4 août 2020 | International, Terrestre

Pandemic lengthens delay in US Army’s M113 vehicle replacement program

By:

WASHINGTON — The coronavirus pandemic has caused another delay for the U.S. Army's plagued M113 replacement program, which has struggled with manufacturing problems as the BAE Systems-made Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle entered low-rate initial production, according to the company's second quarter fiscal 2020 earnings briefing released last week.

The company had to delay delivery of the first LRIP vehicles by roughly four to six months, moving delivery from March to July.

But as BAE prepared to move ahead on delivery, the pandemic hit, bringing with it another delay of roughly a month, which pushed the vehicles' delivery date to August.

The AMPV program entered LRIP in January 2019, but the program office indicated last year that delivery of the first vehicles would be delayed by two months and the completion of production qualification testing would be delayed by seven months due to tooling and assembly line challenges at BAE's facility in York, Pennsylvania.

Because of the issues, the Army's AMPV budget request in FY21 showed the program took a hit. The service indicated it would buy 32 vehicles instead of the 143 planned for the fiscal year, and the program's budget was cut from $445 million to $193 million.

The Army and BAE developed “a production approach that would allow us to incorporate efficiencies during LRIP that modernize manufacturing and increase the overall throughput of the program,” Amanda Niswonger, a BAE spokeswoman, told Defense News in an Aug. 3 statement.

“This included installing new technology and processes such as robotic welding, digital X-ray, and advanced machining. And we worked closely with the Army to update and refine manufacturing processes to incorporate the most modern weld and inspection technology,” she said. “These changes had an impact on our delivery timeline which was not reflected in the original delivery schedule, but continues to meet the Army's fielding schedule.”

The service and BAE had formalized the schedule change just as COVID-19 hit the U.S., which affected a large number of manufacturing facilities and supply chains globally.

“We have worked tirelessly to mitigate the impacts from COVID-19 with our employees, supply network, and customer base to keep our manufacturing sites operational and continue to receive parts as needed,” Niswonger said. “Unfortunately we could not overcome all the challenges and our first delivery has slipped one month.”

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/08/03/pandemic-causes-latest-delay-in-us-armys-m113-replacement-program/

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  • Japan unveils timeline for indigenous fighter jet program

    10 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Japan unveils timeline for indigenous fighter jet program

    By: Mike Yeo   20 hours ago MELBOURNE, Australia — Japan has created a timeline for the development and fielding of its locally made next-generation fighter jet, with serial production set to start at the beginning of the next decade. The Japanese Ministry of Defense presented the draft development plan for the fighter program to a group of lawmakers from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party on Tuesday, which showed that full-scale production is due to begin in 2031. The ministry added that the prime contractor for the program will be selected by early next year, although it could happen as soon as October 2020. This is to allow for the basic design for the airframe and engine to be launched before the end of the current Japanese fiscal year, which ends March 31, 2021. The next step would be the production of the first fighter prototype, which is planned to begin in 2024, with flight tests earmarked to start in 2028 following finalization of the design and production plans. The new fighter is slated to replace about 90 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries F-2 fighters, which are due to be phased out in the mid-2030s, as its replacement is to be formally introduced into service in 2035. Japan previously said the new fighter will be stealthy and interoperable with the U.S. military. Japan has researched and developed fighter technology over the past decade, including work on stealth designs and materials, active electronically scanned array radars, and afterburning turbofan engines. In addition, the U.S. ally also conducted a series of test flights of a locally designed and built fighter technology demonstrator between 2016 and 2018 in order to validate its work. The country used the data gleaned from the test program to further refine its indigenous capabilities. Despite these efforts, the country is still the largest customer of the American Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jet, with plans to eventually operate 157 F-35s, including 42 of the short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing F-35B variant. These will be used to equip the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's anti-submarine helicopter destroyer Izumo, which is being refurbished to accommodate F-35B operations. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/07/09/japan-unveils-timeline-for-indigenous-fighter-jet-program/

  • Germany walks away from Lockheed, Boeing cargo helicopter offers

    30 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Germany walks away from Lockheed, Boeing cargo helicopter offers

    Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany — The German Defence Ministry wants to start fresh on a new heavy transport helicopter after finding that offers from American firms Boeing and Lockheed Martin for the Chinook and the King Stallion, respectively, were too expensive, officials announced Tuesday. The surprise decision halts an acquisition race that was scheduled to a see a contract awarded in 2021. The two companies delivered their initial proposals for the program, aimed at replacing Germany's aging CH-53G helicopters, in January 2020. A request for a second proposal was expected by the end of this year. The move comes as the budget implications of the coronavirus crisis are starting to materialize, despite leaders' pledges to keep military spending high. Given that context, other programs are also expected to be on shaky ground, according to sources in Berlin. Officials canceled the helicopter race — locally known as Schwerer Transporthubschrauber, or STH — because the government deemed offers by the defense giants as “uneconomical,” a Defence Ministry statement read. The chance of meeting all requirements while adhering to the envisioned multibillion-dollar budget would be “unlikely,” officials wrote. The STH program was initially planned to be a poster child for a no-frills, off-the-shelf purchase that's easy on the defense budget. But acquisition officials kept piling on requirements to such a degree that it surprised some industry executives associated with the bidders, Defense News reported earlier this year. Also included in the government's requirements was a decades-long maintenance scheme under which contractors had to guarantee certain availability rates. Tobias Lindner, the Green Party's point man in the Bundestag for defense issues, called the helicopter program's a “bitter sign” for Germany's soldiers. He argued the Defence Ministry had been naive in its approach to the much-needed acquisition. “A new competition alone won't solve that problem,” he said. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/09/29/germany-walks-away-from-lockheed-boeing-cargo-helicopter-offers/

  • Huge Deficit = Defense Budget Cuts? Maybe Not

    19 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Huge Deficit = Defense Budget Cuts? Maybe Not

    The congressional calendar and strategic inertia may come together to keep the defense budget relatively high. The calendar helps because the fiscal 2021 defense budget will likely be passed while Congress is in a free-spending mood. By MARK CANCIAN The current Washington consensus sees deep defense budget cuts in the face of soaring deficits driven by the emergency legislation to stabilize the American economy as it reels from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. It may be wrong. The congressional calendar and strategic inertia may come together to keep the defense budget relatively high. The calendar helps because the fiscal 2021 defense budget will likely be passed while Congress is in a free-spending mood. The next administration — Republican or Democratic — will develop budgets beyond that, but the constraints of long-standing strategy will prevent major changes to force structure and acquisition that would drive deep budget cuts. The Challenge The conventional narrative holds that the defense budget will be squeezed as the debt level rises, and the public focuses inward on rebuilding the country's health and economic position. These are reasonable concerns. The deficit in fiscal 2020, initially projected to be about one trillion dollars ― itself getting into record territory without emergency spending― is now projected to be $3.7 trillion, and Congress is not finished spending. Debt held by the public will rise to 101 percent of GDP, a level not seen since World War II. Even if the world is willing to take US debt, rising interest payments will squeeze the rest of the budget. Simultaneously, the electorate is likely to focus inward. The pandemic is already the leading popular concern, not surprisingly. The economic devastation caused by restrictions on normal commercial activities has produced the greatest downturn since the Great Depression. It would be reasonable to put these factors together and project a substantially reduced defense budget. However, the congressional calendar and the inertia of a long-held strategy will likely mitigate any downturn. The Calendar The calendar will help because Congress is likely to pass the 2021 appropriation this fall, when the government will still be operating under emergency conditions. Congress has already passed four bills for pandemic response and economic stimulus and is developing another in the multi-trillion range. There are a few voices for fiscal constraint, but they are overwhelmed by a sentiment to “do more.” Indeed, some lawmakers and commentators are proposing increases to the defense budget to stimulate the economy, enhance deterrence of China, or protect the defense industrial base. Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has indicated his reluctance to do more than protect the industrial base, but a future stimulus bill could include such enhancements as part of a bipartisan deal. Finally, last year's bipartisan budget agreement set levels for defense and domestic spending in fiscal 2021. Undoing that agreement would be a major lift, requiring a bipartisan consensus that does not seem to be occurring. Even if the Democratic left wanted to make such cuts, defense hawks in the House and Senate could block them. Thus, in the near-term proposals for enhancements seem to be offsetting thoughts about cuts. As both the House and Senate consider their authorization acts, they seem to be aiming at roughly the level of the president's proposal and the bipartisan budget agreement. Strategic Inertia The United States has had some variation of the same national security strategy since the end of the Second World War (or perhaps more accurately, since the Korean War and publication of NSC 68, which enshrined a long term competition with the Soviet Union). That strategy involves global engagement, forward-deployed forces, alliances to offset global competitors, and commitment to maintaining an international system of free trade, human rights and secure borders. Scholars can argue about the details and how well the United States has implemented such a strategy, but the major elements have been constant. President Trump has chafed at many of these elements but has generally gone along, however reluctantly. One would expect such reluctant continuity in a second Trump administration, should that occur One would also expect strategic continuity in a Biden administration. Biden was, after all, vice president during the Obama administration, which, after the shocks of 2014, laid out a strategy of confronting five threats: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism. One would expect Biden to implement something like that strategy if he were in office. That does not mean that a Biden administration would do everything a Trump administration would do. The left-wing of the Democratic party would push some level of cuts, perhaps 5 percent, and take aim particularly at nuclear modernization, foreign arms sales, and Middle East conflicts. But this longstanding strategy of global engagement will put a floor on defense cuts. Remaining engaged with NATO, supporting our Asian allies like Japan and South Korea, and maintaining some presence in the Middle East, even if scaled back, takes a lot of forces. These need to be at a relatively high level of readiness to deploy globally and be credible. The all-volunteer force needs to maintain compensation and benefits at a sufficient level to compete for labor in a market economy. Competing with China and Russia requires investment in a wide variety of high technology―and costly―new systems, as well as the R&D foundation to support these innovations. Other strategies are certainly possible. Members of the Democratic left and Republican right, as well as some elements of the academic and think tank community, have proposed strategies of “restraint”, whereby the United States would significantly scale back overseas engagements. Such strategic change would produce a substantial cut in the defense budget. However, neither major candidate has supported such a change, and the national security policy community (aka “the blob”) is adamantly opposed. Despite this relatively optimistic assessment, the future is still cloudy. The president's budget proposal forecasts a level budget in constant dollars. That meant that the defense buildup was over, even if Republicans continued in office. Such budgets do not come close to the 3 to 5 percent real growth that defense officials had talked about to implement the National Defense strategy and would entail choices between readiness, force structure and modernization. A Democratic administration, with a notional 5 percent cut in the defense budget, would not constitute the deep cut that a Sanders or Warren administration might have entailed, but the $35 billion that a 5 percent cut would entail is still a lot of money. Forces would get smaller, likely wiping out all the recent force expansion, and new programs would be delayed. Bottom line: Defense may not be heading into a budget hurricane, but it is not heading into sunlight either. It faces the friction that occurs when expensive plans collide with constrained resources. Mark Cancian, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, was a Marine colonel and senior official at the Office of Management and Budget before he joined CSIS. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/huge-deficit-defense-budget-cuts-maybe-not/

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