25 avril 2019 | Local, Aérospatial
DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN
The Department of National Defence has updated details about its key ongoing defence procurements.
I have written an article on that update which can be viewed at the National Post website:
The article notes the DND warning about issues that could affect the proposed purchase of a fleet of uninhabited aerial vehicles, commonly referred to as drones.
The DND update warned that there might not be enough procurement staff with the required expertise to move that program forward on schedule. The department hopes to deal with the problem by hiring contractors. A draft invitation to qualify for that project was released April 5 and a contact is expected to be awarded in 2022, the update pointed out.
The lack of staff has been an ongoing issue for the UAV program but in other ways. In May 2010 I reported The Canadian Force's plan to buy pilotless aircraft to conduct surveillance off the country's coasts, in the Arctic and on overseas missions had fallen behind schedule because the military doesn't have enough people to fly the drones.
While the UAVs don't carry pilots, they still require an operator on the ground to fly the craft. Staff are also needed to maintain the equipment and to prepare them for flight.
But at the time the air force was having difficulty finding enough people for a new unit that would be needed to operate the UAVs.
Then called the Joint UAV Surveillance and Target Acquisition System or JUSTAS, there had been a number of plans for the acquisition. One of the earlier ones involved a request for proposals from industry to be issued by the end of 2009 and a contract signed in 2010. The first of the UAVs would have arrived by February 2012.
That obviously didn't happen.
A reworked plan called for the delivery of the UAVs in 2014, with full operating capability in 2017.
That didn't happen.
The project is now named, RPAS, for Remotely Piloted Aircraft System. The latest plan calls for a contract to be awarded in 2022-2023 with full capability – an armed drone fleet – in place by 2029-2030.
22 avril 2024 | Local, Terrestre, Sécurité
The Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence, will visit the Northwest Territories from April 23-25, 2024 to discuss Budget 2024 and Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence
27 janvier 2021 | Local, Aérospatial
January 25, 2021 - Lieutenant General Theodoros Lagios, General Director for Defence Investments and Armaments of the Greek Ministry of Defence and Eric Béranger, CEO of MBDA, today signed a contract to provide the armaments for 18 Rafale combat aircraft intended for Greece's air force. A signing ceremony was held in Athens in the presence of the French Minister for Armed Forces, Florence Parly, and the Greek Minister for Defense, Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos. The new aircraft's weapons will benefit from the strong commonality with those from the Mirage 2000s and Mirage 2000-5s currently in service in the Hellenic Air Force. Like these, the Rafales will be armed with SCALP cruise missiles, AM39 Exocet anti-ship missiles and MICA multi-mission air-to-air missiles. Additionally, MBDA will also supply Meteor beyond visual range air-to-air missiles. Eric Béranger, CEO of MBDA, said: “The signing of this agreement turns a new page in our relationship with Greece, which we have had for more than half a century. The country was the very first customer of the Exocet missile in 1968, showing great confidence in it and in our predecessor companies. This confidence has been renewed over the years and is being renewed again today. It is our duty to do everything we can in order to continue delivering on this confidence into tomorrow. View source version on MBDA: https://www.mbda-systems.com/press-releases/mbda-to-arm-hellenic-air-forces-new-rafale-fighter-jets/
25 mai 2020 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
As governments around the world reassess national security, Ottawa could find it harder to delay plans for new ships, helicopters and fighter jets. Jeffrey F. Collins May 22, 2020 A few months into the COVID-19 pandemic, the first signs of impact on Canada's defence procurement plans are showing. The government has been following an ambitious multi-decade blueprint, starting in 2010, to kick-start the domestic shipbuilding sector, but some yards have had to scale back their workforces under public health orders. What this means for the National Shipbuilding Strategy and its more than $85 billion (by my calculations) in ongoing and planned construction of large ships is as yet unclear. The $19-billion Future Fighter Capability project, designed to replace the four-decade-old CF-18 fighter with 88 new jets, could also be affected. Government officials were adamant until early May that the June submission deadline for bids remained unchanged — before granting a 30-day extension. But with industry and public sector workers largely stuck at home, it is difficult to see how even the new July deadline can be met. In earlier times of economic strain, Ottawa found defence spending an easy target for cuts. This time could be different, as governments around the world reassess what national security means and how best to achieve it. Heading into 2020, things were still looking up for the capital spending plans of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The Trudeau government's 2017 Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) defence policy had allocated $108 billion in capital expenditures over a 20-year timeframe, 2017-37. Then came the pandemic. There were more than a million job losses in March alone, and as of early May, the Parliamentary Budget Office was predicting a $1-trillion debt by 2021. Given the rapid drop in both domestic and global consumer demand, the price collapse in the country's key commodity, oil, and the accompanying decline in the Canadian dollar, the country is now in a recession for an unknown period. If past is prologue and the virus persists without a vaccine for the foreseeable future, the likelihood of the government delaying or cancelling projects or trimming its orders for ships and planes is growing. When faced with economic pains in the past, federal governments scaled back procurement plans. The staggering debt and deficit in the late 1980s and 1990s led the Brian Mulroney government to drop its ambitious bid to acquire up to a dozen nuclear submarines in 1989, a mere two years after announcing the project in the 1987 defence White Paper. In 1993 the Jean Chrétien government infamously scrapped the contract to replace the 1960s-vintage Sea King helicopter (at a cost of $478 million in penalties). The following year's defence White Paper outlined $15 billion in delays, reductions and cancellations to the DND's procurement budget; this was in addition to large-scale base closures and 20 percent reductions in both CAF regular force personnel and the overall defence budget. The ostensibly pro-military Stephen Harper Conservatives announced 20-year funding plans, as ambitious as the SSE, in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy but deviated from them in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global recession. With a goal of returning to balanced budgets after $47 billion in stimulus spending, the Harper government delayed or cut over $32 billion in planned procurement spending and laid off 400 personnel from DND's procurement branch. Among the casualties was the army's $2.1-billion close-combat vehicle. There are several reasons why this pattern has repeated itself, but two stand out. First, defence is a tempting target for any government belt-tightening drive, typically accounting for a large share of discretionary federal spending. With most federal money going to individual citizens (employment insurance, pensions, tax benefits) and provinces (health and social transfers), there simply is little fiscal room left outside of defence. To remove money from these politically popular programs is to risk voter resentment and the ire of provincial governments. In short, when past federal governments confronted a choice between cutting tanks and cutting transfers, they cut the tanks. Second, Canada's geostrategic position has helped. Sitting securely atop North America in alliance with the world's pre-eminent superpower has meant, in the words of a defence minister under Pierre Trudeau, Donald Macdonald, that “there is no obvious level for defence expenditures” in Canada. Meeting the terms of our alliances with the United States and NATO means that Canada has to do its part in securing the northern half of the continent and contributing to military operations overseas, but generally in peacetime Ottawa has a lot of leeway in deciding what to spend on defence, even if allies growl and complain. Yet it is this same geostrategic position that may lessen the impact of any cuts related to COVID-19. Unlike the Mulroney and Chrétien governments, who made their decisions amid the end of Cold War tensions, or the Harper government, which was withdrawing from the combat mission in Afghanistan, this government must make its choices in an international security environment that is becoming more volatile. The spread of the virus has amplified trade and military tensions between the world's two superpowers and weakened bonds among European Union member states as they fight to secure personal protective equipment and stop the contagion at their borders. Governments worldwide are now unabashedly protectionist in their efforts to prevent the export of medical equipment and vital materials. As supply chains fray, pressures mount for each country to have a “sovereign” industrial capability, including in defence. In fact, the Trump administration has turned to the 1950 Defense Production Act to direct meatpacking plants to remain open or to restrict the export of health products (three million face masks bound for Canada were held up, then released). The pandemic is intensifying the Trump administration's skepticism of alliances and international institutions; in late March, there was even discussion of stationing US troops near the Canadian border (the plan was eventually abandoned). Smaller powers like Canada that have traditionally relied on American security guarantees will have to maintain their defence spending, or even increase it, as they try to strengthen old alliances and create new ones. As Timothy Choi, a naval expert at the University of Calgary, has told me, an irony of the pandemic is that it may see the National Shipbuilding Strategy become a “major destination for stimulus spending in times of recession.” Either way, by the time the pandemic subsides, Canadians may yet find out that there is indeed an “obvious level” to defence spending. This article is part of the The Coronavirus Pandemic: Canada's Response special feature. Photo: The Halifax-class navy frigate HMCS Fredericton in the waters of Istanbul Strait, Turkey. Shutterstock.com, by Arkeonaval. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2020/defence-procurement-wont-be-so-easy-to-cut-in-a-time-of-covid-19/