Italy places order for up to 24 Eurofighter Typhoon jets

Sur le même sujet

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  2 décembre 2019 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  How the Defense Digital Service revamped Army cyber training

  Earlier this year, the Defense Digital Service — the Pentagon's cadre of coders and hackers performing a short stint in government — finished the second phase of a pilot program to streamline cyber training for the Army. The Army wanted to streamline two phases of cyber training: the Joint Cyber Analytics Course, or JCAC, which takes 27 weeks in Pensacola, Florida, and provides basic cyber training for joint forces that have no prior experience in cyber; and the more tactical training that happens at Fort Gordon in Georgia. Combined, the two phases take a minimum of 36 weeks. To accomplish this, the Defense Digital Service, working with the Army Cyber Center of Excellence and a private vendor, built a course to conduct training in three months — everything a cyberwarrior needed to know from JCAC, said Clair Koroma, a bureaucracy hacker at DDS. Phase two — which combines tactics involving hardware, offensive and defensive cyber, and networking — takes seven months. It excluded the classified course, Koroma added. At this point, she said, DDS has transitioned all of its materials to the Cyber School, which will pick up the third phase of the pilot training, though DDS will still be available for assistance. “The plan is that eventually the 17Cs, [who execute offensive and defensive cyberspace operations], will come to Fort Gordon on inception and do their entry and mid-level training at Gordon. They will run this as the course for those soldiers,” she said. Koroma said success of the pilot will be measured from the operational world — evaluating the skill sets of the soldiers that graduate from the pilot program and comparing them to prior classes. Thus far, she added, no graduates from the pilot program have been overwhelmed in operations. Students during the second pilot were also evaluated by senior leaders within the Army cyber community and commands where they might be assigned during their final project and presentation. Students needed to identify issues on the network and conduct an outbrief to these leaders. “Senior leaders then got an opportunity to ask them questions,” Koroma said. “Every single person who was in that presentation said that they were impressed by the delivery of the students and the quality of the presentation that the students gave.” In fact, Koroma said, there are two students she's aware of whose orders were changed at the conclusion of training because leaders who attended the presentation wanted them on their team. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/army/2019/11/29/how-defense-digital-service-revamped-army-cyber-training/

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  24 octobre 2023 | International, Naval

  Second French Offshore Patrol Vessel fitted with HENSOLDT's LYNCEA® Combat System

  To enhance the patrol vessel's mission system, the HENSOLDT group has supplied two sensors: the SHARPEYE MK11 surveillance radar from HENSOLDT UK and the IFF MSSR2000 encrypted interrogator from HENSOLDT...

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  8 juin 2020 | International, Terrestre

  China could lose 95% of ballistic, cruise missiles under strategic arms control pact, says new analysis

  By: Mike Yeo MELBOURNE, Australia — China could stand to lose almost all of its ballistic and cruise missiles if it were to sign a new strategic arms control treaty, according to a new regional security assessment. The analysis, titled “The End of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty: Implications for Asia,” is one of the chapters of the annual Asia-Pacific regional security assessment published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank. IISS' report was released June 5 and covered regional security topics such as Sino-U.S. relations, North Korea and Japanese policy. China could lose 95 percent of its ballistic and cruise missile stockpile if it signs a treaty similar to the 1980s Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, according to the chapter's co-authors Douglas Barrie, a senior fellow focused on military air power; Michael Elleman, the director of the Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Program; and Meia Nouwens, a research fellow focused on Chinese defense policy and military modernization. The treaty, signed between by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, banned all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles systems with ranges between 310 and 3,420 miles (500-5,500 kilometres). The U.S. withdrew from the INF Treaty in August 2019, citing Russian violations of the agreement with its development and fielding of the 9M279 missile, although Russia denies that the missile violated range restrictions. However, the IISS report suggested the U.S. withdrawal was done with an eye toward China's missile arsenal, which has grown to what is believed to be the world's largest inventory of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. IISS' own figures estimate China possesses more than 2,200 missiles that fall under the INF Treaty's restrictions. These short- and medium-range missiles are important assets in exerting pressure on Taiwan, which China sees as a rogue province and has vowed to reunite with the mainland, by force if necessary, although it continues to describe its fielding of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles as solely for defensive purposes. Given these missiles provide China with what Barrie described as a “comparative advantage” in the region, it's unlikely the country would willingly sign a potential arms control treaty like the INF Treaty. The U.S, for its part, has already started testing missiles previously prohibited by the treaty, and there have been suggestions that the country might deploy such missiles to the Asia-Pacific region to address an imbalance in such weapons between itself and its rivals without solely relying on air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. (Those cruise missiles existed under the INF Treaty, as they did not violate the pact.) The report cautioned there is a two-fold risk in deploying such weapons to the Asia-Pacific. Chief among those: exacerbating Chinese concerns that the missiles will be positioned for use against it, increasing the potential for a response from China that could lead to an “action-reaction cycle of weapons development and deployment” and continued regional instability. The U.S. is also faced with the quandary of basing any potential INF-busting systems, with regional allies and partners unlikely to accede to locating such missiles on their territory, partly because of the diplomatic and economic reprisals Beijing could inflict on them. And there's precedent here: China targeted South Korea's economy in response to and expressed its distaste at the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system on South Korean soil in 2017. As for the U.S. territory of Guam, basing missiles there would limit their utility due to the distances involved. The IISS report also raised questions about whether U.S. moves to develop and deploy weapons previously prohibited by the INF Treaty will bring China to the arms control negotiating table. However, the think tank conceded that not deploying such weapons is also unlikely to persuade China, noting that that Beijing has shown little appetite for participating in any form of strategic and regional arms control. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/06/05/china-could-lose-95-of-ballistic-cruise-missiles-under-strategic-arms-control-pact-says-new-analysis/