine, with successful tests on all components, Wilson said. “We've done three full-engine tests and provided an unprecedented amount of test data to the Army for them to determine which engine was the best to move forward with in EMD,” he added. Funding a second engine through EMD would cost more than twice as much and delay critical Army modernization by at least two years, Wilson argued. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/06/07/how-did-the-two-offerings-competing-to-be-the-us-armys-future-engine-measure-up/

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