NATO urges members to get their logistics homework done | Reuters

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  2 décembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Japan Could Pick And Choose Components From Tempest

  Bradley Perrett Japan says it wants international collaboration in developing its Future Fighter for the 2030s, but it wants to lead the project despite limited experience in fighter development. And it aims at a fighter much larger than any operated by a western European country ; the U.S. is not offering a possible joint project. That seems to leave only the choice of indigenous development, perhaps with help from a foreign technical partner. Nevertheless, participation in the UK's Tempest program may also be feasible. The Tempest project—which includes the Royal Air Force, BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce and MBDA—has a cooperation concept that leaves scope for Japan and other partners to use their own systems, weapons, propulsion and even airframes, says Air Commodore Daniel Storr, head of combat aircraft acquisition at the UK Defense Ministry. The model described by Storr gives Japan the flexibility to choose the size of its own fighter. Though evidently not an objective, this mix-and-match approach also creates an opportunity for Japan to continue to claim development leadership—but also to save money by sharing systems. The policy goal of running its own fighter program, stated in 2018, has looked like a big obstacle to Japan's participation in the Tempest or the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project initiated by France and Germany. But if the Future Fighter shared only some features with Tempest, Japan could reasonably say it was leading its own program. BAE Systems promoted the Tempest program at the DSEI Japan exhibition held in Tokyo fromNov. 18-20. Prospective FCAS prime contractors, such as Airbus, did not show their concept. Storr outlined the flexible model of cooperative development at an exhibition conference, but Japanese speakers at that event did not comment on the prospect of Japan joining Tempest. In a Nov. 1 interview with The Financial Times, newly appointed Defense Minister Taro Kono seemed to play down the possibility of participation in a European program, saying Japan should explore all possibilities but needed to maintain interoperability with U.S. forces. Storr addressed that point, emphasizing that working with the U.S. was a high priority for the UK too. Japan's alternative to international cooperation is developing a fighter by itself with the technical help of a foreign company. Lockheed Martin is supporting the Korea Aerospace Industries KF-X and BAE is helping the Turkish Aerospace Industries TF-X in such an arrangement. By working with Lockheed Martin, Boeing or Northrop Grumman, Tokyo would partially compensate the U.S. for its expenditures in defending Japan. But the U.S. would gain little from technical support fees, and Japan is already committed to buying 147 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightnings as the aircraft to precede the Future Fighters. The defense ministry has asked for the development of the Future Fighter to be launched in the fiscal year beginning April 2020. It is not clear whether that means mobilizing resources to commence full-scale development or taking some lesser step to firm up the commitment to create the aircraft. For the past year, the government's policy has been to launch no later than March 2024. However, Japanese companies, especially fighter builder Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), are pushing for a launch as soon as possible. They want to transfer knowledge to young engineers from the older generation that developed Japan's last fighter, the MHI F-2, which the Future Fighter will replace. The UK does not want to commit to launching full-scale development of the Tempest before 2025, but its date for entry into service in 2035 meets Japan's objective, which is sometime in the 2030s. Meanwhile, the FCAS program is aiming at 2040. Sweden and Italy are cooperating with the UK during the current early stage of Tempest research, while Spain has joined France and Germany for FCAS work. Like Storr, BAE has stressed the advantages of partners taking only as much of the Tempest as they want. “There is a range of different partnership models that can be considered,” says Andy Latham, who is working on the program. “Japan has some great technology that any partner can benefit from. Their avionics industry is pretty effective.” The cooperation concept replaces the standard model, one in which partners spend years negotiating and compromising to define a design that all of them must accept. Instead, according to Storr, they can save time and money by agreeing to disagree—to the extent that each is willing to pay the extra cost of independent development and manufacturing of design elements. The Japanese defense ministry's studies point to a need for a very big fighter with an empty weight well above 20 metric tons (40,000 lb.), larger than the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor. Superior endurance and internal weapon capacity are the key factors behind this choice. No western European country has operated a fighter more than about two-thirds as big, but Storr said a large configuration for the Tempest cannot be ruled out. The mockup exhibited at the 2018 Farnborough International Airshow was bigger than the F-22. Still, the UK and other European partners might want a much smaller fighter; concept designs that have not been shown are not as big as the mockup. But the concept for cooperation would allow for Japan to devise its own airframe while, for example, using the same engine and some weapons, software and avionics as other partners. The architecture of the software is intended to be open, accepting different programs easily. Tempest researchers will consider which systems and capabilities will go into the fighter and which will be incorporated into the ammunition or an accompanying drone, which could be fully reusable or optionally expendable, Storr says. The FCAS program is taking a similar approach. The Tempest will need great capacity for generating electricity, he says, and the weapon bay should be regarded as a payload bay, perhaps for holding additional fuel that would extend endurance on surveillance missions. The Japanese finance ministry is insisting upon private investment in the Future Fighter program, in part to ensure contractors are fully incentivized to prevent failure. Contractors will be able to make money in civil programs from technology developed for the fighter, says the ministry, which is highly influential but does not have a final say. “Judging from past program examples, it is clear that the Future Fighter program would bring a risk of a budget overrun and schedule slippage, but would also benefit the private sector,” the finance ministry said in an October presentation to the Council on Fiscal Policy, an advisory body. “The government and private sector should invest funds and resources to build a failure-proof framework.” Noting that MHI used technology from the F-2 program in its development and manufacturing of the outer wing boxes of the Boeing 787, the ministry says contractors can expect to gain similar opportunities for civil applications of technology from the Future Fighter program—so they should invest in it. https://aviationweek.com/defense/japan-could-pick-and-choose-components-tempest

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  27 juin 2024 | International, Sécurité

  CACI Awarded $2 Billion Task Order to Provide Modern Digital Solutions to NASA

  CACI will provide development, application support, and sustainment across all business functions and devices

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  27 février 2020 | International, Terrestre

  OMFV: Army Seeks Industry Advice On Bradley Replacement

  Having rebooted the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program, the Army is now is asking industry input on how to achieve nine goals, from survivability to mobility to streamlined logistics. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on February 26, 2020 at 4:01 AM Two months ago, the Army cancelled its original solicitation to replace the M2 Bradley troop carrier after no company could meet the strict requirements. This afternoon, the Army officially asked for industry input on how to achieve nine broadly-defined “characteristics” for the future Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. “Feedback may be submitted in any form (concepts, information papers, technical papers, sketches, etc.),” says the announcement on SAM.gov. “The Army would like to obtain this initial feedback prior to 06 March 2020.” This call for suggestions on how to move forward comes just weeks after the Army issued a surprisingly apologetic survey asking industry what they did wrong the first time around. It's part of a newly humble approach in which the Army doesn't prescribe formal requirements up-front but instead lays out broad objectives and asks industry how best to achieve them. The chief of Army Futures Command, Gen. Mike Murray, gave reporters a preview of the nine characteristics three weeks ago, but the list announced today is much more detailed – though still leaving plenty of room for companies to brainstorm solutions. Our annotated highlights from the announcement – the emphasis is in the original: Background: The OMFV, as part of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), will replace the Bradley to provide the capabilities required to defeat a future near-peer competitor's force. The Army is seeking a transformational increase in warfighting capability, not simply another incremental improvement over the current Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Concept of employment: As part of an ABCT, the OMFV will not fight alone, but rather as part of a section, platoon, and company of mechanized infantry.... “Near-peer competitor” is Pentagon jargon for “China or Russia” – chiefly Russia in this case, since the plains of Eastern Europe are a far more likely arena for armored warfare than Pacific islands. That the Army wants “transformational” improvements, not “incremental” ones, shows there's still some real ambition in the vision for this vehicle. At the same time, the OMFV will still fight “as part of an ABCT,” meaning the existing Armored Brigade Combat Team organization — not as part of some all-new organization with all-new equipment, as was once envisioned for the cancelled Future Combat Systems. Survivability. The OMFV must protect the crew and Soldiers from emerging threats and CBRN environments. The OMFV should reduce likelihood of detection by minimizing thermal, visual, and acoustic signatures. In other words, the vehicle needs to give the crew a chance of survival against cutting-edge anti-tank missiles, precision-guided artillery, attack drones and other such “emerging threats,” as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination (CBRN). That does not mean the vehicle itself has to survive intact. The way this is worded, if a hit totals the OMFV but the soldiers inside can walk away, the Army will count that as a win. (The JLTV 4×4 truck takes this same approach to roadside bombs). So the OMFV doesn't necessarily have to have heavy armor protecting the entire vehicle. It could have a heavily armored crew compartment, light armor elsewhere, and an Active Protection System to intercept incoming threats. (The Russian T-14 Armata uses this combination). It also should avoid being spotted in the first place by eye, ear, or thermal sensor, which might favor designs with hybrid-electric motors that can switch from hot, noisy diesels to a battery-driven stealth mode. Mobility. The OMFV must have mobility that can keep pace with the Abrams in a combined arms fight through rural and urban terrain. That's the M1 Abrams main battle tank, which the existing M2 Bradley and M109 Paladin howitzer were also designed to keep up with. This is another aspect of that “concept of employment” that calls for the OMFV to slot into existing formations and work closely with existing vehicles. Note also the reference to “rural and urban terrain,” which will come up again: Traditionally the Army has avoided city fighting, but as urban sprawl covers ever more of the planet, technology and tactics have to adapt to brutal close-quarters combat. Growth. The OMFV must possess the growth margins and open architecture required for rapid upgrades and insertion of future technologies such as mission command systems, protection systems, and sensors. This characteristic is really where you get the potential for “transformational” improvements. The M2 Bradley was originally introduced in 1980 and, after 40 years of upgrades, it has very little margin left to handle additional weight or – even more important nowadays – power-hungry electronics. The Bradley's lack of room to grow has driven the Army to try replacing it three times already: the original OMFV requirements cancelled this year; the Ground Combat Vehicle cancelled in 2014; and the Future Combat Systems cancelled in 2009. Hopefully, fourth time's the charm. Lethality. The OMFV-equipped platoons must defeat future near-peer soldiers, infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters, small unmanned aerial systems, and tanks as part of a Combined Arms Team in rural and urban terrain. This is a more ambitious hit list than the Bradley, which sports machineguns for killing infantry, a 25 mm autocannon to destroy light armored vehicles, and the obsolescent TOW missile for taking on heavy tanks. The Pentagon is increasingly worried about small drones, which ISIS terrorists have used as flying IEDs and Russian artillery has used as spotters for barrages. With Russia and China developing increasingly sophisticated anti-aircraft systems, there's also a concern that US fighters may not be able to keep enemy attack helicopters at bay, forcing ground forces to handle that threat themselves. These aerial targets require more sophisticated tracking systems, and drones may be best dealt with by electronic jamming or lasers rather than bullets. Weight. The OMFV must traverse 80% of Main Supply Routes (MSRs), national highways, and bridges in pacing threat countries, and reduce the cost of logistics and maintenance. Designs must allow for future growth in components and component weights without overall growth of vehicle weight through modularity and innovation. Weight is the issue that has bedeviled Bradley replacements for two decades. The FCS vehicles, optimized for air transport, were too light to carry adequate armor; GCV was too heavy; and the original OMFV couldn't meet its air transport requirements and its protection requirements at the same time. With most bridges in Eastern Europe unable to safely take weights over 50 tons, too much heavy armor can cripple your mobility. Logistics. The OMFV must reduce the logistical burden on ABCTs and must be equipped with advanced diagnostic and prognostic capabilities. Advanced manufacturing and other innovative techniques should be included in the design that reduce the time and cost of vehicle repairs. There are two big factors that make a vehicle hard to keep supplied and in working order. One is weight – heavier vehicles burn more fuel – and the other is complexity. High-tech is usually high-maintenance. The US military is hopeful that AI-driven predictive maintenance can detect and head off impending breakdowns, and that 3D printing can produce at least some spare parts on demand without a long supply line. Transportability. The OMFV must be worldwide deployable by standard inter- and intra-theater sea, waterway, air, rail, and road modes of transportation. The original OMFV requirement very specifically called for two of the vehicles to fit on a single Air Force C-17 jet transport, which proved undoable with the weight of armor desired. This time, the Army isn't specifying any particular aircraft. In practice, armored vehicles are almost always shipped by sea and, where possible, stockpiled on allied soil well before a crisis erupts. On land, since tracked vehicles aren't designed to drive hundreds of miles by road, they're usually deployed to the battle zone by train or tractor-trailer, both of which have their own weight limits. Manning. The OMFV should operate with the minimal number of crew members required to fight and win. The OMFV should allow commanders to choose between manned or remote operation based on the tactical situation. This is the objective that gave the OMFV its name: Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. Now, since it's a Bradley replacement, the OMFV is supposed to be a troop carrier – specifically, the heavily armed and armored kind known as an Infantry Fighting Vehicle – so by definition it needs to carry people. But the Army is intensely interested in having the option to run it by remote control, or maybe even autonomously, to (for example) scout out especially dangerous areas or carry casualties back to an aid post without pulling healthy soldiers out of the fighting line. Training. The OMFV should contain embedded training capabilities that are compatible with the Synthetic Training Environment (STE). STE is the Army's total overhaul of its training simulators, drawing on commercial gaming technology to develop an array of virtual and augmented reality systems using a common database of real-world terrain. Instead of having to use a simulator in a warehouse somewhere, the Army wants troops to be able to run virtual scenarios on the same vehicles they'll actually fight with. All these characteristics are intertwined – and after its past troubles, the Army is acutely aware that maximizing one, such as protection, may compromise another, such as transportability. That's another thing the service wants feedback on, the announcement says: “The Army is interested in industry partners' ability to meet the desired characteristics and what trades” – that is, trade-offs – “may be necessary.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/omfv-army-seeks-industry-advice-on-bradley-replacement