30 septembre 2020 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

Industry Sustainment Business Case Analysis Workshops (October 2020 and January 2021)

Industry Sustainment Business Case Analysis Workshops (October 2020 and January 2021)

Objectif : Le but de ce courriel est d’inviter les principaux représentants de l'industrie travaillant dans le milieu du soutien de l’équipement militaire à participer à l’un des ateliers en ligne suivants destinés à l’industrie, portant sur l'Analyse de rentabilisation du soutien (ARS) et prévus pour le 19 octobre 2020 ou le 18 janvier 2021, de 8 h à midi. Ces ateliers donneront un aperçu du processus SBCA, souligneront le rôle important que joue l'industrie dans le développement de solutions de soutien optimisées pour l'équipement militaire, et expliqueront plus en détail quand l'industrie peut s'attendre à s'engager, ce qui sera attendu et comment l'industrie peut influencer le processus pour capitaliser sur ses atouts.

 

Contexte : L’ARS fournit un processus d'analyse et de prise de décision logique, défendable et documenté qui facilite l’élaboration de solutions de soutien en service qui sont personnalisées, optimisées selon les quatre principes de soutien : rendement de l'équipement, optimisation des ressources, souplesse et retombées économiques pour les Canadiens.

 

Pourquoi cet atelier est important : Certains éléments essentiels d’ARS sont: un champ d'analyse bien défini, des exigences précises, un engagement précoce et significatif de l'industrie, un processus analytique rigoureux et une prise de décision éclairée. Pour maximiser les avantages, les parties prenantes de l'industrie du soutien en service de la défense souhaiteront comprendre comment le processus d’ARS répond à ces besoins.

 

À propos de l'atelier : Ces ateliers seront dispensés en anglais et se dérouleront dans une atmosphère informelle qui permet des questions et des échanges. Veuillez noter : bien que tous les efforts soient déployés pour répondre aux préoccupations des participants et pour discuter de questions d'intérêt mutuel, les ateliers de l’ARS ne se penchent pas sur des ARS ou des approvisionnements spécifiques.

 

Inscription : Pour vous inscrire, veuillez envoyer un courriel au soussigné, en fournissant votre nom, votre adresse courriel (pour la confirmation de l'inscription et la distribution du matériel de l'atelier), le nom de votre entreprise et votre fonction. Veuillez-vous inscrire au plus tard 10 jours ouvrables avant l'atelier prévu. Ces ateliers seront dispensés en ligne via Microsoft Teams, pour lequel les détails pertinents seront fournis. Une copie des diapositives de présentation de l'atelier sera fournie.

 

Veuillez me faire part de vos questions ou de vos préoccupations par courriel à Bill.Troupe@tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca

Sur le même sujet

  • Why the Australians are better at buying new warships than Canadians: report

    21 novembre 2019 | Local, Naval

    Why the Australians are better at buying new warships than Canadians: report

    Andrea Gunn (agunn@herald.ca) OTTAWA, Ont. —  Canada could have a thing or two to learn from the Australians when it comes to buying warships, a new report claims. Ian Mack, a retired rear admiral and director-general in the Department of National Defence, released a paper via the Canadian Global Affairs Institute on Friday shedding light on what he believes are some key mistakes in the way Ottawa has handled the $60-billion procurement of a new fleet of frigates. Mack has a unique perspective. He served in his DND role from 2007 to 2017 and was responsible for the conception, shaping and support of the launch and implementation of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, including the initial stages of the Canadian surface combatant competition. In 2017 Mack was selected by the Australian government to join an international expert advisory panel for their Future Frigate Program as it moved into its competitive evaluation process. In the paper, Mack points out the similarities between the two countries: they embarked on the procurement process at about the same time, they both sought to break the boom-and-bust cycle of shipbuilding, and ultimately they would both end up selecting BAE’s Type 26 global combat ship as their preferred design. But the differences, Mack says, are what have encumbered Canada’s process, and why the Canadian government took three years longer to go from government approval to design selection than the Australians, In the paper, Mack points to excessive red tape, inexperience among officials working on the project, and a general lack of drive to change the process to make it more efficient and cost-effective. For example, the Australian government made the decision up front to restrict the competition to three shipbuilders and their warship designs, whereas Canada only required shipbuilders to qualify to compete, which over 10 of them did.  The initial request for proposals for the Canadian surface combatant also included hundreds of mandatory technical requirements characterized in great detail which proved problematic and led to an eventual overhaul of the process. In comparison, for Australia’s future frigate, there were only a few mandatory requirements of any kind with further guidance provided to bidders via a question and response process. Mack also pointed out that in Canada, the project management office was about the same size as in Australia but entirely drawn from the public service and the Canadian Armed Forces, with a significant number of team members having little or no applicable industry experience or knowledge, whereas in Australia, the office was populated by knowledgeable contractors. The Canadian government, Mack concludes, has traditionally worn blinders when it comes to executing complex procurement projects. “It takes a serious investment of effort to study what others are doing,” he writes. “One useful place to start is by comprehensively exploring other nations’ approaches to identify gems we might adopt and trial before we need to buy warships again.” https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/news/local/why-the-australians-are-better-at-buying-new-warships-than-canadians-report-377148/

  • Canada Needs New Aircraft, Could The F-35 Fit The Bill?

    21 février 2020 | Local, Aérospatial

    Canada Needs New Aircraft, Could The F-35 Fit The Bill?

    As part of its commitment to NATO, Canada also must be prepared for high-tech warfare in Europe. by David Axe Follow @daxe on TwitterL Key point: Canada, like Switzerland, likely can’t afford to fail again to buy new planes.   Canada for the third time in a decade is trying to replace its aging F/A-18A/B Hornet fighter jets. With every year the acquisition effort drags on, the condition of the Royal Canadian Air Force’s fast-jet fleet grows direr. “The politically-charged competition to replace Canada's aging fleet of fighter jets will rocket forward at the end of May [2019] as the federal government releases a long-anticipated, full-fledged tender call,” Murray Brewster reported for CBC News. Four companies are vying for the multibillion-dollar contract for as many as 88 fighters that would replace the RCAF’s 1980s-vintage Hornets, which in Canadian service are designated “CF-18.” Saab, Airbus, Boeing and Lockheed Martin all are in the running, respectively offering the Gripen, Eurofighter, F/A-18E/F and F-35A. The manufacturers will have until the end of 2019 to submit bids, CBC News reported. But the RCAF hardly can wait. The RCAF acquired 138 F/A-18A/Bs from McDonnell Douglas starting in 1982. In early 2019, 85 of the original Hornets, all more than 30 years old, comprise Canada's entire fighter fleet. The Canadian Hornets are unreliable and lack modern systems. In 2010, Canada's Conservative Party government announced plans to acquire 65 new F-35 stealth fighters by 2020. But the government never fairly compared the F-35 to rival fighter types such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Auditor General of Canada concluded in a 2018 report. "National Defense did not manage the process to replace the CF-18 fleet with due diligence." In 2015, Liberal Party candidate Justin Trudeau made the F-35 a major issue in his campaign for prime minister. Trudeau won. And in 2017, Ottawa backed off its proposal to purchase F-35s and, instead, launched a new competition to acquire 88 fighters. The aircraft would enter service in 2032, meaning the old Hornets would have to continue flying 12 years longer than the government originally planned. Ottawa briefly considered acquiring 18 F/A-18E/Fs from Boeing in order to bolster the early-model Hornets, but the government canceled the plan during a U.S.-Canada trade dispute in 2017. Canada was left with its original Hornets. In December 2017, the government announced it would spend around $500 million buying up to 25 1980s-vintage F/A-18s that Australia was declared surplus as it acquired its own fleet of new F-35s. The RCAF would add some of the Australian Hornets to the operational fleet and use others as sources of spare parts. But the government has no plan to keep its Hornets combat-ready as they enter their fourth and even fifth decade of service." We found that the CF-18 had not been significantly upgraded for combat since 2008, in part because [the Department of] National Defense expected a replacement fleet to be in place by 2020," the government auditors found. "Without these upgrades, according to the department, the CF-18 will become more vulnerable as advanced combat aircraft and air-defense systems continue to be developed and used by other nations." Against this backdrop, Brewster assessed the current fighter contenders, in particular, the Swedish Gripen and the American F-35. “There has been a rigorous political and academic debate about whether Canada should choose a legacy design from the 1990s, such as the Gripen, or the recently-introduced Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighter,” Brewster wrote. “The Swedish air force is about the same size as the Royal Canadian Air Force,” Brewster pointed out, adding that Sweden and Canada also share geographic concerns. “The Gripen is intended for operations in rugged environments, such as Sweden's Arctic region,” Brewster wrote. “Canada's CF-18s occasionally operate from forward bases in the north, but those deployments are infrequent compared with the routine activity of the Swedes.” As part of its commitment to NATO, Canada also must be prepared for high-tech warfare in Europe. The Gripen lacks the radar-evading stealth features that in theory allow the F-35 to penetrate the most dangerous Russian-made air-defenses. But Brewster cited a March 2019 Swedish study that claimed Russian defenses are less fearsome than many observers believe. “Besides uncritically taking Russian data at face value, the three cardinal sins have been: confusing the maximal nominal range of missiles with the effective range of the systems; disregarding the inherent problems of seeing and hitting a moving target at a distance, especially targets below the horizon; and underestimating the potential for countermeasures against [anti-access area-denial]-systems,” Robert Dalsjo, Christopher Berglund and Michael Jonsson explain in their report "Bursting the Bubble." The stakes are high. If Canada fails a third time to buy a new fighter, it might find itself in the same unfortunate situation in which Switzerland has found itself. In April 2019 the Swiss air force is down to just 10 ready fighters with full-time pilots. The crisis is the result of the Swiss public's decision in a 2014 referendum to reject the air force's proposal to buy 22 new fighters to begin replacing 40-year-old F-5 Tigers. The Swiss air force in 2019 plans to remove from service 27 Tigers. The 26 Tigers that remain will perform limited duties. With the F-5 force shrinking and flying part-time, the Swiss air force increasingly relies on its 30 F/A-18C/Ds. To last that long, the F/A-18s need structural upgrades. The upgrade work has sidelined more than half of the Hornet fleet. Switzerland like Canada has relaunched its fighter competition. The same companies and designs that are competing in Canada, plus Dassault with the Rafale, are in the running in Switzerland. Intensive flight testing began in April 2019. Canada like Switzerland likely can’t afford to fail again to buy new planes. The old Canadian Hornets probably won’t last much longer. "The CF-18 will be disadvantaged against many potential adversaries, and its combat capability will further erode through the 2020s and into the 2030s," Ottawa’s auditors warned. David Axe serves as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels  War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. (This first appeared last year.) https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/canada-needs-new-aircraft-could-f-35-fit-bill-125556

  • Work on HMCS Corner Brook could stretch out to 2021, DND confirms

    29 mars 2019 | Local, Naval

    Work on HMCS Corner Brook could stretch out to 2021, DND confirms

    DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN HMCS Corner Brook’s Extended Docking Work Period, or EDWP, is presently underway in Esquimalt, BC and was scheduled to be completed in 2020. But an assessment conducted by the contractor, Babcock Canada Inc., indicates that the work could take longer than expected, the Department of National Defence confirmed to Postmedia. DND spokeswoman Ashley Lemire said given the complex and lengthy nature of submarine EDWPs, periodic assessments are routinely undertaken by Babcock Canada to ensure that the schedule remains achievable. “The most recent schedule assessment took into account the remaining work, and an updated assessment of the potential risk factors, to produce a probabilistic assessment of the completion date that showed that the EDWP could continue into 2021 if a number of the risks materialized,” Lemire noted in an email. The Canadian government and Babcock will now undertake a review of all risks to determine how those can be avoided and or mitigated, she added. They will also review the remaining items still to be done to ensure that only essential work has been scheduled. “This necessary process generally results in the schedule coming back towards the baseline and the process must be left to unfold to determine if a full return to baseline can be achieved,” Lemire added. If the work on Corner Brook slips into 2021, it could have an impact on the work periods for other submarines to follow. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/work-on-hmcs-corner-brook-could-stretch-out-to-2021-dnd-confirms

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