Japan sets naval-friendly requirement in search to replace AH-1S Cobra fleet

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  20 août 2024 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Czech Mobile Users Targeted in New Banking Credential Theft Scheme

  Discover how cybercriminals are using Progressive Web Apps to steal banking credentials in a sophisticated phishing campaign targeting mobile users.

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  9 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

  By: Sarah Bidgood Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination. Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble. One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions." The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons. These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit. Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built. Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others. There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains. Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/08/russias-new-nuclear-policy-could-be-a-path-to-arms-control-treaties/

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  27 janvier 2021 | International, Terrestre

  Raytheon Expects Biden to Block $500M Bomb Sale to Saudi Arabia

  Yet industry executives believe foreign arms sales will remain a priority of the new administration. BY MARCUS WEISGERBER GLOBAL BUSINESS EDITOR JANUARY 26, 2021 02:51 PM ET Raytheon Technologies executives told investors Tuesday that it expects the Biden administration to block at least one arms deal to a Middle Eastern ally as the U.S. shifts its weapons export policy. Raytheon CEO Greg Hayes, speaking on the company's quarterly earnings call, said Raytheon has removed from its books a $519 million projected sale of an “offensive weapon system” to a “customer in the Middle East...we can't talk about.” On the same call, CFO Toby O'Brien said the sale involves an “offensive munition.” The scale of the deal indicates that the execs were referring to the planned sale of some 7,500 Paveway bombs to Saudi Arabia. Last April, Raytheon said in a regulatory filing that its arms sales could be hurt by lawmakers' concerns about Riyadh's role in Yemen's civil war and about the Saudi crown prince's involvement in the murder of a U.S.-based Saudi journalist. Still, in December, Bloomberg reported that the Trump administration was moving ahead with the sale. “We had assumed that we were going to get a license to provide these offensive weapon systems to our customer,” Hayes said. “With the change in administration, it becomes less likely that we're going to be able to get a license for this. And so we appropriately decided that we could no longer support the booking of that contract.” During his Senate confirmation hearing last week, now-confirmed Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said the Biden administration would “end our support for the military campaign led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen.” Still, Hayes said the company does not anticipate issues selling defensive weapons, like Patriot missile interceptors, and other types of arms in the region. “Look...peace is not going to break out in the Middle East anytime soon,” Hayes said. “I think it remains an area where we'll continue to see solid growth.” Similarly, Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet expected foreign arms sales to remain a priority in the Biden administration. “As far as international business, including foreign military sales, the tendency of the people in the Biden administration [and] in the president's own statements, reiterate his view that alliances are important that they need to be cultivated, and that they have real value in deterrence and national defense,” Taiclet said. “I do think that we'll have a more open environment for [foreign military sales] and direct commercial sales to our international partners.” Taiclet said foreign weapon sales are a way to generate American jobs and stimulate the U.S. economy. “If jobs and the economy are important, the promotion of international defense sales, one would surmise, would also be important,” Taiclet said Tuesday morning on Lockheed's quarterly earnings call. While arms sales create jobs growth, a 2019 Center for International Policy report said those claims, particularly during the Trump administration, were greatly exaggerated. Still Taiclet, a former U.S. Air Force pilot, said arms sales are a way to deepen relationships with an ally. “I can tell you that there's no better way to get a tighter bond with an ally than sell them jet fighter aircraft,” he said. “All the way back in the mid-[19]80s, when I was in pilot training, we had Saudis in our class, for example.” https://www.defenseone.com/business/2021/01/raytheon-expects-biden-block-500m-bomb-sale-saudi-arabia/171645/