Lithuania pledges to spend at least 3% of GDP on defence

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  30 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  America’s F-22 stealth fighter may be limited in Asia-Pacific conditions, China’s J-20 designer says

  Aircraft has been sent to the region but was designed for combat in Europe, which could affect its capabilities, according to Yang Wei China's answer to the Raptor has yet to be put to the test in a real combat situation, military expert notes Minnie Chan Published: 12:00am, 30 Jul, 2020 America's F-22 Raptor stealth fighter was designed for combat in Europe but is now being used in the Asia-Pacific, according to a top Chinese aircraft designer, who says the different conditions will limit its capabilities there. Yang Wei, general designer of China's first stealth fighter the J-20, said the twin-engine F-22s could face the same challenges in the region as the F-4 fighter-bombers the Pentagon sent to the Vietnam war between 1965 and 1973. “The complex environment and political constraints in Vietnam caused the F-4 to almost fail to show its high-speed performance and over-the-horizon combat capabilities,” Yang wrote in a paper published in Chinese aeronautics journal Acta Aeronautica et Astronautica Sinica last month. He said the F-22, a tactical fighter inspired by the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union, was designed for battle in Europe and could face similar problems now that it had been deployed in the Asia-Pacific. Yang did not draw any comparisons between America's F-22 and China's J-20 both fifth-generation, twin-engine heavy fighter jets and of a similar size. But military experts said his remarks indicated that the J-20 Weilong, or Powerful Dragon, was clearly seen as China's answer to the F-22. Comparing the two, Song Zhongping, a military commentator in Hong Kong, said the J-20's biggest advantage was that it was developed later, meaning its designers could learn from the F-22 – including how to fix shortcomings, and what type of new technologies could be used to optimise the aircraft. “The F-22 was originally designed for combat with the former Soviet Union, or today's Russia, in Europe, but now the Raptor's main opponent is the [People's Liberation Army] in the Asia-Pacific,” Song said. “China's J-20 was inspired by the F-22's deployment. The Chinese aircraft designers used the Raptor as a rival and the F-35 [stealth multi-role fighter] as a tactical opponent to help them to come up with a more practical and capable fighter jet.” Both the F-22 and the J-20 have a ceiling of 20km (12.4 miles) and a maximum speed of over Mach 2 (2,470km per hour, or 1,535mph) – faster than the speed of sound. The F-22 has a comparatively shorter range – with a combat radius of 800km (497 miles), while the J-20's large internal fuel tank can sustain a longer combat radius of 1,100km (684 miles). But Beijing-based military expert Zhou Chenming noted that the J-20, which entered service in 2017, had yet to be put to the test in a real combat situation. Andrei Chang, founder of influential military magazine Kanwa Asian Defence, said that in contrast, the F-22's combat capabilities had been seen, most recently last year when the stealth fighters were sent to Qatar as tensions rose with Iran. “The operation of the F-22 has been perfected since it joined the US military in 2005. The Raptor has taken part in countless actual combat situations around the globe, including in the Middle East, Singapore and Okinawa in the Pacific,” Chang said. A military source close to the PLA believed the J-20 could counter the F-22 in a one-on-one combat situation, but said far fewer of the fighter jets had been made compared to America's Raptors. “At the moment China has about 60 J-20s – just one-third of the total number of F-22s,” said the source, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter. “Now the US has deployed hundreds of F-35s to the region, so it's an even bigger threat to China,” he added. With F-22s being deployed to the Asia-Pacific region – and as relations worsen with Washington, including over the disputed South China Sea – Beijing has stepped up development of its new stealth fighter. Mass production of the J-20B began earlier this month. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3095219/americas-f-22-stealth-fighter-may-be-limited-asia-pacific

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  4 août 2020 | International, Terrestre

  US weapon sales boss talks China, arms exports and his agency’s future

  By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — After years of working various jobs related to security cooperation, Lt. Gen. Charles Hooper took over the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency in August 2017. It was an appointment that coincided with a major push by the Trump administration to increase weapon sales as an economic driver. Three years later, as he gets ready to retire, Hooper sat down with Defense News for an exclusive exit interview. This interview was edited for length and clarity. You came in as DSCA director in 2017, when the Trump administration was making a concerted push to increase arms sales abroad. Has that push been successful? Certainly I think the answer to that question is: “Yes, absolutely.” When I assumed responsibility at DSCA, we saw a convergence of three authorities that helped to create conditions that would help us to move forward and to elevate security cooperation. The first one was the fiscal 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, which [gave me] responsibilities in the Department of Defense to reform security cooperation, in ways that would make it more efficient and effective. The second one was the revision and the updating of the administration's arms transfer policies. And the third was the National Defense Strategy with which has three lines of effort, the second of which was strengthen alliances and attract new partners. So those three authorities created by convergence — what I call a perfect storm of authorities — and conditions to allow us to elevate and push for security cooperation and foreign military sales. And I made it my mission to take advantage of those conditions to move it forward. You have talked often about the need to both trim time and cost for partners and allies buying American systems. What are some highlights for you? In 2018, we lowered the admin surcharge rate from 3.5 to 3.2 percent. And since the new rates have gone into effect, our partners have saved $250 million on FMS cases. Next, we reduced the transportation rates in 2018. And since that reduction has gone into effect, since Aug. 15, 2018, our partners saved about $15 million. Then this year, we reduced the FMS contract administration surcharge from 1.2 percent to 1 percent. Although we don't have enough data as of yet to determine actual savings, we estimate that our allies and partners will save about 17 percent on contract administration over the life of each FMS case, which averages about seven or eight years. That perfect storm of authorities allowed us to move forward with many of the initiatives that we've been able to accomplish over my tenure as DSCA director. And then the Defense Security Cooperation University. I'm very proud of that, and we were able to bring that online in less than two years: The establishment of a civilian career field for security cooperation specialists, so that we are able to train and educate a cadre of people specifically focused on security cooperation, and foreign military sales through their mid-career and all the way to their capstone years. We all know one big FMS case can skew an entire year's numbers, but do you feel confident that enough has been done to ensure FMS sales will continue to grow? Although we tell everyone what the total value was of the cases that were implemented in that year, we think a three-year running average is a much more accurate measure of the success of FMS over time. And if you look at the three-year running average, over the past three years we're actually up around 16 percent, I believe. So the answer to your question is, yes, I think that we're still on a very positive trajectory. And I think that's the result of many of the changes that have taken place over the last three years that were made possible by the authorities that we were given. So for example, we looked at those surcharge [changes], we revised our financial collection policies to align collections with the actual anticipated billing requirements. And so by decreasing those early collections, foreign partners will experience less financial strain, aligning FMS procurement with fiscal realities. And we've also introduced new flexible financing options for our allies and partners to fit their own unique national budget and fiscal requirements. I'm very optimistic that we're going to continue to see positive trends in our foreign military sales this year, and in the years to come. The DSCA job is moving from a three-star role to a civilian job, with Heidi Grant taking over. You've often talked about the benefit of having years of relationships, going back to your younger officer days, with officers from other countries. Do you see any downside with the position being civilian? What's most important about this position is the person coming into it, and Heidi Grant has all the qualifications that you would need to be an exceptional DSCA director. She has time in combatant commands; of course time on the Air Force secretary's [staff]; her time as the director of the Defense Technology Security Administration. So it is the right person, with the right skill set, to be an upstanding director of DSCA and, frankly, I'm excited to see all the accomplishments that she's going to have. There is speculation that a potential Biden administration could roll back some of the arms control changes made under the Trump administration. If that were to happen, what would be the impact? I'm not going to hypothesize here about what ifs. What I can say is that we're clearly on a very positive trajectory as a result of the three steps that have taken place. And I think that the results that have come forward — I mean, the results that we've seen today are a reflection of the NDAA, the conventional arms transfer policies and National Defense Strategy. Future administrations will of course consider things as they will consider them. And I wouldn't want to speculate on that. But I think the progress we've made today speaks very, very strongly toward the effectiveness of the measures in place. We hear a lot about Russia and China looking at foreign arms sales as a way to exert influence around the globe. Are they successful in pushing the U.S. out of certain markets? Both of our main strategic competitors are mounting challenges to the United States, and I think we see that in a number of places all over the world. But I would say that the proper characterization of this is that they are challenging us. They are competing with us. Certainly they've mounted challenges around the world and in providing goods and services that are not quite the quality of the United States, trying to replace the United States as the partner of choice. Whether it's been successful or not, I think that we have recognized that they've mounted this challenge and we've taken some of the steps that I've articulated for you here that we've done to ensure that we remain the partner of choice and that we complicate their efforts to compete with us. In addition to providing partners with the hardware, our approach ensures that we strengthen these institutions — logistics, doctrine, infrastructure, institutional support, financial management — so that they can learn how to pay the people who will actually fix the equipment. And this is what makes our approach so unique. And this is why we will win this great power competition. Our values set us apart from the other great power competitors. You were the defense attache to the embassy in Beijing for two years, and obviously have a view on China's efforts from your current spot. How do you asses the country's defense export capacity? Certainly, the Chinese are going to look across the spectrum, but certainly they're looking in areas where they think they can challenge us. We know, of course, that the Chinese have marketed UAVs and other things. So they'll look for market niches in areas where they think they can be competitive with the United States. They have economic reasons for doing so, as well as strategic reasons for doing so. But once again, their approach stops at the point of sale. And this is the inherent weakness in their approach and the inherent strength in our approach. Do you think UAVs will be the main area that China targets? No. I used that solely as one example. We've seen attempts by the Chinese to compete across the spectrum, from small arms, small missile sets and others all the way up to more sophisticated equipment such as UAVs and others. We've seen a comprehensive effort by the Chinese to compete across the spectrum of defense articles and services. And I think we've seen a comprehensive effort on their part to try and market systems that replicate U.S. systems and U.S. capabilities across the spectrum, from small arms through artillery systems and other things. So I think we have to be vigilant across the spectrum of defense articles and services to where the Chinese are probing. I think the Chinese will generally try to press forward in areas where they sense that the U.S. position is perhaps a bit weaker, and they will push forward in those areas. And I think rather than having a strategy of competing in any particular sector of defense articles and services, I think that they're more interested in trying to compete across the spectrum, where what they perceive to be potential areas where they might be able to make some advances, and moving forward in those. In what areas is the U.S. potentially vulnerable, and are those where the U.S. needs to increase sales? I don't look at it that way. Defense exports are driven by a rapidly evolving security environment and emerging threats. And so we can't really predict this system or that system, or this category of systems. That said, we know what our military leaders are saying: that [the capabilities] they need in the field to ensure our strategic and operational edge [is what] our allies and partners will want as we move into the more modern areas of conflict. In the past, there was a lag between when the United States would introduce a system and when our allies and partners would ask for us to export it, and those days are behind us. We're in a world where interoperability is the key to success, and we cannot afford to have delays in when we introduce new technology and when we consider exporting them. Now, there are inherent challenges here, between conducting the cost-benefit analysis of risk versus gain, but we have the talent and the ability to rapidly assess these, and to move forward and provide our partners their defense articles and services that they want and that they need, and that will make them better allies and partners for the United States. So rather than predict any particular segment, I would say that the steps that we're taking to improve our overall approach will ensure that whatever the evolution of systems and the evolution of threats is, we will be able to respond and react quickly, and work with our allies and partners to provide them those defense articles and services in a timely fashion. Both the commercial and defense industries are investing heavily in new technologies, including artificial intelligence, which can be tricky to export. How does this work going forward? That's a great question. And I'll tell you, early this year I took a visit out to Silicon Valley and Stanford, and had an opportunity to talk to some of the people out there. Ever since I came back from that trip, I've been thinking about this question and related questions. And, to be honest with you, I think we've yet to determine — we know that this will be one of the principal challenges for security cooperation moving forward. We absolutely know this. And I'm confident that we're thinking deeply about this because I've had this discussion with my colleagues and others. I don't have any solutions for you right now. But I think we've all come to the conclusion that the rapid evolution of technology is going to require us to conduct risk assessments and cost-benefit analysis more quickly, without sacrificing the due diligence necessary to determine the relative cost and benefits of whether or not we want to move forward with [exporting] a certain technology. We all recognize that we have a challenge to come together and determine how we will move forward in the security cooperation realm to address space, cyber, artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies. Should there be a hard and fast rule for whether technology like AI can be exported, given its nature? Listen, never ever forget that security cooperation is a policy function at its core. That's why DSCA resides in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. And policy is a process of adjudicating on a case-by-case basis, based upon a number of economic, diplomatic and political factors, as well as the right steps to take to secure the security of the United States. Just as security cooperation now is a case-by-case consideration of a number of factors, I don't see why, as the technology evolves, it would be any different. All of this, everything we do, is on a case-by-case basis because our national security is predicated on a comprehensive assessment of the situation as it exists, the factors impacted on that situation and the ramifications of a decision for the security of the United States. https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2020/08/03/us-weapon-sales-boss-talks-china-arms-exports-and-his-agencys-future/

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  25 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - November 24, 2020

  NAVY BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair, Norfolk, Virginia, was awarded a $197,452,828, firm-fixed-price contract for the execution of the USS Wasp (LHD 1) fiscal 2021 Chief of Naval Operations scheduled docking selected restricted availability. This availability will include a combination of maintenance, modernization and repair of USS Wasp (LHD 1). This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value to $237,765,941. Work will be performed in Norfolk, Virginia, and is expected to be completed by May 2022. Fiscal 2021 operation and maintenance (Navy) (97.2%); and fiscal 2021 other procurement (Navy) (2.8%) funding in the amount of $197,452,828 will be obligated at contract award, of which funding in the amount of $191,836,933 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured using full and open competition via the Federal Business Opportunities website with one offer received in response to Solicitation No. N00024-20-R-4404. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-21-C-4404). (Awarded Nov. 20, 2020) Auxiliary Systems Inc.,* Norfolk, Virginia, is awarded a maximum dollar value $35,423,320 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract to provide alternating current/direct current motors and motor generator sets repair. Work will be performed in Norfolk, Virginia, and is expected to be complete by November 2021 and if options are exercised, work will be completed by November 2025. Fiscal 2021 operation and maintenance (Navy) funding in the amount of $12,000 ($12,000 minimum guarantee per contract) will be obligated at time of award and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This single award contract was procured as a small business set-aside via the beta.sam.gov website with two offers received. The Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center, Norfolk, Virginia, is the contracting activity (N50054-21-D-0001). Bell Boeing Joint Project Office, Amarillo, Texas, is awarded a $12,861,992 modification (P00004) to cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price order N00019-20-F-0315 against previously issued basic ordering agreement N00019-17-G-0002. This modification exercises options to modify the V-22 aircraft to the government of Japan's unique configuration requirements. Additionally, the modification exercises options for the production and delivery of nine traffic collision avoidance systems, technical support representation and preservation of aircraft post completion of unique modifications. Work will be performed in Stennis, Mississippi (75%); Ridley Park, Pennsylvania (15%); Fort Worth, Texas (5%); and Tokyo, Japan (5%), and is expected to be completed in August 2024. Foreign Military Sales funds in the amount of $12,861,992 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. Pacific Federal Management Inc.,* Tumon, Guam, is awarded a $10,366,798 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity modification for the exercise of Option Number One for base operating support services at Naval Base (NB) Guam and Naval Support Activity (NSA) Andersen. The work to be performed provides for all labor, supervision, management, tools, material, equipment, facilities, transportation and incidental engineering and other items necessary to accomplish all work to perform ground maintenance and tree trimming services for U.S. military facilities on Guam and NSA Andersen at various locations on Guam, Marianas Islands. After award of this option, the total cumulative contract value will be $19,783,731. Work will be performed in the Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC) Marianas area of operations, including but not limited to, NB Guam (70%); and NSA Andersen, Guam (30%). This option period is from December 2020 to November 2021. No funds will be obligated at time of award. Fiscal 2021 operation and maintenance (O&M) (Navy); and fiscal 2021 O&M (family housing) in the amount of $7,945,193 for recurring work will be obligated on individual task orders issued during the option period. NAVFAC Marianas, Guam, is the contracting activity (N40192-20-D-9000). IAP Worldwide Services Inc., Cape Canaveral, Florida, is awarded a $9,112,276 recurring/non-recurring services type modification for base operating services at Naval Support Activity Annapolis. The work to be performed provides for all management, supervision, labor hours, training, equipment and supplies necessary to perform base operating services to include, but not limited to, facility investment, service calls, pest control, operation of utility plants, refuse collection, special events and snow and ice removal. Work will be performed in Annapolis, Maryland, with the contract period of Dec. 1, 2020, to Feb. 28, 2021. No funds will be obligated at time of modification award. Fiscal 2021 operation and maintenance in the amount of $5,833,247 for recurring work will be obligated on individual task orders issued during the contract period. The Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command, Washington, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N40080-20-D-0500). ARMY FLIR Unmanned Ground Systems Inc., Chelmsford, Massachusetts, was awarded a $30,100,000 modification (P00007) to contract W56HZV-19-D-0031 for reset, sustainment, maintenance and recap parts to support the overall sustainment actions of the entire FLIR Unmanned Ground Systems family of small, medium and large robots. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 23, 2020. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, is the contracting activity. Norfolk Dredging Co., Chesapeake, Virginia, was awarded a $20,490,500 firm-fixed-price contract to remove dredging material from the Delaware River. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed in Bellafonte, Delaware, with an estimated completion date of March 22, 2021. Fiscal 2010 civil construction funds in the amount of $20,490,500 were obligated at the time of the award. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the contracting activity (W912BU-21-C-0007). AIR FORCE Busek Co. Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, has been awarded a $20,335,186 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for development of a 1-2 kW Hall Thruster system for a near-term space experiment. This contract provides a contract vehicle the Air Force Research Laboratory, Aerospace Systems and Space Propulsion Division can use to address technical needs for next-generation strategic, tactical and spacecraft propulsion systems. Work will be performed in Natick, Massachusetts, and is expected to be completed Nov. 25, 2023. Fiscal 2021 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $2,559,980 are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California, is the contracting activity (FA9300-21-C-6001). DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY Epic Aviation LLC, Salem, Oregon, has been awarded a maximum $11,263,200 fixed-price with economic-price-adjustment contract for jet fuel. This was a competitive acquisition with three responses received. This is an 18-month base contract with one six-month option period. Locations of performance are California and Oregon, with a May 31, 2022, performance completion date. Using customer is Air National Guard. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2021 through 2022 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Energy, Fort Belvoir, Virginia (SPE605-21-D-4527). *Small business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2427044/source/GovDelivery/