19 novembre 2018 | Local, Aérospatial
David Pugliese, Ottawa Citizen
Neither Canada's top soldier nor the commander of the air force had or produced any records about a fighter jet “capability gap” in the year leading up to the Liberal government's announcement that such a critical issue had to be dealt with by spending billions to buy aircraft.
Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan used the capability gap argument in November 2016 to justify a $5-billion program to buy new Super Hornet jets, a deal since scuttled, and later a $500-million program to purchase used F-18 planes from Australia.
But in the year leading up to Sajjan's announcement about the urgent need to acquire such planes, neither Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Jon Vance nor Lt.-Gen. Mike Hood, then head of the Royal Canadian Air Force, produced any documentation indicating there was ever a capability gap, according to Department of National Defence's Access to Information branch. In addition, no such documents exist among the records of various members of Sajjan's staff, according to the department.
It would be normal practice to have hundreds, if not thousands of pages of records, discussing such a key defence issue or gap if it existed, military insiders tell Postmedia.
But records obtained by Postmedia through the Access law do show that just before Sajjan's announcement that the 18 jets were needed in the “interim” to deal with the capability gap, the minister was told the existing fleet of CF-18s was in better shape than expected and could keep flying until 2032.
Conservative MPs allege the capability gap didn't exist and was concocted by the government to delay a larger project to buy new jets, a competition that might end up selecting the F-35 stealth fighter the Liberals vowed never to purchase.
When asked about the lack of documentation about the capability gap, a DND official said the department could not comment.
Taxpayers may get more information Tuesday when the Auditor General's office releases its examination of the fighter jet plan.
29 mai 2023 | Local, Naval
Almost a decade ago, the notion of a conflict between the United States and its allies on one side and China on the other was described as the “unthinkable war” by major foreign policy and defence observers. Lately, it’s become clear that those same experts are thinking through the unthinkable.
18 janvier 2019 | Local, Naval
by Jeffrey F. Collins CGAI Fellow Executive Summary While both Canada and Australia share similar constitutional frameworks and imperial histories, they are also no stranger to procurement challenges. Cost overruns, delays, regionalism, and protracted intellectual property disputes have all been part of major defence acquisition projects in recent decades. This Policy Paper analyzes the largest and most expensive procurement projects undertaken by either country, Canada's $73 billion (estimated) National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), launched in 2010, and Australia's A$90 billion Naval Shipbuilding Plan (NSP), launched in 2017. Each project represents an attempt to implement a rational, multi-decade approach to naval acquisition. Driven by a desire to overcome previous boom-and-bust cycles, the NSS and NSP aim to create a sustainable shipbuilding sector capable of meeting the immediate and future naval demands of Ottawa and Canberra. Neither country has attempted a shipbuilding plan on this scale before. The NSS and NSP are still in their early stages but some common themes have emerged. On implementation challenges, old problems persist. For one, the rational approach to naval shipbuilding is not devoid of procurement politics and regionalism. Determining which province or state will be home to billions in contracts over many years remains a zero-sum game no matter how arms-length the process of yard selection. Cost increases also remain a reality. Building domestically can carry a 30 per cent to 40 per cent premium. Project delays increase this premium, something Canada has already experienced when initial NSS acquisition costs, pegged at $37.7 billion nearly a decade ago, jumped to an estimated $73 billion today. Australia's delays in securing an agreement with France's Naval Group on its $A50 billion future submarine project could mean additional cost increases. In this context, schedule is king and avoiding cost increases requires keeping to planned shipbuilding schedules. Failure to do so opens production gaps and necessitates going with alternative options including building overseas (Australia) or converting commercial vessels for naval and coast guard use (Canada). Prolonged cost sensitivities raise the consideration of trade-offs on committing more money to continuous shipbuilding at the expense of acquiring other military capabilities. Canada, for instance, will need to make decisions at some point on whether to spend billions on replacing the North Warning System in the country's North. Australia will have to grapple with an Indo-Pacific region proliferating with relatively cheaper but lethal anti-ship missiles. In this context, money spent on surface combatants may be perhaps better spent on other capabilities. None of this is to say that progress has not occurred in either the NSS or NSP. Ships are getting built, including Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships in Canada, and Offshore Patrol Vessels in Australia. In 2018, both countries selected the British Type-26 as their preferred design for a new generation of surface combatants. It is very possible that these respective strategies will achieve their goals of bypassing the boom-and-bust eras, but ongoing challenges serve as a reminder that even with the best-laid plans, naval shipbuilding is a complicated affair. 1 https://www.cgai.ca/overcoming_boom_and_bust_analyzing_national_shipbuilding_plans_in_canada_and_australia
16 décembre 2022 | Local, Aérospatial
Les négociations entre le Canada, Lockheed Martin et le gouvernement des États-Unis concernant l’achat de 88 avions furtifs F-35 progressent. À un point tel que la ministre de la Défense nationale, Anita Anand, laisse entendre dans une entrevue à La Presse qu’elle pourra annoncer de bonnes nouvelles « bientôt ».