9 avril 2018 | International, Aérospatial

India opens contest to supply more than 100 fighter jets

NEW DELHI (Reuters) - India is seeking to buy around 110 fighter jets, the air force said in a request for information issued on Friday, marking the first step toward a long-delayed deal that could be worth more than $15 billion.

Boeing (BA.N), Lockheed Martin (LMT.N), Saab (SAABb.ST) and Dassault Aviation (AVMD.PA) are among the manufacturers expected to compete.

The aircraft must be built largely in India as part of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's drive to build a domestic industrial base.

The air force said in a notice that “85 percent will have to be made in India by a Strategic Partner/Indian Production Agency”.

Lockheed has offered to move its F-16 production line in Fort Worth, Texas, to India and make it the only plant worldwide to produce the F-16 for not only India but also other countries, said Vivek Lall, vice president, strategy and business development at Lockheed Martin.

Lockheed has teamed with India's Tata Advanced Systems to build the planes locally while Sweden's Saab has entered into a partnership with the Adani Group, a resources conglomerate. The other contenders have not announced their local partners.

The tender will be open for makers of both single engine and twin-engined combat jets, in a widening of the field. The Eurofighter Typhoon and Russian aircraft are also potential contenders under the new requirements.

A spokesman for Dassault Aviation which makes the twin-engine Rafale declined to comment.

Earlier, the defense ministry had sought expressions of interest from single-engine manufacturers which effectively restricted the contest to Lockheed's F-16 and Saab's Gripen fighter jets.

But in February the government asked the air force to open up the competition to twin-engined aircraft, in the latest flip-flop in policy that has delayed the acquisition process for years and left the air force short of hundreds of planes.

India began its search for new planes for the Indian air force in 2003 to replace its Soviet-era MiG fighters.

The request for information is open until July, the air force said. A request for proposal will then be issued followed by bid evaluations and contract negotiations. The process could take years, officials say.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-defence/india-opens-contest-to-supply-more-than-100-fighter-jets-idUSKCN1HD1UX

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  • OMFV: Army Seeks Industry Advice On Bradley Replacement

    27 février 2020 | International, Terrestre

    OMFV: Army Seeks Industry Advice On Bradley Replacement

    Having rebooted the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program, the Army is now is asking industry input on how to achieve nine goals, from survivability to mobility to streamlined logistics. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on February 26, 2020 at 4:01 AM Two months ago, the Army cancelled its original solicitation to replace the M2 Bradley troop carrier after no company could meet the strict requirements. This afternoon, the Army officially asked for industry input on how to achieve nine broadly-defined “characteristics” for the future Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. “Feedback may be submitted in any form (concepts, information papers, technical papers, sketches, etc.),” says the announcement on SAM.gov. “The Army would like to obtain this initial feedback prior to 06 March 2020.” This call for suggestions on how to move forward comes just weeks after the Army issued a surprisingly apologetic survey asking industry what they did wrong the first time around. It's part of a newly humble approach in which the Army doesn't prescribe formal requirements up-front but instead lays out broad objectives and asks industry how best to achieve them. The chief of Army Futures Command, Gen. Mike Murray, gave reporters a preview of the nine characteristics three weeks ago, but the list announced today is much more detailed – though still leaving plenty of room for companies to brainstorm solutions. Our annotated highlights from the announcement – the emphasis is in the original: Background: The OMFV, as part of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), will replace the Bradley to provide the capabilities required to defeat a future near-peer competitor's force. The Army is seeking a transformational increase in warfighting capability, not simply another incremental improvement over the current Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Concept of employment: As part of an ABCT, the OMFV will not fight alone, but rather as part of a section, platoon, and company of mechanized infantry.... “Near-peer competitor” is Pentagon jargon for “China or Russia” – chiefly Russia in this case, since the plains of Eastern Europe are a far more likely arena for armored warfare than Pacific islands. That the Army wants “transformational” improvements, not “incremental” ones, shows there's still some real ambition in the vision for this vehicle. At the same time, the OMFV will still fight “as part of an ABCT,” meaning the existing Armored Brigade Combat Team organization — not as part of some all-new organization with all-new equipment, as was once envisioned for the cancelled Future Combat Systems. Survivability. The OMFV must protect the crew and Soldiers from emerging threats and CBRN environments. The OMFV should reduce likelihood of detection by minimizing thermal, visual, and acoustic signatures. In other words, the vehicle needs to give the crew a chance of survival against cutting-edge anti-tank missiles, precision-guided artillery, attack drones and other such “emerging threats,” as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination (CBRN). That does not mean the vehicle itself has to survive intact. The way this is worded, if a hit totals the OMFV but the soldiers inside can walk away, the Army will count that as a win. (The JLTV 4×4 truck takes this same approach to roadside bombs). So the OMFV doesn't necessarily have to have heavy armor protecting the entire vehicle. It could have a heavily armored crew compartment, light armor elsewhere, and an Active Protection System to intercept incoming threats. (The Russian T-14 Armata uses this combination). It also should avoid being spotted in the first place by eye, ear, or thermal sensor, which might favor designs with hybrid-electric motors that can switch from hot, noisy diesels to a battery-driven stealth mode. Mobility. The OMFV must have mobility that can keep pace with the Abrams in a combined arms fight through rural and urban terrain. That's the M1 Abrams main battle tank, which the existing M2 Bradley and M109 Paladin howitzer were also designed to keep up with. This is another aspect of that “concept of employment” that calls for the OMFV to slot into existing formations and work closely with existing vehicles. Note also the reference to “rural and urban terrain,” which will come up again: Traditionally the Army has avoided city fighting, but as urban sprawl covers ever more of the planet, technology and tactics have to adapt to brutal close-quarters combat. Growth. The OMFV must possess the growth margins and open architecture required for rapid upgrades and insertion of future technologies such as mission command systems, protection systems, and sensors. This characteristic is really where you get the potential for “transformational” improvements. The M2 Bradley was originally introduced in 1980 and, after 40 years of upgrades, it has very little margin left to handle additional weight or – even more important nowadays – power-hungry electronics. The Bradley's lack of room to grow has driven the Army to try replacing it three times already: the original OMFV requirements cancelled this year; the Ground Combat Vehicle cancelled in 2014; and the Future Combat Systems cancelled in 2009. Hopefully, fourth time's the charm. Lethality. The OMFV-equipped platoons must defeat future near-peer soldiers, infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters, small unmanned aerial systems, and tanks as part of a Combined Arms Team in rural and urban terrain. This is a more ambitious hit list than the Bradley, which sports machineguns for killing infantry, a 25 mm autocannon to destroy light armored vehicles, and the obsolescent TOW missile for taking on heavy tanks. The Pentagon is increasingly worried about small drones, which ISIS terrorists have used as flying IEDs and Russian artillery has used as spotters for barrages. With Russia and China developing increasingly sophisticated anti-aircraft systems, there's also a concern that US fighters may not be able to keep enemy attack helicopters at bay, forcing ground forces to handle that threat themselves. These aerial targets require more sophisticated tracking systems, and drones may be best dealt with by electronic jamming or lasers rather than bullets. Weight. The OMFV must traverse 80% of Main Supply Routes (MSRs), national highways, and bridges in pacing threat countries, and reduce the cost of logistics and maintenance. Designs must allow for future growth in components and component weights without overall growth of vehicle weight through modularity and innovation. Weight is the issue that has bedeviled Bradley replacements for two decades. The FCS vehicles, optimized for air transport, were too light to carry adequate armor; GCV was too heavy; and the original OMFV couldn't meet its air transport requirements and its protection requirements at the same time. With most bridges in Eastern Europe unable to safely take weights over 50 tons, too much heavy armor can cripple your mobility. Logistics. The OMFV must reduce the logistical burden on ABCTs and must be equipped with advanced diagnostic and prognostic capabilities. Advanced manufacturing and other innovative techniques should be included in the design that reduce the time and cost of vehicle repairs. There are two big factors that make a vehicle hard to keep supplied and in working order. One is weight – heavier vehicles burn more fuel – and the other is complexity. High-tech is usually high-maintenance. The US military is hopeful that AI-driven predictive maintenance can detect and head off impending breakdowns, and that 3D printing can produce at least some spare parts on demand without a long supply line. Transportability. The OMFV must be worldwide deployable by standard inter- and intra-theater sea, waterway, air, rail, and road modes of transportation. The original OMFV requirement very specifically called for two of the vehicles to fit on a single Air Force C-17 jet transport, which proved undoable with the weight of armor desired. This time, the Army isn't specifying any particular aircraft. In practice, armored vehicles are almost always shipped by sea and, where possible, stockpiled on allied soil well before a crisis erupts. On land, since tracked vehicles aren't designed to drive hundreds of miles by road, they're usually deployed to the battle zone by train or tractor-trailer, both of which have their own weight limits. Manning. The OMFV should operate with the minimal number of crew members required to fight and win. The OMFV should allow commanders to choose between manned or remote operation based on the tactical situation. This is the objective that gave the OMFV its name: Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. Now, since it's a Bradley replacement, the OMFV is supposed to be a troop carrier – specifically, the heavily armed and armored kind known as an Infantry Fighting Vehicle – so by definition it needs to carry people. But the Army is intensely interested in having the option to run it by remote control, or maybe even autonomously, to (for example) scout out especially dangerous areas or carry casualties back to an aid post without pulling healthy soldiers out of the fighting line. Training. The OMFV should contain embedded training capabilities that are compatible with the Synthetic Training Environment (STE). STE is the Army's total overhaul of its training simulators, drawing on commercial gaming technology to develop an array of virtual and augmented reality systems using a common database of real-world terrain. Instead of having to use a simulator in a warehouse somewhere, the Army wants troops to be able to run virtual scenarios on the same vehicles they'll actually fight with. All these characteristics are intertwined – and after its past troubles, the Army is acutely aware that maximizing one, such as protection, may compromise another, such as transportability. That's another thing the service wants feedback on, the announcement says: “The Army is interested in industry partners' ability to meet the desired characteristics and what trades” – that is, trade-offs – “may be necessary.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/omfv-army-seeks-industry-advice-on-bradley-replacement

  • Will commercial and military launch programs ever be truly complementary?

    29 avril 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Will commercial and military launch programs ever be truly complementary?

    By: Kirk Pysher In a few months, the U.S. Air Force will choose two of the four competing space companies to provide five years of launches in the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program. One of the core objectives for this program is to increase affordability by leveraging the technologies and business models of the commercial launch industry. Is that a realistic expectation given the current commercial space market and historical precedents? Historically, the commercial launch market has seen significant variability. Launches of commercial communication satellite constellations began in the early 1970s with NASA serving as the launch provider. New launch providers began to emerge from the commercial world after the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 allowed the private sector to provide launch services. We then witnessed a remarkable growth in commercial space launches in the 1990s that peaked just before the turn of the century. Then, until about 2014, the commercial launch market stabilized at 20-25 commercial geostationary orbit satellites per year that were split essentially between three global launch suppliers. Since then, new entrants into the commercial launch market and pricing pressure from terrestrial-based communication systems have significantly impacted the viability of the commercial launch market, reducing profit margins and returns on investment across the board. The expected 20-25 commercial GEO missions is now in the range of 10-15 launches per year and is expected to remain at that level beyond the NSSL five-year period of performance. With new entrants into the commercial launch market, that 40-50 percent reduction in annual launch opportunities will now be competed among seven to eight global launch providers, putting further pressure on the viability of those launchers. Additionally, commercial launch revenue is also expected to decrease over that period by as much as 30 percent as satellite operators look to reduce their launch cost through shared launch, smaller spacecraft and reduced launch pricing. Given the projected commercial launch market and additional competition from new entrants, launch service providers will have difficultly building and maintaining viable commercial launch business plans, let alone having commercial launch-driven capital to invest in new technology. History has proven that no commercial launch service provider can succeed without having an anchor government customer. The commercial launch market simply has not been able to provide the stable, long-term demand needed to maintain affordable pricing, innovation and factory throughput for the Air Force to benefit from. History has also demonstrated that it is the Air Force with NSSL since 2003 that has provided the launch service providers with a stable number of launches. The defense and commercial launch markets have a fundamental difference. The former focuses strictly on satisfying national security mission requirements in space — needs that are driven by risk, strategy and geopolitical events regardless of vulnerabilities in commercial markets. The defense market began in the late 1950s with industry designing, developing and building launch vehicles for the U.S. government to place critical national security satellites into orbit. Early on, we saw a large number of launches in the beginning — peaking at more than 40 in 1966 — before activity levels decreased to level out by 1980. After more than 400 launches of defense-related satellites, the defense launch market finally settled into an average eight launches annually, whereas the commercial launch market is strictly tied to the ability of global satellite operators to close business plans and obtain institutional and/or private funding on new and replacement satellites. The global COVID-19 pandemic is a stark reminder of the vulnerability of all commercial markets. Airlines, aircraft manufacturers and commercial space companies are needing to seek tens of billions of dollars in government assistance; and private commercial space investors are also reassessing their risk postures, as is demonstrated by the recent OneWeb bankruptcy filing. Given the projected decline in commercial launch along with the historical precedents, there would be significant risk for the Air Force to expect to leverage benefit from commercial launch. In fact, I believe history has demonstrated that it is commercial launch that is able to leverage the benefits derived from the steady cadence of defense and civil government launches. The Air Force, in its role as anchor customer, needs to clearly understand commercial market dependencies and business cases of its key providers. With that understanding, the Air Force will mitigate any risk of critical national security missions being dependent on a finicky and fluctuating commercial market. Kirk Pysher is an aerospace executive with more than 20 years in the commercial launch market, serving most recently as the president of International Launch Services until October 2019. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/28/will-commercial-and-military-launch-programs-ever-be-truly-complementary/

  • British Army’s AS90 howitzers to stick around amid replacement delay

    31 juillet 2020 | International, Terrestre

    British Army’s AS90 howitzers to stick around amid replacement delay

    By: Andrew Chuter LONDON — The program to replace the British Army's aging AS90 self-propelled artillery has hit at least a two-year delay, with the forthcoming howitzer not expected to reach initial operating capability until the first quarter of 2029. The decision to defer the Mobile Fires Program was taken to allow the Ministry of Defence to address key technical risks and meet requirements in the government's integrated defense, security and foreign policy review expected around the end of the year, according to sources with knowledge of the program. Britain's new heavy artillery had been due to gain initial operating capability in the fourth quarter of 2026, but the MoD confirmed that has now been put back to the first quarter of 2029. The howitzer procurement delay means the current date for decommissioning the AS90s has also gone back two years. A portion of the howitzer force will now remain operational until 2032. Revised timelines for a new procurement process are currently under development by the MoD. An initial request for information was sent to industry in April 2019. The MoD issued revised key user requirements in January 2020 with a deadline for industry responses set for Feb. 17. Britain's BAE Systems, South Korea's Hanwa Defense, Israel's Soltham Systems, France's Nexter and Germany's Rheinmetall are among the companies that expressed interest in the program, an industry executive told Defense News on condition of anonymity. Late last year, the Royal United Services Institute think tank in London blasted the British military for its lack of artillery firepower compared with a country like Russia. “The UK's ground forces are comprehensively outgunned and outranged , leaving enemy artillery free to prosecute fire missions with impunity”, RUSI analyst Jack Watling wrote in a report. “If conventional deterrence is to remain a key component of the UK's national security strategy, then the modernisation of its fires capabilities should be a top priority.” The integrated review, run by Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his advisers, is expected to be announced this year. Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said in a July 26 op-ed in the Sunday Telegraph that the review would pivot the military away from conventional arms and toward space, cyber and sub-sea capabilities. As the MoD shuffles resources to fund the change in focus, land forces are expected by some to be a target for cuts. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/07/29/british-armys-as90-howitzers-to-stick-around-amid-replacement-delay/

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