French aviation rescue plan bets on defence helicopters, drones and tankers

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  25 juin 2024 | International, Terrestre, C4ISR

  Armed with quantum sensors, France eyes leaps in electronic warfare

  Quantum gravimeter technology, used for mapping the seabed, offers the prospect of surreptitiously tracking adversary submarines.

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  22 mai 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Opinion: Aviation’s Cybersecurity Imperative

  Remzi Seker May 22, 2020 With the expansion across the aviation industry of connectivity and computing services, cybersecurity has become ever more important. Connecting people, processes and assets creates new vulnerabilities and multiple attack points—from flight-critical avionics to passenger inflight entertainment networks and airline backend operations. Information about systems, protocols and technologies such as software-defined radio are now readily available well beyond the industry. Demand for greater efficiency meanwhile continues to increase connectivity and accelerate computerization within aviation infrastructure, including aircraft. Fortunately, ongoing efforts to protect aircraft, airlines and passengers from cybersecurity threats have been largely unaffected by the global pandemic, suggesting an opportunity for the industry to ramp up cybersafety programs and training amid the current slowdown. The comprehensive, coordinated nature of aviation cybersecurity initiatives means committees have long carried out their work primarily through virtual meetings, so those efforts are able to continue in full swing. With slowdowns taking place in other areas, the industry can address cybersafety at a more rapid pace. The aviation industry and its stakeholders have been working hard to tackle cybersecurity challenges comprehensively—from the supply chain and the maintenance of aircraft to operations. Such efforts remain essential so that cyberthreats affecting safety can be mitigated before they materialize, whether that happens during flight through physical access to a bus, by interfering with equipment through Wi-Fi or remotely disrupting operations. The need to weigh cyberthreats according to their safety impact, a practice referred to as “cybersafety,” requires a different perspective than that of IT cybersecurity. Cybersafety differs from traditional IT cybersecurity because of the need for safety certification, which relies on guaranteeing a system's behavior, or “determinism.” This unique characteristic of aviation cybersafety means that solutions widely used across traditional computing systems may pose serious certification challenges. Imagine rolling out security patches for every avionics component on a commercial aircraft. Tackling cybersafety challenges requires a coordinated, comprehensive, global effort. Multiple agencies are cooperating to establish much-needed standards. For example, the U.S. FAA and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency have been working with the RTCA and the European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment to set harmonized cybersecurity standards. Efforts to secure the aviation ecosystem also include dedicated committees such as the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee Aircraft System Information Security/Protection working group. Similarly, the Aerospace Industries Association has established the Civil Aviation Cybersecurity Subcommittee. In the U.S., the Aviation Cyber Initiative (ACI) is led by the Defense Department, Department of Homeland Security and FAA. The ACI includes experts representing government, defense, industry and academia who collaborate to tackle aviation cybersecurity threats. The Aviation Information Sharing and Analysis Center shares global threat intelligence among aviation companies. Globally, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) leads this work. Its Trust Framework Study Group (TFSG) includes experts from the FAA, EASA, commercial industry and academia and has established three important working groups. Academic institutions play a critical role in advancing cybersecurity research and training, too. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, for example, develops engineering solutions and provides degree, certification and training programs in aviation cybsersecurity. Faculty researchers contribute expertise to cyberdefense and preparedness efforts by serving on national and international committees and working groups and by organizing the annual Aero-Cybersecurity Symposium. Aviation's impeccable safety culture positions it well to combat and defeat cybersafety risks. In the years ahead, the industry will need to invest in expanded education and training as well as research to secure high-assurance systems that can be updated with minimal impact on certification. Computerization and Cyberphysical Systems As computing becomes ever more affordable, functions that were traditionally implemented through hardware are now being realized through software, and inclusion of software has supported increased customization. Cyberphysical systems are designed to perform a set of functions with limited impact on the physical environment, such as temperature control, welding and parts assembly. One feature of cyberphysical systems is a failsafe property that involves shutting down—an approach that is clearly not desirable midflight. Connectivity Inexpensive and ubiquitously available computing, combined with advancements in networking, have accelerated the networking of devices. The Internet of Things concept does not require any form of certification or service-quality assurance, let alone any safety requirement or oversight. Rather than leveraging the Internet of Things, the aviation industry might consider using “networked wings” to underscore its safety commitment. Remzi Seker is the associate provost for research at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. The views expressed are not necessarily those of Aviation Week. https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-regulation/opinion-aviations-cybersecurity-imperative

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  25 novembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Lockheed And Pentagon Joust Over Lucrative F-35 Data Rights

  Steve Trimble, Lee Hudson and Michael Bruno An ongoing legal dispute between the U.S. government and Lockheed Martin over intellectual property (IP) rights in the F-35 program has emerged as the source of a 2.5-year delay in activating a key system required to complete initial operational testing and the full-rate production decision. Involving the Pentagon's largest single weapons program ever—and with full-rate production critical to Lockheed's long-term profitability—the dispute has waylaid progress for both sides. But not only is the matter holding up the program, it may set a precedent for the military's increasing reliance on software and the government's desire to reap data-based rewards. “We still do have concerns,” says U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Eric Fick, F-35 program executive officer. “We don't need all the data, but the data that we need, it's important that we pursue it.” “We also have fundamental standards that we need to set down so that it is very, very clear,” adds Ellen Lord, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment. The military's open-air test ranges lack the capacity to fully test the F-35's advanced capabilities, so the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) office is relying on the activation of the Joint Simulation Environment (JSE). The JSE creates a synthetic world that allows operational testers to gauge the F-35's performance in theater-level scenarios, with multiple aircraft flying against an adversary's full arsenal of fighters, missiles and electronic warfare capabilities. The JSE was supposed to be activated in late 2017 but now is scheduled to achieve the first-use milestone in July 2020, Robert Behler, the head of DOT&E, told lawmakers Nov. 13 during a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing on F-35 readiness. The DOT&E has completed 91% of open-air missions during the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation phase required to qualify the F-35 for a full-rate production decision, but the testers still need to use the JSE to complete all of the testing. According to Fick's testimony, the IP dispute has delayed activation of the JSE. The JSE requires Lockheed to supply the software to enable a function nicknamed “F-35 in a Box,” he says. This is a software module that allows the JSE to virtually replicate each of the F-35's sensor subsystems, along with the sensor fusion brain embedded in the operational flight program. The government would then add software modules to replicate various threats, including aircraft, weapons and sensors of various adversaries. A dispute arose because Lockheed asserted an IP claim over nine specific algorithms that were included in the “F-35 in a Box” software package, the general says. The program office responded by bringing in the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to review Lockheed's records. The DCAA's auditors determined they could not find the proof in Lockheed's records that the nine algorithms had been developed solely at Lockheed's expense. Since Lockheed failed to prove its claim, the DCAA determined the nine algorithms belonged to the government. Lockheed has appealed the DCAA's decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, where it is still being adjudicated, the general told lawmakers. The dispute over the JSE feeds into a larger source of tension between the government and contractors over IP rights. Lord testified that her office is in the final stages of approving a new, Pentagon-wide policy on preserving the government's rights to IP in acquisition contracts. The policy will be modeled on an approach adopted late last year by the Army, which requires program managers to establish the government's IP rights on specific systems up front, rather than treat the issue as an afterthought. “Before we put together an acquisition strategy, you have to think about what information is critical to a program, particularly in terms of sustainability, so that you're not always held hostage to the prime on that through the life of the contract and [so] that you can find better cost solutions through a variety of different providers,” she said. Still, the new approach could challenge the business models of prime contractors and suppliers, who traditionally have eaten costs up front or bid low to win weapons contracts, with the intent of making money in the two-thirds of the life cycle of the program that includes sustainment. At an Aviation Week defense conference years ago, defense executives were asked to address the idea of giving up IP rights to the government and were determined to resist. “No!” yelled one executive in the closed-door gathering. Indeed, the new policy—which will not require explicit congressional blessing, as it is internal rulemaking—still faces questions by industry lobbying groups, including the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA). John Luddy, AIA's vice president for national security policy, said IP policymaking is “probably the most important” issue currently between his trade lobby group and defense leaders. Industry is not yet behind the emerging Pentagon policy, he indicated during the ComDef 2019 conference in October, because it does not strike the proper “balance,” in industry's view, to allow it to reap profits while letting the government contract to sustain weapon systems more affordably. “We think [it] is headed toward the right kind of balance, but I would just encourage that to continue—we're engaged quite a bit with the department on that,” Luddy said. “We have to find that balance.” Diana Maurer, director of defense capabilities and management at the Government Accountability Office, noted that her auditing office flagged the IP issue in 2014 and is happy to see the Pentagon make progress on the issue. But the changing nature of warfare systems means the issue will likely only grow. “Weapon systems today are essentially flying or sailing or moving pieces of software, and the intellectual property is an important piece of that.” https://aviationweek.com/defense/lockheed-and-pentagon-joust-over-lucrative-f-35-data-rights