Government to commit to building first three warships despite budget concerns

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  10 décembre 2019 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Canada is rich - and cheap

  EUGENE LANG Eugene Lang is an adjunct professor at the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, and a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. “It's Canada, they have money,” Donald Trump said at last week's NATO summit. Most of what the U.S. President says is either exaggerated or false, but occasionally he sums up in a sentence what everyone knows to be true. After admonishing Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at the summit for Canada's failure to meet, or strive toward, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's defence-spending target of 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Mr. Trump pointed out an inconvenient truth. The President was saying Canada is rich and cheap. But just how rich is Canada? Among the Group of Seven -- a group of the richest countries in the world -- Canada enjoys the third-highest per-capita income and, since 2016, has led the G7 in economic growth. Canada also has the lowest net-debt-to-GDP ratio among those same seven countries, and the second-lowest national-government-deficit-to-GDP ratio. Which means, in essence, that Canada is the third-richest country in the G7 and the best in class with government finances. Successive governments in Ottawa have spent 20 years boasting about this strong national balance sheet to Canadians at every turn, and telling anyone abroad who would listen. This is why Mr. Trump knows that Canada does indeed have money. We are rich, at least compared with most other countries. But are we cheap? Canada spends about 1.3 per cent of GDP on national defence, tying us for fourth with Italy within the G7. Yet, Ottawa has never fully accepted the validity of the defence-spending-to-GDP measure. Both the Harper government – which signed the Wales Declaration, enshrining the 2-per-cent NATO target – and the Trudeau government have claimed input measures such as the GDP ratio don't tell the full story, and that output indicators are more meaningful. The defence output measure that is best understood is the extent to which a country's military is engaged in operations internationally. On that score, Canada looks terrible. We have fewer troops deployed abroad today on NATO, United Nations and other multilateral missions than in decades. To be sure, having influence internationally and carrying your fair share of global responsibility entails much more than the size or engagement of your military. Official Development Assistance (ODA), or foreign aid, is another important measure in this connection. Canada also ranks fourth among G7 countries in ODA as a percentage of gross national income (GNI). However, Ottawa is spending only 0.28 per cent, up slightly from 0.26 per cent last year, the lowest level this century. Fifty years ago, a World Bank Commission report, titled Partners in Development, recommended developed countries spend 0.7 per cent of GNI on aid. That Commission was chaired by Lester Pearson, former prime minister of Canada, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and a Canadian icon. Over the years, various Canadian governments have paid homage to Mr. Pearson's vision. Yet in the five decades since his report was published, Canada has rarely reached half of the Pearson target in any given year. Whether Ottawa likes or doesn't like input or output measures, or GDP or GNI ratios, doesn't really matter in the world of international politics. For better or worse, these are the indicators that are used to compare and assess the degree to which countries are living up to their obligations and responsibilities internationally. Imperfect as they are, these are measures of burden sharing. They are the statistics countries look at when considering whether Canada or any other country is pulling its weight globally. And on these measures, Canada looks middling at best, and bad at worst, by both international comparative standards. At the same time, we are among the world leaders in economic growth among developed countries, and we have held the gold medal in public finances for years. Rich and cheap, as it were. That was the essence of Mr. Trump's criticism of Canada this week at the NATO Summit. And foreign governments the world over know it to be true. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-is-rich-and-cheap/

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  5 juin 2020 | Local, Aérospatial, Sécurité

  Canada launches AI project to manage BVLOS search and rescue operations

  Public Safety Canada has selected Kongsberg Geospatial, Larus Technologies and the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association of Canada (CASARA) to integrate geospatial software, artificial intelligence, and machine vision software to help develop new methods for the use of drones in search and rescue operations in remote communities in Canada. The project will be funded by the Search and Rescue New Initiatives Fund (SARNIF) and has been dubbed OVERSEE – an acronym for “Optical Vision Enhancement and Refinement of Sensor Exploitation Effectiveness”. The OVERSEE project is intended to help address the unique challenges of conducting search and rescue operations in remote areas (such as indigenous communities in the Arctic and their immediate surrounding area) with UAS platforms. OVERSEE will initially employ available search and rescue statistics from the Department of National Defence, CASARA, Transport Canada and other agencies and execute simulations driven by Artificial Intelligence. The AI will use Deep Learning techniques to investigate how BVLOS regulation effects SAR efforts that make use of drones, and how drones have been integrated most effectively in search and rescue operations, particularly for isolated indigenous communities in Canada's North that don't have quick access to Aeronautical search and rescue assets. Ultimately the goal of this research is to help CASARA members and GSAR (Ground Search and Rescue) workers use BVLOS drones more effectively in search and rescue operations. Kongsberg Geospatial will be leading the project, contributing their expertise in precision mapping, Air Traffic Management, and the development of multi-vehicle UAS control stations for BVLOS missions to help develop tools and procedures for the safe, effective use of drones for search and rescue missions in remote areas. They will also be contributing tools and training for machine vision techniques. Larus Technologies specializes in Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems for defence applications, and will be contributing their Total::Perception™ simulation engine and Total::Vision™ computer vision technology to the project. CASARA will be helping to gather drone video from training exercises throughout Canada in cooperation with its volunteers, as well as search and rescue event statistics from community organizations. Upon completion of the project, CASARA membership will help to circulate the SOPs derived from the project to their membership of Civil Air Search and Rescue workers and volunteers across Canada to ensure that everyone has access to the improved UAS SAR guidance. While the project is primarily funded through Public Safety Canada's SARNIF fund, all three partners will be making in-kind contributions in software licenses, technology, and professional services. The OVERSEE project is expected to be completed sometime in 2021. https://www.unmannedairspace.info/latest-news-and-information/canada-launches-ai-drone-project-to-find-ways-to-effectively-manage-bvlos-search-and-rescue-operations/

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  13 juin 2019 | Local, Sécurité, Autre défense

  Canada should think again about having the ability to use offensive cyber weapons: Expert

  Howard Solomon Canada's electronic spy agency will soon get new authority to launch cyber attacks if the government approves legislation that is in the final stages of being debated. There's a good chance it will be proclaimed before the October federal election. But a discussion paper issued Wednesday by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute says Canadians need to debate the pros and cons of using this new power. “This direction not only opens up new possibilities for Canadian defence, it could also represent significant new risks,” says the report. “Without good answers to the difficult questions this new direction could raise, the country could be headed down a very precarious path.” Among the possible problems: Cyber retaliation. Another: While Canada might try to target a cyber attack, the impact might be bigger than expected — in fact, it might boomerang and smack us back. Third is the lack of international agreement on the use of cyber weapons (although this is a double-edged sword: Without an agreement there are no formal limits on what any country is forbidden from doing in cyberspace). “To move forward at this point to implement or even formally endorse a strategy of cyber attack would be risky and premature,” concludes the report's author, computer science professor Ken Barker, who also heads the University of Calgary's Institute for Security, Privacy and Information Assurance. “There are challenging technical controls that must be put in place as well as a critical international discussion on how cyber weaponry fits within the rules of war.” Barker's paper is in response to the 2017 strategy setting out Defence Department goals, where the possibility of Canada having a cyber attack capability first raised. It wasn't written with Bill C-59 in mind — now in its final stage before Parliament — which actually gives Canada's electronic spy agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the power to use what's called “active” as well as defensive cyber operations. In an interview Tuesday, Barker said “in the desire to push this thing they need to have more carefully thought about the questions I raise in this paper.” “Maybe it's late, but at least it's available.” He dismisses the argument that by announcing it has an offensive cyber capability Canada will cause other countries to think twice about attacking us with cyber weapons. “They would attempt to find out what Canada is doing to create cyber attack capabilities,” he argued. “One of the risks once we do endorse this,” he added, “is we open ourselves up to other countries to using Canada as a launching pad for cyber attacks to cover up their involvement, and [then] say ‘That was done by Canada.'” Nation states are already active in cyberspace. Ottawa has blamed China for the 2014 hack of the National Research Council, Washington suspects China was behind the massive hack of employee files at the Office of Personnel Management, and there is strong evidence that Russia mounted a sophisticated social media attack against the U.S. during the 2016 federal election. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The U.S. the U.K. and Australia say they have used offensive cyber operations against the Islamic State. The U.S.-based Council on Foreign Relations notes that Germany increased its offensive cyber capability after a 2016 attack on the country's legislature blamed on Russia. Last year the New York Times reported the U.S. Cyber Command has been empowered to be more offensive. Meanwhile in April the CSE warned it's “very likely” there will be some form of foreign cyber interference during the run-up to October's federal election here, The most commonly-cited interference in a country were two cyber attacks that knocked out electrical power in Ukraine — in December 2015 and again in December 2016 — largely believed to have been launched from Russia. All this is why some experts say Canada has to have an offensive cyber capability to at least keep up. In January, Ray Boisvert, former assistant director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), told a parliamentary committee that “the best defence always begins with a good offense ... “When more than five dozen countries are rumoured to be developing active cyber capabilities, in my view that means we must develop capabilities to respond and in some cases that includes outside our borders.” Background In 2017 the Trudeau government announced a new defence strategy that included the promise of “conducting active cyber operations against potential adversaries in the context of government-authorized military missions.” The same year the government introduced Bill C-59, which in part would give the CSE, which is responsible for securing government networks, the ability to take action online to defend Canadian networks and proactively stop cyber threats before they reach systems here. This would be done as part of new legislation governing the CSE called the Communications Security Act. That act would give CSE the ability to conduct defensive and “active” cyber operations. Active operations are defined as anything that could “degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.” Both defensive and active cyber operations can't be used against any portion of the global information infrastructure within this country. And they have to be approved by the Minister of Defence. C-59 has been passed by the House of Commons and slightly amended by the Senate. It was scheduled back in the House last night to debate the Senate amendments. Despite all the cyber incidents blamed on nation states, Barker is reluctant to say we're in an era of low-level cyber war right now. Many incidents can be characterized as cyber espionage and not trying cause harm to another state, he argues. https://www.itworldcanada.com/article/canada-should-think-again-about-having-the-ability-to-use-offensive-cyber-weapons-expert/418912