NSA approves tablet and communicator for Five Eyes special forces

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  28 août 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Terrestre

  Can Army Futures Command Overcome Decades Of Dysfunction?

  By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. ARMY S&T CONFERENCE: How broken is the procurement system the new Army Futures Command was created to fix? It's not just the billions wasted on cancelled weapons programs. It's also the months wasted because, until now, there has not been one commander who can crack feuding bureaucrats' heads together and make them stop bickering over, literally, inches. “I have not always been an Army Futures Command fan,” retired Lt. Gen. Tom Spoehr told the National Defense Industrial Association conference here. But as he thought about his own decades in Army acquisition, he's come around. How bad could things get? When he was working in the Army resourcing office (staff section G-8), Spoehr recalled, the Army signals school at Fort Gordon wanted a new radio test kit that could fit in a six-inch cargo pocket. The radio procurement programmanager, part of an entirely separate organization, reported back there was nothing on the market under eight inches. The requirements office insisted on sixinches, the acquisition office insisted they had no money to develop something smaller than the existing eight-inchers, and memos shot back and forth for months. At last, Spoehr warned both sides that if they didn't come to some agreement, he'd kill the funding. Suddenly Fort Gordon rewrote the requirement from “fit in a cargo pocket” to “cargo pouch” and the procurement people could go buy an eight-inch kit. That kind of disconnected dithering is what Army Futures Command is intended to prevent. “I had the money, but nobody really had control of all of this,” Spoehr said. As a result, he said, “we probably spent six months trading memos back and forth on the size of the radio frequency test kit.” Multiplying that by thousands of requirements over hundreds of systems, and the wasted time and money gets pretty bad. But what's often worse is when the requirements are unrealistic and no one pushes back. Most notoriously ,Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki demanded easily airlifted Future Combat Systems vehicles that weighed less than 20 tons but had the combat power of a 60-ton M1 Abrams tank. The designs eventually grew to 26 tons, and the performance requirements came down, but by then FCS had lost the confidence of both Congress and Defense Secretary Bob Gates, who canceled it in 2009. It was another casualty of overly ambitious requirements drawn up by staff officers in isolation from the people who'd actually have to build them. Army Futures Command is structured to force those two groups to talk to each other from the start. Full article: https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/can-army-futures-command-overcome-decades-of-dysfunction

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  12 novembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre

  Rust Costs the Pentagon $21 Billion Per Year

  By Aaron Boyd, The Defense Department isn't doing a good job determining how much to spend to prevent damage from nature's basic chemical reactions. Rust costs the Pentagon more money annually than many of its most expensive weapons systems—up to $21 billion per year, according to a Defense Department-commissioned audit released in March. The report indicates the corrosion of metals that make up modern weapons systems like fighter jets, ships, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons can sometimes approach one-third of the total operations and maintenance costs of those systems. The problem is so large, in 2002, the department established the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to ensure big-dollar weapons systems weren't taken offline by oxidation and to help branches determine how much money ought to be spent on rust prevention. But the data being reported by the military branches has been inconsistent and the office has yet to issue guidance on how funding levels should be categorized, according to a related audit released Thursday by the Government Accountability Office. For example, “In fiscal year 2017, the Army and Navy used direct costs, such as salary and training costs, to identify their funding levels, but the Army also included other associated costs. The Air Force used the prior year's funding level and adjusted it for inflation,” the report states. These different methods led to funding requests based on different criteria, making it difficult for Congress to determine what an appropriate funding level should look like. It has also led to vastly different funding requests. In 2017, the Army requested $2.4 million and the Air Force $3 million, while the Navy only requested $220,000. Similarly, all three branches either failed to accurately report the supporting data or, in the Air Force's case, did not provide any data at all some years. “The Army data GAO received did not reconcile with data presented in the Corrosion Office annual reports to Congress for five of eight fiscal years,” auditors wrote. “The Navy data did not reconcile for two of eight fiscal years, and there was no supporting documentation identifying how these figures were calculated. Air Force officials did not provide any figures or supporting documentation for four fiscal years, stating that these figures were not available.” Army officials told GAO they're not able to accurately report how much is spent preventing or combating corrosion because many of those duties are performed by personnel who do many other things, as well. This includes the Army's lead corrosion executive, who also serves as the aviation logistics and safety officer for the Army G-4 logistics organization. “The corrosion-related costs of conducting the corrosion executive role are not separated from this other function,” they told GAO. The Navy had a similar issue but took a different tack. The Navy merely requested $220,000 for the corrosion executive's salary, despite the fact that “this method does not capture other costs, such as personnel assigned to other offices that provide support to the corrosion executive.” The misreported numbers don't appear to be malfeasance, according to the GAO report, but a natural consequence of a lack of direction from the Corrosion Office on how to identify funding needs and properly report that data. GAO made three recommendations to the Defense Department: Issue guidance for identifying and reviewing funding levels for performing corrosion executive duties. Ensure that the Corrosion Office develops a process to maintain documentation of its reviews of corrosion planning. Ensure that corrosion executives establish guidance on reviewing the adequacy of corrosion planning. Defense officials agreed with all three recommendations. https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2018/11/rust-costs-pentagon-21-billion-year/152709/

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  4 janvier 2024 | International, Terrestre

  Marine amphibious combat vehicle variants will arrive

  The command and control and 30 mm-equipped versions will be ready for unit testing in 2024.