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  11 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Gotta go fast: How America’s Space Development Agency is shaking up acquisitions

  Nathan Strout WASHINGTON — In March 2019, the Pentagon established a new organization to buy space systems: The Space Development Agency. But this led to some confusion. After all, the U.S. Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center already bought the bulk of the military's satellites and space systems, and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office acted as a supplement to drive faster programs. The imminent establishment of the U.S. Space Force brought further questions: Why set up a new space acquisitions organization when the military was on the verge of reorganizing its main space acquisitions service? Some suggested that the nascent agency wouldn't survive the year. Over the intervening 18 months, the Space Development Agency, or SDA, has embarked on a whirlwind tour to not only explain what it's building, but how it offers something different than legacy organizations. To the first point: SDA was set up to build the National Defense Space Architecture, a new proliferated constellation primarily in low Earth orbit that will be made up of hundreds of satellites. That's a radical departure from traditional military space. To date, the biggest military constellation in operation is GPS, with about 30 satellites ― give or take a satellite or two ― on orbit at any one time. With the new architecture, SDA wants to put into orbit about 1,000 satellites by 2026. “It's got this novel approach compared to, you know, kind of the legacy approach. They've got these very unique core values. So they do things quickly. They're a very lean organization. They move out fast. They're responsive to the needs of the war fighter,” said Mark Lewis, the Pentagon's acting deputy undersecretary of defense for research and engineering. Over the last 18 months, the agency has designed the National Defense Space Architecture, or NDSA; issued its first request for proposals; and awarded its first contracts. Here's what onlookers have seen in how the agency works differently: Gotta go fast The area where SDA has most distinguished itself is speed, according to some observers. “A lot of the reason the SDA was stood up is that there is a general recognition that the speed of the threat is increasing tremendously,” said Eric Brown, director of mission strategy for military space at Lockheed Martin, one of the companies providing satellites for the NDSA. “Everyone is acknowledging that in order to stay ahead and maintain our high ground from a space superiority standpoint, we're going to have to operate at a different speed.” At an industry day in summer 2019, SDA Director Derek Tournear laid out the agency's plan. In 2022, just three years after SDA was established, it would launch its first satellites ― a little more than 20. Most military constellations consist of less than a dozen satellites, and it can take five to 10 years from conception until the first satellite arrives at the launch pad. SDA's plans didn't stop there. The agency planned to launch increasingly large numbers of satellites into orbit in two-year tranches, culminating in a constellation of about 1,000 satellites in 2026. With this spiral development approach, the agency is looking to put mature technology on orbit now, and then provide upgraded capabilities as more tranches go online. In other words: In less time than it traditionally took the Air Force to design and launch one satellite, SDA wanted to launch 1,000. In the resulting 18 months, the agency has set a goal of launching its first satellites two years from now. “I certainly have to applaud SDA. In every case over the past year and a half, when they have set a date they have met that date,” Brown said. “They really kept to a very tight schedule, which is certainly impressive, especially for an agency that's only just standing up.” SDA issued its first request for proposals on May 1, seeking 20 satellites for its transport layer. Later that month, it issued another solicitation for eight wide-field-of-view satellites for its missile-tracking layer. “They've done things that we've never seen before,” said Bill Gattle, the chief executive of L3Harris Technologies' space systems business. “They were able to release a request for proposal very quickly, and it was actually a pretty good request for proposal.” Gattle said SDA was unusually clear in laying out what it wanted and that the agency had one priority: speed. SDA wanted vendors who could stick to their aggressive schedule and deliver satellites in two years' time. “They only gave industry 30 days to respond (for each request for proposal),” Gattle said. “That is unprecedented speed ― we normally get 45, 60 days.” Moreover, while it typically takes months to get feedback from the customer, SDA responded within three weeks, offered the proposers notes, and required updated submissions back within two weeks, recalled Gattle. “And then they awarded about two to three weeks later. That compressed timeline was stunning.” In August, the agency awarded Lockheed Martin and York Space Systems $188 million and $94 million respectively to each build 10 of those satellites. In October, the agency announced two more contracts: SpaceX and L3Harris would receive $149 million and $193 million respectively to each build four wide-field-of-view satellites for the NDSA's missile-tracking layer. Neither York Space Systems nor SpaceX responded to requests from C4ISRNET to discuss the contracts. “It demonstrates SDA [is] doing what it was created to do, which is to quickly obligate funds, move really quickly and execute toward the mission,” Lewis said, referring to the contracts. “It shows one of the values of SDA as kind of an independent organization in delivering this tranche 0,” he added. “It's not clear that a larger, more bureaucratic organization culture could have moved as quickly as SDA did.” Bringing in the new kids Program officials sometimes talk a big game about bringing in nontraditional vendors, yet end up awarding to the same small group of contractor giants over and over again. But with its first batch of four contracts, the agency has already brought in some surprising names. York Space Systems, which will be building 10 transport layer satellites, has never built a major satellite for the Air Force or Space Force. The small satellite manufacturer has done some experimental work with the military, but this seems to be the company's first major contract win with the Pentagon. SpaceX may be the most recognized company in the world when it comes to space, but to date the firm's efforts have been limited to launch services and satellite-enabled commercial broadband. SpaceX has scrappily fought over the last decade to win more national security launches, and earlier this year it was named one of two companies providing heavy launches for the Space Force over a five-year period. Additionally, the company's Starlink constellation has helped popularize the proliferated constellation concept on which SDA is built, and the services have begun experimenting with Starlink to enable beyond-line-of-sight communications. Still, this will be the first time SpaceX has built a satellite for the military. Neither York Space Systems nor SpaceX responded to requests for comment. L3Harris Technologies may not be a newcomer when it comes to supplying technology to the military, but many were likely surprised to see the company selected to build the missile-tracking satellites that will be key to the Pentagon's efforts to defeat hypersonic weapons. L3Harris has not built a missile warning satellite for the U.S. military before; its forays into infrared sensors was limited to weather satellites until now. “We were known pretty much as a weather company in this area, infrared,” Gattle admitted. “This is the culmination for us of a pretty big pivot in our company.” A couple of years ago, L3Harris decided to apply its weather-sensing infrared technology to missile tracking, with a focus on the types of satellites the military was signaling it wanted: affordable and quick to produce. In October, that bet seems to have initially paid off with SDA. “The industry people, including us, are all repositioning our companies to address basically the message that space has to be a war-fighting domain, space has to be more affordable, space has to have easier access, where you can get there faster,” Gattle said. “I think for a lot of us in the industry, we view this as probably the biggest transformation we've seen since the Apollo days.” Of course, Lockheed Martin stands out in the group as a defense giant — one of the companies that's always in the discussion when selecting a military satellite manufacturer — and naysayers may point to the firm's inclusion as proof that SDA isn't reinventing the wheel. The company itself is quick to acknowledge its role in the status quo, but Brown credited the contract win to Lockheed's ability to be disruptive and quickly refocus its energy. “We've demonstrated — and have been told from SDA — we've demonstrated that we've built upon Lockheed Martin's history of being disruptive,” Brown said. “We've had some success in the past and people have stopped associating us in some way with disruption, but this was a place where we really wanted to demonstrate something very differently from what you would see in some of our existing programs of record.” A key example of the company's pivot from exquisite space systems to proliferated constellations is Pony Express, Lockheed's experimental on-orbit mesh network. Developed in nine months, Pony Express was privately funded by the company to test new space-based computing capabilities that could enable on-orbit artificial intelligence, data analytics, cloud networking and advanced satellite communications. In other words, it was testing some of the very capabilities with which SDA wants to enable its own on-orbit mesh network. “We saw the requirements coming for transport layer — frankly, it's the capability that the U.S. government has needed for some time,” Brown said. “Pony Express really marked a little bit of a graduation, being able to show the community and show the world the kind of capabilities that Lockheed Martin had been investing in and developing for some time.” Lockheed brought forward some of the technologies developed for Pony Express to the transport layer. In addition, Brown claimed, the company's proposal included plans for a diversity of subcontracts in building its satellites, helping to expand the industrial base for SDA's future tranches, which will include a massive increase in the sheer number of satellites purchased. “We made a conscious choice not to take a heavily vertical approach because we don't think that that sort of vertical play that you might see from some other companies would have really benefited the SDA,” Brown said. Learning from industry Tournear has his own example of how his agency is unique, and it showcases how SDA wants to act like a commercial entity. Just as the agency awarded the two contracts for its first tracking layer satellites, it also canceled a contract for an experiment meant to reduce risk on those satellites. “We canceled that experiment because what we do at SDA is we continually look at measuring the return on investment to get the best capability for the taxpayer dollar, and we view that as the investment going forward,” Tournear said. “The tracking phenomenology experiment was started before tranche 0, with the idea that it would do two things. One, it would burn down risk for tranche 0 WFoV [wide field of view],” he added. “And number two, it would give us OPIR [overhead persistent infrared] bands that were multiple bands.” As the agency began receiving proposals, it became clear that some of the proposers were already including multiple bands on their OPIR solutions. In other words, SDA didn't need to develop its own solution for that capability — instead, industry could provide it. Still, the experiment would offer valuable risk reduction, giving the tracking layer a greater chance of succeeding. SDA decided to calculate whether it was worth continuing the experiment. “We had to look at the cost going forward to carry the tracking phenomenology experiment, subtract from that the risk leans that it would burn down in the WFoV experiment, and calculate, in essence, our net present value going forward,” Tournear explained. “So in that respect, canceling that program saved us a total net present value of $20 million.” One contributing factor was the knowledge that the experiment was only going to deliver data nine months prior to the satellites being delivered. That was not a lot of time to factor lessons learned into the final product. Additionally, the agency didn't have enough money allotted to buy all eight missile-tracking satellites. But by canceling the contract, SDA could apply the $20 million to buying more of them. “In order to ensure we get the best capability to the war fighter, the return is higher to invest that money toward getting more of the WFoV sensors up on tranche 0,” Tournear said. “That is a calculus that you don't often hear being made by the government on these programs. But it does show that we are trying to respond in a rapid manner to get these capabilities fielded as quickly as possible, and we're going to do trades to make sure that we push forward with getting those capabilities fielded." Tournear declined to say how many satellites the $20 million from the experiment bought, only noting that it enabled the agency to get the eight total satellites it wanted for tranche 0. “They're making good decisions. The ability to stop things that aren't working — I think that's really important. The ability to start things quickly — that's also really important,” said Lewis. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/11/09/gotta-go-fast-how-americas-space-development-agency-is-shaking-up-acquisitions/

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  27 février 2020 | International, Terrestre

  OMFV: Army Seeks Industry Advice On Bradley Replacement

  Having rebooted the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program, the Army is now is asking industry input on how to achieve nine goals, from survivability to mobility to streamlined logistics. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on February 26, 2020 at 4:01 AM Two months ago, the Army cancelled its original solicitation to replace the M2 Bradley troop carrier after no company could meet the strict requirements. This afternoon, the Army officially asked for industry input on how to achieve nine broadly-defined “characteristics” for the future Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. “Feedback may be submitted in any form (concepts, information papers, technical papers, sketches, etc.),” says the announcement on SAM.gov. “The Army would like to obtain this initial feedback prior to 06 March 2020.” This call for suggestions on how to move forward comes just weeks after the Army issued a surprisingly apologetic survey asking industry what they did wrong the first time around. It's part of a newly humble approach in which the Army doesn't prescribe formal requirements up-front but instead lays out broad objectives and asks industry how best to achieve them. The chief of Army Futures Command, Gen. Mike Murray, gave reporters a preview of the nine characteristics three weeks ago, but the list announced today is much more detailed – though still leaving plenty of room for companies to brainstorm solutions. Our annotated highlights from the announcement – the emphasis is in the original: Background: The OMFV, as part of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), will replace the Bradley to provide the capabilities required to defeat a future near-peer competitor's force. The Army is seeking a transformational increase in warfighting capability, not simply another incremental improvement over the current Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Concept of employment: As part of an ABCT, the OMFV will not fight alone, but rather as part of a section, platoon, and company of mechanized infantry.... “Near-peer competitor” is Pentagon jargon for “China or Russia” – chiefly Russia in this case, since the plains of Eastern Europe are a far more likely arena for armored warfare than Pacific islands. That the Army wants “transformational” improvements, not “incremental” ones, shows there's still some real ambition in the vision for this vehicle. At the same time, the OMFV will still fight “as part of an ABCT,” meaning the existing Armored Brigade Combat Team organization — not as part of some all-new organization with all-new equipment, as was once envisioned for the cancelled Future Combat Systems. Survivability. The OMFV must protect the crew and Soldiers from emerging threats and CBRN environments. The OMFV should reduce likelihood of detection by minimizing thermal, visual, and acoustic signatures. In other words, the vehicle needs to give the crew a chance of survival against cutting-edge anti-tank missiles, precision-guided artillery, attack drones and other such “emerging threats,” as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination (CBRN). That does not mean the vehicle itself has to survive intact. The way this is worded, if a hit totals the OMFV but the soldiers inside can walk away, the Army will count that as a win. (The JLTV 4×4 truck takes this same approach to roadside bombs). So the OMFV doesn't necessarily have to have heavy armor protecting the entire vehicle. It could have a heavily armored crew compartment, light armor elsewhere, and an Active Protection System to intercept incoming threats. (The Russian T-14 Armata uses this combination). It also should avoid being spotted in the first place by eye, ear, or thermal sensor, which might favor designs with hybrid-electric motors that can switch from hot, noisy diesels to a battery-driven stealth mode. Mobility. The OMFV must have mobility that can keep pace with the Abrams in a combined arms fight through rural and urban terrain. That's the M1 Abrams main battle tank, which the existing M2 Bradley and M109 Paladin howitzer were also designed to keep up with. This is another aspect of that “concept of employment” that calls for the OMFV to slot into existing formations and work closely with existing vehicles. Note also the reference to “rural and urban terrain,” which will come up again: Traditionally the Army has avoided city fighting, but as urban sprawl covers ever more of the planet, technology and tactics have to adapt to brutal close-quarters combat. Growth. The OMFV must possess the growth margins and open architecture required for rapid upgrades and insertion of future technologies such as mission command systems, protection systems, and sensors. This characteristic is really where you get the potential for “transformational” improvements. The M2 Bradley was originally introduced in 1980 and, after 40 years of upgrades, it has very little margin left to handle additional weight or – even more important nowadays – power-hungry electronics. The Bradley's lack of room to grow has driven the Army to try replacing it three times already: the original OMFV requirements cancelled this year; the Ground Combat Vehicle cancelled in 2014; and the Future Combat Systems cancelled in 2009. Hopefully, fourth time's the charm. Lethality. The OMFV-equipped platoons must defeat future near-peer soldiers, infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters, small unmanned aerial systems, and tanks as part of a Combined Arms Team in rural and urban terrain. This is a more ambitious hit list than the Bradley, which sports machineguns for killing infantry, a 25 mm autocannon to destroy light armored vehicles, and the obsolescent TOW missile for taking on heavy tanks. The Pentagon is increasingly worried about small drones, which ISIS terrorists have used as flying IEDs and Russian artillery has used as spotters for barrages. With Russia and China developing increasingly sophisticated anti-aircraft systems, there's also a concern that US fighters may not be able to keep enemy attack helicopters at bay, forcing ground forces to handle that threat themselves. These aerial targets require more sophisticated tracking systems, and drones may be best dealt with by electronic jamming or lasers rather than bullets. Weight. The OMFV must traverse 80% of Main Supply Routes (MSRs), national highways, and bridges in pacing threat countries, and reduce the cost of logistics and maintenance. Designs must allow for future growth in components and component weights without overall growth of vehicle weight through modularity and innovation. Weight is the issue that has bedeviled Bradley replacements for two decades. The FCS vehicles, optimized for air transport, were too light to carry adequate armor; GCV was too heavy; and the original OMFV couldn't meet its air transport requirements and its protection requirements at the same time. With most bridges in Eastern Europe unable to safely take weights over 50 tons, too much heavy armor can cripple your mobility. Logistics. The OMFV must reduce the logistical burden on ABCTs and must be equipped with advanced diagnostic and prognostic capabilities. Advanced manufacturing and other innovative techniques should be included in the design that reduce the time and cost of vehicle repairs. There are two big factors that make a vehicle hard to keep supplied and in working order. One is weight – heavier vehicles burn more fuel – and the other is complexity. High-tech is usually high-maintenance. The US military is hopeful that AI-driven predictive maintenance can detect and head off impending breakdowns, and that 3D printing can produce at least some spare parts on demand without a long supply line. Transportability. The OMFV must be worldwide deployable by standard inter- and intra-theater sea, waterway, air, rail, and road modes of transportation. The original OMFV requirement very specifically called for two of the vehicles to fit on a single Air Force C-17 jet transport, which proved undoable with the weight of armor desired. This time, the Army isn't specifying any particular aircraft. In practice, armored vehicles are almost always shipped by sea and, where possible, stockpiled on allied soil well before a crisis erupts. On land, since tracked vehicles aren't designed to drive hundreds of miles by road, they're usually deployed to the battle zone by train or tractor-trailer, both of which have their own weight limits. Manning. The OMFV should operate with the minimal number of crew members required to fight and win. The OMFV should allow commanders to choose between manned or remote operation based on the tactical situation. This is the objective that gave the OMFV its name: Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. Now, since it's a Bradley replacement, the OMFV is supposed to be a troop carrier – specifically, the heavily armed and armored kind known as an Infantry Fighting Vehicle – so by definition it needs to carry people. But the Army is intensely interested in having the option to run it by remote control, or maybe even autonomously, to (for example) scout out especially dangerous areas or carry casualties back to an aid post without pulling healthy soldiers out of the fighting line. Training. The OMFV should contain embedded training capabilities that are compatible with the Synthetic Training Environment (STE). STE is the Army's total overhaul of its training simulators, drawing on commercial gaming technology to develop an array of virtual and augmented reality systems using a common database of real-world terrain. Instead of having to use a simulator in a warehouse somewhere, the Army wants troops to be able to run virtual scenarios on the same vehicles they'll actually fight with. All these characteristics are intertwined – and after its past troubles, the Army is acutely aware that maximizing one, such as protection, may compromise another, such as transportability. That's another thing the service wants feedback on, the announcement says: “The Army is interested in industry partners' ability to meet the desired characteristics and what trades” – that is, trade-offs – “may be necessary.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/omfv-army-seeks-industry-advice-on-bradley-replacement

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  27 novembre 2019 | International, Terrestre

  MELLS guided missile for the German Infantry

  26 Nov 2019 Rheinmetall and its joint venture partners Diehl Defence and Rafael have won an order to supply the Bundeswehr with the advanced MELLS antitank guided missile. Rheinmetall is tasked with supplying key components to Eurospike, the company that manufactures the MELLS multirole lightweight guided missile system. For Rheinmetall, this represents an order intake of over €30 million without valued added tax. Delivery begins in 2020 and continues through to 2023. A framework agreement contains an option for the fabrication and delivery of around 100 additional weapon systems and a five-figure number of component sets for the MELLS guided missile during the 2024-2031 timeframe. This would mean incoming orders for Rheinmetall in the three-digit million-euro range. The MELLS missiles now ordered by the Bundeswehr are intended for infantry operations. Rheinmetall will be supplying over a hundred integrated command and launch units, including transport and storage containers, as well as 1,500 sets with components for the long-range Spike LR missile produced by Rafael. Produced by Eurospike – a joint venture of Rheinmetall, Diehl Defence and Rafael – the MELLS is a state-of-the-art effector capable of engaging armoured targets at ranges of up to 4,000 metres. Rheinmetall can point to abundant expertise and experience with the MELLS. The Düsseldorf, Germany-based company has already integrated this advanced missile system into the Marder infantry fighting vehicle, and is doing so again in the Puma IFV. In addition, another contractor is currently integrating the system into Rheinmetall's air-portable Wiesel/Wiesel weapons carrier. Looking ahead, more extensive networking of the command and launch units and guided missiles with Rheinmetall-made soldier systems like the Future Soldier – Expanded System (IdZ-ES) and the TacNet battle management system offers significant future potential, which will further optimize the sensor-to-shooter sequence. RHEINMETALL AG Corporate Sector Defence Press and Information Oliver Hoffmann Rheinmetall Platz 1 40476 Düsseldorf Germany Phone: +49 211 473-4748 Fax: +49 211 473-4157 View source version on Rheinmetall AG: https://www.rheinmetall-defence.com/en/rheinmetall_defence/public_relations/news/latest_news/index_22144.php