Northrop Grumman Delivering Next Generation Ammunition Capability to US Army

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  21 janvier 2021 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  After huge hack, Biden security picks want more cyber coordination with industry

  Andrew Eversden WASHINGTON — Two top national security nominees advocated Tuesday for stronger federal cybersecurity and increased collaboration with contractors in the aftermath of a supply chain breach that infiltrated numerous federal agencies. If confirmed, retired Army Gen. Lloyd Austin and Avril Haines, President-elect Joe Biden's nominees for defense secretary and director of national intelligence, respectively, would start their jobs in the middle of the national security community's assessment of damage from a cybersecurity breach pinned on Russian hackers. They gained access through software from SolarWinds, a major government contractor. “We must elevate cybersecurity as an imperative across the government in order to defend the American people and U.S. critical infrastructure,” Austin told the Senate Armed Services Committee in his answers to the lawmaker's advance policy questions. “Additionally, the government must continue to strengthen its partnership with the private sector to foster greater information sharing and collaboration.” So far, federal investigators have discovered breaches at “fewer than 10” federal agencies, though the Pentagon and intelligence community haven't confirmed whether their offices were among the victims. Haines, who served as deputy CIA director and deputy national security adviser to President Barack Obama, found it concerning that the breach first came to light through cybersecurity company FireEye, instead of through U.S. government cybersecurity operators. “[I] absolutely share ... concern that we're actually able to detect these because that's obviously absolutely critical to us protecting against them,” Haines said before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “I think ... it was pretty alarming that we found out about it through a private company as opposed to our being able to detect it ourselves to begin with.” In response to the breach, Austin committed to reviewing the DoD's cyber posture and emphasized that Russia must be punished for infiltrating federal networks. In the advance questions, Austin stopped short of calling the breach an act of war, arguing that designation “requires a case-by-case and fact-specific determination.” “For example, malicious cyber activities could result in injury, death or significant property destruction,” Austin wrote. “These activities would need to be considered in their totality.” An early January announcement from several federal investigators, including the NSA and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, stated that the breach was believed to be an espionage campaign and “likely Russian in origin.” “If that's the case, I think Russia should be held accountable,” Austin said at the hearing. “That's my personal belief.” Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., who sits on both SASC and SSCI, called the breach “the greatest cyber intrusion in the history, I think, perhaps, of the world” and said that the stovepiped nature of the U.S. national security apparatus needed to be addressed. Reed said one challenge for Haines will be developing a “more coherent, cohesive, integrated approach” to dealing with cybersecurity threats, particularly from advanced nation-state actors. Under questioning from senators, Haines said the SolarWinds supply chain hack was a “grave threat,” and the government needs new to improve its defenses against such attacks, though she noted that she hasn't received a classified briefing on the intrusion. In 2019, a report from ODNI warned of growing software supply chain hacks that provide an “efficient way to bypass traditional defenses and compromise a large number of computers.” “To prevent a recurrence of this kind of attack, we need to close the gap between where our capabilities are now and where they need to be in order to deter, detect, disrupt and respond to such intrusions far more effectively in the future,” Haines wrote in her questionnaire. “If confirmed as DNI, I will review the expert conclusions from the SolarWinds incident and the current intelligence about supply chain vulnerabilities and what steps may be taken to address any vulnerabilities.” Haines told senators that she would assess how the intelligence community can improve its cybersecurity partnerships with industry and the whole federal government. “I believe that the IC plays an integral role in detecting and warning against nation-state targeting of U.S. networks and infrastructure,” she wrote. “If confirmed, I will examine how better collaboration between the IC and the rest of the U.S. government, coupled with closer partnerships with the private sector and our international allies, can enhance our ability to deter, detect, and mitigate cyberattacks.” Haines will review whether the intelligence community is allocating resources properly to face advanced cyber threats and will examine the adequacy of the IC's existing authorities to protect the digital infrastructure of the United States, she said. Austin pointed to a cyber-threat sharing partnership the department has with the defense industrial base and stated that the department should “continue to look for ways to better integrate with interagency partners and the private sector.” In light of the SolarWinds breach, the senators on SSCI wrote that they are worried about a “lack of mandatory threat information sharing between the private sector and government,” adding that any information sharing from the private sector after the breach is voluntary. Haines would review the relationship. “Information sharing between the IC and the private sector is increasingly important to ensure that our data systems and networks are secure,” she wrote. “If confirmed as DNI, I look forward to reviewing the Intelligence Community's data sharing and information exchange relationship with the private sector, to engaging with IC experts and private sector leaders on what information is currently being shared, and to examining the efficacy of the current framework for sharing threat information.” The incoming Biden administration has signaled that it will prioritize cybersecurity in the aftermath of the SolarWinds breach. The Biden team named Anne Neuberger, the NSA's cybersecurity director who worked to improve information sharing with the private sector, to National Security Council as deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology. Haines wrote that she will “ensure” that the intelligence community has a “robust data sharing and information exchange relationship” with private companies and said that she will be “studying current information sharing to determine how it can be improved and what types of information can be shared to enhance cybersecurity protections.” “The private sector has unique insight and expertise on malicious activity occurring within its networks,” Haines said. “Real-time integration of private sector and government data could lead to more effective prevention and mitigation outcomes.” Cyber norms and deterrence For the last few years, the U.S. government wrestled with the concept of deterrence in the cyber domain, a complex challenge that including resilient defenses, risk management and strong international partnerships. As the SolarWinds breach demonstrated, deterring adversaries from hacking, which is seen as below the threshold of an armed response, is difficult. In response to a question from Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, about how to approach cyber deterrence, Haines pointed to many of the same tenets of current U.S. cyber deterrence, including imposition of costs for malicious actors' behavior, bringing foreign allies together to impose those costs, building resilient systems that are hard to hack, developing norms and creating strong relationship with the private sector. Haines wrote that setting norms should include outlining sanctionable behavior with the agreement from allies. A cornerstone to sanctioning is attributing cyberattacks to actors, a challenging undertaking in the cyber realm. Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., said he wanted Haines to be more forthcoming with attribution of cyberattacks, stating that he found it “extraordinarily concerning” that the “[Trump] White House underplay[ed] attribution on Russia.” Attribution, Haines said, would be a major piece of the ODNI's role in deterrence. “Something we [ODNI] can do is promote the ability to detect when adversaries are engaging in such activity so as then to provide information about attribution, for example. And then hold adversaries to account through that.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2021/01/20/after-huge-hack-biden-security-picks-want-more-cyber-coordination-with-industry

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  20 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Northrop receives $2.4B contract for two missile defense satellites

  Nathan Strout The U.S. Space Force has awarded Northrop Grumman a $2.375 billion contract for two Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared satellites that will help provide ballistic missile warning for the military. Next Gen OPIR is to replace the Space-Based Infrared System, a crucial part of the nation's missile defense architecture. Utilizing infrared sensors, the satellites will be able to detect and track ballistic missile threats while being more survivable than the legacy system. The Space and Missile Systems Center plans to have five satellites in the constellation: three geosynchronous satellites built by Lockheed Martin, and two polar satellites being built by Northrop Grumman. Northrop Grumman was initially awarded a $47 million contract for system and payload requirements analysis and risk reduction for the two polar vehicles in June 2018. The $2.4 billion contract modification issued May 18 provides for Phase One design and development, the procurement of critical flight hardware, and risk-reduction efforts leading to critical design review. At this time, $70.5 million is being released. Work is expected to be completed by December 2025. Meanwhile, Lockheed is developing the three geosynchronous Next Gen OPIR space vehicles. That company was awarded $2.9 billion in August 2018 to begin work on the satellites, leading to critical design review. In October 2019, the Space and Missile Systems Center announced the system had passed preliminary design review. The Air Force has accelerated the timeline for Next Gen OPIR to get the first satellite delivered in 2025. That's required more money up front than initially expected, which was provided through a series of reprogramming requests in 2019. That became a source of tension between competing versions of the annual defense budgets in the House and Senate last year, but SMC credited that reprogramming with keeping Next Gen OPIR on track. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/05/19/northrop-grumman-receives-24-billion-for-two-missile-defense-satellites

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  8 octobre 2019 | International, Terrestre

  Bradley Replacement: Army Risks Third Failure In A Row

  With the surprise disqualification of the Raytheon-Rheinmetall Lynx, the Army has effectively left itself with one competitor for the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, General Dynamics -- unless the Pentagon or Congress intervene. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. WASHINGTON: Experts fear the Army has undermined a top priority program, the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, by disqualifying one of the only two remaining competitors for not delivering its prototype on time. “I cannot believe that is the reason,” said a baffled Thomas Spoehr, a retired three-star who headed the Army's program analysis & evaluation office. There must be, he told me this morning, some more profound problem driving this decision: “Nobody wants to have this major program go forward with only one competitor.” The news was broken by our colleague Jen Judson on Friday and confirmed to us by several sources. The Army declined official comment. Manufacturer Rheinmetall could not physically ship their Lynx-41 prototype from Germany to the US — which is strange, since they've managed to do so before — by the October first deadline. While some Army officials were willing to offer them an extension, the recently created Army Futures Command refused. That leaves General Dynamics, offering an all-new design we describe below, as the sole competitor for the Engineering & Manufacturing Design (EMD) contract to be awarded early next year. A crucial caveat: Winning EMD does not guarantee General Dynamics will win the production contract, which will be awarded in 2023 in a competition open to all comers. But any 2023 contender would have to refine their design at their own expense, without the constant feedback from the Army that comes with being on the EMD contract. That's a hard risk for a board to justify, given GD's advantage. And without a second competitor, all the Army's eggs are in the basket of GD succeeding, with no backup. “I strongly suspect that [General Dynamics] has done a great job of tailoring a solution, developed over time through successes in other programs, for exactly what the US Army wants,” as expressed in roughly 100 detailed and rigid requirements, said George Mason scholar Jim Hasik. But, he said, that doesn't mean what the Army thinks it wants is the right solution, or that GD will deliver on budget and schedule. “I would prefer that two or three contractors were proceeding to some trials of truth at Aberdeen in some months,” Hasik told me. “I do not single out GDLS; I just expect lower likelihood of success in non-competitive contracting. Any given bid may have problems of which even the bidder does not know.” The timing of this news is particularly painful for the Army, because thousands of soldiers, contractors, and media will be heading to Washington for next-week's huge Association of the US Army conference. One of the highlights of last year's show was the Lynx prototype. Why? Disqualifying the Lynx doesn't make sense, said Spoehr, who as head of national defense studies at the Heritage Foundation has long urged the Army to replace its M2 Bradley troop carrier and other 1980s-vintage armored vehicle designs. “I have to believe the Army will take another look at this situation,” Spoehr said. Or, maybe not. The decision to disqualify the Rheinmetall-Raytheon team for missing the deadline is arguably, “the correct one when you consider schedule is the priority,” an industry source told me. But maybe schedule shouldn't be the priority, the source went on, because the current timeline — fielding the first combat-ready unit by 2026 — doesn't permit much innovation. “The vehicle they are asking for will not be significantly better than the current Bradley.” (General Dynamics disputes this hotly, not surprisingly, as we detail later in this story). “I think the Army is pretty short-sighted,” the industry source said. “Personally, I don't see how the program survives in future budgets.” Even before this news broke, skeptical Senate appropriators had already cut funding for Army Next Generation Combat Vehicles in their draft of the defense spending bill, although the House has not. But with the Hill so roiled by impeachment that it's unclear legislators will even be able to pass the annual defense bills — which were already headed for closed-door conferences in any case — we've not been able to get any but the most noncommittal comment from Congress. We'll update this story or write a sequel when we hear from the Hill. The underlying anxiety here is that the Army has tried and failed repeatedly to modernize its Reagan-era arsenal over the past 30 years — the problem Army Futures Command was created to fix. Armored fighting vehicle programs, above all replacements for the Bradley troop carrier, have been particularly fraught. The Future Combat Systems family of vehicles, which included a lightweight Bradley replacement, was canceled in 2009, while the Ground Combat Vehicle, a better-armored and correspondingly heavier Bradley replacement, was cancelled in 2014. The Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle is the Army's third swing at this ball. That puts tremendous pressure on Army Futures Command and General Dynamics to deliver. Their balancing act is to make something different and better enough it's worth replacing the Bradley instead of just upgrading it again, without taking on so much new technology that the program risks major delays and overruns. The Army's modernization director for Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Brig. Gen. Richard Ross Coffman, spoke to me Friday just before the news broke about Rheinmetall. While he didn't speak to the number of competitors, he did emphasize that a company that doesn't win an Engineering & Manufacturing Design contract can still compete for Low-Rate Initial Production. “The LRIP award is FY23,” Coffman said. “That's a free and open competition. So let's say you didn't have the time or didn't feel you had the money ... to compete starting on 1 October, you can further mature your product, you can test that product, and then enter back in to the competition in '23.” We Have A Winner (By Default)? Assuming General Dynamics does win the production contract in 2023, what will their vehicle look like? It will not resemble the Griffin III concept vehicle that vied with the Lynx on the floor of last year's Association of the US Army mega-conference, company officials told me. In fact, they said, the GD OMFV shares no major components with the ASCOD/Ajax lineage of combat vehicles, widely used in Europe, on whose proven chassis and automotive systems GD build its Griffin series, including its offering for the Army's Mobile Protected Firepower light tank. “The suspension is a totally new design. The engine and transmission are totally different. Drive train is different. Exhaust placement is different,” Keith Barclay, director of global strategy for General Dynamics Land Systems, said in an interview. (The core of the engine is the same as MPF, but not the configuration, cooling, or transmission). That's remarkable because Army leaders had said they were willing to go with a proven, pre-existing chassis to reduce risk, as long as the weapons and electronics were cutting-edge. As with many weapons programs, the Army plans to field OMFV in successively more advanced increments: Increment 1 will only have to meet minimum or “threshold” requirements, while Increment 2 will go after higher “objective” requirements. “One of the problems we had with previous ground vehicle programs was we always tried to reach for technology that wasn't mature,” Coffman told me. “Now we've set the objective to those technologies that are on the cusp of maturation, so that if it does mature ... we can achieve[it] in Increment 2.” Barclay and other GD execs told me this morning that the prototype they just delivered to the Army already meets some of the objective requirements for Increment 2, particularly for the gun and fire control. (They declined to offer more specifics). Meeting those requirements was what drove the all-new design. “It had to be designed from the inside out,” Barclay told me. “Modifying an existing platform would not work.” That said, Barclay went on, this is not new unproven tech. “These are very high Technological Readiness Level (TRL) components that have been through quite a bit of testing, and we've just packaged them and designed them... into a new configuration.” (Of course, “quite a bit of testing” isn't the same as actually being deployed on hundreds of vehicles in Spanish, Austrian, and — soon — British service, as was the case for many of the Griffin's components). While the GD OMFV's components aren't the same as those on the ASCOD/Ajax/Griffin series, they do build on that experience, Barclay said, as well as on decades of General Dynamics R&D for the cancelled FCS and GCV programs. What's New? So what are the innovations in the GD OMFV that make it a significant improvement over an upgraded Bradley? Most visible from the outside is the weapon, the one component the OMFV shares with the Griffin III prototype at AUSA last year. It's a new 50mm quick-firing cannon, largely developed by the Army's Armaments Center, which is many times more powerful than the 25mm on the Bradley or the 30mm weapons on many Russian vehicles. Whereas the Bradley gunner and commander sit in the turret, the OMFV's turret is unmanned, remote-controlled from a well-protected and well-connected crew compartment in the hull. In fact, from the crew's perspective inside the vehicle, the most visible difference will probably be how much better their visibility is. Traditional armored vehicles rely on narrow viewports and periscopic sights, making them half-blind behemoths on the battlefield. But massive investments by the automotive industry — from backup cameras to self-driving cars — have driven down the cost and size of sensors. GD boasts their OMFV design offers “360 degree situational awareness” from cameras all around the vehicle. The sensor feeds are visible from screens at not only the crew stations but in the passenger area, so the infantry can know what kind of situation they may have to clamber out into. Currently, the vehicle is configured for three crew and five infantry soldiers, the same as the Bradley and the Army's minimum requirement for OMFV. (The seats are designed to buffer blasts from mines and roadside bombs). But all eight seats are together in the hull, rather than having some in the turret, and each crew station can control any function, rather than each being specially hard-wired for the commander, gunner, and driver respectively. So GD expects that, as automation technology improves, it'll be possible to go down to just two crewmembers, freeing up a seat for a sixth passenger. That ability to upgrade electronics is perhaps the single most important, if subtle, improvement over the Bradley. Designed in the 1970s and repeatedly upgraded since, the Bradley has repeatedly run into the limits of its electrical system. Troops in Iraq often had to turn equipment on and off because they couldn't run all of it at once. The Army is now increasing the Bradley's power, and they're even retrofitting it with an Active Protection System that uses electricity-hungry radars to detect and shoot down incoming anti-tank missiles. But the OMFV will have Active Protection as standard equipment, rather than tacked on. And the all-new design lets GD build in the power, wiring, and — most crucial — the standardized interfaces (aka a Modular Open Systems Architecture) to make future electronic upgrades much easier, from anti-missile jammers to reconnaissance mini-drones to AI-assisted targeting systems. “We have looked to the future about what power requirements will be,” Barclay told me. Their vehicle, he said, has “electrical power, both high voltage and low voltage, that will allow myriad capabilities that you could not put onto an existing combat vehicle today in the Army's inventory.” https://breakingdefense.com/2019/10/bradley-replacement-army-risks-third-failure-in-a-row