Pentagon says inflation has made one company request to cancel a long-term contract

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  1 mars 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité, Autre défense

  Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - February 26, 2019

  NAVY Lockheed Martin Space, Littleton, Colorado, is awarded a maximum amount $846,030,000 un-priced letter contract modification PH0001 to a previously awarded and announced un-priced letter contract (N00030-19-C-0025) for the design, development, build and integration of large diameter rocket motors, associated missile body flight articles, and related support equipment for Navy Intermediate Range Conventional Prompt Strike Weapon System flight test demonstrations. Work will be performed at Littleton, Colorado, with an expected completion date of Jan. 1, 2024. Fiscal 2018 research, development, test, and evaluation funds in the amount of $20,000,000 are obligated on this award, which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Fiscal 2019 research, development, test, and evaluation funds in the amount of $67,000,000 are being obligated on this award, which will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Strategic Systems Programs, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity. Raytheon Co., Tucson, Arizona, is awarded $25,229,389 for firm-fixed-price modification P00033 to a previously awarded contract (N00019-17-C-0034). This modification provides for the procurement of Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round spares to support the recertification of Tomahawk Missiles. Work will be performed in El Segundo, California (27.57 percent); Walled Lake, Michigan (15 percent); Tucson, Arizona (14.47 percent); Washington, Pennsylvania (11.66 percent); Hollister, California (4.25 percent); Midland, Ontario, Canada (4.18 percent); Glenrothes Fife, United Kingdom (3.2 percent); Vergennes, Vermont (2.9 percent); Orchard Park, New York (2.56 percent); Berryville, Arkansas (1.86 percent); South El Monte, California (1.46 percent); Merrimack, New Hampshire (1.28 percent); Fairfield, California (1.08 percent); Huntsville, Alabama (1.05 percent); and various locations within the continental U.S. (7.48 percent), and is expected to be completed in October 2020. Fiscal 2017, 2018 and 2019 weapons procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $25,229,389 will be obligated at the time of award, $4,186,657 of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. Johnson Control Navy Systems, York, Pennsylvania, was awarded an $18,819,845 firm-fixed-priced, indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity contract, for up to 32 air conditioning plant conversion kit and auxiliary components to support Naval Surface Warfare Center Philadelphia Division. Work will be performed in York, Pennsylvania. The contract will have a three year ordering period and work is expected to be complete by February 2022. Fiscal 2019 other procurement (Navy) funding in the amount of $1,995,356 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 U.S. Code. 2304(c)(1) - only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia Division, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the contracting activity (N64498-19-D-4008). (Awarded Feb. 22, 2019) ARMY Jacobs Engineering Group Inc., Dallas, Texas, was awarded a $40,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for architect and engineer services to support the Air Force Materiel Command Headquarters buildings at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Bids were solicited via the internet with six received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Feb. 25, 2024. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisville, Kentucky, is the contracting activity (W912QR-19-D-0013). QED Systems LLC,* Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, was awarded a $9,688,969 modification (P00036) to contract W15P7T-14-C-C012 for program management, engineering, logistics, business, administrative, operations, and security services. Work will be performed in Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, with an estimated completion date of Aug. 26, 2019. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance Army funds in the amount of $9,688,969 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity. AIR FORCE Cherokee Nation Technologies, Tulsa, Oklahoma, has been awarded a $39,461,205 firm-fixed-price contract for advisory and assistance services (A&AS) for programmatic, environmental cleanup, project execution and financial support. This contract provides base realignment and closure programs and requires a full range of A&AS and deliverables in the areas of management and professional services; studies, analyses, and evaluations; and engineering and specialized technical expertise. Work will be performed at several locations in the U.S. and is expected to be complete by April 6, 2023. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition and three offers were received. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $9,525,678 are being obligated at the time of award. Air Force Installation Contracting Agency, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas, is the contracting activity (FA8903-19-F-0001). RiverTech, LLC,* Colorado Springs, Colorado, has been awarded a $34,513,979 firm-fixed-price contract for command and control technical support. This contract provides for the operational, technical, and analytical expertise for the planning and execution of training and test events, conducting Live-Virtual-Constructive and Distributed Mission Operations activities, providing operational support, providing non-kinetic operations training and tactics development support, and conducting operational testing of command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Work will be performed at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico; and Nellis AFB, Nevada, and is expected to be complete by March 25, 2024. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition and three offers were received. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $3,520,157 are being obligated at the time of award. Air Combat Command Acquisition Management & Integration Center, Hurlburt Field, Florida, is the contracting activity (FA4890-19-C-A005). Sonalysts Inc., Waterford, Connecticut, has been awarded a $17,316,322 cost-plus-fixed-fee modification (P0002) to previously awarded contract FA8806-19-C-0002. This modification provides for the development of the training system supporting GPS Next Generation Operational Control System under the management of the Space Training Acquisition Office. Work will be performed in Waterford, Connecticut, and is expected to be complete by April 25, 2022. Fiscal 2019 research and development funds in the amount of $6,000,000 are being obligated at the time of award. Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, is the contracting activity. DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY De Rossi & Son Company, Inc., Vineland, New Jersey, has been awarded a maximum $11,351,934 modification (P00012) exercising the fourth one-year option period of a one-year base contract (SPE1C1-15-D-1033) with four one-year option periods for men's Army coats. This is a firm-fixed-price contract. Location of performance is New Jersey, with a March 3, 2020, performance completion date. Using military service is Army. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2019 through 2020 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND Cargo Transport System Co., Safat,, Kuwait, has been awarded a contract modification (P00007) on contract HTC711-17-D-R021 in the amount of $10,000,000. This modification provides continued stevedoring and related terminal servicesto the 595th Transportation Brigade. This includes vessel loading, vessel discharge, receipt of cargo, disposition of cargo, stuffing/unstuffing of cargo, intra-terminal transfer of cargo, inland transportation of cargo, customs clearance, yard management and management expertise. Work will be performed in ports of Kuwait. The period of performance is from March 9, 2019, to Sept. 8, 2019. Fiscal 2019 Transportation Working Capital Funds were obligated at award. This modification brings the total cumulative face value of the contract to $27,709,945 from $17,709,944.97. U.S. Transportation Command, Directorate of Acquisition, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, is the contracting activity. (Awarded Feb. 25, 2019) * Small Business https://dod.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1768604/

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  8 juillet 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Autre défense

  DARPA Funding Brings Machine Learning to BAE Systems’ Signals Intelligence Capabilities

  HUDSON, N.H.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--BAE Systems has been awarded funding from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to integrate machine-learning (ML) technology into platforms that decipher radio frequency signals. Its Controllable Hardware Integration for Machine-learning Enabled Real-time Adaptivity (CHIMERA) solution provides a reconfigurable hardware platform for ML algorithm developers to make sense of radio frequency (RF) signals in increasingly crowded electromagnetic spectrum environments. The up to $4.7 million contract, dependent on successful completion of milestones, includes hardware delivery along with integration and demonstration support. CHIMERA's hardware platform will enable algorithm developers to decipher the ever-growing number of RF signals, providing commercial or military users with greater automated situational awareness of their operating environment. This contract is adjacent to the previously announced award for the development of data-driven ML algorithms under the same DARPA program (Radio Frequency Machine Learning Systems, or RFMLS). RFMLS requires a robust, adaptable hardware solution with a multitude of control surfaces to enable improved discrimination of signals in the evolving dense spectrum environments of the future. “CHIMERA brings the flexibility of a software solution to hardware,” said Dave Logan, vice president and general manager of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Systems at BAE Systems. “Machine-learning is on the verge of revolutionizing signals intelligence technology, just as it has in other industries.” In an evolving threat environment, CHIMERA will enable ML software development to adapt the hardware's RF configuration in real time to optimize mission performance. This capability has never before been available in a hardware solution. The system provides multiple control surfaces for the user, enabling on-the-fly performance trade-offs that can maximize its sensitivity, selectivity, and scalability depending on mission need. The system's open architecture interfaces allow for third party algorithm development, making the system future-proof and easily upgradable upon deployment. Other RF functions, including communications, radar, and electronic warfare, also can benefit from this agile hardware platform, which has a reconfigurable array, front-end, full transceiver and digital pre-processing stage. Work on these phases of the program will take place at BAE Systems' sites in Hudson and Merrimack, New Hampshire, and Dallas, Texas. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190708005199/en

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  10 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Losing Market Share And Damaging National Security Due To Anachronistic Drone Policy

  Dave Deptula Contributor Adherence to an obsolescent approach to the international nuclear non-proliferation export guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is hurting the United States (U.S.) both commercially and from a national security perspective. In a nutshell, the MTCR treats large drones as if they were nuclear missiles—which they are not. As a result, this self-imposed restriction not only limits the sale of large U.S. drones to our friends and allies but pushes them into the arms of foreign suppliers some of whom are potential adversaries. The result is a series of negative consequences for the U.S. When the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute released its annual report on global arms transfers earlier this year, it was a good news story for the U.S. From 2015-2019, the U.S. accounted for 36 percent of major global arms sales, a 23 percent increase in volume over the previous five-year period and 76 percent more than its next closest competitor—Russia. The dominant position the U.S. finds itself in is a testament to both the quality of U.S. defense equipment, which is typically accompanied by robust training, sustainment, and support packages, as well as the mutual desire of the U.S. and its partners and allies to develop and maintain strong defense relationships. However, one important segment of the defense market where this pattern does not hold are large military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). This is not due to a lack of capability—the U.S. remains the world's leader in UAV technology and expertise—nor a lack of demand as by 2029 the international market will account for over 50 percent of the over $10 billion projected to be spent annually on UAVs. Instead, the U.S. has hamstrung itself due to restrictive export policies that equate large UAVs to nuclear missiles. This mismatch between the definitions and controls imposed on UAVs and the reality of how they are actually employed has significantly harmed coalition operations, U.S. relationships with its partners and allies, and the U.S. defense industrial base. It is imperative that the U.S. modernize its UAV export policy. Currently, the MTCR governs the export of U.S. UAVs. Initially formed in 1987, the MTCR is a voluntary agreement intended to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons—and later weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The MTCR defines UAVs capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload more than 300 kilometers one way as Category I systems, the transfer of which “are subject to an unconditional strong presumption of denial.” Although at the time the MTCR was negotiated no UAV exceeded the Category I thresholds, their envisioned use as delivery vehicles for WMD equivalent to cruise missiles precipitated their inclusion in the MTCR. However, since then the development of UAVs evolved as remotely piloted aircraft, not cruise missiles. Unfortunately, export policy has failed to keep pace, resulting in a situation where the export of UAVs is regulated under the same stringent regime as intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. policy failure to adequately remedy this situation creates significant problems for the following reasons. First, current U.S. export policy prevents the U.S. from realizing the full potential of UAVs in coalition operations. Because current policy frequently results in the denial of export requests for U.S. UAVs by close partners and allies, these nations must either resort to indigenous production or to another foreign manufacturer to meet their military requirements. Under the best of circumstances, the result is a lower level of interoperability with U.S. forces than possible had they been able to acquire U.S. UAVs. This hampers the integration of partners that would enable the coalition to be much more effective. The current policy impedes the use of common UAVs critical for success in allied operations. Of greater concern is that much of the unmet demand by friends for U.S. military UAVs is now being fulfilled by China because of the MTCR restrictions. Integrating partners into coalition operations using Chinese UAVs creates significant security risks. This is because China maintains control of the systems necessary to operate their UAVs. This enables them to collect intelligence on coalition operations if allowed access to coalition networks. From the perspective of a U.S. commander, the risk these likely infiltrations pose to security is sufficient to exclude partners operating Chinese UAVs from participating in both U.S. led coalition operations and intelligence sharing agreements. Second, the U.S. denying UAV export requests from nations that are security partners fosters frustration, raises doubts about U.S. commitments, and drive partners to pursue security relationships with China. Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates provide recent examples of solid U.S. partners that have procured Chinese UAVs. Furthermore, these countries are then forced to rely on China for training, sustainment, intelligence processing, and other related services. China's willingness to integrate indigenous industry in joint ventures—another practice restricted by the MTCR—serves to further solidify the ties between China and the partnering nation. Absent a change in U.S. policy, China will continue to expand its UAV market share and associated influence into regions important to the U.S. Third, the associated U.S. loss of global market share of UAV sales weakens U.S. business and the U.S. defense industrial base. Domestic funding for certain UAVs already faced downward pressure in the most recent budget request amidst other modernization priorities. Looking ahead the enormous federal expenditures to address the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic downturn are likely to result in significant cuts to future U.S. defense budgets. Greater access to foreign markets would serve to diversify the customer base of U.S. manufacturers of large UAVs, helping to offset reduced revenue from domestic buyers and keeping commercial production lines. Unfortunately, current UAV export policy precludes this from happening. Declining production rates for large military UAVs threaten to not only to shrink the U.S. aerospace industrial base, but also to undermine its competitive edge. Lacking predictable cash flow and sufficient profit margins, companies that manage to remain in the market will become more reticent to invest significant funds into research and development. Furthermore, the MTCR prohibits co-development and co-production of UAVs, precluding U.S. drone companies from pooling resources and expertise with international partners. The danger is that the U.S. may squander its drone advantage just as international interest in procuring advanced, survivable, multi-mission UAVs ramps up. It would be a tremendous shame if the U.S. finds itself no longer in a leading position and must instead rely on others to develop cutting-edge UAV technologies. Although there is growing awareness of these problems, recent efforts to craft a more reasonable UAV export policy have largely fallen short. Rather than a fundamental shift in policy, the few positive steps taken have been stopgap measures involving workarounds—approving more Category I sales via direct commercial sales rather than foreign military sales—or maneuvering within the confines of the MTCR through attempts to modify UAV definitions such as adding a speed criteria. Instead, as is comprehensively laid out in the Mitchell Institute's most recent policy paper, what is needed is for the Congress to insert language into the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act that explicitly defines UAVs as combat aircraft and subject them to the same export considerations. This would effectively remove U.S. UAV export decisions from the MTCR guidelines. The U.S. has a proven process of adjudicating sales of the most advanced fighter aircraft in the world, including how to configure them to make sales mutually beneficial to the U.S. and its partners. The example of the F-35 is particularly pertinent because technologies approved for export on the F-35 would be restricted by the MCTR if applied to a UAV—the only difference being the pilot of the F-35 is in the aircraft whereas large UAVs are remotely piloted. Given both the high degree of commonality of combat aircraft and UAVs, as well as the proven success combat aircraft sales have in providing partners a formidable deterrent and warfighting capability, improving interoperability among coalition partners, and supporting both U.S. and partner industrial capacity, treating UAVs as combat aircraft for export policy offers the most sensible and effective solution. Change cannot come soon enough. The U.S. has a limited window to re-engage with partners with a stated interest in U.S. UAVs or who are experiencing buyer's remorse with regard to their Chinese UAV partnerships. It is therefore critical that the U.S. normalize its UAV export policy before China can consolidate its gains. The future of warfare increasingly depends on UAV technology. Exporting large U.S. UAVs is vital to effective coalition operations. For too long the MTCR has distorted the balance of national security and economic interests against the fear of nuclear and WMD proliferation. Acknowledging UAVs as what they are—aircraft, not missiles—will enhance U.S. security, improve commercial trade in a growing business sector while preserving the MTCR as an effective means to prevent the proliferation of missiles and their associated technologies. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davedeptula/2020/06/09/losing-market-share-and-damaging-national-security-due-to-anachronistic-drone-policy/#50ce76d51332