25 janvier 2021 | International, Aérospatial
Le Figaro analyse les enjeux de défense liés à la maîtrise de l'espace, à l'heure où près de 90 États disposent d'au moins un satellite en orbite. Selon le CNES, 2 200 satellites en fonctionnement sont aujourd'hui en orbite autour de la Terre. L'augmentation est exponentielle: en dix ans, le nombre de satellites opérationnels a plus que doublé, notamment sous l'impulsion des acteurs privés du «New Space», tels que SpaceX. La France a établi une doctrine militaire et un commandement de l'espace en 2020, avec deux objectifs : des capacités de connaissance et, à moyen terme, de défense active. « La clé, c'est détecter, identifier, agir », explique le général Lavigne, chef d'état-major de l'armée de l'Air et de l'Espace. Des capacités de suivi sont développées : pour la France, l'approche du satellite franco-italien de télécommunication militaire Athena-Fidus en 2017 a ainsi été détectée par le système GeoTracker, développé par ArianeGroup, équipé de huit télescopes au sol. L'armée veut aussi se doter de moyens de défense active. En 2023, elle doit lancer le démonstrateur Yoda, qui sera capable d'accompagner des satellites en orbite géostationnaire. Au sein du CSpO (Combined Space Operation), la France cherche aussi depuis un an à établir avec ses partenaires des Five Eyes (États-Unis, Royaume-Uni, Canada, Australie, Nouvelle-Zélande) et de l'Allemagne un « code de bonne conduite ». Dans un entretien accordé au Monde, les chercheurs Marc Julienne et Isabelle Sourbès-Verger décryptent par ailleurs la montée en puissance de la Chine dans le domaine de l'espace, et ses enjeux militaires.
Le Figaro et Le Monde du 25 janvier
9 septembre 2021 | International, Aérospatial
A source with knowledge of Pakistan's defense programs tells Defense News that Paramount Group is now the lead contractor on the conversion project, with Leonardo relegated to supplying hardware.
20 septembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre
By: Usman Ansari ISLAMABAD — Pakistan's ambassador to Turkey pledged this week to increase defense cooperation between the two countries to new levels, but after a string of recent deals, analysts believe further cooperation will be incremental. Speaking to Turkey's Daily Sabah, Muhammad Syrus Sajjad Qazi highlighted defense relations such as recent deals for platforms like the T-129 helicopter gunships and Milgem corvettes, which he said would further improve as the countries continue to explore new opportunities. The existing deals alone are likely to see substantial offsets and technological input for Pakistani industry, and build upon existing supply of defense technology critical for all three branches of Pakistan's military. Pakistan's defense industry generally lags behind other nations, and has struggled to offer much in return bar a deal for the PAC Super Mushak basic training aircraft, further highlighting the importance of the relationship between Ankara and Islamabad. Asked exactly how that relationship may further improve, Brian Cloughley, and author, analyst, and former Australian defense attaché to Islamabad, said there is room to do so. He highlighted training as one area of cooperation, thanks to tensions between Pakistan and the U.S., along with armored personnel carriers and future orders of helicopters. While Turkish AFV-related technology is already finding its way onto Pakistani APCs and tanks, Pakistan is exploring options to supplement or even replace its M113 type APCs, perhaps with an IFV design, with Turkey's Kaplan or Tulpar IFV programs potentially of interest. Turkey's T625 multirole transport helicopter may also be considered to replace Pakistan's range of legacy types. Both countries also have active fifth generation fighter development projects, but analysts believe this level of cooperation is presently a step too far. Justin Bronk, an analyst with the RUSI think tank, raises concerns given “the lack of any proven domestic capacity in both Pakistan and Turkey to produce a fifth-generation fighter, than with any issues around security or industrial interests.” “Neither country is in any position to develop such capabilities for the foreseeable future without massive external assistance and technology transfer,” he said That idea is echoed by author, analyst, and former air force pilot Kaiser Tufail, who nevertheless stresses their respective fifth generation programs “must continue for a long-term goal of manufacture”. Tufail believes both nations should co-operate on an interim type of jet, with some of the technical characteristics of a full fifth-generation fighter “rather than jumping straight to a full-capability fifth generation fighter.” Though new to aircraft manufacture, he believes Pakistan has gained a slight edge over its potential partner, having co-produced the JF-17, “essentially a Chinese design based on PAF's specifications”, though there is still “need for collaboration in design and production of any new fighter.” Turkey in comparison, though having license produced F-16s, lacks comparable modern fighter design experience. Their close relationship makes fighter co-production “logical” though, he said. Therefore, present co-operation “could well take the shape of a ‘Block-4' JF-17 developed by Turkey and Pakistan” to be “considered for joint design and co-production”, after which “a stealth fighter would then be a logical next step.” https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/09/19/future-pakistan-turkish-defense-cooperation-likely-to-be-incremental-for-now
20 décembre 2018 | International, C4ISR
Executive Summary The fifth generation of mobile network technologies, known as “5G,” promises greater speed, security, and capacity. 5G will underpin the internet economy and provide the backbone for the next generation of digital technologies. So, it is unsurprising that there is intense competition among companies and countries for 5G leadership. 5G will determine the direction the internet will take and where nations will face new risks and vulnerabilities. Who makes 5G technologies will affect security and innovation in an increasingly competitive technological environment. Decisions made today about 5G will affect national security and economic performance for decades to come. This is a competition among companies and groups of companies but also a competition between market-based and state-directed decisionmaking. The United States has relied on the former, China on the latter, and Europe falls somewhere in between. American technology remains essential for 5G mobile telecommunications. American companies have been strong performers in developing 5G technologies, but the United States and its allies face a fundamental challenge from China. The focus of competition is over 5G's intellectual property, standards, and patents. Huawei, for example, has research programs to develop alternatives to American suppliers, and U.S. trade restrictions have accelerated China's efforts to develop its own 5G industry. While American companies lead in making essential 5G technologies, there are no longer any U.S. manufacturers of core telecommunications network equipment. Four companies dominate the market for the core network technologies needed for 5G networks. None of these companies are American. 1The choices are between European security partners (Ericsson and Nokia) and China (Huawei and ZTE). Telecom is a strategic industry and having two companies with close ties to a hostile power creates risk for the United States and its allies. A secure supply chain for 5G closes off dangerous areas of risk for national security in terms of espionage and the potential disruption to critical infrastructures. China's aggressive global campaign of cyber espionage makes it certain that it will exploit the opportunities it gains as a 5G supplier. One way to envision this is to imagine that the person who built your house decides to burgle it. They know the layout, the power system, the access points, may have kept a key, and perhaps even built in a way to gain surreptitious entry. Major telecom “backbone” equipment connects to the manufacturer over a dedicated channel, reporting back on equipment status and receiving updates and software patches as needed, usually without the operator's knowledge. Equipment could be sold and installed in perfectly secure condition, and a month later, the manufacture could send a software update to create vulnerabilities or disrupt service. The operator and its customers would have no knowledge of this change. The United States can manage 5G risk using two sets of policies. The first is to ensure that American companies can continue to innovate and produce advanced technologies and face fair competition overseas. American and “like-minded” companies routinely outspend their Chinese competitors in 5G R&D and hold 10 times as many 5G patents. Chinese companies still depend on the western companies for the most advanced 5G components. The second is to work with like-minded nations to develop a common approach to 5G security. The United States cannot meet the 5G challenge on its own. When the United States successfully challenged Chinese industrial policy in the past, it has been done in concert with allies. Another task will be to find ways to encourage undecided countries to spend on 5G security. Huawei's telecom networks cost between 20 to 30 percent less than competing products. Huawei also offers foreign customers generous terms for leasing or loans. It can do this because of its access to government funds. Beijing supports Huawei for both strategic and commercial reasons. Many countries will be tempted by the steep discount. Not buying Huawei means paying a “premium” for security to which economic ministries are likely to object. The United States will need to encourage others to pay this security premium while at the same time preparing for a world where the United States unavoidably connects to Huawei-supplied networks and determine how to securely connect and communicate over telecom networks in countries using Chinese network equipment. The United States does not need to copy China's government-centric model for 5G, but it does need to invest in research and adopt a comprehensive approach to combatting non-tariff barriers to trade. 5G leadership requires a broader technology competition policy in the United States that builds the engineering and tech workforce and supports both private and public R&D. The United States also needs to ensure that U.S. companies do not face obstacles from antitrust or patent infringement investigations undertaken by other countries to obtain competitive advantage. In the twentieth century, steel, coal, automobiles, aircraft, ships, and the ability to produce things in mass quantity were the sources of national power. The foundations of security and power are different today. The ability to create and use new technologies is the source of economic strength and military security. Technology, and the capacity to create new technologies, are the basis of information age power. 5G as the cornerstone of a new digital environment is the focal point for the new competition, where the United States is well-positioned to lead but neither success nor security are guaranteed without action. This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-5g-will-shape-innovation-and-security