26 février 2021 | Local, Naval

PBO says mixed frigate fleet and other designs offer cheaper options to navy program | CBC News

The Parliamentary Budget Office says the projected cost of building the Canadian navy's new combat fleet is rising and could hit $77 billion. The watchdog released a new report that looks at alternate designs and a mixed fleet — ideas that could save taxpayers billions of dollars.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/frigate-fleet-cost-1.5926000

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  • U.S. sale to Canada of new Boeing surveillance planes will support American military, Congress told

    28 juin 2023 | Local, Aérospatial

    U.S. sale to Canada of new Boeing surveillance planes will support American military, Congress told

    U.S. will sell Canada 16 P8 Boeing surveillance aircraft at a cost of $7.8 billion. Bombardier wants an open competition for the deal.

  • Pandemic equipment snarls will rewrite Canada's definition of national security needs, say experts

    9 avril 2020 | Local, Sécurité

    Pandemic equipment snarls will rewrite Canada's definition of national security needs, say experts

    When every country needs the same stuff to keep people safe, cost arguments seem less convincing The mad scramble to secure protective medical equipment and ventilators in the midst of a global pandemic has given some of the people who work in the usually tedious world of government procurement an unwelcome excuse to say, "I told you so." For years, there have been quiet but persistent demands coming out of the defence and acquisition sectors for successive federal governments to develop a list of "strategic industries" that do not have to rely on foreign supply chains — as insurance against the kind of procurement panic in play right now. Those calls were largely ignored. Now, defence experts are saying the COVID-19 crisis is a costly wake-up call. Canada needs — and has needed for almost two decades — a 21st century national security industrial plan that focuses on critical equipment and materials that should be produced at home, not abroad. 'Totally negligent' "We've been totally negligent on that and it is something I have articulated over and over again," said Alan Williams, the former head of the procurement branch at the Department of National Defence. "It's absolutely critical and if this doesn't wake us to that reality, I don't know what would." Williams devoted a substantial portion of one of his books, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View from the Inside, to the absence of a national security vision of Canadian industry. "It frankly pisses me off because there's no reason for us not to have done that," he said. "That should be the kind of thing ministers, the leaders of the country desperately want to do. And why we seem to have avoided that kind of strategic thinking ... It just boggles my mind. It's inexcusable." 'Key' industries geared toward trade, not tragedies There was a faint glimmer of hope in the initial debate over the National Shipbuilding Strategy a decade ago, when the former Conservative government made a conscious decision to build future warships, Canadian Coast Guard and fisheries vessels in Canada, instead of outsourcing the work to other countries. At least in the context of defence procurement, Canada does have what are known as "key industrial capabilities", including shipbuilding, the production of certain types of ammunition and the construction of a range of aerospace and maritime electronic systems. Much of the work of those "key" domestic industries is, however, geared toward making high-end components for global supply chains. Critics have often said the policy focuses on high-tech innovation and business priorities, rather than hard-headed national security interests. Other countries, Williams said, have carved out a space for national security interests in industrial policy by not allowing other countries to build certain pieces of equipment. The Japanese, for example, have retained the capability to assemble their own warplanes. A shift in thinking The COVID-19 crisis, which has uncovered a potentially deadly shortage of ventilators and protective equipment for medical professionals, will push the federal government into a radical re-evaluation of what we need to be able to build at home to protect the country. In some respects, that work has already started. Earlier this week, reflecting on the Trump administration's moves to restrict exports of protective equipment, Ontario Premier Doug Ford expressed dismay over how the fate of so many Canadians had been taken out of the hands of the federal and provincial governments. Doctors, nurses demand government fill 'unacceptable' gaps in protective gear on front lines Canada working to produce up to 30,000 ventilators domestically: Trudeau "I am just so, so disappointed right now," he said. "We have a great relationship with the U.S. and all of a sudden they pull these shenanigans. But as I said yesterday, we will never rely on any other country going forward." Over the past two weeks, the federal government has announced plans to pour more than $2 billion into sourcing and acquiring protective medical equipment — masks, gowns, face shields, hand sanitizer — at home. On Tuesday, Ottawa unveiled a plan to get three Canadian companies to build 30,000 ventilators. Health equipment may have been outside the normal definition of national security needs until just a few weeks ago — but the shifting geopolitical landscape offered another warning sign that was ignored, said procurement expert Dave Perry. Leaning on China "This is pointing out the flip side of our globalized world and globalized supply chains," said Perry, an analyst and vice president at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. "The cold, hard truth is that we're going to be relying on China for critical supplies." When the coronavirus outbreak ramped up, federal officials should have been aware of the potential peril involved in relying on Chinese factories for so many critical items. But in the absence of homegrown capability, Canada is at the mercy of panicked nations in the midst of panicked buying. "The entire world is trying to put through orders from the same sets of factories we're trying to source from," Perry said. "It might be accurate to criticize the Chinese for their response, but in the current context the government has to be cognizant of the impact on our potential ability to source stuff we really, really need right now from China — when there's not a lot of other options available in the short term and when the rest of the world is making the same phone calls." One of the critical arguments against a homegrown national security industrial strategy has been the cost. It's an argument familiar from the shipbuilding context: taxpayers pay a premium when we task Canadian industry with delivering solutions, instead of turning to cheaper foreign manufacturers. Elinor Sloan, a defence policy expert at Carleton University, said she believes the crisis will focus the public's attention on securing the critical industries and supplies the country needs in a global crisis. "The trade-off, as we know, is that it can be more costly to build or produce at home," she said. "This crisis may engender a perspective among the public that the extra cost is worth it." https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/pandemic-covid-coronavirus-procurement-masks-ventilators-1.5525373

  • NORAD modernization to dominate agenda of Canada-U.S. defence relations, experts say

    8 février 2021 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    NORAD modernization to dominate agenda of Canada-U.S. defence relations, experts say

    Levon Sevunts, Radio Canada International The modernization of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) will dominate the agenda of Canada-U.S. defence relations as the Biden administration gears up to repair relations with old allies and face emerging threats from resurgent Russia and ascending China, Canadian defence experts say. The continued modernization of the binational command created in 1957 was on the agenda of the first phone call between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau last month, and during the first calls of Canadiand and U.S. defence ministers, said Andrea Charron, head of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba. “This is at the highest levels. When the U.S. is concerned about the homeland defence and they feel vulnerable, it's something that Canada has to take very-very seriously and I think that is what's happening,” Charron told Eye on the Arctic. Canadian defence expert Nancy Teeple said she expects the Biden administration to ask Canada to contribute more to continental defence. “It opens up the question of whether Canada will participate in missile defence, it's going to push Canada towards that new fighter capability,” said Teeple, who teaches at the Royal Military College of Canada and is Postdoctoral Fellow at the North American Defence and Security Network (NAADSN). The need for NORAD modernization is driven by changes in the strategic and the global geopolitical environment, Charron said. “Where as before the primary threat during the Cold War was one peer competitor, who wasn't using greyzone tactics, or at least not to the same extent as now, we now have two peer competitors to the U.S. – China and Russia – and they are using greyzone tactics, and they're developing more sophisticated weapons like hypersonic glide vehicle weapons,” Charron said. A new generation of threats The urgency of the NORAD modernization and the paths towards that goal were outlined last fall in a paper written for the Wilson Center's Canada Institute by the former U.S. NORAD commander, retired Gen. Terrence O'Shaughnessy, and U.S. Air Force Brig.-Gen. Peter Fesler, the current deputy director of operations at the U.S. air defence headquarters. In the paper, titled Hardening the Shield: A Credible Deterrent & Capable Defense for North America, O'Shaughnessy and Fesler argue that “with innovations in long range missiles and foreign missile defense systems as well as a changing Arctic landscape, threats to U.S. national security are closer and less deterred than ever from attacking the U.S. Homeland.” O'Shaughnessy and Fesler argue that both China and Russia have developed capabilities to target North America with a new generation of long-range and high-precision conventional weapons. They say that while the U.S. has invested billions of dollars into building ballistic missile defences to protect against strikes by rogue nations such as North Korea, Washington and Ottawa have neglected investments and upgrades of the continental defensive systems “designed to defend against the range of threats presented by peer competitors.” Moreover, the various systems in place in many cases simply can't automatically share information, they say. “The radars used by NORAD to warn of Russian or Chinese ballistic missile attack, for example, are not integrated with those used by Northern Command to engage missiles launched by North Korea,” O'Shaughnessy and Fesler write. “Even if the ballistic missile defense architecture were to detect a launch from China, it would not directly share that information with NORAD's missile warning systems. “The watch standers in the consolidated NORAD and Northern Command headquarters are forced to verbally pass information displayed on independent systems.” Putting up a SHIELD O'Shaughnessy and Fesler call for a “more holistic modernization effort” for NORAD. Northern Command and NORAD have collectively developed a modernization strategy for defence referred to as the Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for Layered Defence, or SHIELD, they write. “SHIELD is not a system, or even a system of systems, it is an ecosystem,” O'Shaughnessy and Fesler write. “It is a fundamentally new approach to defending North America.” SHIELD takes advantage of the data provided by traditional and non-traditional sources to provide a layered ability to detect any threat approaching the continent, from the seafloor to on orbit, in what NORAD and Northern Command refer to as “all domain awareness,” they write. “It pools this data and fuses it into a common operational picture. Then, using the latest advances in machine learning and data analysis, it scans the data for patterns that are not visible to human eyes, helping decision-makers understand adversary potential courses of action before they are executed.” ‘It's many things and they are already happening' Experts say figuring out Canada's role in this new “ecosystem” will be tricky politically and likely to come at a steep financial cost just as both Ottawa and Washington are deep in the red because of the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. “It's everything from, for example, the runways at Inuvik being extended because right now only the CF-18 Hornets can land there and we need to make it longer,” Charron said. “It's things like better communication in the Arctic because there seems to be the potential for more activity there.” Or it could be something like coming up with a new Combined Forces Air Component Commander to change the command and control structure and allow the NORAD commander to think more strategically rather than to be bogged down by the day-to-day tasks, Charron said. In addition, upgrades to NORAD capabilities also have to be guided by the need for information dominance, Charron said. “So it's many things and they are already happening,” Charron said. “For example there is a new program called Pathfinder, which is helping feeds from the North Warning System through artificial intelligence to glean more information that the North Warning System is actually picking up but current algorithms and analysts aren't able to see.” Teeple said Canada can also benefit from Washington's interest in developing continental defence, including the Arctic by developing infrastructure that has dual military-civilian use. “This provides incredible benefits if Canada can collaborate,” Teeple said. “And those benefits would be obviously involving collaboration, involving input from Northern Indigenous communities and developing systems that can enhance things like communications and other types of infrastructure in the North that would enhance their quality of life.” Canadian policy-makers should also think about some of the niche areas where Canada can contribute to the NORAD modernization and the continental defence, Teeple said. “So enhancing its sensor capabilities for early warning, obviously that involves the upgrading of the North Warning System,” Teeple said. Other roles for Canada could include non-kinetic disruptive capabilities, such as cyber capabilities, Teeple said. This could give Canada a more offensive role in the new SHIELD ecosystem that would be more palatable politically than hosting ballistic missile interceptors on its territory, she added. https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2021/02/05/norad-modernization-to-dominate-agenda-of-canada-u-s-defence-relations-experts-say/

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