8 octobre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

L'Allemagne renonce à son projet d'hélicoptère lourd

BOQUET Justine

L'Allemagne a finalement décidé de repousser l'acquisition d'hélicoptères de transport lourds.

Remplacement des CH-53G.

Suite à l'impact économique de la crise du Coronavirus, Berlin a finalement fait le choix d'annuler son appel d'offres visant au remplacement de sa flotte de CH-53G, pour lequel concouraient d'une part Rheinmetall et Sikorsky avec le CH-53K et de l'autre Boeing avec son Chinook. « L'annulation a eu lieu peu de temps avant la date prévue pour l'attribution du contrat, indiquant que de nouveaux facteurs tels que la COVID-19 ont dû être pris en considération », met en avant Harry Boneham, analyste associé pour GlobalData. Cependant l'Allemagne n'a pas pour autant renoncé à l'idée de remplacer sa flotte de CH-53G, mais souhaite cependant revoir sa copie et ses priorités dans le cadre de ce projet. Un contrat pourrait ainsi malgré tout être attribué, mais comportant beaucoup moins d'options, afin de faire baisser le coût global.

Coup dur pour Boeing et Lockheed Martin.

Alors que l'on savait le secteur de l'aviation civile durement touché par la crise, cette décision montre que les budgets de défense pourraient également être touchés dans certains pays, venant dès lors impacter les entreprises duales à l'instar de Boeing. « Les entreprises telles que Boeing présentes sur les deux marchés s'appuient fortement sur la branche défense pour compenser l'impact sur l'activité commerciale. Ce contrat aurait fourni une précieuse source de revenus fiable sur le moyen et long terme » complète l'analyse.

Cas isolé ?

Si pour le moment les conclusions sont difficiles à tirer, la tendance générale reste malgré tout à la hausse des budgets de défense. Que cela soit en France, en Finlande, en Colombie, en Estonie, au Pakistan, en Suède ou encore en Argentine, le secteur de la défense est vu comme une des clés de la relance. Il permet ainsi d'offrir des débouchés via de la commande publique aux entreprises du secteur. Ces contrats, s'ils ne sont attribués à l'industrie nationale, comportent bien souvent une part non négligeable de compensations industrielles permettant la création d'emplois ou l'installation de chaîne de production.

https://www.air-cosmos.com/article/lallemagne-renonce-son-projet-dhlicoptre-lourd-23696

Sur le même sujet

  • Europe must take on its own defense responsibilities

    7 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Europe must take on its own defense responsibilities

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Some of Europe's biggest investors in defense are in NATO but not in the EU. The U.K. accounted for 16 percent of defense spending in Europe in 2019, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. But despite some early promise, Britain seems to have lost interest in any institutionalized cooperation with the EU on foreign and security policy. Relations between the EU and NATO member Turkey, which accounted for another 7 percent of European defense spending last year, have rarely been worse. Despite such difficulties, the fact that NATO and the EU are currently both reassessing the security environment presents an opportunity for a more joint approach. NATO is engaged in the #NATO2030 process, which Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg hopes will strengthen political consultation in the alliance. Meanwhile, by the end of 2020 the EU aims to complete a process to assess the threats it faces, which the bloc calls its “strategic compass.” These two efforts need to complement each other to produce a shared view of the threats to Europe, and the creation of a forum for political dialogue on security where European countries, regardless of whether they belong to both the EU and NATO, can discuss appropriate responses. Europe's ability to counter threats will depend on making its money go further by spending it efficiently, both nationally and multilaterally. The commission should do more to ensure that more defense procurement involves competitive tendering, rather than member states awarding contracts to national champions. But it should not try to shut defense firms from non-EU NATO countries out of the European market. The commission stands more chance of influencing the research and procurement decisions of member states if it has a substantial budget to dangle in front of them. It should keep pushing back against cuts proposed earlier in the year to the defense elements of the EU's next seven-year budget. And the commission needs to be more open to the participation of “friendly” countries in EU-funded programs. Joe Biden, a former U.S. vice president and a contender in the current presidential race, would be an easier president for Europeans to work with than Trump has been. But Biden's victory in November is not guaranteed. Moreover, the forces in U.S. society that propelled Trump to power in 2016 will still exist, and may return in 2024. Even if they would rather pretend that nothing is changing, the EU and as many non-EU, Europe-based NATO members as are willing to do so need to pay attention to Trump's message. And they need to start thinking about how to defend Europe and deter potential adversaries with reduced U.S. help. Ian Bond is the director of foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform think tank. He was a member of the British diplomatic service for 28 years, most recently serving as political counselor and joint head of the foreign and security policy group in the British Embassy in the United States. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/03/europe-must-take-on-its-own-defense-responsibilities/

  • The data challenge of space-based hypersonics defense

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  • US Navy selects builder for new MQ-25 Stingray aerial refueling drone

    31 août 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval

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