29 avril 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
Contracts for April 28, 2021
Today
10 juillet 2018 | International, Naval
By: David B. Larter
WASHINGTON ― The U.S. Navy is rapidly moving toward procuring the first hull in its new class of frigate in 2020, but a new report is raising questions about whether the Navy has done detailed analysis about what it needs out of the ship before barging ahead.
The Navy may not have done an adequate job of analyzing gaps and capabilities shortfalls before it set itself on a fast-track to buying the so-called FFG(X) as an adaptation from a parent design, said influential Navy analyst Ron O'Rourke in a new Congressional Research Service report.
In essence, the CRS report questions whether the Navy looked at what capabilities the service already has in the fleet, what capabilities it's missing and whether the FFG(X) is the optimal solution to address any identified shortfalls.
O'Rourke suggests Congress push the Navy on “whether procuring a new class of FFGs is the best or most promising general approach for addressing the identified capability gaps and mission needs, and whether the Navy has performed a formal, rigorous analysis of this issue, as opposed to relying solely on subjective judgments of Navy or [Defense Department] leaders.”
““Subjective judgments, though helpful, can overlook counter-intuitive results regarding the best or most promising general approach,” the report reads. “Potential alternative general approaches for addressing identified capability gaps and mission needs in this instance include (to cite a few possibilities) modified LCSs, FFs, destroyers, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, or some combination of these platforms.”
The Navy is looking to adapt its FFG(X) from an existing design such as Fincantieri's FREMM, one of the two existing littoral combat ships or the Coast Guard's national security cutter as a means of getting updated capabilities into a small surface combatant and into the fleet quickly.
A better approach, O'Rourke suggests, would be to make a formal, rigorous analysis of alternatives to its current course. Failure to do so has led to a series of setbacks with the Navy's current small surface combatant program, the LCS.
“The Navy did not perform a formal, rigorous analysis of this kind prior to announcing the start of the LCS program in November 2001, and this can be viewed as a root cause of much of the debate and controversy that attended the LCS program, and of the program's ultimate restructurings in February 2014 and December 2015,” O'Rourke writes.
O'Rourke further suggests the Navy is relying too much on subjective opinions of Navy and Defense Department leaders, instead of a legitimate analysis. And indeed, the Navy has made rapid acquisition of the new ship the hallmark of the program.
“Subjective judgments can be helpful, particularly in terms of capturing knowledge and experience that is not easily reduced to numbers, in taking advantage of the ‘wisdom of the crowd,‘ and in coming to conclusions and making decisions quickly,” O'Rourke argues.
“On the other hand, a process that relies heavily on subjective judgments can be vulnerable to group-think, can overlook counter-intuitive results regarding capability gaps and mission needs, and, depending on the leaders involved, can emphasize those leaders' understanding of the Navy's needs.”
Read the full report here.
29 avril 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
Today
18 septembre 2018 | International, Sécurité
As Leaders set out at the Bratislava Summit two years ago, the Union's objective in this area is to do everything necessary to support Member States in ensuring internal security and fighting terrorism. The European Union must help protect the public, safeguard the Schengen area and respond intelligently to a changing security environment where some threats are hybrid in nature, and where the line between internal and external security is sometimes blurred. Building on the real progress made in recent years to strengthen our collective security, we must think in more operational terms and ensure the full and effective implementation of our previous conclusions, including on cybersecurity (October 2017, June 2018) and on strengthening resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related risks, also in light of the Salisbury attack (March and June 2018). Leaders should focus on where EU efforts can add immediate value to national ones and on ways to reinforce Europe's long-term response to emerging and new threats, as part of the new Strategic Agenda for the Union to be adopted at the June 2019 European Council. Upgrading police and judicial cooperation Strengthening border security Resilience in cyberspace Crisis response capability Full article: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36409/leaders-agenda-note-on-internal-security.pdf
30 juillet 2021 | International, Aérospatial
UK-based global major aerospace and defence group BAE Systems (BAES) announced on Thursday that it had been awarded a £250-million contract by the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) to further advance the design and development of the country’s Tempest Future Combat Air System (FCAS). The signing of this contract marks the formal initiation of the concept and assessment phase for Tempest. The FCAS is being developed by a group of UK companies and UK subsidiaries of major Western aerospace and defence enterprises, collectively known as Team Tempest. These are BAES itself, Rolls-Royce, Leonardo UK and MDBA UK, plus experts from the UK MOD. Tempest is expected to become operational in the mid-2030s.