15 septembre 2020 | International, Terrestre, C4ISR
The Global Positioning System of satellites remains the prime source of positioning, navigation and timing for the military, but it's increasingly vulnerable as adversaries develop capabilities that can undermine the signal. Delivering capabilities that allow the war fighter to verify such data or replace it in a degraded or denied environment is a major problem that the Army now wants to solve.
Col. Nickolas Kioutas — program manager for position, navigation and timing, Army Program Executive Office Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors — is leading the Army's efforts to develop anti-jamming and anti-spoofing technology and get it into the hands of war fighters as soon as possible.
Kioutas and Director of the Assured PNT Cross-Functional Team Willie Nelson held a media roundtable Oct. 4 announcing the fielding of one such solution: the Mounted Assured Position Navigation and Timing System (MAPS). Kioutas sat with C4ISRNET Oct. 15 at the Association of the U.S. Army's annual conference to discuss MAPS, the Military Encrypted GPS Signal and what he would like to see from industry as he looks for assured PNT solutions.
C4ISRNET: Your office recently announced that you fielded MAPS with 62 Stryker vehicles in the Army's 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Germany. What's next in the development of the MAPS program?
COL. NICKOLAS KIOUTAS: We've got two generations right now that we're working with. Generation 1 is really an anti-jamming capability that we fielded to 2CR second cavalry unit in Germany just this last month, and we're looking to upgrade now to our Gen. 2 capability, which would add the spoof protection. Right now we're doing prototyping with the Gen. 2 and we're actually going to compete the Gen. 1. Hopefully, it can integrate some spoof protection, but we'll be competing the Gen. 1 against the Gen. 2 to ask, “Hey, is that really the right capability to go forward with,” and field a lot more. Obviously, we just fielded 62. We still have in the pipeline some fielding of Gen. 1 before we make that final decision. And then we'll field either Gen. 2, or we'll decide to go to a Gen. 3 and continue fielding more of the Gen. 1 with upgraded spoof capabilities.
C4ISRNET: And what did you learn with the fielding of the Gen. 1 capability?
KIOUTAS: It's great to get a chance to do a little bit of something before you have to do a lot of something. You kind of learn some lessons and figure out what did the soldiers really like? What did they have problems with? Where can we make those little tweaks that allow us to do really well when we go to do the much broader army.
C4ISRNET: Are there lessons from MAPS that can be applied to DAPS? Where is that program now?
KIOUTAS: We are learning from what we're doing. It's really a change in the construct of how we do acquisitions. Instead of having the one huge program that's been perfectly thought out, perfectly tested and built, and then we get it to the field and it's 10 years too late and it's really not what we want, we're doing more iterative learning steps. So, everything that we learn even on the MAPS side — [which] is very similar technology — will apply to the DAPS side. With DAPS we're also developing some prototypes. We've got three vendors right now that we're working with to give us early prototypes, get them to the soldiers, let them touch and play with them, tell us what they like and what they didn't like, and then we'll do an initial capability set. And then we'll decide, hey, was there something that we can do different, better and then upgrade? So, [we're] constantly going to try to do that approach.
C4ISRNET: The Air Force is working to develop M-Code, a military-grade GPS code with anti-jamming capabilities. How does the eventual delivery of that impact the development of anti-spoofing capabilities in the here and now?
KIOUTAS: M-Code is important. It's a much better capability than the existing Selective Availability Anti-Spoof Model, or SAASM. However, it's not the complete answer, and what I always say is PNT does not equal GPS, because it's not just about GPS capability. It's about layering technologies with each other in order to be able to operate in a denied or degraded environment.
C4ISRNET: M-Code delivery may be a ways out, but a limited version called M-Code Early Use is supposed to be available in the near future. How does that interim solution factor into assured-PNT solutions being developed now?
KIOUTAS: There's probably two answers to that. One is we are already working with the M-Code to put it into the MAPS Gen. 2, as well as the DAPS system. So, we're going to have M-Code from the get-go. The other thing is, the Army has really got to decide how many M-Code modules are we going to buy between now and say 2028, when we're really going to get the increment 2 M-Code capabilities. So, we've really got to project out how many systems are we going to buy, what are they going to look like, [and] there's three different vendors so which vendor do we need to buy [from]?
C4ISRNET: Let's talk about the Army's need for a modular open systems architecture as you develop APNT capabilities. How does that inform your acquisitions strategy? What do you want industry to know?
KIOUTAS: For a modular open systems architecture, what we're really going to is [a] change from the previous way we did acquisition. Again, we're not going to do the one megalithic program that is perfectly designed and takes 10 years to build and then it gets to the field too late, we need a modular open systems architecture that allows us to be agile, that allows us to constantly take what industry is developing and integrate it to the solution to pace the threat. We're working with the CMOSS architecture to be able to put a bunch of different cards for our MAPS, maybe Gen. 3 capability. We're also working on a similar approach to the DAPS program. So, again, [we're] always looking for, not what is the best integrated solution, but what are the best individual solutions that we can take from across industry back to breed and integrate together.
C4ISRNET: We're speaking at AUSA and around us many companies are showing off their assured PNT solutions. What are some of the APNT solutions you're excited to see from commercial industry?
KIOUTAS: That's a good question. I don't really know the answer until we do some more testing. Of course, software-defined things are always great. The problem is there's sometimes problems with security and cybersecurity of those systems. And, so, there's probably a balance between do you really want a lockdown solution, where do you want that lockdown solution and where can you accept some risk and have a little more flexibility in software.
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By: Kelsey Atherton In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Air Force's Global Positioning System was a continuous target. “Every year [as] we went through the budget cycle the United States Air Force ... tried to kill the GPS program,” Gen. John Hyten, now head of U.S. Strategic Command, said during a 2015 speech. “Why would they kill the GPS program? It's really very simple: ‘Why would we need a satellite navigation system when we have perfectly good [inertial navigation system, or] INS for airplanes? Why would we do it?' Nobody could see the future of what GPS was going to bring to the world.” First developed and launched late in the Cold War, GPS made its combat debut in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and ever since has informed the movements and targeting capabilities of the Department of Defense. More than that, since GPS signals were opened to the commercial world, everything from road trips to finding new restaurants to the entire development of self-driving cars has hinged around accessing the reliable signals, that let machines and people know exactly where they are in time and space. The whole architecture is simultaneously vital and vulnerable and, in the era of a pending Space Force, an unspoken mandate is that it has never been more important that the United States ensure the signal endures. It is the potential risk of losing GPS, and everything else supported by the satellite network, that serves as the foundation for much of the discussion around a new Space Force. For as long as humans have put objects into orbit, space has been a military domain, but one with a curious distinction from other fighting theaters: while land, sea and air have all seen direct armed confrontation, space is instead a storehouse for sensors, where weapons are vanishingly rare and have yet to be used in anger. “Capabilities that we have built that we now take for granted in the Air Force, the whole [remotely piloted aircraft, or RPA] fleet that we fly, is impossible without space,” Hyten said at another speech in 2015. “You cannot have Creech Air Force Base without space because the operators at Creech reach out and talk to their RPAs via satellite links. Those aircraft are guided by GPS. You take away GPS, you take away SATCOM, you take away RPAs. They don't exist anymore. All those things are fundamentally changed in the Air Force.” Looking over the horizon Missiles remain the most effective way for nations to reach out and mess with something in orbit, and so long as GPS satellites cost around $500 million to build and launch, the cost of destroying a satellite will remain cheaper than fielding satellites. There is a double asymmetry here: not only are the satellites that power the GPS network expensive to build and launch, but the United States relies on this network to a far greater extent than any adversary that might decide to shoot those satellites down. This vulnerability is one reason that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is funding development of networks of smaller satellites, which are individually less capable than existing models but are cheaper to field and replace and will deploy in greater numbers, making destruction by missile a much more expensive proposition. Blackjack, the DARPA program that aims to do this, is focused on military communications satellites first, though the approach may have lessons for other satellite functions. “Better distribution, disaggregation and diversity of space capabilities can make them more resilient against attacks,” said Brian Weeden, director of program planning for the Secure World Foundation. “But the specific answer of how best to do that might be different for each capability. The specific techniques to make [position, navigation and timing, or] PNT more resilient may be different than the techniques needed to make satellite communications more resilient.” Missiles are not the only threat faced by satellites in orbit. An April 2018 report by the Secure World Foundation on Global Counterspace Capabilities details the full spectrum of weapons and tools for disrupting objects in orbit, and also the nations and, in some instances, nonstate actors that can field those tools. The nations with counterspace programs highlighted in the report include China, Russia, the United States, Iran, North Korea and India, all of which (barring Iran) are also nuclear-armed nations. Beyond anti-satellite missiles, which only China, Russia and the United States have demonstrated, the other means of messing up a satellite are the familiar bugaboos of modern machines: electronic warfare, jamming and cyberattacks. “The most important thing is that it's not always about the satellites in space. Space capabilities include the satellites, the user terminal/receivers, and the signals being broadcast between them. Disrupting any one of those segments could lead to loss of the capability,” Weeden said. “In many cases, it's far easier to jam a satellite capability rather than destroy the satellite. And, from a military perspective, the end effect is what's important.” A satellite that cannot broadcast or whose signal cannot overcome the strength of a jammer is a satellite that is functionally offline, and the means to disable satellites extend beyond the traditional strengths of near-peer competitors to the United States and down even to nonstate actors. In 2007, the Tamil Tigers reportedly hacked the ground nodes for a commercial satellite and were able to gain control of its broadcasting capabilities, and in 2008 a set of hackers demonstrated they could eavesdrop on supposedly secure Iridium signals. A decade has passed since those demonstrations, but satellite architectures change slowly, in waves of half-a-billion dollar machines launched over time. Should a vulnerability be found on the ground, there's lag time between how long it can be exploited and how long it can be rendered inert. What happens if the GPS signal stutters out of sync with time? Everything about how GPS works is bound up in its ability to precisely and consistently track time. Knowing where something is depends on knowing when something was. Without the entire network of automatic navigation aids they've built their lives around, people will fumble. Consider what happened for 11 hours on Jan. 26, 2016. “The root cause was a bug in the GPS network,” wrote Paul Tullis in Bloomberg. “When the U.S. Air Force, which operates the 31 satellites, decommissioned an older one and zeroed out its database values, it accidentally introduced tiny errors into the database, skewing the numbers. By the time Buckner's inbox started blowing up, several satellites were transmitting bad timing data, running slow by 13.7 millionths of a second.” Tullis goes on to detail the possibility and plans for a redundant ground-based navigation system that could let GPS-dependent functions of commercial machines keep working, even if a satellite slips out of sync. There is an international agreement to eventually make all signals across the Global Navigation Satellite System (GPS, Galileo, etc.) broadcast compatible civil signals. This would improve the redundancy among day-to-day civilian applications dependent upon GPS, but it would do very little for the military signals. “There is no such compatibility between the military signals of the different constellations,” says Weeden. “In fact, during negotiations with the European Union the U.S. demanded that the Galileo protected/military signal be made separate from the GPS military signal. It is possible to create receivers that can pull in the military signals from both GPS and Galileo, but it's not easy to do so securely.” GPS III, which Lockheed Martin is building, will mitigate some of this when those satellites are on orbit: the new hardware is designed with stronger signals that will make them harder to jam, but that will also require new receivers on the ground. While developers are working on making those new receivers, one way to build in redundancy would be to make GPS receivers that can use both Galileo and GPS military signals, suggests Weeden. That's a technical solution that requires at least some political finesse to achieve, but it's one possibility for making existing infrastructure more redundant. “But there are also other ways to get precision timing and navigation other than from GPS, such as better gyroscopes or even using airborne or terrestrial broadcasts of PNT signals,” says Weeden. “These alternatives are probably not going to be as easy to use or have other drawbacks compared to GPS, but they're better than nothing.” Redundant systems or complementary systems provide a safeguard against spoofing, when a navigation system is fed false GPS coordinates in order to reroute it. Big changes in inputs are easy for humans monitoring the system, say a car's navigation or a drone flying by GPS coordinates, to spot, but subtle changes can be accepted as normal, lost as noise, and then lead people or cars or drones into places they did not plan on going. The next generation of threats Protecting the integrity of satellite communications from malicious interference is the centerpiece of a report from the Belfer Center, entitled “Job One for Space Force: Space Asset Cybersecurity.” The report's author, Gregory Falco, outlines broad goals for organizations that manage objects in space, policymakers, as well as a proposed Information Sharing and Analysis Center for space. These include everything from adopting cybersecurity practices like working with security researchers and encrypting communications to setting up a mechanism for organizations to disclose if their satellites suffered interference or hacking. If the security of GPS is suffering from anything, it is less ignorance of the threat and more complacency in the continued durability of the system as currently operating. “Cybersecurity challenges will only become more substantial as technology continues to evolve and attackers will always find the weakest link to penetrate a target system,” writes Falco. “Today, space assets are that weakest link. Space asset organizations must not wait for policy-makers to take action on this issue, as there are several steps that could be taken to secure their systems without policy guidance.” The fourth domain of space is more directly threatened by threats traveling through the fifth domain of cyberspace than anything else. To the extent that space requires a specialized hand, it is managing from the start to the launch the specific vulnerabilities of orbital assets, and the points at which they are controlled from the ground. Perhaps the way to address that specific problem is a Space Force framed around the physical and cybersecurity needs of satellites. Raytheon is the contractor tasked with building GPS OCX, the next-generation operational control system for the satellite network. After years of delay in the program, Block 0 of the OCX deployed in September 2017, putting in place a system that could manage the launch and early orbit management of the new GPS satellites. Besides managing the satellites, the control system has to ensure that only the right people access the controls, and that means extensive cybersecurity. Raytheon says that, together with the Air Force, the company recently completed two cybersecurity assessments, including a simulated attack by an adversary. While Air Force classification prevents Raytheon from disclosing the results of that test, the company's president of intelligence, information and services, Dave Wajsgras, offered this: “We've built a layered defense and implemented all information assurance requirements for the program into this system. We're cognizant that the cyber threat will always change, so we've built GPS OCX to evolve and to make sure it's always operating at this level of protection.” Ideally, this massive job of protecting GPS will fall to the Space Force. “One of the big drivers for the Space Force is improving the space acquisitions process, and another is developing better ways to defend U.S. military satellites against attack,” says Weeden. “So, in that context, the Space Force debate could impact the future of GPS.” Yet many of the answers to vulnerabilities in space are not found in orbit, and it's possible that shifting the full responsibility for signal security to a body built around managing satellites would miss the ways greater signal redundancy can be built in atmospheric or terrestrial systems. The Army and Navy are funding GPS alternatives, but that funding is minuscule by Pentagon standards. “The United States should take smart steps to make its space force more resilient,” writes Paul Scharre of the Center for New American Security, “but the U.S. also needs to be investing in ways to fight without space, given the inherent vulnerabilities in the domain.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/satellites/2018/08/29/what-will-top-the-space-force-to-do-list