L’avion de chasse F-35, la clé du développement de l’aéroport de Gatineau

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  5 novembre 2019 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  A new Defence Procurement Agency – Would it solve anything?

  By Brian Mersereau Defence Watch Guest Writer During the recent federal election, the issue of considering a new Defence Procurement Agency or DPA surfaced again. The Liberals made such an organization part of their defence platform this time around as part of their plan to improve military procurement. While positive outcomes could result from a new organizational structure, simply installing one will not in and of itself create an efficient procurement model. It most certainly will not address in any substantive manner why taxpayers pay far too much to acquire the defence capabilities Canada needs to protect our sovereign interests in a world that has become increasingly unstable in recent years. It appears that, in many cases, Canada pays more per unit of capability to satisfy its defence needs than most of its allies. Unfortunately, though quite logically, this phenomenon has effectively shrunk the size of our armed forces as the number of platforms we can afford to acquire continues to dwindle due to high costs. While this approach can create short-term jobs, they are ultimately unsustainable since there is no international market for our higher-priced solutions. This is not the direction in which Canada should be headed. Before Canada decides to move ahead with a new procurement agency, it should assemble a “smart persons” panel or forum to thoroughly review the existing system and establish the mandate and objectives of whatever type of organization results from said review. Such a review group must be composed of people from the public and private sector with significant experience, not skewed with staff whose procurement experience primarily consists of exposure to the Canadian “way”. During this review, the panel must examine various issues which are currently perceived to be an impediment to the efficiency of Canada's procurement system. Based on my own years of experience on both the buy and sell sides of the procurement equation, the following areas merit some serious thought: Organizational Structure The fewer individuals, departments and oversight committees with their fingers in the “procurement pie”, the quicker and more coherently things will get done. Even at today's interest rates, time really is money for all involved in the process. Adding more time to a schedule for another management review quite often has a negative impact. While I understand governance and oversight committees have their place, their overinvolvement can produce negative outcomes if mandates are not absolutely clear and if individuals on these committees have limited experience with respect to the issue at hand. Risk Canada's ongoing method for defence procurement is that it will not assume any risk on their side of a contract. If Canada insists the private sector must accept all risk, the private sector will so oblige – but at a significant price and to the detriment of schedules and timelines. As contract prices necessarily increase, so do governments costs to manage the contract. In reality, the most efficient procurement solution for Canada would see some elements of risk managed by the buyer, rather than entirely borne by the seller. More consideration needs to go into balanced risk-sharing formulas. Process Canada has an extremely hands-on procurement process for major systems during the competitive phase, as well as during the implementation of the contract. Even in this digital age, Canada hamstrings its own progress with the sheer degree of detail and bureaucracy it requires; unbelievably, freight trucks are still required to deliver proposals. It seems as though, on occasion, the buyer thinks it knows more about designing and engineering the defence systems Canada needs than the actual designers and engineers for whom it is a primary occupation. Requirements of little or no consequence are painstakingly spelled out in the greatest of detail. Such an approach has a tremendous impact on the amount of time consumed by both the buyer and seller, again driving up costs and extending schedules. Less “hand holding” by the customer must be seriously considered. Sole Source In the procurement world, “sole source” is often viewed as a dirty phrase. Frequently, Canada attempts to run competitions in scenarios where the chances of achieving any meaningful savings or benefits related to competition are low at best. This takes years and drives costs higher at no measurable gain for the buyer. The parameters of when and under what circumstances Canada should move directly to a sole source should be thoroughly reviewed. Significant resources are being wasted managing nearly meaningless processes. Skills Canada's internal skill set for managing large, complex defence procurements does not appear to be adequate. As a result, it turns more and more often to the expertise of external third parties in order to keep up with large private sector firms at the negotiation table from a knowledge and experience standpoint. While there will always be a need for some third-party expertise, project managing many external suppliers in the negotiation phase – each of whom have their own agendas – only further complicates the already convoluted procurement process. Canada would be much better off with an enhanced internal core staff. If Canada takes the time to review the appropriateness of some form of DPA model, it must cast the net wider and review other critical aspects of the procurement process – or else any organizational changes will inevitably succumb to the systematic inertia of the overall process. A failure to do so means Canada will continue struggling mightily to stand-up the level of defence and security necessary to secure its citizens in an increasingly turbulent world. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/a-new-defence-procurement-agency-would-it-solve-anything

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  26 mars 2024 | Local, Terrestre

  Canada’s ban on Israeli arms sales baffles industry

  The association representing Canadian defense firms says it is in the dark about the status of equipment exports to Israel.

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  20 juillet 2020 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Why it is time for smart protectionism

  Put simply, Canadian governments have a responsibility to practise smart protectionism where the risks to Canadians' personal security and national security are high. Free trade is good economics. Protectionism is bad. Global supply chains are efficient. Favouring domestic goods, services and industries is inefficient. Canada has long adhered to these orthodoxies. And most of the time it makes sense to do so. However, through the COVID-19 pandemic, both the public and private sectors have seen weaknesses associated with heavy or total reliance on foreign sources and global supply chains for essential goods, notably personal protective equipment (PPE). As of June 2, for example, the Government of Canada had ordered close to 122 million N95 masks from international suppliers, yet 12 million had been received and 9.8 million of those failed Canadian standards. We are learning the hard way that foreign sources cannot necessarily supply the products we need in the time, quantity or quality required during a national or global emergency. China, as the dominant global producer of many of these PPE supplies, has become the focal point for an emerging debate around domestic control over certain goods, technologies, and services. A recent report from the Henry Jackson Society in the U.K., for example, has argued the “Five Eyes”—the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand—are far too reliant on Chinese sources for all kinds of strategically important goods, and that this is a threat to the national security of those countries. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, too, has warned that Canadian companies that produce certain critical technologies are vulnerable to foreign takeovers by entities with agendas hostile to Canada's interests. This is not just an issue with China, though. In Canada, we like to believe that in national or global crises we can rely on the U.S. or other allies for help. Canada, in other words, would be at or near the front of the line with allies. The COVID-19 pandemic, and the behavior of the U.S. and European countries, suggests this is naive. Italy, a founding EU member, requested and was denied face masks from the EU's stockpile at the peak of their COVID-19 outbreak. In April, a presidential executive order gave the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency the power to “allocate to domestic use” several types of PPE that would otherwise be exported. U.S. produced masks bound for Germany, a close American ally, were reportedly diverted back while in transit. Ultimately, Canada was exempt from the U.S. order, but this episode should tell us that global emergencies can lead to “home front comes first” attitudes, even among our closest allies. Fundamentally, the issue comes down to one of efficiency versus necessity. Sometimes, in some areas of the economy, security of supply is more important than efficiency. While this thinking is new to most companies and governments in Canada, it is not new to Canadian companies working in defence and national security. The Canadian defence industry has long highlighted the need for focused sovereign production and control in key national security capabilities—in part to ensure security of supply—as our allies in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere have been doing for generations. The argument has fallen largely on deaf ears. There seems to be a greater aversion in Canada to any kind of protectionism than among our more pragmatic allies. There is also a belief that Canada can always rely on obtaining critical supplies from the U.S., owing to both our close trading relationship and bi-lateral defence agreements dating from the 1950s that purport to establish an integrated North American defence industrial base. Canada puts too much faith in these beliefs, to our peril. While we can still hold free trade and integrated global supply chains as the goal, we also need to recognize that this view of the economy does not always serve our national interests. Put simply, Canadian governments have a responsibility to practise smart protectionism where the risks to Canadians' personal security and national security are high. Christyn Cianfarani is president and CEO of the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI). The Hill Times https://www.hilltimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/072020_ht.pdf