9 décembre 2019 | International, Autre défense

Opinion: Is Pressuring Allies To Pay More For Defense Worth The Cost?

President Donald Trump appears to be getting his wish that U.S. allies pay more for their own defense, which begs the question: Is the victory worth the cost?

Pushing allies to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense is not a new concept. Trump's predecessors George W. Bush and Barack Obama both argued for greater burden sharing, and Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine's Crimea region had allies starting to move toward that benchmark. Arguably, Trump's “America First” drumbeat is getting NATO allies to pay a bigger share of the cost of their defense three decades after the end of the Cold War. Military spending by European NATO nations and Canada has risen 4.6% this year, and the majority of allies have plans to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense by 2024, according to NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is on a path to dial back its contribution from 22% of NATO's total funding to 16%. “This is a direct result of President Trump making clear our expectations that these Europeans would step up to help secure their own people,” says U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

Unfortunately, Trump has not stopped there, openly expressing disdain for an organization established to guard against the kind of territorial expansion undertaken by the former Soviet Union. He has hurled sophomoric barbs at steadfast allies such as the UK, Germany and Canada, while refusing to criticize Russian strongman Vladimir Putin, the architect of both the Crimea invasion and Moscow's campaign to interfere in U.S. elections. For the first phase of the Trump presidency, his cabinet tried to temper those go-it-alone impulses. Then-Defense Secretary James Mattis sought to reassure allies of U.S. support for their security. But more recent White House appointees have been less willing to cross their boss.

Even more damaging was Trump's abrupt decision to withdraw most U.S. forces from Syria, disgracefully abandoning America's Kurdish allies to the benefit of Turkey, Russia and Iran and leaving Europe more exposed to attacks from Islamic extremists. “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO,” French President Emmanuel Macron told The Economist. Trump sees NATO in a transactional way, “as a project in which the United States acts as a sort of geopolitical umbrella, but the trade-off is that there has to be commercial exclusivity,” he added. “It's an arrangement for buying American.”

While Macron is calling for a reconsideration of what NATO means in light of reduced American commitment, European nations are not waiting. They are building up their own defense industrial base. In 2017, the EU created the Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative, which is pursuing research toward new missiles, aircraft, missile defense and electronic attack capabilities. U.S. efforts to have its companies included in the work have so far been brushed off.

Trump's hardball approach also is being applied to key allies in Asia that have long served as a bulwark against a rising China. The U.S. alliance with South Korea is now reviewed annually, instead of every four years. And after signing a deal in February that calls for South Korea to pay nearly $1 billion to maintain the U.S. military presence there, Washington is now demanding that Seoul pay $4.7 billion annually. Before an agreement was reached, the U.S. walked out of the talks. The Trump administration also is looking for more cash from Japan, calling for more than triple Tokyo's $1.7 billion contribution toward hosting U.S. troops in its country.

These requests are straining longstanding alliances. South Korea is edging closer to China, while Japan, which has a strong industrial base, might partner with the UK on its Tempest fighter program.

To be sure, U.S. defense exports remain near an all-time high. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced $55.4 billion in potential Foreign Military Sales in fiscal 2019, about the same as the prior year. But there are indications that Trump's pay-up-now methods may lead to an erosion in future sales.

Asking allies to contribute more for their own defense certainly has merit, but the wider risks to U.S. global interests cannot be ignored. Can 70-year-old alliances survive if the leading partner vocally questions their value? And if the alliances crack, what would that mean for the U.S. military industrial base?

“The more our alliances fray,” says Eric Edelman, a former U.S. undersecretary of defense, “the less interest people have in buying U.S. defense goods and services.”

https://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-pressuring-allies-pay-more-defense-worth-cost

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