Navy 30-year shipbuilding plan relies on more money, industry capacity

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  17 janvier 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Défense spatiale : les grandes lignes du rapport

  Par Yann Cochennec Les députés Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille viennent de remettre leur rapport sur la stratégie de défense spatiale dont la France doit se doter pour annihiler les menaces actuelles et futures. La France a décidé de se doter d'une stratégie de défense spatiale et la première étape est ce rapport que les députés Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille viennent de rendre devant la Commission de la Défense et des forces armées. L'incident du satellite espion russe en a été l'élément le plus médiatiquement visible et a servi d'accélérateur à une volonté qui était d'ores et déjà en gestation. Après la militarisation de l'espace, Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille soulignent dans leur rapport "l'arsenalisation de l'espace avec envoi et présence d'armes qui auront vocation à être utilisées dans le cadre d'un conflit". Le tout dans un contexte qui a changé : apparition de nouvelles puissances spatiales, l'arrivée de firmes privées sur le marché du spatial et la révolution "nano", soit la capacité de produire des satellites de plus en plus petits "pratiquement indétectables, qui peuvent être équipés d'une capacité de brouillage, d'écoute, de prise de contrôle cyber ou de charges explosives". Par conséquent : "défendre nos satellites civils comme militaires dans l'espace, être capable de voir, d'éviter, d'agir et de neutraliser un menace devient dès lors un enjeu de souveraineté nationale et européenne", soulignent Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille. Pour les auteurs du rapport, cette stratégie de défense spatiale devrait s'orienter autour de plusieurs axes. D'abord en renforçant les moyens de surveillance. Les systèmes de radars GRAVES et SATAM doivent "être complétés par de nouveaux développements" capables de suivre des engins "non-kepleriens" ou "très manoeuvrants et suivant des orbites non habituelles". Solution préconisée : deux nouveaux systèmes de radars de veille en orbite basse installés, l'un en métropole, l'autre en Guyane. Les rapporteurs préconisent aussi la mise en place "d'un système de surveillance des orbites géostationnaires" avec l'achat de trois télescopes supplémentaires (Polynésie, Nouvelle Calédonie) en plus du système TAROT du Cnes. "La surveillance de l'espace devra aussi pouvoir s'effectuer depuis l'espace : emport de capteurs d'approche sur nos satellites, mise en orbite de satellites patrouilleurs, surveillance de nos satellites par un petit satellite de type "chien de garde". Deuxième axe : la capacité de neutraliser une menace dans l'espace. Les deux parlementaires préconisent, plutôt que l'usage de missiles anti-satellites, de développer de nouvelles technologies : laser ionique "affectant les capteurs qui équipent les voies haute résolution visibles du satellite en le rendant momentanément inopérant, laser classique permettant de détruire chirurgicalement un équipement donné d'un satellite; moyens cyber pour brouiller ou détourner un satellite, bras articulés montés sur un satellite ou une mini-navette permettant d'arrimer un satellite hostile, de le dévier de son orbite et de l'envoyer vers les confins du système solaire. Enfin, pour être en capacité de poursuivre les missions "en cas de neutralisation de nos propres satellites", les auteurs proposent les dispositions suivantes : développement de constellations de satellites, "développement de moyens de lancement très rapides de fusées emportant un satellite à partir de drones spéciaux de type ALTAIR développé par l'Onera ou de type Pegasus de Dassault", développement "de pseudo-satellites de haute altitude capables de rendre des services équivalents à un satellite de basse altitude", de type Stratobus de Thales Alenia Space ou Zephyr d'Airbus Defense & Space. Pour mettre en place cette stratégie, le rapport propose la création d'une "Force spatiale" sous l'autorité directe du Chef d'état-major des Armées ainsi que d'une "Haute Autorité de Défense Spatiale" placée directement sous l'autorité du Premier Ministre en lien direct avec le ministre des Armées. http://www.air-cosmos.com/defense-spatiale-les-grandes-lignes-du-rapport-119321

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  2 octobre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, Sécurité

  AeroVironment debuts bigger, anti-armor loitering missile

  Jen Judson CORRECTION - Blackwing is a reconnaissance system. The dash speed of the Switchblade 600 is 115 mph. WASHINGTON — Building on its Switchblade 300 loitering missile legacy with the U.S. Army, AeroVironment is releasing a family of capabilities to include its new Switchblade 600, a larger version suited to go up against armored targets at greater ranges in denied and degraded environments. AeroVironment has provided the tube-launched, rucksack-portable Switchblade to the Army for roughly a decade, delivering thousands of them into theater, but the company sealed the largest loitering munitions deal to date with the service in May — a $146 million contract, funded at $76 million for the first year, to supply the 300 version of the system for the Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile Systems program. “Our family of loitering missile systems is redefining and disrupting a multibillion-dollar missiles market,” AeroVironment CEO Wahid Nawabi told reporters during a Sept. 30 media event. The family also includes Blackwing, a loitering reconnaissance system that can be deployed from a submarine while submerged and used in an underwater air-delivery canister. “The ability to identify a threat on the battlefield, assess it, neutralize the threat with an extremely high degree of precision, with low to no collateral damage, while always having the option of waving off the mission and reengaging the same or different target, is at the core of our solution sets and capabilities,” Nawabi said, “and we're going beyond that.” Department of Defense customers wanted the same features of the 300, but with greater effects, Todd Hanning, AeroVironment's product line manager for tactical missile systems, said during the same event. “The 600 delivers with enhanced effects, greater standoff range and extended endurance,” Hanning said. “This all-in-one, man-portable solution includes everything required to successfully launch, fly, track and engage non-line-of-sight targets with lethal effects.” The 50-pound system can be set up and operational in less than 10 minutes and is designed to be capable of launching from ground, air or mobile platforms, “providing superior force overmatch while minimizing exposure to enemy direct and indirect fires,” Hanning said. The new version can fly for 40 minutes with a range of more than 40 kilometers. The missile exceeds a 115 mph dash speed and carries an anti-armor warhead designed to neutralize armored vehicles without the need for external intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance or fires assets. The new system comes with a touchscreen tablet-based fire control system with an option to pilot the vehicle manually or autonomously. The missile is secured through onboard encrypted data links and Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module GPS. The Switchblade 600 is also equipped with a patented wave-off capability where operators can abort missions at any time and recommit. “From [artificial intelligence] to autonomy, we're not stopping there. We're investing in future technologies like edge computing and artificial intelligence engines, latest-gen processing with massive computing power,” Hanning said. “We believe it'll be the smartest loitering missile in the market.” AeroVironment began developing the 600 as a new class of loitering missiles to meet a set of requirements in an Army development program called Single Multi-Mission Attack Missile. But according to Brett Hush, the company's senior general manager of product line management for tactical missile systems, “we've evolved beyond that.” Other customers, including the U.S. Marine Corps and a “number of DoD customers,” have since adopted similar requirements, he said. “We've been developing very closely with a number of DoD customers,” Hush said, “The only one that we can talk about publicly at this point in time is the U.S. Marine Corps program, of which we are one of the competitors in the phase one development demonstration.” He added there would be a fly-off in January followed by a downselect to a single supplier. The company has had a rigorous test schedule over the past several years for the Switchblade 600, according to Hanning. Most of that testing was ground-launched against both fixed and moving targets. “I think we are up to about over 60 flights in our test program,” he added, "and we'll continue to do that through this next year. Then the 600 will progress into both maritime and aerial environments, Hanning said. AeroVironment is also continuing to find ways to integrate Switchblade into air and ground platforms. The company continues to team up with General Dynamics Land Systems to offer an integrated solution as part of its offering to the Army's Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle competition. AeroVironment is also teaming with Kratos Defense and Security Systems to demonstrate a “high-speed, long-range unmanned combat air vehicle” that serves as a mothership to deliver large quantities of Switchblade 300s that can provide a mesh network of information back to a ground control station “to tactically execute multiple attack scenarios cooperatively and to overwhelm and disable enemy systems,” Hanning said. Initial air-launch testing will begin at the start of next year, Hush said. While AeroVironment is not one of the initial companies developing capabilities within the Army's Future Vertical Lift Air-Launched Effects, or FVL ALE, portfolio, “we definitely see a way for AeroVironment to participate in that and really be a player in that market knowing that Switchblade 600 is definitely designed for air-launched effects, air-launched capability,” Hush said, “and that's something that we'll continue to work on and look at the opportunity to be a part of that effort. We definitely see its capabilities are directly aligned with that fight and with those platforms.” When asked if the company submitted an offering to the ALE development competition, Nawabi said: “I'm not in a position to be able to comment on the specific details due to the competitive nature of the deal, but we believe that we have a lot to offer for the ALE program and initiative as a whole. I will keep you updated in the future.” https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/10/01/aerovironment-debuts-bigger-anti-armor-loitering-missile/

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  7 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Europe must take on its own defense responsibilities

  By: Ian Bond As they look at the state of their coronavirus-hit economies and U.S. President Donald Trump's poor standing in opinion polls, many European leaders may be tempted to put on hold any plans to meet NATO's target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. But Europeans need to wake up. Trump is not a reliable ally, and the damage he has done to the trans-Atlantic partnership is likely to linger. Trump's hostility to NATO has been obvious since he called into question its Article 5 mutual defense guarantee during his last presidential campaign. We now know, according to former national security adviser John Bolton's tell-all memoir, that Trump was ready to pull the U.S. out of NATO at its 2018 summit. In recent weeks Trump announced without warning that the U.S. will withdraw 9,500 — more than one quarter — of the 34,500 troops it has stationed in Germany because the German government is not spending enough on defense. Then at a Washington press conference with Polish President Andrzej Duda, Trump said a large number of NATO countries were “delinquent” and declared that Europe was taking “tremendous advantage of the United States on trade.” Trump may not understand how NATO works or the value to the U.S. of having troops in Germany, but it is true that the U.S. carries a disproportionately large share of the financial burden of defending Europe. During his presidency, Barack Obama also accused Europe of being “complacent” about its own defense — though he was rather more diplomatic. Only a handful of European NATO members have met the alliance's target of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense over the past 20 years, while the U.S. has consistently exceeded it, spending 3.1-4.9 percent. But Europe's problem is not just the amount it spends on defense, but the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of its spending: Europeans get far too many systems and far too little military capability for their money. The European Commission's 2017 fact sheet on European defense reported that European Union member states operated 178 different major weapons systems; the U.S. had only 30. EU member states have 17 different types of main battle tank; the U.S. has one. This proliferation of weapons systems leads to high unit costs for short production runs, and a lack of interoperability. And European spending is not directed to ensuring that troops can fight when needed. The European members of NATO have almost 1.9 million active-duty troops, while the U.S. has 1.3 million and Russia about 900,000. But very few of the European forces can be deployed in a crisis. Politically and economically, this is a bad time to try to get European politicians to think seriously about increasing and rationalizing defense spending. The EU's economic forecast for spring 2020 foresees a contraction in real GDP of 7.4 percent this year, albeit followed by an increase of 6.1 percent in 2021. Some of Europe's biggest investors in defense are in NATO but not in the EU. The U.K. accounted for 16 percent of defense spending in Europe in 2019, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. But despite some early promise, Britain seems to have lost interest in any institutionalized cooperation with the EU on foreign and security policy. Relations between the EU and NATO member Turkey, which accounted for another 7 percent of European defense spending last year, have rarely been worse. Despite such difficulties, the fact that NATO and the EU are currently both reassessing the security environment presents an opportunity for a more joint approach. NATO is engaged in the #NATO2030 process, which Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg hopes will strengthen political consultation in the alliance. Meanwhile, by the end of 2020 the EU aims to complete a process to assess the threats it faces, which the bloc calls its “strategic compass.” These two efforts need to complement each other to produce a shared view of the threats to Europe, and the creation of a forum for political dialogue on security where European countries, regardless of whether they belong to both the EU and NATO, can discuss appropriate responses. Europe's ability to counter threats will depend on making its money go further by spending it efficiently, both nationally and multilaterally. The commission should do more to ensure that more defense procurement involves competitive tendering, rather than member states awarding contracts to national champions. But it should not try to shut defense firms from non-EU NATO countries out of the European market. The commission stands more chance of influencing the research and procurement decisions of member states if it has a substantial budget to dangle in front of them. It should keep pushing back against cuts proposed earlier in the year to the defense elements of the EU's next seven-year budget. And the commission needs to be more open to the participation of “friendly” countries in EU-funded programs. Joe Biden, a former U.S. vice president and a contender in the current presidential race, would be an easier president for Europeans to work with than Trump has been. But Biden's victory in November is not guaranteed. Moreover, the forces in U.S. society that propelled Trump to power in 2016 will still exist, and may return in 2024. Even if they would rather pretend that nothing is changing, the EU and as many non-EU, Europe-based NATO members as are willing to do so need to pay attention to Trump's message. And they need to start thinking about how to defend Europe and deter potential adversaries with reduced U.S. help. Ian Bond is the director of foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform think tank. He was a member of the British diplomatic service for 28 years, most recently serving as political counselor and joint head of the foreign and security policy group in the British Embassy in the United States. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/03/europe-must-take-on-its-own-defense-responsibilities/