10 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial

Losing Market Share And Damaging National Security Due To Anachronistic Drone Policy

Adherence to an obsolescent approach to the international nuclear non-proliferation export guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is hurting the United States (U.S.) both commercially and from a national security perspective. In a nutshell, the MTCR treats large drones as if they were nuclear missiles—which they are not. As a result, this self-imposed restriction not only limits the sale of large U.S. drones to our friends and allies but pushes them into the arms of foreign suppliers some of whom are potential adversaries. The result is a series of negative consequences for the U.S.

When the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute released its annual report on global arms transfers earlier this year, it was a good news story for the U.S. From 2015-2019, the U.S. accounted for 36 percent of major global arms sales, a 23 percent increase in volume over the previous five-year period and 76 percent more than its next closest competitor—Russia. The dominant position the U.S. finds itself in is a testament to both the quality of U.S. defense equipment, which is typically accompanied by robust training, sustainment, and support packages, as well as the mutual desire of the U.S. and its partners and allies to develop and maintain strong defense relationships.

However, one important segment of the defense market where this pattern does not hold are large military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). This is not due to a lack of capability—the U.S. remains the world's leader in UAV technology and expertise—nor a lack of demand as by 2029 the international market will account for over 50 percent of the over $10 billion projected to be spent annually on UAVs. Instead, the U.S. has hamstrung itself due to restrictive export policies that equate large UAVs to nuclear missiles. This mismatch between the definitions and controls imposed on UAVs and the reality of how they are actually employed has significantly harmed coalition operations, U.S. relationships with its partners and allies, and the U.S. defense industrial base. It is imperative that the U.S. modernize its UAV export policy.

Currently, the MTCR governs the export of U.S. UAVs. Initially formed in 1987, the MTCR is a voluntary agreement intended to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons—and later weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The MTCR defines UAVs capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload more than 300 kilometers one way as Category I systems, the transfer of which “are subject to an unconditional strong presumption of denial.” Although at the time the MTCR was negotiated no UAV exceeded the Category I thresholds, their envisioned use as delivery vehicles for WMD equivalent to cruise missiles precipitated their inclusion in the MTCR. However, since then the development of UAVs evolved as remotely piloted aircraft, not cruise missiles. Unfortunately, export policy has failed to keep pace, resulting in a situation where the export of UAVs is regulated under the same stringent regime as intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. policy failure to adequately remedy this situation creates significant problems for the following reasons.

First, current U.S. export policy prevents the U.S. from realizing the full potential of UAVs in coalition operations. Because current policy frequently results in the denial of export requests for U.S. UAVs by close partners and allies, these nations must either resort to indigenous production or to another foreign manufacturer to meet their military requirements. Under the best of circumstances, the result is a lower level of interoperability with U.S. forces than possible had they been able to acquire U.S. UAVs. This hampers the integration of partners that would enable the coalition to be much more effective. The current policy impedes the use of common UAVs critical for success in allied operations.

Of greater concern is that much of the unmet demand by friends for U.S. military UAVs is now being fulfilled by China because of the MTCR restrictions. Integrating partners into coalition operations using Chinese UAVs creates significant security risks. This is because China maintains control of the systems necessary to operate their UAVs. This enables them to collect intelligence on coalition operations if allowed access to coalition networks. From the perspective of a U.S. commander, the risk these likely infiltrations pose to security is sufficient to exclude partners operating Chinese UAVs from participating in both U.S. led coalition operations and intelligence sharing agreements.

Second, the U.S. denying UAV export requests from nations that are security partners fosters frustration, raises doubts about U.S. commitments, and drive partners to pursue security relationships with China. Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates provide recent examples of solid U.S. partners that have procured Chinese UAVs. Furthermore, these countries are then forced to rely on China for training, sustainment, intelligence processing, and other related services. China's willingness to integrate indigenous industry in joint ventures—another practice restricted by the MTCR—serves to further solidify the ties between China and the partnering nation. Absent a change in U.S. policy, China will continue to expand its UAV market share and associated influence into regions important to the U.S.

Third, the associated U.S. loss of global market share of UAV sales weakens U.S. business and the U.S. defense industrial base. Domestic funding for certain UAVs already faced downward pressure in the most recent budget request amidst other modernization priorities. Looking ahead the enormous federal expenditures to address the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic downturn are likely to result in significant cuts to future U.S. defense budgets. Greater access to foreign markets would serve to diversify the customer base of U.S. manufacturers of large UAVs, helping to offset reduced revenue from domestic buyers and keeping commercial production lines. Unfortunately, current UAV export policy precludes this from happening.

Declining production rates for large military UAVs threaten to not only to shrink the U.S. aerospace industrial base, but also to undermine its competitive edge. Lacking predictable cash flow and sufficient profit margins, companies that manage to remain in the market will become more reticent to invest significant funds into research and development. Furthermore, the MTCR prohibits co-development and co-production of UAVs, precluding U.S. drone companies from pooling resources and expertise with international partners. The danger is that the U.S. may squander its drone advantage just as international interest in procuring advanced, survivable, multi-mission UAVs ramps up. It would be a tremendous shame if the U.S. finds itself no longer in a leading position and must instead rely on others to develop cutting-edge UAV technologies.

Although there is growing awareness of these problems, recent efforts to craft a more reasonable UAV export policy have largely fallen short. Rather than a fundamental shift in policy, the few positive steps taken have been stopgap measures involving workarounds—approving more Category I sales via direct commercial sales rather than foreign military sales—or maneuvering within the confines of the MTCR through attempts to modify UAV definitions such as adding a speed criteria. Instead, as is comprehensively laid out in the Mitchell Institute's most recent policy paper, what is needed is for the Congress to insert language into the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act that explicitly defines UAVs as combat aircraft and subject them to the same export considerations. This would effectively remove U.S. UAV export decisions from the MTCR guidelines.

The U.S. has a proven process of adjudicating sales of the most advanced fighter aircraft in the world, including how to configure them to make sales mutually beneficial to the U.S. and its partners. The example of the F-35 is particularly pertinent because technologies approved for export on the F-35 would be restricted by the MCTR if applied to a UAV—the only difference being the pilot of the F-35 is in the aircraft whereas large UAVs are remotely piloted. Given both the high degree of commonality of combat aircraft and UAVs, as well as the proven success combat aircraft sales have in providing partners a formidable deterrent and warfighting capability, improving interoperability among coalition partners, and supporting both U.S. and partner industrial capacity, treating UAVs as combat aircraft for export policy offers the most sensible and effective solution.

Change cannot come soon enough. The U.S. has a limited window to re-engage with partners with a stated interest in U.S. UAVs or who are experiencing buyer's remorse with regard to their Chinese UAV partnerships. It is therefore critical that the U.S. normalize its UAV export policy before China can consolidate its gains. The future of warfare increasingly depends on UAV technology. Exporting large U.S. UAVs is vital to effective coalition operations. For too long the MTCR has distorted the balance of national security and economic interests against the fear of nuclear and WMD proliferation. Acknowledging UAVs as what they are—aircraft, not missiles—will enhance U.S. security, improve commercial trade in a growing business sector while preserving the MTCR as an effective means to prevent the proliferation of missiles and their associated technologies.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davedeptula/2020/06/09/losing-market-share-and-damaging-national-security-due-to-anachronistic-drone-policy/#50ce76d51332

Sur le même sujet

15 novembre 2019 | International, C4ISR

U.S. Government Designates Lockheed Martin's Latest Generation Radar: AN/SPY-7(V)1
MOORESTOWN, N.J., Nov.14, 2019 /PRNewswire/ -- The world's latest generation solid-state radar technology, formerly known as Lockheed Martin's (NYSE: LMT) Solid State Radar (LM SSR), has been designated as AN/SPY-7(V)1 by the United States government. The designation of AN/SPY-7(V)1 is a direct reflection of the maturity and capability of Lockheed Martin's solid-state radar technology. The Japanese Ministry of Defense selected AN/SPY-7(V)1 for two planned Aegis Ashore installations in 2018. Additionally, variants of AN/SPY-7(V)1 will be used by the Royal Canadian Navy for the Canadian Surface Combatant program and the Spanish Navy for the upcoming F-110 frigate program. "Lockheed Martin's solid state solution meets the mission now and is flexible to adapt to the evolving threats of the future," said Paul Lemmo, vice president and general manager at Lockheed Martin. "This new designation solidifies our ability to provide the most technically advanced capabilities our warfighters require." AN/SPY-7(V)1 is a modular and scalable solid state radar, allowing for continuous surveillance and protection. It will be fully integrated with the Aegis Combat System, providing advanced technology for future ship classes. With 50 years of constant evolution and innovation, Lockheed Martin has a trusted history of producing, integrating and delivering radars and combat systems. Lockheed Martin and the Aegis Combat System continue to keep pace with evolving integrated air and missile threats, introducing new capabilities to create the latest generation of advanced solid state technologies, integrated with the Aegis system, to provide world-class defense and ensure future safety and security. About Lockheed Martin Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, Lockheed Martin is a global security and aerospace company that employs approximately 105,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. SOURCE Lockheed Martin https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2019-11-14-U-S-Government-Designates-Lockheed-Martins-Latest-Generation-Radar-AN-SPY-7-V-1
15 septembre 2021 | International, Aérospatial

At next Project Convergence, 7 scenarios will test American tech against adversaries
The force is also looking for ways to incorporate advanced technology like artificial intelligence and robotics to more quickly make decisions across multiple domains of operations.
8 août 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - August 7, 2019
AIR FORCE United Launch Services, Centennial, Colorado, has been awarded a $156,752,771 firm-fixed-price modification (P00003) to previously awarded contract FA8811-19-C-0002 for National Security Space Launch Delta IV Heavy Launch services. This modification provides for launch vehicle production services for National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Launch Mission Three, the last of three planned NRO launch missions under this contract. This modification brings the total cumulative face value of the contract from $310,784,574 to $467,537,345. Work will be performed in Centennial, Colorado; Decatur, Alabama; and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, and is expected to be completed by January 2024. Fiscal 2019 missile procurement funds in the amount of $144,637,202 are being obligated at the time of award. The Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, is the contracting activity. (CORRECTION: The May 9, 2019, announcement of this contract's modification for Launch Mission Two incorrectly stated the total cumulative face value of the contract at the time as $449,813,010. The actual total cumulative value was $310,784,574.) Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems, Redondo Beach, California, has been awarded a $22,500,000 cost-plus incentive-fee modification (P00017) to previously awarded contract FA8808-18-C-0002 for changes to the payload driven by selection of a host space vehicle. The contract provides for the delivery of two Enhanced Polar System Recapitalization (EPS-R) payloads. Work will be performed at Redondo Beach, California, and is expected to be completed by December 2023. Fiscal 2019 research and development funds in the amount of $5,900,000 are being obligated at the time of award. The Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, is the contracting activity. TFAB Defense Systems LLC,* Warner Robins, Georgia, was awarded an $8,918,791 firm-fixed-price contract for engineering services. This contract provides for develop the software, test hardware and related documentation for test program sets for use with the Air Force's Versatile Depot Automatic Test Station family of testers to isolate failures within line replaceable units and shop replaceable units. Work will be performed at Warner Robins, Georgia, and is expected to be completed by Aug. 6, 2022. This award is the result of a Small Business Set Aside sole-source acquisition. No funds are being obligated at time of award. The Air Force Sustainment Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, is the contracting activity for contract (FA8571-19-D-A003). ARMY Southwest Valley Constructors Co., Albuquerque, New Mexico, was awarded an $80,869,000 contract for design-build horizontal construction in support of the Department of Homeland Security in McAllen, Texas. Three bids were solicited with three bids received. Work will be performed in McAllen, Texas, with an estimated completion date of April 28, 2021. Fiscal 2019 Department of Homeland Security funds in the amount of $80,869,000 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Worth, Texas, is the contracting activity (W9126G-19-C-0118). Oshkosh Defense LLC, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, was awarded an $11,812,335 modification (P00240) to contract W56HZV-15-C-0095 for Authorized Stockage List. Work will be performed in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, with an estimated completion date of April 30, 2021. Fiscal 2018 and 2019 other procurement, Army and procurement Marine Corps funds in the combined amount of $11,812,335 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Warren, Michigan, is the contracting activity. Stantec Consulting Services Inc., Louisville, Kentucky, was awarded a $9,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for geotechnical services. Bids were solicited via the internet with six received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Aug. 7, 2024. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisville, Kentucky, is the contracting activity (W912QR-19-D-0046). NAVY Data Link Solutions LLC, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, is awarded a maximum potential value $75,000,000 modification to a previously awarded indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity multiple award contract (N00039-15-D-0042) for the Block Upgrade II retrofit of Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) low volume terminals. The terminals provide secure, high-capacity, jam-resistant, digital data and voice communications capability for Navy, Air Force and Army platforms, and for Foreign Military Sales customers. Work will be performed in Wayne, New Jersey (50%); and Cedar Rapids, Iowa (50%), and is expected to be completed by December 2026. No funding is being obligated at the time of award. Funds will be obligated as individual delivery orders are issued. This contract modification was not competitively procured because it is a sole-source acquisition pursuant to the authority of 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1) - only one responsible source (Federal Acquisition Regulation subpart 6.302-1). The Naval Information Warfare Systems Command, San Diego, California, is the contracting activity and awarded the contract on behalf of the MIDS Program Office. Oceaneering International Inc., Chesapeake, Virginia, is awarded a maximum value $34,316,273 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for the Virginia class submarine sail racetracks, payload tube loading platforms and multiple all-up-round canister special support equipment ladder kits with shipping crates. Work will be performed in Chesapeake, Virginia, and is expected to be complete in August 2024. Fiscal 2019 other procurement (Navy) funding in the amount of $3,368,978 will be obligated at time of award, and not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured in accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304 (a) via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with two offers received. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia Division, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the contracting activity (N64498-19-D-4031). Stantec Consulting Services Inc., Burlington, Massachusetts, is awarded $17,695,256 for firm-fixed-price modification to task order N40085-18-F-5881 under previously awarded contract N40085-17-D-5004 for design of a multi-mission dry dock at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. This modification will provide for all architectural and engineering services necessary for the final design, including developing the design-bid-build solicitation documents. Work will be performed in Massachusetts (90%); and Maine (10%), and is expected to be completed by March 2021. Fiscal 2021 military construction (Navy) contract funds in the amount of $17,695,256 are obligated on this award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Mid-Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia, is the contracting activity. RTL Networks Inc.,* Denver, Colorado, is awarded a $14,399,532 cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract to provide services in the areas of cooperative cyber risk assessments and cyber table tops of fighter/attack (fixed and rotary wing) and surveillance aircraft or similarly complex aircraft, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, GPS guided weapons or similarly complex weapons, training simulators, Portable Electronic Maintenance Aids equipment, software and development environments, and associated communications and networks. Work will be performed in China Lake, California (50%); Placentia, California (48%); and Denver, Colorado (2%), and is expected to be completed in August 2024. No funds will be obligated at the time of award. Funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. This contract was competitively procured via an electronic request for proposal as a Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business set-aside; two offers were received. The Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, California, is the contracting activity (N68936-19-D-0040). The Lockheed Martin Corp., Rotary and Mission Systems, Mitchel Field, New York, is awarded $11,498,789 for cost-plus-incentive-fee modification P00018 for new scope under previously awarded contract N00030-18-C-0045 to provide U.S. Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapon System efforts for the navigation subsystem. Work will be performed in Mitchel Field, New York, with an expected completion date of Dec. 31, 2021. Fiscal 2018 research, development, tests and evaluation (Navy) funds in the amount of $11,498,789 are being obligated on this award. This contract was a sole-source acquisition pursuant to 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1). Strategic Systems Programs, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity. Treadwell Corp., Thomaston, Connecticut, is awarded a not-to-exceed $7,330,400 ceiling-priced delivery order N00104-19-F-J80J under previously awarded basic ordering agreement N00104-15-G-A408 for repair of 98 items in support of the Navy's Electrolytic Oxygen Generator System. The contract is a four-year contract with no option periods. Work will be performed in Thomaston, Connecticut, and is expected to be completed by September 2023. Working capital funds (Navy) in the amount of $3,591,896 will be obligated at the time of award and funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. One firm was solicited for this sole-sourced requirement under authority 10 U.S. Code 2304 (c)(1), with one offer received. Naval Supply Systems Command, Weapon Systems Support, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, is the contracting activity. *Small Business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/1928698/source/GovDelivery/

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Losing Market Share And Damaging National Security Due To Anachronistic Drone Policy

Sur le même sujet

At next Project Convergence, 7 scenarios will test American tech against adversaries The force is also looking for ways to incorporate advanced technology like artificial intelligence and robotics to more quickly make decisions across multiple domains of operations.

At next Project Convergence, 7 scenarios will test American tech against adversaries
The force is also looking for ways to incorporate advanced technology like artificial intelligence and robotics to more quickly make decisions across multiple domains of operations.