Retour aux nouvelles

10 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial

Losing Market Share And Damaging National Security Due To Anachronistic Drone Policy

Dave Deptula Contributor

Adherence to an obsolescent approach to the international nuclear non-proliferation export guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is hurting the United States (U.S.) both commercially and from a national security perspective. In a nutshell, the MTCR treats large drones as if they were nuclear missiles—which they are not. As a result, this self-imposed restriction not only limits the sale of large U.S. drones to our friends and allies but pushes them into the arms of foreign suppliers some of whom are potential adversaries. The result is a series of negative consequences for the U.S.

When the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute released its annual report on global arms transfers earlier this year, it was a good news story for the U.S. From 2015-2019, the U.S. accounted for 36 percent of major global arms sales, a 23 percent increase in volume over the previous five-year period and 76 percent more than its next closest competitor—Russia. The dominant position the U.S. finds itself in is a testament to both the quality of U.S. defense equipment, which is typically accompanied by robust training, sustainment, and support packages, as well as the mutual desire of the U.S. and its partners and allies to develop and maintain strong defense relationships.

However, one important segment of the defense market where this pattern does not hold are large military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). This is not due to a lack of capability—the U.S. remains the world's leader in UAV technology and expertise—nor a lack of demand as by 2029 the international market will account for over 50 percent of the over $10 billion projected to be spent annually on UAVs. Instead, the U.S. has hamstrung itself due to restrictive export policies that equate large UAVs to nuclear missiles. This mismatch between the definitions and controls imposed on UAVs and the reality of how they are actually employed has significantly harmed coalition operations, U.S. relationships with its partners and allies, and the U.S. defense industrial base. It is imperative that the U.S. modernize its UAV export policy.

Currently, the MTCR governs the export of U.S. UAVs. Initially formed in 1987, the MTCR is a voluntary agreement intended to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons—and later weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The MTCR defines UAVs capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload more than 300 kilometers one way as Category I systems, the transfer of which “are subject to an unconditional strong presumption of denial.” Although at the time the MTCR was negotiated no UAV exceeded the Category I thresholds, their envisioned use as delivery vehicles for WMD equivalent to cruise missiles precipitated their inclusion in the MTCR. However, since then the development of UAVs evolved as remotely piloted aircraft, not cruise missiles. Unfortunately, export policy has failed to keep pace, resulting in a situation where the export of UAVs is regulated under the same stringent regime as intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. policy failure to adequately remedy this situation creates significant problems for the following reasons.

First, current U.S. export policy prevents the U.S. from realizing the full potential of UAVs in coalition operations. Because current policy frequently results in the denial of export requests for U.S. UAVs by close partners and allies, these nations must either resort to indigenous production or to another foreign manufacturer to meet their military requirements. Under the best of circumstances, the result is a lower level of interoperability with U.S. forces than possible had they been able to acquire U.S. UAVs. This hampers the integration of partners that would enable the coalition to be much more effective. The current policy impedes the use of common UAVs critical for success in allied operations.

Of greater concern is that much of the unmet demand by friends for U.S. military UAVs is now being fulfilled by China because of the MTCR restrictions. Integrating partners into coalition operations using Chinese UAVs creates significant security risks. This is because China maintains control of the systems necessary to operate their UAVs. This enables them to collect intelligence on coalition operations if allowed access to coalition networks. From the perspective of a U.S. commander, the risk these likely infiltrations pose to security is sufficient to exclude partners operating Chinese UAVs from participating in both U.S. led coalition operations and intelligence sharing agreements.

Second, the U.S. denying UAV export requests from nations that are security partners fosters frustration, raises doubts about U.S. commitments, and drive partners to pursue security relationships with China. Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates provide recent examples of solid U.S. partners that have procured Chinese UAVs. Furthermore, these countries are then forced to rely on China for training, sustainment, intelligence processing, and other related services. China's willingness to integrate indigenous industry in joint ventures—another practice restricted by the MTCR—serves to further solidify the ties between China and the partnering nation. Absent a change in U.S. policy, China will continue to expand its UAV market share and associated influence into regions important to the U.S.

Third, the associated U.S. loss of global market share of UAV sales weakens U.S. business and the U.S. defense industrial base. Domestic funding for certain UAVs already faced downward pressure in the most recent budget request amidst other modernization priorities. Looking ahead the enormous federal expenditures to address the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic downturn are likely to result in significant cuts to future U.S. defense budgets. Greater access to foreign markets would serve to diversify the customer base of U.S. manufacturers of large UAVs, helping to offset reduced revenue from domestic buyers and keeping commercial production lines. Unfortunately, current UAV export policy precludes this from happening.

Declining production rates for large military UAVs threaten to not only to shrink the U.S. aerospace industrial base, but also to undermine its competitive edge. Lacking predictable cash flow and sufficient profit margins, companies that manage to remain in the market will become more reticent to invest significant funds into research and development. Furthermore, the MTCR prohibits co-development and co-production of UAVs, precluding U.S. drone companies from pooling resources and expertise with international partners. The danger is that the U.S. may squander its drone advantage just as international interest in procuring advanced, survivable, multi-mission UAVs ramps up. It would be a tremendous shame if the U.S. finds itself no longer in a leading position and must instead rely on others to develop cutting-edge UAV technologies.

Although there is growing awareness of these problems, recent efforts to craft a more reasonable UAV export policy have largely fallen short. Rather than a fundamental shift in policy, the few positive steps taken have been stopgap measures involving workarounds—approving more Category I sales via direct commercial sales rather than foreign military sales—or maneuvering within the confines of the MTCR through attempts to modify UAV definitions such as adding a speed criteria. Instead, as is comprehensively laid out in the Mitchell Institute's most recent policy paper, what is needed is for the Congress to insert language into the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act that explicitly defines UAVs as combat aircraft and subject them to the same export considerations. This would effectively remove U.S. UAV export decisions from the MTCR guidelines.

The U.S. has a proven process of adjudicating sales of the most advanced fighter aircraft in the world, including how to configure them to make sales mutually beneficial to the U.S. and its partners. The example of the F-35 is particularly pertinent because technologies approved for export on the F-35 would be restricted by the MCTR if applied to a UAV—the only difference being the pilot of the F-35 is in the aircraft whereas large UAVs are remotely piloted. Given both the high degree of commonality of combat aircraft and UAVs, as well as the proven success combat aircraft sales have in providing partners a formidable deterrent and warfighting capability, improving interoperability among coalition partners, and supporting both U.S. and partner industrial capacity, treating UAVs as combat aircraft for export policy offers the most sensible and effective solution.

Change cannot come soon enough. The U.S. has a limited window to re-engage with partners with a stated interest in U.S. UAVs or who are experiencing buyer's remorse with regard to their Chinese UAV partnerships. It is therefore critical that the U.S. normalize its UAV export policy before China can consolidate its gains. The future of warfare increasingly depends on UAV technology. Exporting large U.S. UAVs is vital to effective coalition operations. For too long the MTCR has distorted the balance of national security and economic interests against the fear of nuclear and WMD proliferation. Acknowledging UAVs as what they are—aircraft, not missiles—will enhance U.S. security, improve commercial trade in a growing business sector while preserving the MTCR as an effective means to prevent the proliferation of missiles and their associated technologies.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davedeptula/2020/06/09/losing-market-share-and-damaging-national-security-due-to-anachronistic-drone-policy/#50ce76d51332

Sur le même sujet

  • Joint Artificial Intelligence Center Keeps Branching Out

    4 novembre 2020 | International, C4ISR

    Joint Artificial Intelligence Center Keeps Branching Out

    By Yasmin Tadjdeh When the Pentagon's Joint Artificial Intelligence Center was stood up in 2018, it was established to bring together the Defense Department's various AI programs and projects. Two years later, JAIC is pivoting to new mission sets, expanding its portfolio and more closely working with industry. The organization is currently working on 30 different projects across six different areas including joint warfighting operations, warfighter health, business process transformation, threat reduction and protection, joint logistics and joint information warfare. The center is built “around getting a spark going or getting a prototype or making a market in some way, and then handing it off for transition and scaling right to a customer,” said Nand Mulchandani, JAIC chief technology officer. “We're now starting to demonstrate great and exciting success across those products.” The joint warfighting mission initiative is the organization's flagship product and is looking at means to transform the way the United States will go to war, Mulchandani said during an exclusive interview with National Defense on his first day back as chief technology officer after serving as the acting head of JAIC. In late September, Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Michael Groen was confirmed by the Senate to serve as its director. “Our early products ... were really focused on kind of starter AI projects when it came to things like predictive maintenance and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,” Mulchandani said. “The algorithms were not that hard. ... [However,] joint warfighting is the hardest problem at the DoD for us to take on.” The center is starting with technology such as human-machine teaming and decision support, Mulchandani said. “There are different ways of displaying information, about communicating information, about absorbing information,” he said. “We're spending time with our commanders, with training and education, etc., on how to absorb AI-enabled systems. And we want to do that in a very systematic, deliberate way where we start out with human-machine teaming, decision support, etc., and then work our way toward things like autonomy and others.” Joint warfighting will contribute to many Pentagon efforts such as joint all-domain command-and-control and the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System program, he said. In May, the center awarded the joint warfighting operations initiative's prime contract to Booz Allen Hamilton. The contract has an $806 million ceiling. However, the center would likely not spend all of the funding because the entire budget of the JAIC over a couple of years is around $800 million, Mulchandani said during a recent briefing with reporters. Despite the center being gung-ho about the initiative, a continuing resolution for fiscal year 2021 — which began Oct. 1 — could have an outsized effect on joint warfighting programs, he noted. “What this really impacts ... is new starts, our ability to start a bigger new project that we have been potentially forecasting for starting with new FY ‘21 money,” he said. That will require some programs to be delayed. However, JAIC “will be receiving some money as part of the CR that will allow us to kick-start some of these new projects and things along the way, and then scale them ... when we get out of the CR mode” after a full-year appropriations bill is passed by Congress, he added. JAIC had been planning for a continuing resolution for some time, Mulchandani noted. “Many of our projects and products ... have actually been pre-funded through much of the money that we got in FY ‘20,” he said. “We have contracts and vendors and other things working months and months out into the new fiscal year. ... We're not in a crisis mode at all.” Meanwhile, JAIC's relationship with industry has continued to improve over the past two years, Mulchandani said. When it was first stood up, much attention was put on what some perceived to be a reluctance from Silicon Valley to work with the Pentagon. “A lot of people ask us [about] the whole thing with Google and Project Maven and whether that's still” a strained relationship, he said, referring to a 2018 incident where thousands of Google employees signed a letter objecting to the company's work with the Defense Department's Project Maven, a pathfinder AI effort to better analyze drone footage. Google subsequently backed out of the program. However, JAIC collaborates closely with the tech giant now, he said. “We're working with Google on a number of projects directly ... whether it be health or other types ... of products there,” he said. “We have contracts with Google that we're working on, but all the other bigger vendors as well.” Mulchandani said JAIC is working with all of the largest technology companies in Silicon Valley. “Name an AI vendor and we either have work going on with them, or they're involved in some way in some of the newer projects that we're doing,” he said. As the organization continues to work with industry, it is setting up initiatives to better take advantage of rapid acquisition, Mulchandani said. It currently has partnerships with a number of contracting vehicle organizations such as the General Services Administration, the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense Information Systems Agency. Additionally, legislation is currently in front of Congress that could grant JAIC direct acquisition authority. “We obviously are very excited about that, [but] it's not done yet,” he said. “When the final vote happens and we do get it, we'll be very pleased and happy, and if we don't get it, well, we'll still be obviously continuing business with the partners that we have.” The center is also working on an acquisition effort called Project Tradewind which is a way for JAIC and the Defense Department writ large to better reach out to small companies, he said. Contract vehicles will be created that any organization across the department will be able to use to gain access to “teensy weensy, little companies that normally would hate to work with — or wouldn't know how to work with — the DoD,” Mulchandani said. “They can use Project Tradewind's acquisition frameworks to be able to interact with us in a very low overhead way.” During remarks at the Defense Department's Artificial Intelligence Symposium and Exposition, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper touted the work JAIC has done since its inception. “We have come a long way since establishing the JAIC two years ago,” he said. “Today, more than 200 talented civil service and military professionals work diligently to accelerate AI solutions and deliver these capabilities to the warfighter. From helping the Joint Force organize, fight and win at machine speed, to enhancing wildfire and flood responses through computer vision technology, the JAIC is utilizing every aspect of AI as a transformative instrument at home and abroad.” The center is lowering technical barriers to AI adoption by building a cloud-based platform to allow Defense Department components to test, validate and field capabilities with greater speed and at greater scale, he said. “The goal is to make AI tools and data accessible across the force, which will help synchronize projects and reduce redundancy, among many other benefits,” he said. JAIC is also working on ways to better train the Defense Department's acquisition workforce to buy AI products, Esper noted. The organization, in partnership with the Defense Acquisition University and the Naval Postgraduate School, was slated to launch an intensive six-week pilot course in October to train over 80 defense acquisition professionals of all ranks and grades. The trainees will learn how to apply AI and data science skills to operations, Esper said. The Defense Department plans to request additional funding from Congress for the services to grow the effort over time, he said. Dana Deasy, the Pentagon's chief information officer, noted JAIC's journey is still evolving. Meanwhile, the military is “generating positive momentum from our early days as AI pioneers toward a mature organization of AI practitioners,” he said. The center is now starting to deliver real AI solutions to the warfighter while leading the Defense Department in AI ethics and governance, he noted. Its budget is also growing. It went from $89 million in fiscal year 2019 to $268 million in fiscal year 2020, and the Pentagon plans to spend more than $1.6 billion over the next few years thanks to strong bipartisan support from Congress and Defense Department leadership, Deasy said. The organization is already generating early returns on investment in its mission initiatives, from predictive maintenance to business process transformation, Deasy noted. The center recently delivered an innovative engine health model predictive maintenance capability that is being utilized by Black Hawk helicopter maintainers from the U.S. Army's Special Operations Aviation Regiment, he said. Additionally, JAIC — via its business process transformation initiative — is delivering language-processing AI applications to the Washington Headquarters Service and the Pentagon's administrative and financial management teams, Deasy said. “These capabilities are automating the review of thousands of documents and memos for consistency, accuracy and compliance, thus increasing speed and efficiency while reducing manual, laborious processes,” he said. The center is also laying down the foundations for the Joint Common Foundation, an AI development environment that will broaden opportunities for developers across the Pentagon to build and deliver artificial intelligence capabilities in a secure DevSecOps infrastructure, he said. According to the General Services Administration, DevSecOps promotes a cohesive collaboration between development, security and operations teams as they work toward continuous integration and delivery of products. However, “while we develop and deliver these important near-term projects, we have to be ready for the contingencies of a changing and unpredictable operating environment,” Deasy said. “This is why I believe the true long-term success of the JAIC will depend on how the organization adapts and delivers real-world solutions when the strategic landscape and priorities change.” The organization is already proving it can adapt via its Project Salus effort — which is named after the Roman goddess of health and well-being — that has helped with the federal government's COVID-19 response, he said. “Working alongside a team of private industry partners, the JAIC developed a predictive-logistics AI dashboard platform for the U.S. Northern Command that enabled National Guard teams to assist states and municipalities with mitigating panic buying and managing supply chains,” he said. “That project went from concept to code in a matter of weeks. More importantly, it demonstrated the JAIC's ability to support the emergent needs of a combatant commander and deliver real AI solutions during a national emergency.” https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/11/3/joint-artificial-intelligence-center-keeps-branching-out

  • Women take charge of key portfolios in Justin Trudeau's new cabinet | CBC News

    29 octobre 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Women take charge of key portfolios in Justin Trudeau's new cabinet | CBC News

    For the first time in Canada's history, women will lead each of the departments of Finance, Defence and Foreign Affairs.

  • Airbus unveils B-model Lakota helos to enter US Army fleet next year

    31 août 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Airbus unveils B-model Lakota helos to enter US Army fleet next year

    By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — The newest version of the UH-72B Lakota light utility helicopter will enter the U.S. Army fleet in 2021, aircraft manufacturer Airbus announced Aug. 28 at the National Guard Association of the United States virtual trade show. Beginning with the newest orders placed in 2020, Airbus will deliver 17 UH-72Bs next year after supplying 460 UH-72As across the Army, Navy and National Guard. In September, the last UH-72A (the 463rd) will roll off the production line in Columbus, Missouri, according to the statement. The “B” model will look distinctly different from the “A” variant. The aircraft is based off the Airbus H145 and will feature a Fenestron tail rotor, which the current A model does not have, according to Airbus. The B model will also have more powerful engine technology, “enhanced” controls and the Airbus Helionix avionics suite, the company said. The new helicopter variant will go to the Army National Guard. “Since we first began operations with the UH-72 Lakota some 15 years ago, this helicopter has been the workhorse of the Army and National Guard, saving lives, assisting in disaster relief, training thousands of pilots, and, more importantly, helping to protect our communities and our country,” Col. Calvin Lane, the Army's project manager for utility helicopters, said in the statement. “Procuring the UH-72B Lakota provides tremendous value with no research and development costs for the Army.” Since the program's inception in 2006, the Army and National Guard have logged nearly 800,000 flight hours, serving as the initial entry rotary-wing training aircraft for the Army at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and has flown search and rescue, medical evacuation and disaster relief missions as well counter-drug operations at the Southwest border. The Army chose to make the Lakota the primary training helicopter and retire its TH-67 aircraft when it restructured its entire aviation fleet in 2013. The decision met some resistance. Several companies like Bell Helicopter and AgustaWestland were hoping at the time to sell military training helicopters to several armed services, including the Army. AgustaWestland, a Leonardo subsidiary, filed a lawsuit four years ago in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims over the Army's plan to buy 16 of the aircraft for the training fleet. The court ruled in favor of AgustaWestland, and the Army was barred from buying the Lakotas. But the U.S. Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's decision in early 2018, allowing the service to move forward in procuring Lakotas. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/08/28/airbus-unveils-b-model-lakotas-will-enter-us-army-fleet-in-2021/

Toutes les nouvelles