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  22 juillet 2020 | International, C4ISR

  The Army’s new directorate eyes multidomain integration

  Mark Pomerleau WASHINGTON — The Army has created a new entity within is operations and plans directorate, G-3/5/7, to focus on non-physical capabilities and better ready the service for multidomain operations. The new directorate, Department of the Army's Management Office-Strategic Operations (DAMO-SO), was created about six months ago and replaces DAMO-CY, which focused primarily on cyberspace operations. The organization now encompasses cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, space, enterprise IT networks, tactical communications networks, data architectures and artificial intelligence. “We're an organization that pulls together a lot of the multidomain operating capabilities. Things like cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, space,” Brig. Gen. Martin Klein, director of DAMO-SO, told C4ISRNET in a July 20 interview. “We're also bringing into the directorate the capabilities of really underwriting the Army's ability to digitally transform into this new era ... Part of what we've been asked to do is underwrite multidomain operations and then to digitally enable our warfighting systems.” The office will serve as the Army point of contact for joint initiatives with the other services, namely Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). Klein said his organization is the Army's lead entity for the JADC2 cross functional team. The team will also work with the Air Force in experimenting with its Advanced Battle Management System, which is considered an early possibility for the JADC2 program. “One of the tenets of multidomain operations is the recognition that we fight and win as a joint force,” he said. “A lot of what I do, frankly, is develop capabilities with the Army but coordinate those capabilities throughout our sister services to make sure that we can fight and win certainly in the competition space ... in conflict if it should arise.” Additionally, the team will work to standardize data and data architectures within the Army and joint force to ensure interoperability. But a key distinction between the predecessor organization and the newly formed office was the importance of space, Klein said. “As the Army looked at the Multidomain Task Force and, in particular, how to win in multidomain contested operations, we came to the realization of how interdependent our space-based capabilities are,” he explained. One of the key premises to the office was the notion of better posturing the Army in the competition phase against near peer adversaries that are seeking to exploit the so-called gray zone below the threshold of armed conflict. The new office works as an integrator across the Army – especially within the G-3/5/7 – of how offices can better organize, restructure or resource these non-kinetic capabilities. Along with Army Futures Command, it also looks at emerging capabilities and, with the various program executive offices, examines what capabilities are needed now. “What we primarily do is we address this capability through a policy lens, but we also go forward and do resourcing ... we work with a strategy team here in the Army G-3/5/7 to make sure that competition and conflict strategies are deconflicted and we certainly work without operational folks ... to make sure when we go through a plan and when we mobilize ... that we have the right organizations within our cyber, electronic warfare and our information operations space,” Klein said. Klein said he was tasked to keep his finger on the pulse of the emerging multidomain concept as others across the Army look at how the Army will fight in 2028 and beyond. In doing so, his outfit will make recommendations regarding force structure changes or capabilities that could be endorsed by the Army. “End to end, we're developing a desired capability that our chief and that our secretary of defense need in order to fight and win against a near peer adversary,” he said. DAMO-SO will participate in upcoming exercises and advise on combat training center rotations to ensure units are defending against these non-kinetic tools that can cripple communications. One exercise includes the forthcoming Project Convergence, a data sharing test and experiment to take place in the fall. “It's really bringing long range precision fires, weapon systems and some of our modernization efforts together under the rubric of a data enabled cloud orchestrated system to be able to do the experimentation necessary,” he said. Ultimately, Klein said he hopes the office will provide a great benefit. “As that lead integrator, we can bring multiple perspectives from multiple different vantage points all the way form strategic down to the tactical to make sure that 0 as we're developing these capabilities, as we're exercising and as we're coming up with new things of use in the existing systems - we get back best practices,” he said. https://www.c4isrnet.com/smr/information-warfare/2020/07/21/the-armys-new-directorate-eyes-multidomain-integration/

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  16 juillet 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  The key to securing the defense industrial base is collaboration

  Teresa Shea With cyber threats constantly evolving and increasing in sophistication, a strong national cybersecurity posture has never been more important. COVID-19 is causing an uncertainty across industry sectors, and criminals as well as adversaries are increasing their cyber-attacks and taking advantage of our increased digital work from home dependence. It is especially important to protect the organizations that comprise the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. Defined as the “worldwide industrial complex that enables research and development, as well as design, production, delivery, and maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and components or parts, to meet U.S. military requirements,” Defense industrial base networks host mission-critical information and operational assets vital to national security. If infiltrated, the ramifications could plague the U.S. national security strategy, hamper our warfighting edge, create chaos within the critical infrastructure and ultimately undermine adversary deterrence. To effectively protect the Defense Industrial Base, the government and private sector must both work to secure the U.S. critical infrastructure. Organizations should prioritize collaboration to bolster the nation's cyber resiliency and collectively defend against malicious cyber actors' intent on doing us harm. Proactively defend networks It's widely known that, in an ideal world, organizations should stop threats before they reach their targets. However, to deter effectively, organizations need to have real-time situational awareness of their network infrastructure and supply chain, which can be a difficult undertaking. Threat intelligence information sharing between the government and the private sector companies that comprise the Defense Industrial Base is essential to achieving a strategic view of an advanced threat actor. Today, targets can only know what is happening to their own assets without insight into the attacker's intent. The Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Program allows both the DoD and private companies to share cyber threat information, mitigation and remediation strategies, which helps key players in both sectors increase cyber situational awareness and be more proactive in their security efforts. However, this program is currently voluntary, meaning that the crucial information uncovered within the program is only available to those who proactively join the program. Moving forward, both the public and private sectors must work to enact policies that require collaboration. It is no longer acceptable to rely on incident response protocols, performance assessments of existing systems and one-off reactions to threats without coordination. Increased information sharing is key to staying one step ahead of our adversaries. Follow government-suggested guidelines The U.S. government has dedicated time and resources to help secure the Defense Industrial Base, and organizations must act upon the recommendations provided. Earlier this year, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission released a report on the U.S. government's cyber readiness, which found that “the U.S. is currently not designed to act with the speed and agility necessary to defend the country in cyberspace.” The commission's findings place an emphasis on protecting the Defense Industrial Base's intellectual property, and called on Congress to require that these firms share threat data with the DoD and conduct threat hunting on their networks. Both sharing threat data and conducting threat hunting are proven to result in increased defense of our networks. A secure future As noted in a recent LawFare blog, “Cyber-enabled intellectual property theft from the DIB and adversary penetration of DIB networks and systems pose an existential threat to U.S. national security.” Given the abundance of cyber-attacks focused on Defense Industrial Base networks, penetrating them is high on our adversaries' target list. They're currently zeroing in on the U.S. critical infrastructure, attempting to poach the intellectual property that secures our very nation. Until we are willing to come together across sectors to share threat data, and commit to hiring strong talent, we will remain at a disadvantage. Fundamentally, it is about trust and our ability to put the greater defense above individual interests. If accomplished, the U.S. cybersecurity posture and resiliency will remain strong, deterring malicious cyberattacks against our Defense Industrial Base. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/07/15/the-key-to-securing-the-defense-industrial-base-is-collaboration/

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  20 février 2024 | International, Terrestre

  DND cyber force hindered by lack of staff and training, assessment team warns

  Canadian military’s cyber force is being hindered by a lack of staff and training, according to an internal review.