27 juillet 2023 | International, Terrestre
Australia selects South Korea’s Hanwha in military vehicle competition
The Redback beat out competition from Germany company Rheinmetall’s KF41 Lynx vehicle.
17 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial
International Hypersonic Strike Weapons Projects Accelerate
James Bosbotinis June 15, 2020
There is growing international interest in the development of offensive hypersonic weapon systems, particularly following the deployment by Russia and China of nascent hypersonic strike capabilities. France, India, Japan and the UK all are seeking to develop a hypersonic strike capability too.
Beyond Russia's Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) and Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), and China's DF-17 HGV, both nations are developing additional hypersonic weapon systems. Russia, for example, is working on the Zircon hypersonic cruise missile (HCM) and related technologies, while China is developing an expansive technological base and infrastructure for the development and production of hypersonic systems for military, commercial and space applications.
Given the technical challenges and cost inherent in developing hypersonic weapons, particularly in areas such as propulsion, airframe design, guidance and thermal management, what roles will such weapons undertake? The speed, maneuverability and flight characteristics of hypersonic weapons makes them challenging to detect, track and intercept, reducing the warning time available and window for interception.
Hypersonic weapons thus provide advantages for the prosecution of time-critical targets, mobile or relocatable targets or in the face of adversary missile defense capabilities. Maritime strike is also a key projected role for hypersonic missiles under development or being deployed by Russia, China and Japan. In the conventional precision-strike role, hypersonic weapons will require a robust set of supporting intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities, in particular for the prosecution of mobile/relocatable targets.
France is developing its fourth-generation air-launched nuclear missile, the ASN4G, which will be scramjet-powered and is due to enter service in the mid-2030s, replacing the current ASMP-A. It is also developing an HGV demonstrator, the “Vehicule Manoeuvrant Experimental,” or V-MaX, which is due to make its first flight before the end of 2021. India is similarly pursuing two hypersonic weapon projects, the BrahMos-2, developed by the BrahMos joint venture between India and Russia, and another HCM project. The BrahMos-2 is intended to be an HCM capable of speeds of Mach 5-7; HCM development is supported by the scramjet-powered Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV). An attempted test flight in June 2019 failed due to a technical problem with the Agni-1, serving as the launch platform for the HSTDV.
Japan has outlined plans for two hypersonic weapon systems; the Hyper-Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) and a Hypersonic Cruising Missile. Japan outlined in its Midterm Defense Program (fiscal 2019-23) plans to strengthen the defense of “remote islands in the southwest region,” including through the establishment of HVGP units. The HVGP is intended to be a tactical HGV, capable of delivering a penetrating warhead for targeting, for example, aircraft carriers, or a “high-density EFP” (explosively formed penetrator) warhead for “area suppression.”
An initial variant will be deployed in the 2024-28 time frame with an improved variant following in the 2030s. The Japanese HCM will be a scramjet-powered missile, armed with the same warheads as the HVGP, and intended to provide a standoff capability to counter “ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan.” The HCM will be deployed in the late 2020s/early 2030s, with an improved variant following later in the 2030s.
The UK is exploring options for the development of a hypersonic strike capability, including potentially as part of the joint Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon project with France to replace the Storm Shadow/SCALP standoff cruise missile and the anti-ship Exocet and Harpoon from 2030. In July 2019, Air Vice Marshal Simon Rochelle, then chief of staff capability, announced that the UK sought to deploy an affordable, air-launched hypersonic weapon by 2023.
Moreover, as Aviation Week disclosed, a joint U.S.-UK study, Thresher (Tactical High-Speed, Responsive and Highly Efficient Round), is underway between the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory and UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (AW&ST April 6-19, p. 14). It is due to be completed in 2022 or 2023.
With the notable exception of the UK's intention to rapidly acquire a hypersonic missile by 2023, the majority of known programs are not likely to deliver weapon systems until the second half of the 2020s or 2030s. This period is also likely to see a significant expansion in Russian and Chinese hypersonic strike capabilities.
Russia possesses a nascent hypersonic strike capability following the initial deployment in December 2017 of the Kinzhal ALBM and in December 2019 of the Avangard HGV system. The Kinzhal and Avangard were both announced by President Vladimir Putin in his state of the nation address on March 1, 2018, and reflect Russia's long-term efforts to develop hypersonic weapons, particularly as a response to U.S. missile defense efforts.
Although seeming to catch the U.S. public by surprise, the development of the Avangard can be traced back to the Albatross project started in the late 1980s as part of the Soviet response to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. NPO Mashinostroyeniya performed several tests of the Yu-70 prototype in 1990-92, until the program was put on hiatus amid the dissolution of the Soviet Union, says Markus Schiller, founder of ST Analytics and a Germany-based consultant on hypersonic technology. The Yu-70 project was revived shortly after Putin assumed power in 2000, leading to a series of test flights in 2001-11. The Avangard HGV is based on an improved version known as the Yu-71, which performed a series of tests in 2013-18, Schiller says.
The development of hypersonic weapons also reflects Russia's interest in developing a robust conventional long-range precision-strike capability as part of its wider military modernization efforts. It is developing and deploying both nuclear and conventionally armed hypersonic weapons, including dual-capable systems, to undertake tactical and strategic roles.
In addition to the Avangard and Kinzhal, at least three more development programs are underway: the Zircon, GZUR (deriving from the Russian for “hypersonic guided missile”) and an air-launched weapon to arm the Sukhoi Su-57 Felon. The Avangard is an ICBM-launched HGV, initially equipping the UR-100N, a modernized version of the SS-19, and might equip the developmental SS-X-29 Sarmat (Satan 2). The Avangard is reportedly capable of attaining speeds in excess of Mach 20, can maneuver laterally and in altitude, and can travel intercontinental distances.
Although principally intended as a nuclear system, the Avangard can reportedly also be used in the conventional strike role. The Kinzhal is a dual-capable, air-launched derivative of the Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile, with a range of 2,000 km (1,250 mi.) and a speed of Mach 10. It is being deployed with a modified variant of the Mikoyan MiG-31, the MiG-31K, and may be integrated with other aircraft, including reportedly the Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire.
Russia is also developing a scramjet-powered HCM, the 3K22 Zircon, which will be capable of speeds up to Mach 9, have a range in excess of 1,000 km, and operate in the land attack and anti-ship roles. The Zircon will be compatible with existing launchers capable of launching the Oniks supersonic cruise missile, such as the UKSK vertical launch system. It is due to enter service in 2022. A Zircon was successfully test-fired from the new frigate Admiral Gorshkov in February 2020.
Following the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Putin announced the development of a ground-launched Zircon variant. The GZUR is reported to be an air-launched missile capable of a speed of Mach 6, a range of 1,500 km and sized to fit within the bomb bay of a Tupolev Tu-95MS Bear. It may enter service in the early 2020s. In this regard, Russian media reports in May noted the testing of a new hypersonic missile from a Tu-22M3 that is intended to arm the modernized Tu-22M3M. Another hypersonic missile is reported to be under development and intended to equip the Su-57.
China has thus far only confirmed one hypersonic weapon, the DF-17. Its pursuit of hypersonic weapons is driven by the requirements to counter U.S. missile defenses and acquire a robust precision-strike capability as part of its wider efforts to develop “world-class” armed forces. The DF-17 is a conventionally armed medium-range ballistic missile (potentially derived from the DF-16), equipped with an HGV, with a range of 1,800-2,500 km. When it debuted at China's National Day Parade on Oct. 1, it was announced as being intended for “precision strikes against medium- and close-range targets.”
In testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee this March, U.S. Air Force Gen. Terrence O'Shaughnessy, commander of U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, stated that China is testing an intercontinental HGV. It is likely that the DF-41, China's new ICBM that also debuted at the October 2019 National Day Parade, would be armed with the new HGV. O'Shaughnessy's testimony appeared to echo public statements in 2014 by Lee Fuell, who was then in Air Force intelligence and linked China's HGV development program to plans for that country's nuclear arsenal.
China is developing the technologies required for HCMs. For example, in May 2018, a scramjet test vehicle, the Lingyun-1, was publicly exhibited for the first time in Beijing, while in August 2018 China successfully tested a hypersonic waverider test vehicle, the XingKong-2, which attained a speed of Mach 6. Notably, in April 2019, Xiamen University successfully flew the Jiageng-1 test vehicle, which employed a “double waverider” configuration. Interest in developing an air-launched hypersonic strike capability has also been noted. China is also believed to be developing two ALBMs, which would provide China with a near-term air-launched hypersonic strike capability.
The new CJ-100, which also debuted at China's 2019 National Day Parade, warrants mention. Aside from the statement that the weapon offers “long range, high precision and quick responsiveness,” no technical information on the CJ-100 has been officially released. The South China Morning Post, citing the Chinese publication Naval and Merchant Ships, suggests the CJ-100 has a cruising speed of Mach 4 and top speed of Mach 4.5, adding that it employs a two-stage configuration utilizing a rocket booster and ramjets. Given China's progress in developing hypersonic technologies, the possibility that the CJ-100 is a hypersonic cruise missile cannot be dismissed.
In a further indication of China's progress in the development of hypersonic technologies, in January 2019 it was reported that an indigenous Turbine-Based Combined-Cycle engine had completed its design and development phase and was proceeding to the aircraft integration test phase.
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13 septembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial
Massive simulation shows the need for speed in multi-domain ops
FORT BENNING, Ga. – The Army tested its current and future equipment and warfighting methods for the potential next war in a massive, weeks-long simulated experiment that wrapped up recently. The Unified Challenge 19.2 experiment in August involved more than 400 participants working with 55 formations, 64 concepts and 150 capabilities, said Col. Mark Bailey, chief of the Army's Futures and Concepts Center's Joint Army Experimentation Division. The exercise ran Aug. 5-23. The simulation allowed Army leaders to “understand some of the complex patterns” that come out of the very complex systems that the United States and its adversaries are using, or developing to use, in future scenarios, Bailey told reporters this week. Much of what was tested couldn't be done in the real world because it hasn't been invented yet. For example, the Army's priorities in the Cross Functional Teams, from Future Vertical Lift to the Next Generation Combat Vehicle, are years away from fielding their platforms to the force, but through mathematical models and algorithms, researchers can plug in the day and play out a very detailed set of events. And the scope of the experiment dove deeper than what a typical tabletop exercise or wargaming scenario might. It allowed experimenters to see down to the small unit level and all the way up to the division and corps level what would likely play out if those formations collided with a near-peer competitor on foreign turf in a battle for territory. Chris Willis, the chief of the Maneuver Battle Lab's Model and Simulations Branch, said that for the first time, experimenters were able to use “nonlethal effects” in a simulation — electronic jamming, cyber-attacks and other methods — to support maneuver warfighting. That helped them gather data on concepts that Army leaders have been considering and theorizing about for years. But the multi-domain operations tools that were used in simulation were not being flung about the simulated battle space by random privates. Currently, the experiments look at having commanders below the brigade level aware of what MDO tools are at their disposal and how to get access to them when needed from higher echelons, which would likely house them. “The brigade would get access to some effects but those wouldn't rest inside of the brigade proper,” said Col. Chris Cassibry, director of the Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate's Concepts Development Division. Cassibry emphasized that at this stage it's more important for the brigade commander to understand what's happening across the battlefield and use those effects to execute maneuver. For instance, the idea is that by enabling space and cyber assets, ground forces can have more freedom to maneuver. That was assumed to be the case but the complex simulation has put some data behind the concept for researchers to now analyze. A lot of what presented challenges that will consume commanders of the future was creating “windows of domain superiority,” Bailey said. Converging effects The basic plan is to converge effects, fires or non-kinetic or other types, which create that window. Commanders can plan for that and they do. But to do that at the speed that leaders believe MDO will unfold presents a whole other set of challenges. “Things happen so fast you must have this flexibility to do that in a moment's notice so that when you identify a target on a battlefield and don't have the artillery tube in range you have to quickly identify what else you have in range to hit that target,” Bailey said. And also, to understand that even if you switch “guns” quickly enough to another asset, drone, missile, electronic warfare, that means the new tool you've chosen will now not be used on another quickly emerging target or threat. That's where artificial intelligence must fill the gap, by offering up those menus of options for commanders and identifying the targets so that the human can then fire. Unified Challenge is a twice a year event; this was the second. Though it provides a lot of data, it's not something easily replicable. That means that in the near term, smaller experiments will unfold using some of the lessons learned from the larger experiment, further refining concepts and next steps on many of the ways in which the Army goes after MDO. The next step will be for the Futures and Concepts Center to compile a report of lessons learned and recommendations moving forward with some of the platforms, capabilities and doctrine. That will be delivered to the center director in the coming months, and once approved, spread across the Army to inform smaller scale experiments with portions of the larger effort to develop MDO doctrine and materiel, Bailey said. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/09/12/massive-simulation-shows-the-need-for-speed-in-multi-domain-ops
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14 septembre 2021 | International, C4ISR
La rapidité du traitement de données, clé des combats aériens futurs
Le Figaro a recueilli les propos du général Lavigne, chef d'état-major de l'armée de l'Air et de l'Espace (CEMAAE), récemment nommé commandant suprême «Transformation» de l'OTAN, ainsi que du général Brown, chef d'état-major de l'US Air Force. Les deux généraux ont confié leur vision du futur des conflits armés, qui implique « rapidité » et « imbrication » accrues. Que ce soit dans des zones soumises à un « déni d'accès » compte tenu de l'étendue des défenses sol-air, ou dans un conflit de « haute intensité », l'aviation « aura toujours un rôle clé à jouer », insiste le général Lavigne. « Nous devons être prêts individuellement, technologiquement supérieurs et certains d'aller plus vite que nos adversaires», ajoute-t-il, avant d'indiquer: « nous devons travailler notre boucle OODA (Observer, Orienter, Décider, Agir) ». En compressant toujours plus les quatre temps de la tactique militaire, les armées occidentales ont progressivement acquis une supériorité sur leurs adversaires. Mais dans des armées toujours plus technologiques, l'enjeu se complexifie. « Nous devons gérer les données plus rapidement », souligne le général Lavigne. Le Figaro du 14 septembre