17 avril 2024 | International, Terrestre

HDT Awarded $432 Million Contract for Army Standard Family of Rigid Wall Shelters

 The program, known as the Army Standard Family of Rigid Wall Shelters Phase 1 (ASF-RWS P1), consists of both expandable and non-expandable rigid wall shelters. 

https://www.epicos.com/article/796389/hdt-awarded-432-million-contract-army-standard-family-rigid-wall-shelters

Sur le même sujet

  • European Union awards grant to forge unmanned ground vehicle standard

    18 décembre 2020 | International, Terrestre

    European Union awards grant to forge unmanned ground vehicle standard

    By: Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany — The European Commission has awarded Estonia and the country's robotics company Milrem a grant to lead the way on a standard architecture for military unmanned ground vehicles, the company announced. The deal, worth close to $40 million and signed Dec. 11, formally kicks off a pan-European development for a new generation of battlefield ground robots. Named Integrated Modular Unmanned Ground System, or iMUGS, the project uses Milrem's THeMIS vehicle as a reference platform for creating a “standardized European-wide ecosystem for aerial and ground platforms,” according to the company. Also covered by the project is relevant technology in the fields of command and control, communications, sensors, payloads, and algorithms. The connection to the European Union's coffers comes through the bloc's European Defence Industrial Development Programme. Besides Estonia as the lead, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia and Spain also are part of the iMUGS group, adding a combined €2 million (U.S. $2.4 million) to the effort. The countries each bring their relevant national companies to the table, including Safran Electronics & Defense, Nexter Systems, Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, Diehl Defence, and Bittium Wireless. “Estonia has the honor and a great responsibility taking the lead in this project as nothing on a similar scale has been conducted before,” said Martin Jõesaar, chief of the project office in the Estonian Centre for Defence Investment. “Our goal is not only making iMUGS a one-time effort, but to build it into a base project for future developments. Our long-term goal is that each of the modular systems built will pave a way for further innovation in its field.” While the sums involved in iMUGS are relatively small in the world of defense programs, the effort has the potential to shape the European market for military robotic vehicles. The initiative is a prime example of defense companies like Milrem, some of them years ago, sensing a chance to position their own offerings firmly in the thicket of European defense priorities. But the THeMIS robot is not the only game in town. Rheinmetall is equally trying to position its unmanned portfolio in the European market, even without EU backing. In the case of its Mission Master vehicle, the intellectual property belongs to the company's Canadian division, which makes support through EU channels tricky. Still, the vehicle is being tried by the land forces of several countries on the European continent. According to Milrem, European countries are expected to need thousands of ground robots during the next 10-15 years, creating a market valued in the billions of euros. “With seven participating nations and key industrial players, the unmanned ground system developed during iMUGS is expected to become the preferred European solution for integrating into armed units,” the company claims. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/12/16/european-union-awards-grant-to-forge-unmanned-ground-vehicle-standard/

  • The Pentagon wants to create a broader network of innovators

    14 mai 2019 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR, Sécurité, Autre défense

    The Pentagon wants to create a broader network of innovators

    By: Mike Gruss The Pentagon is reorganizing its internal offices to better partner with universities and upstart technology firms to ensure the military has access to talent and research in the near future and to fortify its innovation pipeline. Defense leaders are increasingly worried about what they describe as the national security innovation base. They hope a series of steps will make it easier to work with, and take advantage of, the leading-edge science across the country. This includes technology that spans from the concept stage to the production stage, and outlets that includes researchers to the defense industrial base. The changes, which affect the Defense Innovation Unit and MD5, were first mentioned in the Pentagon's budget request for fiscal 2020 and have been discussed with increasing details in recent weeks. Defense innovation leaders explained the new setup to C4ISRNET in an interview May 9. DIU's mission is to help the military accelerate its use of emerging commercial technologies and lower the barrier of entry for businesses that don't already do business with the Pentagon. Under the new approach: - The MD5 National Security Technology Accelerator has been renamed the National Security Innovation Network. The network, which helps connect academia, DOD laboratories and users, will fall under the Defense Innovation Unit as a way to take advantage of economies of scale. Morgan Plummer, the network's managing director, said the new name, which changed May 6, more accurately portrays the agency's mission. The program has its own line in the budget for the first time in fiscal 2020. - The National Security Innovation Capital fund, a new program created in the fiscal 2019 defense policy bill, will set aside investment in upstart U.S. companies so they don't fall risk to foreign investors. U.S. leaders fear that as some startups become so desperate for funding they may not consider the national security ramifications of accepting money from overseas. “It's an attempt to keep hardware investment on shore,” said Mike Madsen, director of Washington operations at DIU. The NSIC also aims to signal to the investment community that the Defense Department is interested in developing dual-use technologies and to provide a foreign investment alternative for hardware companies. In testimony to Congress in March, Mike Griffin, the Pentagon's acquisition chief for research and engineering, said that the new groups will fall to DIU “in an effort to put similarly-focused organizations under a single leadership structure.” Perhaps more importantly, Defense leaders said the new structure will help the Pentagon “hand off” technology with a low readiness level or level of maturity until it is ready for broader adoption. “There are these huge pools of untapped talent,” Plummer said. To take advantage of that talent means going beyond research grants in academia and instead to create a network of hubs and spokes of early stage ventures in approximately 35 communities throughout the country. While DIU has offices in Austin, Boston and Silicon Valley, creating a broader network means the NSIN would have staffers in cities such as Chicago, Miami, Columbus, Boulder, Raleigh, St. Louis and Minneapolis. “It makes the Department accessible in a real way,” Plummer said. Previously, business leaders may see the Pentagon as a “big gray monolith” and “may not even know where the door to this place is.” DIU will continue to focus on artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber, human systems, and space. The Pentagon asked for $164 million for DIU in its fiscal 2020 budget request. https://www.c4isrnet.com/pentagon/2019/05/13/the-pentagon-wants-to-create-a-broader-network-of-innovators/

  • How 5G Will Shape Innovation and Security

    20 décembre 2018 | International, C4ISR

    How 5G Will Shape Innovation and Security

    Executive Summary The fifth generation of mobile network technologies, known as “5G,” promises greater speed, security, and capacity. 5G will underpin the internet economy and provide the backbone for the next generation of digital technologies. So, it is unsurprising that there is intense competition among companies and countries for 5G leadership. 5G will determine the direction the internet will take and where nations will face new risks and vulnerabilities. Who makes 5G technologies will affect security and innovation in an increasingly competitive technological environment. Decisions made today about 5G will affect national security and economic performance for decades to come. This is a competition among companies and groups of companies but also a competition between market-based and state-directed decisionmaking. The United States has relied on the former, China on the latter, and Europe falls somewhere in between. American technology remains essential for 5G mobile telecommunications. American companies have been strong performers in developing 5G technologies, but the United States and its allies face a fundamental challenge from China. The focus of competition is over 5G's intellectual property, standards, and patents. Huawei, for example, has research programs to develop alternatives to American suppliers, and U.S. trade restrictions have accelerated China's efforts to develop its own 5G industry. While American companies lead in making essential 5G technologies, there are no longer any U.S. manufacturers of core telecommunications network equipment. Four companies dominate the market for the core network technologies needed for 5G networks. None of these companies are American. 1The choices are between European security partners (Ericsson and Nokia) and China (Huawei and ZTE). Telecom is a strategic industry and having two companies with close ties to a hostile power creates risk for the United States and its allies. A secure supply chain for 5G closes off dangerous areas of risk for national security in terms of espionage and the potential disruption to critical infrastructures. China's aggressive global campaign of cyber espionage makes it certain that it will exploit the opportunities it gains as a 5G supplier. One way to envision this is to imagine that the person who built your house decides to burgle it. They know the layout, the power system, the access points, may have kept a key, and perhaps even built in a way to gain surreptitious entry. Major telecom “backbone” equipment connects to the manufacturer over a dedicated channel, reporting back on equipment status and receiving updates and software patches as needed, usually without the operator's knowledge. Equipment could be sold and installed in perfectly secure condition, and a month later, the manufacture could send a software update to create vulnerabilities or disrupt service. The operator and its customers would have no knowledge of this change. The United States can manage 5G risk using two sets of policies. The first is to ensure that American companies can continue to innovate and produce advanced technologies and face fair competition overseas. American and “like-minded” companies routinely outspend their Chinese competitors in 5G R&D and hold 10 times as many 5G patents. Chinese companies still depend on the western companies for the most advanced 5G components. The second is to work with like-minded nations to develop a common approach to 5G security. The United States cannot meet the 5G challenge on its own. When the United States successfully challenged Chinese industrial policy in the past, it has been done in concert with allies. Another task will be to find ways to encourage undecided countries to spend on 5G security. Huawei's telecom networks cost between 20 to 30 percent less than competing products. Huawei also offers foreign customers generous terms for leasing or loans. It can do this because of its access to government funds. Beijing supports Huawei for both strategic and commercial reasons. Many countries will be tempted by the steep discount. Not buying Huawei means paying a “premium” for security to which economic ministries are likely to object. The United States will need to encourage others to pay this security premium while at the same time preparing for a world where the United States unavoidably connects to Huawei-supplied networks and determine how to securely connect and communicate over telecom networks in countries using Chinese network equipment. The United States does not need to copy China's government-centric model for 5G, but it does need to invest in research and adopt a comprehensive approach to combatting non-tariff barriers to trade. 5G leadership requires a broader technology competition policy in the United States that builds the engineering and tech workforce and supports both private and public R&D. The United States also needs to ensure that U.S. companies do not face obstacles from antitrust or patent infringement investigations undertaken by other countries to obtain competitive advantage. In the twentieth century, steel, coal, automobiles, aircraft, ships, and the ability to produce things in mass quantity were the sources of national power. The foundations of security and power are different today. The ability to create and use new technologies is the source of economic strength and military security. Technology, and the capacity to create new technologies, are the basis of information age power. 5G as the cornerstone of a new digital environment is the focal point for the new competition, where the United States is well-positioned to lead but neither success nor security are guaranteed without action. This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-5g-will-shape-innovation-and-security

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