8 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

MQ-NEXT: US Air Force Considers Reaper Replacement

The General Atomics-built MQ-9 Reaper — a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle with millions of hours of operation under its belt — has had a ubiquitous presence over battlefields in the Middle East. But with the Pentagon preparing for future fights in contested, non-permissive environments against peer adversaries, the service is beginning its search for the aircraft's replacement.

The Reaper — which is larger and carries more payload than its predecessor the MQ-1 Predator — provides the military with a “hunter-killer” capability by executing both strike and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection functions. But officials say it is time for a new platform that can take on those same missions and more.

The service signaled its intent in President Donald Trump's fiscal year 2021 budget request by zeroing out its proposed buys of MQ-9s as it pursues a follow-on aircraft, though legislators may push back on the move.

“We made the pivot to divest MQ-9s to pivot into high-end warfighting,”

said Will Roper, assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, technology and logistics, during a press briefing in July. The service is now pursuing a replacement system dubbed the MQ-Next.

The move to acquire a new platform — the second such effort for the Air Force following a canceled program known as MQ-X in 2012 — comes as the Pentagon shifts to great power competition with advanced adversaries Russia and China, as outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

In June, the Air Force released a request for information to industry seeking input about a new medium-altitude drone, with particular focus on innovative development and business practices, and digital engineering initiatives. Responses were due in late July and a number of major defense companies responded.

Affordability and versatility will be key as the Air Force looks for the Reaper's replacement, Roper noted.

“We're going to have to explore more than just the MQ-9 mission or else we're not going to be able to create enough of an asset within the Air Force budget itself to afford to pursue the program,” he said. “If all we do is replace the MQ-9 mission, we really generated a bill for the Air Force.”

The Department of the Air Force has a number of expensive programs on its shopping list as it pursues an ambitious modernization strategy that includes fifth-generation fighters, a new nuclear-capable stealth bomber and ground-based strategic deterrent, space systems superiority and joint all-domain command and control.

If the new drone is “another mouth to feed and it's not helping us with high-end warfighting, then it's not likely to be first in the queue,” he said.

Using a baseball analogy, Roper said he wants to see the replacement platform be a true utility player. He envisions a future where the aircraft could go from collecting ISR data to being weaponized to conduct air-to-air operations.

“Can I have a drone that I can put forward in a high-end fight that can provide a picket line that makes it difficult for enemy fighters to push through?” he asked. “Can I pull that drone back to the rear and have it protect high-value assets, aircraft and even bases?”

Because the Air Force is looking for a UAS that can perform a variety of missions, it may need to pursue more than one aircraft, Roper said.

“I'm open to families of systems,” he said. The service wants industry to think outside-of-the box about how the Air Force can conduct high-end warfighting against a peer adversary.

Increased automation is one solution, which will also help with affordability, Roper noted.

“It takes a ton of people to operate even one MQ-9,” he said. “That's not a knock against the platform — it was designed at a different point in technology. And now many of the things we have people do, we can automate.”

The service intends to have airmen in the loop for critical decisions — especially lethal ones — and will not delegate that to machines, he said. But it wants to simplify how users interact with the next-generation drone.

“We have to automate as much as possible if we're going to keep the platform affordable,” he said.

Technology such as artificial intelligence can assist with automation and reduce operating costs, he added.

“We can really drop the cost per hour of ISR ... if algorithms are doing most of the triaging of the raw video and only sending back to remote operators objects that are of interest,”

Roper said during a Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies event.

Additionally, in regions such as Central Command and Africa Command there is a possibility that the service could reduce the number of airmen that have to operate the MQ-Next platform if AI and new commercial technology is adopted.

Meanwhile, survivability and expendability will be important considerations for the program.

“I imagine being in industry shoes. I would either try to have something that is so cheap that I can proliferate it broadly — and that comes with a logistics challenge for us — or something that is reasonably defendable enough so that if I'm an adversary, I have to truly commit capital assets to take it out,” he said.

Moving to an architecture that supports expendable aircraft will not be easy, he noted.

“We have been able amazingly to build airplanes that we expect to return every single time they take off,” he said. “You can imagine designing things that may not return is a complete culture shift for us and for industry.”

Based on informal engagements he has had with companies, Roper said he expected to see a great deal of creativity in industry responses to the RFI.

The service is aiming for initial delivery beginning in 2030, and initial operational capability by 2031, according to the RFI.

“In a digitally engineered future, 10 years is an eternity. I would hope we could spiral multiple times within that 10 years,” Roper said. If “we can't get it done by 2030 then something is wrong with our system. Ten years should never be the time you take for development except for extremely exceptional things.”

General Atomics is responding to the RFI and plans to leverage its experience with the MQ-9 as it pursues the effort, according to a company spokesperson.

“The technology advancements we propose will leverage open architecture, artificial intelligence, autonomy, modularity and interoperability to maximize both system effectiveness and service investments,” the spokesperson said. “We believe our technology advancements offer lower lifecycle cost and provide warfighters with enhanced unmanned capabilities that enable commonality and joint interoperability on the battlefield.”

The company is embracing the possibility of a family of systems for the program, the spokesperson noted. It is planning to leverage more automation in future platforms and is already integrating such technology on the MQ-9.

“This includes automatic take-off, landing and remote taxi, and a portable aircraft control system for aircraft launch and recovery that eliminates the need for forward-deployed launch/recovery crews,” they said. “We also developed a single-seat ground control station and have a multi-mission control capability that lets a single pilot control up to six MQ-9s.”

If the Air Force were to use all of these automation tools on the Reaper, the spokesperson projected that it could reduce the service's manpower bill by 50 percent and free up 1,500 aircrew billets “that could be applied towards expanded MQ-9 mission capability, reallocated to other priority personnel requirements, or eliminated to realize multi-billion dollar savings over the remainder of the MQ-9 service life.”

Analysts say the likely competitors to incumbent General Atomics include Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman.

In a statement, a Lockheed Martin spokesperson said the company intended to respond to the RFI and would leverage work done by its advanced development program division, Skunk Works, which has expertise in developing unmanned platforms.

Boeing and Northrop Grumman said they plan to pursue the program but declined to provide specific details on their RFI submissions.

MQ-Next will be an important program for General Atomics because the MQ-9 is its bread and butter, said Phil Finnegan, director of corporate analysis at the Teal Group, a Fairfax, Virginia-based aerospace and defense market analysis firm.

“They're going to fight hard to try to build a replacement,” he said. The company would be in a difficult position if it lost the competition because it brings in a lot of revenue from the Reaper.

However, Larry Dickerson, a senior defense analyst at Forecast International, a Newtown, Connecticut-based marketing consulting firm, noted that it wouldn't be all doom and gloom for General Atomics if it loses the MQ-Next competition.

“The Reaper systems are going to be in [service] for a long time, which means there's going to be a lot of long-term support and maintenance contracts that are going to be coming towards them,” he said.

Meanwhile, while the Air Force is gung-ho about pursuing a replacement for the MQ-9, some in Congress appear to be less so. In the House fiscal year 2021 defense appropriations bill — which was passed by the chamber in late July — lawmakers included funding for 16 MQ-9s at a cost of $344 million that would keep its production line going, according to a summary of the legislation. As of press time, a final appropriations bill had yet to be passed.

“The Air Force's fiscal year 2021 budget request proposes to terminate production of MQ-9 aircraft, citing an excess of aircraft compared to projected operational requirements,” said the House Appropriations defense subcommittee in its version of the spending bill. “The committee does not accept this proposal and recommends additional funding for 16 MQ-9 aircraft.”

Lawmakers said they were concerned that the Air Force reached its decision without adequate planning for a follow-on system. The committee directed the service to submit a report about an MQ-9 follow-on program to congressional defense committees before the fiscal year 2022 budget request.

“The report shall detail the desired features of such a system, the cost and timeline required to achieve development and fielding, proposed measures to ensure full and open competition, and an explanation of how such a system would fulfill the goals of the National Defense Strategy,” the bill said.

Roper noted that the Air Force will need to convince the Hill about the usefulness of a new platform.

“Building a utility player that can meet multiple mission demands is not something that our acquisition system has historically been good at,” he said. “We've got to get good quickly to convince Congress that this is a good pivot, and I look forward to having those discussions.”

Finnegan noted that lawmakers' reluctance to shut down the MQ-9 production line could be a hurdle for the MQ-Next program.

“If there's one thing Congress doesn't like, it's shutting down production lines. And trying to kill a program is extremely difficult,” he said. “We're already seeing that.”

Meanwhile, in July the Trump administration announced that it was loosening some UAS export rules associated with the Missile Technology Control Regime, which could have impacts on both the Reaper and the MQ-Next programs. The adjustment would affect “Category 1” systems that have a maximum airspeed of less than 800 kilometers per hour.

The new policy is expected to increase trade opportunities for U.S. companies, according to analysts.

For General Atomics, the loosening of rules could drum up new business abroad for the MQ-9 but there are still some hurdles, Dickerson said.

How the MTCR changes will affect sales of a future MQ-Next platform is still up in the air, he noted.

“It depends on the type of system they select,” he said. “The U.S. will not want to sell this system to everyone.”

https://www.uasvision.com/2020/09/08/mq-next-us-air-force-considers-reaper-replacement/

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  • EXCLUSIVE: DoD CIO Makes Case For Sticking With JEDI

    6 mai 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

    EXCLUSIVE: DoD CIO Makes Case For Sticking With JEDI

    No current cloud, commercial or military, lets frontline troops access both classified and unclassified data from all over the world, Dana Deasy told Breaking Defense. That makes JEDI unique – and too complex to split up among multiple contractors. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. WASHINGTON: A lot of people – even experts – don't get what the JEDI cloud computing program is really about, Dana Deasy told me. And that, the Defense Department's Chief Information Officer admitted, is partly the Pentagon's own fault he told me during a half-hour interview. So, this morning, after Breaking Defense published the latest of several stories on JEDI's legal and political troubles and the mounting criticism of the program, Deasy agreed to an interview to explain just why he thinks the worldwide military cloud is still essential – and too complexly integrated to split chunks off to different contractors. There are three fundamental misunderstandings about JEDI that the Pentagon needs to dispel, Deasy told me: First, people think JEDI is meant to be the one cloud to rule them all. It's not. While JEDI will be the default option for “general purpose” cloud computing across the entire Department of Defense, it will not replace hundreds of existing cloud contracts across the DoD not prevent the creation of new “fit for purpose” clouds tailored to specific missions. “We definitely had created the wrong perception. People believed that we were going to take all of our clouds, get rid of them, and migrate everything over to JEDI,” Deasy told me. “That was clearly never the intent.” Second, people think JEDI is a 10-year, $10 billion contract. It's not – not necessarily. While that's the maximum value and duration of the contract, the Pentagon has the option to terminate it after two years. There's another end-it-or-extend-it decision three years later, and a third three years after that. The minimum the winning contractor is guaranteed to get? Just $1 million over two years. The Defense Department's strategy to transition to cloud computing. “When I came on board, one thing I did was restructure the terms,” Deasy told me. “I've been working with clouds since clouds were first brought to the commercial industry marketplace, and about every two to three years, you see really big changes. I'm talking about significant enough changes where you just want to step back and look at the marketplace. That's why we changed the terms of the contract.” Third, people think JEDI is just another cloud. It's not. While existing military and even civilian clouds can do some of what JEDI is meant to do, none of them can do all of it. None of them can pull unclassified, secret, and top secret data, from the Pentagon, bases around the world, and forward outposts, and put it all together in a way that even troops in combat can access. “Go out to the tactical edge, sit down with the warfighter, and look at how we push information out to someone who's literally outside of the village on the side of a mountain,” Deasy told me. “I spent some time in Afghanistan last year, and you look at what it takes for them to prepare for a mission, to execute a mission. They are pulling data from a variety of sources, some unclassified, some classified.” But doing that today is damnably hard. It takes a lot of awkward workarounds to bridge the gaps between different and frequently incompatible networks, and you can't bring the kludged-together solution with you into combat. That's why one of JEDI's first priorities is building backpack-sized mini-servers. “To actually combine that data and physically get the information out to the warfighter in a form factor that they could use when they're out in the field, it just doesn't exist today. And no — you cannot pull that off the shelf,” Deasy said. “That is a unique capability that we have to build.” “We have to find a partner to help us do that, and that is what we've been looking to do with JEDI,” he told me. He really means a partner, one contractor, not many, because the task of building this highly complex, tightly integrated system is not something you can split up, the way you would an order for bulk commodities like potatoes, jet fuel, or even online storage. Why not? Let's let Deasy explain it in his own words (edited for clarity and brevity). Q: There's been a lot of excitement over JEDI since the program began in 2018, and a lot of frustration over the delays. How would you respond to the critics who say it's time to give up, or even that it was the wrong approach all along? A: At the time I joined [the Defense Department], which was actually two years ago this week, the first thing that Deputy Shanahan turned over to me was JEDI. The first thing he asked me to do was to go back and take a hard look at was, was this the right thing we were doing for the Department of Defense, were we going about it the right way. Was it the right thing? Yes. Were we going about the right way? Well, I'd say, mixed results. [Now] there's this whole conversation: “Should the DoD give up? Should the DoD start over? Should the DoD go and do something else?” I've spent a lot of time contemplating a bunch of different scenarios, and no matter what scenario I look at, you still have to solve the problem for the warfighter. We need to take data all the way out to the tactical edge, across multiple classification levels. And even if I wanted to stop JEDI today, there is no solution that is available already inside the Department of Defense to do that. I'd have to turn right around, go back out to the market, start an RFP once again to solve for that particular problem. This is why we stay the course. We're not staying the course because we're just being defiant or stubborn. We're staying the course because it's the shortest way to get from point A to point B, because if we don't stay this course, we will still have to go back and solve this particular warfighting need. And that is why I believe staying with JEDI and moving forward is the right solution. It's very easy for critics to say, “hey, there's a bunch of clouds already inside of the Department of Defense, why don't you just go use one of those?” Or “why don't you just split this up and give this to a bunch of different suppliers?” Yes, of course, JEDI can do commodity cloud capabilities, and so do a lot of our other clouds across the Department of Defense. The whole world of commodity cloud has gotten better and better. But it doesn't solve for our classification levels. It doesn't solve for the tactical edge today. If you look at the heart of that RFP [the 2018 Request For Proposals] and you really sort through all the requirements, what makes JEDI still unique today, that cannot be satisfied by other cloud environments, is the fact that it was solving for both OCONUS [Outside the Continental United States] and CONUS; it's moving data across multiple classification levels; and it was looking to create a commercial solution that would give us far better terms, conditions, and pricing than we'd ever seen inside the Department of Defense. When we looked across the landscape of all the cloud environments we had, there was not a single cloud environment that we had that could do all those things, nor was there one being contemplated inside the Department of Defense. We've got the Army that is now looking to consolidate their clouds, we have the Air Force has their cloudOne platform, Navy has stood up a special purpose cloud with their SAP HANA to consolidate their various SAP environments. All of those things fit exactly what we were trying to achieve in the cloud strategy document at the end of 2018. However, if you look at all those cloud environments and other ones that are stood up across Department of Defense, none of those, still, can do CONUS and OCONUS, none of them is solving for the tactical edge, and none of them is solving for multiple classification levels. [Before the stop-work order], we had dozens of projects across combatant commands and the services wanting to be the first to standup in the new JEDI cloud, because of two fundamental things: It offered capabilities that their clouds didn't offer and it offered it at a way better price. At the end of the day, the most competitive way of looking at market forces is, where are the services going to? And they were clearly going towards JEDI because of what it offered in terms of technology and what it offered in terms of price. One of the criteria that we really wanted out of JEDI was to get to the best commercial terms and conditions. And I can tell you after we were done with that award, we clearly in that award had better terms, better pricing than we had in any cloud across the Department. Q: But you took a long time assessing which competitors could meet your technical requirements, finally choosing Microsoft. Given the delays, and given how fast IT changes, is that assessment now obsolete? A: We did not take this final decision on the selection of our vendor until towards the back half of last year. Yes, we started this in 2018, but the offerings that we were looking at were being updated and refreshed throughout the entire RFP process until the point that they submitted their final submissions. Our [implementation] schedule is actually going to be in phases. First, we're going to roll out unclassified, then we're going to roll out the secret, and then we're going to roll out the top secret. And those solutions were going to be designed and built as we went through this process. One of the reasons we did that was because we did recognize that technology would change. We set it up in a way that we absolutely can stay fresh with technology as it changes, because we have these option periods [at two years, five years, and eight years] to go back and look at whoever our provider is and to decide whether or not they're staying current. If we saw that a vendor was starting to lose its competitiveness either on pricing, on speed of delivery, or on technology, you make it clear that if they were to continue down the path they're going, there's not going to be a renewal. The best evidence you get is just how are they delivering every day? Is it working, is it up and running? Do they really give you a tactical edge? Do they really give you multiple classifications? Are the warfighters benefiting from it? Q: But why is having a single contractor you can opt out of at set times better than having multiple vendors competing all the time for work orders under an Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quanity contract? A: It's a fair question. And if what we were providing the Department of Defense was pure commodity cloud, a platform for storing and compute and building applications in a standard way that we see industry doing it today, IDIQ would be a perfect way to go. But that's not what we're doing here. That's what gets lost in this whole conversation. This is not your typical, basic, commodity cloud offering where you can put it out to three or four vendors and let the service pick every day who they want. Let's go back to what the requirements are. We are trying to build a cloud that can handle CONUS, OCONUS, unclassified, secret, top secret, traverse the data between those environments, and create hardware solutions at forward bases and to the tactical edge. Imagine for a second that I now wanted to have three or four vendors to do that. Think of the complexity it would take to build cross domain solutions for unclassified, top secret and secret, OCONUS, CONUS, forward bases, tactical edge devices, all the way out to the guys on the side of the mountain. Especially when you think about trying to move forward with this Joint All-Domain Command & Control, where the fight of the future is going to be multiple services and combatant commands having to work together and share data. That becomes almost untenable if you set it up as an IDIQ with multiple vendors. I mean, how would you ever build that to work all the way to the tactical edge? To move data from unclassified to secret to top secret, it's extremely complicated. It's not like you go buy this off the shelf. This is a very bespoke, tailored solution that has to be built. There is an actual hardware element of this, of creating the hardened devices that need to be put into the hands of a warfighter out there on a mission and that's what we don't have today. You have to find a vendor that can help you build those hardened devices out on the tactical edge. If we're doing IDIQs and every time we have a new warfighter need, we now are going to go out for three or four vendors, we're going to put that out, they're going to come back and bid, they're going to give a solution and then we have to go back and now re-integrate that solution. That gets be very hard and very complicated and very time consuming. You have to FEDRAMP all of them, you have to test all of them, you got to run them through certification. We have to put NSA red teams onto them, we have to put US Cyber Command to oversee each of those environments. Is that in the taxpayer's best interest? Does that sound like to you the lowest cost, most efficient solution for the DoD and the warfighter? There's going to be a lot of business across the Department of Defense where IDIQs are going to be perfect and we'll have lots of cloud providers that will flourish. But JEDI is a unique environment where having a partner to help us build this out is the smartest way to go. Throughout this entire process one thing has stayed constant: You have to find a way of putting a warfighter cloud capability into the hands of our men and women out on the tactical edge every day. And I've always looked at my responsibilities as CIO is to not to satisfy the cloud industry, but to satisfy what the warfighter needs. We have a unique war-fighting need that you just can't go get off of the shelf today. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/exclusive-dods-cio-makes-case-for-sticking-with-jedi

  • Slower-than-expected economic growth to help Canada's defence spending numbers

    16 décembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Slower-than-expected economic growth to help Canada's defence spending numbers

    Lee Berthiaume OTTAWA -- The federal government is predicting Canadian defence spending will inch closer to its NATO promises in the coming years than originally expected -- though not because Ottawa is planning to send new money the military's way. All NATO members, including Canada, agreed in 2014 to work toward spending the equivalent of two per cent of their gross domestic products on defence within the next decade as the military alliance sought to share the burden of defending from new threats like Russia and China. Two years ago, when they unveiled their defence policy, the Liberals said the government would hit 1.4 per cent by 2024-25. But Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan this week said, without providing details, that defence spending would instead reach 1.48 per cent of GDP. An increase of that size could represent close to $2 billion more per year for the military. However, the Department of National Defence told The Canadian Press that there are no new investments on the horizon for the Canadian Armed Forces beyond what's already in the Liberals' policy. Instead, Defence Department spokesman Daniel Le Bouthiller attributed the change to slower-than-expected economic growth over the next few years and more spending on non-military specific activities like veterans' benefits and the Canadian Coast Guard. The government has included such activities in its calculations since 2017 to try to address complaints from the U.S. and other NATO allies that Canada was not investing enough in its military. NATO approved the change. "Approximately two-thirds of the increase from 1.40 to 1.48 per cent is due to increased (other government department) forecasts and one-third due to fluctuating GDP forecasts," Le Bouthillier said in an email. Canada currently spends about 1.31 per cent of GDP -- a common measurement of a country's economic output -- on defence and has no plan to reach NATO's two per cent benchmark, a fact that has made it a target for U.S. President Donald Trump. Trump labelled Canada "slightly delinquent" on defence spending during a meeting in London last week in which he publicly grilled Prime Minister Justin Trudeau about Canada's number before subsequently stepping up his calls for the government to meet the NATO target. "He's not paying two per cent and he should be paying two per cent," Trump said during a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Dec. 4. "It's Canada. They have money and they should be paying two per cent." The Liberal government has in fact refused to say whether it believes in the two-per-cent target and has instead repeatedly pointed to Canada's contributions of forces and equipment to NATO missions in Latvia, Iraq and other places as a better measurement of its contributions to the military alliance. The spending target is an imperfect way of measuring how much individual countries are contributing, said Stefanie von Hlatky, an expert on NATO and the military at Queen's University in Kingston, Ont. But all allies are facing pressure to show Trump that they are stepping up on defence spending, she said, which is doubly true for Trudeau after his meeting with the U.S. president in London. "I think there's a little bit of pressure now to maybe update those numbers and probably some rejoicing that it looks better on paper," von Hlatky said. "If we're looking to impress Trump with these minor adjustments, maybe it's all for naught. But there is definitely added pressure with every NATO meeting and NATO summit. And we know it's going to come up as long as Trump is president." Conservative defence critic James Bezan accused the Liberal government of playing a numbers game to make Canada look better rather than investing in the Armed Forces. "It's a sad state of affairs for our military heroes when Justin Trudeau can only improve defence spending figures by engineering a made-in-Canada recession and playing a shell game with other departments' budgets to inflate the numbers," he said. This report by The Canadian Press was first published on Dec. 13, 2019. https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/slower-than-expected-economic-growth-to-help-canada-s-defence-spending-numbers-1.4728602

  • After Hurricane Michael, the Air Force moved Tyndall AFB’s contracting data to the cloud

    5 novembre 2018 | International, C4ISR

    After Hurricane Michael, the Air Force moved Tyndall AFB’s contracting data to the cloud

    By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — After Hurricane Michael ravaged Tyndall Air Force Base in October, airmen took on an unusual mission: recovering the servers base officials used to write, release and award contracts. Reclaiming those servers — which contain data and contract vehicles used by Tyndall's two contracting squadrons to order everything for the base from supplies for the base to spare parts for aircraft — was a relatively minor victory when compared to the larger devastation faced by the installation. But the mission was an important one in that it allowed remaining base personnel to manage contracts in the wake of the disaster, Air Force officials told Defense News. “Obviously, the base is devastated ... but it's clear that there were open, existing contracts whether that was for simple things like cutting the lawn or delivering food to the chow hall on base,” said Richard Aldridge, the Air Force's program executive officer for business and enterprise systems. “Someone has got to either terminate them, or put them on pause or make sure vendors are getting paid for work that they had already done before the contract.” In the days after the hurricane, airmen from Gunter Annex in Alabama worked with the state's civil air patrol to fly into the Florida panhandle, obtain Tyndall's servers and transport them back to Maxwell Air Force Base, where Gunter is located. Then, the service transferred data from the legacy contract writing system into a new cloud-based system called CON-IT, short for Contracting Information Technology. The servers from Tyndall weren't necessary for base officials to use CON-IT, said Mike Allen, the Air Force's CON-IT program manager. But without them, contract officers would be left with no digital record of past contracts, and would be forced to draw up new contracts for mundane goods and services that would normally be bought through indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts that allow for multiple orders. "We were then able to migrate [the data from the servers] into CON-IT so that existing [indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity contracts] or ordering vehicles were available to them, and all of their existing contracts would be available to work with,” said Allen. “They weren't starting from a blank piece of paper.” And moving to a cloud-based environment means that Tyndall's contracting data will no longer be vulnerable to future disasters, Aldridge added. “It's ubiquitous; it doesn't matter where you are, you can access it,” he said. Allen and Aldridge said the program office was able to transition Tyndall's data and train users on the new system, but were unable to provide details on how Tyndall's contracting officers had since used the new system. The plan is to move all of the Air Force's current contract data from existing legacy systems to CON-IT by the end of 2019. The system, built by and originally developed by Appian for use by the Defense Information Systems Agency, has deployed to 1,100 users in 30 locations so far, Allen said. CON-IT will replace three legacy systems: the standard procurement system that supports operational users; ConWrite, which supports the weapon system acquisition and research and development; and the automated contract preparation system for logistics contracts. https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2018/11/02/after-hurricane-michael-the-air-force-moved-tyndall-afbs-contracting-data-to-the-cloud

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