24 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

How’s Military Aftermarket Sector Faring Amid COVID-19 Crisis?

Michael Tint

The COVID-19 crisis has hit the commercial MRO industry hard. How is the military aftermarket sector faring?

Michael Tint, head of defense analytics at Aviation Week, responds:

COVID-19 has not caused military aviation anything like the degree of disruption it has for civil aviation. Defense budgets for 2020 were largely allocated before its onset, and there have been only minor reductions in military operations as a result of the pandemic. Procurement has been similarly steady, with only small production delays so far. However, the nature of military budgeting in most countries means that major cuts in spending will not be felt for at least a year or two. Meanwhile, rising global tensions are likely to ensure that defense spending remains a priority—even if the longer-term economic consequences of the pandemic prove severe.

Growing Military Engine Repair, 2020-29

(U.S. $ billions)

Image

Jet engines powering Western-designed fighters and training aircraft will generate $50.5 billion in maintenance, repair and overhaul demand over the next decade—rising from $4.5 billion in 2020 to $5.6 billion in 2029, for a compound annual growth rate of 2.05%. Most of the growth will come from Pratt & Whitney's F135, the engine on Lockheed Martin's F-35.

As military flying continues, so too must military engine maintenance, repair and overhaul. Aviation Week forecasts that $85.4 billion dollars will be spent on depot-level engine maintenance for Western-designed military aircraft over the next decade. Of this total, $50.5 billion will be spent on the engines powering fighters and jet-powered trainers. Demand for these engines will rise from $4.5 billion in 2020 to $5.6 billion in 2029, a compound annual growth rate of 2.05%. General Electric F404/F414s in Boeing's F/A-18 and T-7, Saab's Gripen, and KAI's KF-X and T-50 will produce the largest share of this demand (22.4%), but most of the growth will come from Pratt & Whitney F135s powering Lockheed Martin F-35s. Demand for this engine will rise from $424 million in 2020 to $1.4 billion in 2029, a rate of 14.19% per year

https://aviationweek.com/mro/hows-military-aftermarket-sector-faring-amid-covid-19-crisis

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  • The new strategy from Navy’s cyber command

    17 août 2020 | International, Naval

    The new strategy from Navy’s cyber command

    Mark Pomerleau The Navy's primary cyber outfit released its strategic plan for the next five years, a document that calls for using the service's networks as a warfighting platform. The document, released by 10th Fleet/Fleet Cyber Command in late July, covers the range of responsibility of the command, which is the only fleet with a global footprint in all the military domains, to include cyberspace operations, signals intelligence and recently, the Navy's component to U.S. Space Command. Much has changed since the last strategic plan was published in 2015, namely, the rampant activity of adversaries on a daily basis below the threshold of armed conflict to strategically harm the United States. “The long term competition we face today is between democracies and authoritarian regimes, freedom of navigation, and access to shared world markets. Our long-term strategic competitors are executing strategic cyber activities to alter the international order. This will not let up,” the document read. It added that adversaries learned the military's game but now the military must learn the adversary's game and play it on their terms. “Historically, to undermine a state's power required territorially-focused, overt armed attacks or physical invasion. While that is and will always remain a possibility, technology has provided our adversaries with the ability to achieve their objectives without traditional military force,” the document read. “Currently, our adversaries are engaging us in cyberspace and the costs are cumulative – each intrusion, hack or leak may not be strategically consequential on its own, but the compounding effects are tantamount to what would have been considered an act of war.” The Navy, and military by extension, must be prepared to contest this activity. “I am certain the opening rounds of a 21st century great power conflict, particularly one impacting the maritime domain, will be launched in the electromagnetic, space, or cyber domains. If the Navy is to fight and win, Navy networks must be able to survive those hits and ‘fight hurt,'” Vice Adm. Timothy White, who rarely speaks publicly, said in the forward to the strategy. “Our people must be trained and exercised to fight through those hits. This contest spans the continuum of competition and conflict. We must win this contest during the day-to-day competition of ‘peacetime operations,' where our networks are already in close contact, under constant probing and attack. If we do not, we will be at a severe disadvantage during crisis and lethal combat.” The plan, which continues to nest within the Navy's overarching vision of Distributed Maritime Operations, features a three pronged vision; acting first in full spectrum information warfare, fighting and winning in a fully contested battlespace and promoting modernization and innovation. Moreover, the plan tweaks the five goals outlined in the previous strategic plan 2015-2020. They include: Operating the network as a warfighting platform: Following several high profile network breaches, the Navy must tighten the screws on its IT. Fleet Cyber is responsible for operating, maintaining and defending the network and as part of that, service leaders recognize they must “fight hurt” when networks are strained. They are also working ton establish greater cyber situational awareness across the service and reduce the intrusion attack surface. Conducting fleet cryptologic warfare: Fleet Cyber published its cryptologic cyber warfare vision in 2019. As part of the new strategy, command officials said they will seek to expand and enhance capabilities in distributed signals intelligence as part of its contribution to Distributed Maritime Operations. Delivering warfighting capabilities and effects: Fleet Cyber wants to expand how it delivers effects on the battlefield to include accelerating and synchronizing information warfare capabilities across Maritime Operations Centers, advancing integration of cyber effects into Navy and Marine Corps concepts and creating tactical cyber teams along with a maritime fires cell to provide expertise across the fleet for delivering cyber effects. Accelerate Navy's cyber forces: Fleet Cyber needs to develop a plan to meet increased demand, both for its joint force requirements through U.S. Cyber Command and Navy specific requirements. Leaders are also looking to mature organizational structures and command and control relationships between various cyber entities that control forces across the globe such as Joint Forces Headquarters–DoDIN, Joint Force Headquarters–Cyber and Cyber Operations–Integrated Planning Elements. Moreover, with the additional importance of the space domain, Fleet Cyber will look to exploit the increasing convergence between space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Establish and Mature Navy Space Command: The document states that Fleet Cyber's goal is to “maintain maritime superiority from the sea floor to space with a core emphasis on lethality, readiness and capacity,” and so officials must re-focus to provide the best space integration possible as the service component to Space Command. The strategy also articulates Fleet Cyber's role in enabling Distributed Maritime Operations, which is underpinned by assured command and control, battlespace awareness and integrated fires. All of those require robust networks, information and completion of the kill chain. https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2020/08/13/the-new-strategy-from-navys-cyber-command/

  • Opinion: Why The Future Will Not Be Virtual

    8 février 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Opinion: Why The Future Will Not Be Virtual

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So it was that after cracking open Fulda Gap: Battlefield of the Cold War Alliances, I quickly thumbed forward to Chapter 7, “A Personal Perspective from Platoon Leader to Army Group” by Gen. (ret.) Crosbie Saint, who had commanded the 1st AD during my service in it. Saint's reflections transported me back to 1984 and the pastoral beauty of the Bavarian Oberpfalz, where we were actively preparing to fight a third world war. Prominent among the preparations Saint recounts was the terrain walk, a compulsory practice of every officer leading a maneuver unit regularly to traverse the ground where his troops would deploy, battle book in hand, mastering the contours of the landscape and envisioning his squads' movements in the General Defense Plan. Saint writes ardently about how “repetitive terrain walks at multiple command levels to analyze and become expert in exploiting the terrain for tactical purposes” gave the U.S. a decisive advantage over the vast armies of the Warsaw Pact. The still-clear memory of then-Lt. Grundman's own terrain walks along the monikered kill zones in my battle book—The Kemnath Bowl, Erbendorf Fire Trap, et al.—prompted me to wonder if the marvels of a virtual reality simulation would leave as indelible a mark. I doubt it. While the adoption of videoconferencing for commodity conversation is no doubt here to stay, the premium work of enterprise leadership must remain incarnate. Just as the experience of looking out from a ridgeline engages all the senses, strategic vision flows from an intuitive integration of time and space that no telemediation can fully activate. Beyond the battlefield lay other terrain walks affirming my conviction. In April 1993, just three weeks on the job as chief executive of an IBM teetering on insolvency, Lou Gerstner launched Operation Bear Hug, which directed each of the company's 250 most senior executives to visit at least five key customers over the following three months to learn why IBM had lost their trust. Years later, Gerstner wrote that Bear Hug made manifest what came to be the motive force of IBM's acclaimed transformation: “[W]e were going to build a company from the outside in and . . . the customer was going to drive everything we did in the company.” Gerstner invested this practice of deep listening to customers with the same strategic importance Saint attributed to a lieutenant's intimacy with the sight lines of his firing positions. Operation Bear Hug was a terrain walk. One of the trade secrets of my career as a business consultant to the aerospace industry is never to pass up an invitation to take a plant tour. No matter how near it is to your next flight's departure, when asked “Wanna see the shop?” the right answer is always “Of course.” When, a decade ago, I toured SpaceX's Hawthorne, California, headquarters and observed Elon Musk sitting at his desk among the busy cubicles of 30-something engineers gutting out their work in T-shirts, I instantly understood how the company's garage-shop culture could revolutionize the staid business of space launch. Years earlier, the clinical attention to workers' safety I saw at the bustling CFM56 jet engine plant in Villaroche, France, told me more about the success of the GE-Safran joint venture than even its impressive financials. So, too, did I need actually to feel the cavernous quietude in an antique defense factory to appreciate the true meaning of the sunk-cost fallacy. The aerospace plant tour is often a terrain walk. To all you leaders who, like me, find the progressively virtual world unsettling (and with apologies to a certain light lager's ad campaign), I say, “Find your terrain walk.” Once we again are free to move about, go physically to the crucible of what creates value for your enterprise and open your senses. Only from that vantage will you see truly into its future. The views expressed are not necessarily those of Aviation Week. https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/manufacturing-supply-chain/opinion-why-future-will-not-be-virtual

  • Le marché français de la défense aiguise l'appétit du suédois Saab

    26 mars 2019 | International, Aérospatial

    Le marché français de la défense aiguise l'appétit du suédois Saab

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