Generative AI like viral ChatGPT lands on DISA technology watch list

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  13 janvier 2021 | International, Aérospatial

  Does Japan Need to Develop a New Fighter Aircraft?

  By Arnaud Sobrero The Japanese archipelago lies in a volatile region rife with historical tensions and territorial disputes. China's defense spending has increased at a double-digit rate annually for much of the past three decades. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has drastically modernized its air capabilities with development of the J-20 fighter and the upcoming FC-31, and has demonstrated consistently assertive behavior, including airspace violations and military buildups in the South China Sea. North Korea, a nuclear power since 2006, has also shown belligerence by firing ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, while Russia has violated Japanese airspace on several occasions prompting Japan to scramble its F-15J fleet. Those geopolitical challenges are clearly stated in Japan's Mid Term Defense Plan and National Defense Plan Guidelines, which define Japan's long-term procurement strategy. To effectively address those security challenges, these documents claim, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) needs to modernize its existing fleet and significantly upgrade its capabilities. Japan's 200-plus-strong F-15J fleet, built under license by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, has been the backbone of Japan's air superiority for close to 40 years. Nonetheless, they face some obsolescence issues that have led the Japanese defense ministry to purchase a $4.5 billion upgrade package to modernize 98 of them into a “Japan Super Interceptor” configuration equipped with better radar, avionics, and weaponry. The F-2 program, co-developed with Lockheed Martin, has been facing operational challenges and has a staggering unit cost of $170 million. Even though the last F-2 was delivered in 2011, the program faces significant obsolescence issues and will remain in service for a shorter duration than the F-15J. Given the dynamic geopolitical environment Japan finds itself in, the Japanese defense ministry is determined to fill the capability gap created by the old F-15J and the future retirement of the F-2. It has decided to purchase its first batch of 42 F-35As, destined to replace the aging F-4, followed by a second batch comprised of 63 F-35A and 42 F-35B fighters, worth $23 billion. The F-35 is a formidable addition to Japan's military apparatus: it offers stealth, excellent sensor and networking capabilities,and an ability to fuse real-time information for rapid decision-making rather than high speed and pure dogfighting capabilities. From a traditional standpoint, the F-35 scarcely represents the air superiority platform the JASDF wants to counter China's growing fleet of J-11 fighters, or even the more advanced platforms recently deployed by Beijing, such as the Su-35 or J-20. Japan has tried to acquire the F-22 from Lockheed Martin but ultimately failed to do so, given that the aircraft was not designed for export due to its sensitive technologies. The JASDF is still looking to acquire a stealthy, twin-engine, long-range air superiority fighter with a robust payload and advanced networking capabilities, which will provide Japan with a qualitative military edge over growing Chinese air capabilities. ADVERTISEMENT Beyond the requirement of modernizing JASDF's capabilities, maintaining a competitive defense industrial base has been a primary strategic goal for Japan. After the Second World War, Japan spent decades rebuilding its aerospace sector, building U.S. military aircraft under license, including the F-86, F-4, F-15, CH-47, and P-3. Building sophisticated aircraft under license has been Japan's de facto strategy to acquire new technologies and upgrade its industrial base skills. Japan has historically relied on U.S. companies to import military hardware through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) framework. These imports have increased considerably in the last decade, its proportion of the country's total defense budget rising from 0.9 percent in 2010 to 8.9 percent in 2019 with big-ticket items like the F-35, the MV-22, and the E-2D being procured through the government-to-government route. Outside of servicing those types of equipment, tier 1 and tier 2 domestic companies have not benefited from those FMS programs. Japanese companies face restrictions on sharing some critical software intellectual property and technical data from equipment that has originated in the U.S. original. Even Japan's industrial participation in the manufacture of the F-35 has been a far cry from what the local industry had envisioned initially, when Japanese companies were seeking a larger role in the aircraft's production. Recently, in a blow to U.S. military exports, the Japanese defense ministry has decided to scrap two major programs – the Global Hawk and the Aegis Ashore – due to some price and technical issues. These developments may suggest that Japan is potentially reconsidering its engagement with the U.S. on military hardware and could utilize government funds instead for domestic development to enhance the competitiveness of its defense industrial base and, more importantly, gain full control of defense capabilities, as well as on future upgrades. According to the ministry of defense's Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency, Japan is looking to leverage the technologies the industry has captured through license production, as well as the development of the experimental ATD-X stealth aircraft, for the development of an indigenous fighter, known as F-X. This would represent a shift in Japan's long-term procurement strategy and could indicate that Japan is now looking to partner for the design and manufacturing of sixth-generation fighter aircraft technologies. After former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's return to power in 2012, he stopped years of decline in defense spending by boosting investments modestly. After eight years of slow but steady increase, the Japanese defense budget stands at a record of about $51.6 billion with the FY21 budget request. In addition, the Japanese defense ministry decided to “convert” its Izumo helicopter destroyer into a small aircraft carrier capable of accommodating 12 F-35B jet fighters, which will strengthen Japan's offensive capabilities. Following the lift of the ban on defense exports, Japan had seen last year its first successful military export, with the sale of air radar systems to the Philippines. Japan would likewise welcome an opportunity to export the F-X, its future sixth-generation fighter, with the assistance of an international partner – if not to promote military ties with friendly nations, then in order to reduce the tremendous development cost. Of all the challenges the F-X program will face, its affordability will be the most pressing. The F-X program represents a clear continuation of Abe's robust defense doctrine and will further cement its legacy into Japan's long-term military modernization. By bolstering the country's domestic defense industrial base and by enabling technological transfer, the F-X program will help Japan catch up with China and Russia in the stealth fighter market. Based in Asia for more than 10 years, Arnaud Sobrero is an independent writer focused on defense technology and East Asian affairs. https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/does-japan-need-to-develop-a-new-fighter-aircraft/

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  5 juin 2023 | International, Autre défense

  Defense spending lifts US factory orders in April

  New orders for U.S.-made goods rose for a second straight month in April, boosted largely by defense spending, but the overall manufacturing industry continued to struggle under the weight of higher interest rates.

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  4 décembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  How to take EU-NATO relations from words to action

  By: Jeffrey A. Stacey After the successful 2011 Libya operation, it appeared the U.S. and European allies were on the cusp of a new era of working together on international crises, only to stall out thanks to economic austerity and populist elections. Now that the refugee crisis in Europe is subsiding and allied troops and equipment have deployed to Poland and the Baltics, the window of opportunity has once again opened for deepening relations between the European Union and NATO. By setting up an EU-NATO informal track, regularizing operational transitions and embarking on expanded coordination in out-of-area operations — all of which are more crucial, given a potential Brexit and the 2020 U.S. election — these two crucial, overlapping alliances can step into a new era. There are two logical diplomatic tracks to be pursued: a formal track centered on implementation of EU and NATO ministerials/summits, as well as an informal track centered on working through difficult issues and preparing them for decision-makers. Senior officials from both organizations have commented recently that the informal track would be particularly useful for the kind of deep-dive, “peer around the corner” strategizing that busy officials are rarely afforded an opportunity to engage in. The EU is a global leader in what it calls “crisis management,” and what NATO refers to as “stabilization and reconstruction.” Joint planning ahead of such operations, aligning civil/military planning in advance, will allow for improved outcomes in theater. In general, NATO would gain a new capability to act in the immediate aftermath of its military operations when a crisis occurs, and the EU would gain the opportunity to spearhead joint Western crisis management as a matter of course. Taking a cue from the so-called changing of berets in the 2004 NATO mission in Bosnia — when European soldiers involved in the terminating NATO mission simply changed their uniforms out for EU uniforms and remained in place to take part in the EU follow-on mission — there is a strong likelihood that a similar arrangement can be made for deployed civilians. The EU and NATO have ample reasons to agree to regularize operational leadership transitions in moving from the military phase of a conflict to the post-conflict stabilization phase. Here's how it could work: The EU would be designated to spearhead the stabilization phase, having jointly planned this phase of the operation with NATO civilian planners at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. NATO would commit to always selecting a European as the head of the NATO temporary civilian operation, and would call up a modest number of civilian experts from the nations, who would deploy to theater and engage in a delimited number of core stabilization tasks with the plan for a larger EU-led civilian deployment to absorb the NATO operation. NATO civilian operators would focus on a discrete set of core stabilization tasks awaiting the follow-on EU mission to become more comprehensive. Once a decision to deploy a civilian mission occurs in Brussels, the NATO stabilization mission would devolve to the EU. Most of the civilian experts will already be from EU countries, with the mission head also European. The rest of the NATO civilians can be seconded to the civilian operation mission via framework agreements such as the extant one between the U.S. and the EU that already has seconded Americans to EU missions in Africa. This operational compromise would prevent either alliance from playing second fiddle, ushering in a new era of co-planning and cooperating for both. Why can't both sides “just do it,” i.e., simply enact a leadership transition in theater whenever the need arises? Pragmatism can work in the moment, but it doesn't set precedents, as proven by the fact this is not already happening; past “impromptu” experiences of working together on the ground have not led to any pattern or even expectation of repeat or improved cooperating since. This proposal is firmly in the EU's interests, as it will put it fully in the driver's seat of crisis management and bring the EU the recognition it deserves for its existing capabilities and substantial operational experience. This proposal is also firmly in NATO's interests, for the alliance that almost split over its ongoing Afghanistan operation has no interest in further prolonged field deployments. There is also an additional strategic opportunity for both, as closer EU-NATO cooperation would be an important means for keeping the U.K. connected with its EU partners in the security and defense field following Brexit. But with crises around the world proliferating, in more pressing terms these two critical overlapping alliances among Western allies need to jointly become more operationally ready. Despite the political challenges in numerous Western countries, an agreement to overcome the EU-NATO operational impasse is on the cards. Prior to the negative impact of U.S. President Donald Trump's arrival, NATO-EU relations had been at their pinnacle. With an EU-NATO informal track and a means for overcoming the operational hurdle in hand, substantial progress can still be made prior to the next U.S. administration. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/12/03/how-to-take-eu-nato-relations-from-words-to-action/