17 juin 2024 | International, Autre défense
L'OTAN recueille des données sur les dépenses de défense des Alliés et les publie régulièrement. Le ministère de la Défense de chaque pays membre communique les données relatives aux dépenses de défense actuelles et futures selon une définition agréée des dépenses de défense. Ces montants représentent les paiements qu’un État a réellement effectués ou devra effectuer au cours de l'exercice pour satisfaire les besoins de ses forces armées, de celles d’autres Alliés ou de l’Alliance. Dans les graphiques et tableaux qui suivent, l'OTAN recourt également à des informations économiques et démographiques mises à disposition par la direction générale des affaires économiques et financières de la Commission européenne ainsi que par l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_226465.htm?selectedLocale=fr
13 décembre 2023 | International, Terrestre, Sécurité
“The hardware is good,” Lt. Gen. Michael Schmidt said. “It’s the rate at which they’re producing them to meet our production and retrofit needs."
21 août 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By: Charles V. Peña The first COVID-19 clusters appeared in Italy in late February, and by early March the Italian authorities issued a decree to install strict public health measures, including social distancing first in the affected regions and then nationwide. Soon afterward, Spain, France and many other European countries instituted similar public health measures. Without debating the efficacy of those measures, the important takeaway is that when faced with what was viewed as a clear and present danger, European countries acted in their own self-interest without having to depend on the U.S. to counter the threat posed by COVID-19. They need to take that same approach for their own security and responsibilities under NATO. It is not a question of resources or capabilities — it is largely a matter of political will. The low hanging fruit for our European NATO allies is to meet their pledge of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. Currently nine countries meet that threshold: the United States (3.42 percent), Bulgaria (3.25 percent), Greece (2.28 percent), the United Kingdom (2.14 percent), Estonia (2.14 percent), Romania (2.04 percent), Lithuania (2.03 percent), Latvia (2.01 percent) and Poland (2 percent). Noticeably absent are Germany (1.38 percent), France (1.84 percent) and Italy (1.22 percent) — the fourth, seventh and eighth largest economies in the world. These are wealthy countries that can afford to make the necessary investment. Indeed, the combined GDP of NATO Europe is nearly on par with the U.S. — about $17.5 trillion versus about $20 trillion. Yet, the U.S. spends more than double on defense than our European NATO allies. Other than political will, there is no real reason that European NATO countries cannot spend 2 percent of their GDP for their own defense. Yet, even though Germany previously pledged to meet its 2 percent obligation, Berlin is proposing a new metric based on a country's defense needs — perhaps because U.S. President Donald Trump has stated that he wants European allies to spend 4 percent of their GDP on defense (a metric even the U.S. does not meet). Beyond spending, there is the question of what threat NATO should counter. Originally created in 1949, NATO was intended to counter the Soviet military threat and communist expansion. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies had some 4 million troops and 60,000 main battle tanks deployed against Western Europe — and threatened invasion via the North German Plain, Hof Corridor and Fulda Gap. But today's Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, NATO's European countries have the resources to counter a Russian military threat (although it's worth noting that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently said: “We don't see any imminent threat against any NATO ally.”) NATO Europe's combined GDP is 10 times larger than Russia's — more than $17 trillion versus $1.7 trillion. And current defense spending is also in Europe's favor by more than 4-to-1 ($287 billion versus $65 billion). Again, there is no practical reason why NATO Europe cannot make the necessary investments to provide for its security. It is more a question of political will. Moreover, if NATO is concerned about Russia as a potential threat, it should think twice about continuing to expand the alliance eastward onto Russia's doorstep. Rather than providing increased security, it may do more to provoke the Russian bear. Part of the problem is that NATO has largely strayed from its original purpose of collective defense against the Soviet Union (and now Russia). According to the NATO website, the organization is “an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the international stage” that “promotes democratic values and is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes” with “approximately 20,000 military personnel ... engaged in NATO operations and missions around the world.” If Russia is deemed a threat to Europe and NATO, then the European members of NATO need to take primary responsibility for defending themselves against that threat — and they should view that threat widely to include Russian cyberthreats as well as misinformation and disinformation campaigns meant to undermine elections. That doesn't mean a U.S. withdrawal from NATO. But it is long past the post-World War II era when European countries were struggling to regain their footing and needed America to be the bulwark of its defense. Europe as a whole is today an economic powerhouse — second only to the United States. NATO Europe can and should do more to provide for its own security rather than depending on the U.S. to act as the front line of its defense. All that needs to happen is for those countries to be as serious as they were with COVID-19 and take the same approach to national security as they did when the pandemic began. Charles V. Peña is a senior fellow with Defense Priorities. He has experience supporting the U.S. departments of Defense and Homeland Security. He previously served as the director of defense for policy studies at the Cato Institute, and he is author of “Winning the Un—War: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism.” https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/08/20/money-and-missions-nato-should-learn-from-europes-pandemic-response/
14 mai 2018 | International, Aérospatial
By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — Finland's defense minister, Jussi Niinistö, visited the Pentagon May 8 to sign a letter pledging greater trilateral cooperation between his nation, the United States and Sweden. After the event, he talked with Defense News about his goals for the meeting, shared concerns about the European Union's new defense initiative and Finland's relationship with NATO. Finland just signed a new statement on trilateral defense cooperation with the U.S. and Sweden, but it's fairly broad language. What do you see as the most concrete part of the agreement? Firstly, I have to say it is not a “trilateral agreement,” in a legally binding way. It is a statement of intent, and there is a big difference with that. I think the most important part of the statement of intent is the exercise part. We have had good exercise cooperation with the United States and Sweden lately. For instance, last year, Sweden arranged a multinational exercise called Aurora, [in] which both U.S. and Finland participated. For instance, right now in Finland there is an Army exercise called Arrow, there are U.S. Marines taking part in that. In the autumn, there will be a big exercise in Norway called Trident Juncture ― high-visibility exercise. Finland will be taking part with 1,500 or up to 2,000 soldiers, and also Sweden is taking part in that big exercise. Remember that in 2021, Finland will be arranging a similar kind of exercise like Sweden did with the Aurora exercise, so we will have over 20,000 soldiers in Finland, and the most important partners in that exercise are the Untied States and Sweden. But the 2021 exercise has been in the works for a while. So does this change that at all? Well, it is a cooperation done on a win-win basis. We go to exercise, for instance, to Sweden or the United States, Finnish Air Force is taking part at Red Flag exercise in October this year. This is the first time in Finnish Air Force history that we take part in this biggest exercise in the world. The United States comes to our exercise. So everybody hopes to benefit in this cooperation. Finland has been very supportive of the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence initiative, but the U.S. has been wary. Did that topic come up during your talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis? Yes, it was a topic. PESCO is a topic, I guess. Every time Secretary Mattis meets with a European counterpart, he will talk about PESCO. And I understand it. We talk with the same voice on this issue because, for instance, the United States defense industry is worried about this PESCO project, [if it will] lead to the fact that every country in the European Union has to buy defense products from the European Union. And Finland doesn't want it to be like that. We have a strong opinion that we want to buy the best available defense material, wherever we want, because since 1992, when Finland decided to buy F-18 fighter planes, we have been practically married with United States defense technology, and we buy a lot of stuff, from Israel also. So for a country like Finland, which is militarily nonaligned and has territorial defense, [it] has to take care of defense on her own if needed. Of course we hope partners [will come to our aid], but alone if needed. It's very important that PESCO is not excluding [non-EU industries]. Finland is in the early process of buying a new fighter. How do you balance between quantity and quality when looking at the new fighter? We have money for €7-10 billion (U.S. $8-12 billion), and we are going to buy 64 fighter planes. We have been always counting on quality: quality on planes and quality on training our pilots. Our pilots are the best in the world, let me say that, because they are trained so well. We have our own special program. We train them in Finland, and they get along very well in international [exercises]. I am thrilled to see what happens in the Red Flag exercise, what is the level of expertise of Finnish pilots now, because it has been very good during the recent years. Sweden is looking to buy Patriot, and some of the Baltics have limited networked air-defense capabilities. Would you want an interoperable system among all Baltic nations for air defense? No. No. We are not exploring that kind of possibility. But we have done cooperation when it comes to radar with Estonia. For instance we bought medium-range radars, we purchased 10 and Estonia two, so we bought them together. So we do that kind of cooperation. And it was a couple of years ago. Could you see that expanding to other nations or areas? We can buy together. For instance, we bought ― last year I was able to buy surplus material from South Korea, K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, 48 pieces. At the same time, we negotiated the same deal for Estonia, who is going to buy [the same]. So we do that kind of cooperation all the time, [but] Estonia is part of NATO, we are a militarily nonaligned country. We make materiel procurements together, but it doesn't bind us. What do you want to see happen from the upcoming NATO summit? There are issues to be discussed inside NATO, for instance, the command structure. But of course we are looking forward to taking part in the Resolute Support mission, and the political dialogue all in all is important for us. We want to be part of that, and I know Sweden does too. Anything you will specifically be pushing for? Well, Finland is not going to push in a NATO summit. We just hope that we can take part in these summits in the future and have this important political dialogue together and to be partners in NATO, enhanced-opportunities partners. That is good for our defense capabilities. That, we want to continue. https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2018/05/11/interview-finlands-defense-minister-talks-air-defense-eu-procurement-regulations/