3 décembre 2021 | International, Aérospatial
Tandis que les tensions dans le domaine spatial s'accroissent à l'échelle mondiale, la France a investi résolument dans le secteur, ambitionnant de devenir la seconde puissance militaire occidentale du domaine, derrière les Etats-Unis. Dans cette optique, le Commandement de l'Espace (CDE), créé en 2019, a lancé plusieurs chantiers ambitieux pour permettre à la France de disposer, en 2025, d'une liberté d'action et d'assurer la défense de sa souveraineté dans le domaine spatiale. Aussi, la doctrine, la stratégie capacitaire, l'organisation et la création d'expertises constituent les quatre axes qui ont structuré les travaux de l'état-major du CDE. Interviewé par Air & Cosmos, le général Friedling, premier commandant du CDE, détaille les différents défis que la France et ses armées doivent relever afin de conserver leur rang et d'améliorer sans cesse leurs capacités. La France est en effet la deuxième force spatiale de l'OTAN, et considérée comme l'« allié le plus capable des Américains dans ce domaine », selon le général Friedling.
Air & Cosmos du 3 décembre
20 janvier 2022 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
International conflicts, contracting decisions, shareholders and an industrial-base review are likely to shape the A&D outlook in 2022.
3 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR, Sécurité
Kevin Coggins The United States and our allies are increasingly dependent on unfettered access to space. However, it has become abundantly clear that our space systems have significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities that our adversaries are eager to exploit. Earlier this year, William Akoto wrote about the growing constellations of satellites operated by private industry, led by SpaceX, Blue Origin and others: “If hackers were to take control of these satellites, the consequences could be dire. On the mundane end of scale, hackers could simply shut satellites down, denying access to their services. Hackers could also jam or spoof the signals from satellites, creating havoc for critical infrastructure. This includes electric grids, water networks and transportation systems.” Space Policy Directive 5, recently issued by the White House, notes that “cybersecurity principles and practices that apply to terrestrial systems also apply to space systems” and that we must integrate these principles and practices into every phase of the space system life cycle. SPD-5 is charting the right course toward assuring our cybersecurity in the space domain. This article highlights the unique vulnerabilities of space systems and how innovative solutions like “digital twins” can help us protect systems in orbit today and design more secure ones for the future. Cyberattacks on space systems — comprised of satellites, ground control stations, and user terminals (e.g., GPS receivers) — are appealing to nation-states, criminal groups, hackers and other bad actors. It's a tremendous opportunity to breach data and disrupt operations in a low-risk way with a low cost of execution. The different components that make up space systems each come with their own set of cyber vulnerabilities, the ground segment in particular. Some space systems were built with speed to market rather than cybersecurity in mind. In contrast, for traditional defense-focused space systems, a slower design and development process has introduced vulnerabilities as well. Space systems operating today may have taken a full 20 years to go from paper to launch and lack the capabilities to recognize or respond to today's cyberthreats. Space systems are increasingly interconnected — a malicious attack can easily spread from a single point of vulnerability in a ground station to the satellites. Cybersecurity in space systems has struggled to keep pace with the rapid evolution of threat actors and exploits. Given these challenges, how can organizations with space systems stay ahead of cyberthreats and protect their missions and users? The older approach of paper-based assessments has significant limitations, like the inability to duplicate reactions to all possible scenarios. At the other end of the spectrum, full-scale replicas are expensive and time-consuming to build. In the middle is the “digital twin” concept — a virtual mirror model that synchronizes a physical object with a cyber representation. With this approach, organizations can test a satellite in different scenarios to identify vulnerabilities and develop protection strategies, even before the satellite is built. One specific project that demonstrated digital twins' strengths and capabilities: testing Air Force GPS space systems for vulnerabilities after the passage of Section 1647 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. Starting with a model-based system engineering review of thousands of pages of design documents, we built a digital replica of critical GPS Block IIR satellite components launched between 1987 and 2004 that ran on a single laptop with lightweight applications. Our digital twin created the foundation for a flexible cyber test bed — a suite of scalable software applications to demonstrate and validate cyber vulnerabilities and protection strategies as the system is designed or modified. The test bed can connect with assets beyond the network to generate data, provide war-gaming support and explore attack scenarios. We need this flexibility and functionality for future space system protection. The next generation of satellites will encounter more extreme service conditions and increased, simultaneous cyberattack vectors over longer periods of time. To respond to these challenges, these space systems will need increasingly complex designs, and with such complexity comes potentially greater vulnerability to cyberattacks and threats. Digital twins and model-based system engineering approaches can strengthen security throughout the acquisition and sustainment phases. Use them to: Develop system requirements and analyze design trades. Create test scenarios for requirements clarification and reference systems. Simulate threats, anomalies and impacts without risk to critical infrastructure. Assess the impact of new threats or operational scenarios on an on-orbit system design. What can space system acquisition professionals, developers and operators learn here? Digital twins offer an innovative approach that can streamline and strengthen the testing and design process of our space assets. They can also provide insights on as-built systems and enable the buydown of risks across the space system life cycle, enabling affordability across the entire system life cycle. Now is the time to leverage their capabilities, to ensure that the space infrastructure so vital to our security and American way of life has the protection it requires. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/11/02/securing-the-final-frontier-digital-twins-satellites-and-cybersecurity/
8 juillet 2021 | International, Aérospatial
La ministre des Armées, Florence Parly, a assisté mercredi sur le site de la DGA Essai de missile, à Biscarrosse, à une démonstration de destruction en vol d'un mini-drone au moyen d'un laser. Le système HELMA-P, développé par la pépite CILAS, filiale d'ArianeGroup, est composé d'un radar pour détecter les drones jusqu'à 3 kilomètres, d'un système de pointage pour suivre la cible et d'un laser pour le neutraliser. Il peut « soit brûler le drone soit l'éblouir avec un tir de précision ». D'une portée d'un kilomètre, le laser est d'une puissance de 2 kW et détruit sa cible en moins d'une dizaine de secondes. Le système devrait être opérationnel en 2024. « A moyen terme, pour renforcer notre défense anti-drones, nous travaillons sur le développement de lasers de puissance, et c'est ce que vous nous avez montré aujourd'hui », a souligné la ministre. Parmi les armées occidentales, seuls les Américains et les Israéliens ont développé des capacités similaires. En Allemagne ou au Royaume-Uni, des recherches se poursuivent aussi. Ensemble de la presse du 8 juillet