Europe's Vega-C rocket returns to space after two-year gap

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  10 décembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Three Generations Of Fighters Compete For Limited Resources

  Steve Trimble December 10, 2020 Fateful decisions loom in the next 12 months for a global fighter market caught up in a pivotal debate over how much to invest in each of three generations of aircraft designs now in production or development. As next-generation fighters continue to take shape on industry drawing boards—and in one case, a secret flying demonstrator—a final decision in 2021 over whether to buy another batch of aircraft with a Cold War legacy or Lockheed Martin's 20-year-old-design F-35A stealth fighter confronts Canada, Finland, Israel, Switzerland and, perhaps most surprisingly, the U.S. Internal U.S. Air Force fighter road map capped the F-35 at 1,050 Canada, Finland and Switzerland contract awards expected in 2021 With 13 purpose-built fighter types now in production globally for export customers (excluding about half as many modified training jets), military buyers are spoiled with competitive options and motivated sellers. But a series of contract awards planned for the next 12 months could induce a long-awaited reckoning, especially among production lines for fighters produced in Europe and the U.S. Multiple decisions in favor of so-called fifth-generation capabilities could nearly complete the F-35's dominance over European and American fighter demand for the next decade. Alternatively, if the balance of new contracts falls to fourth-generation rivals, the F-35 is likely to continue to face intense competition from the same aircraft it was designed to replace. For now, pressure from F-35 competitors is surging, including from within the type's biggest customer. The U.S. Air Force's program of record for the F-35A stands at 1,763 total aircraft, a figure that has not budged in nearly two decades, despite changes to the assumptions that determined the original number. The pressure on the Air Force's orderbook for F-35As has been building for at least six years. Speaking on condition of anonymity in November 2014, a senior Air Force official said the service internally was considering a purchase of 72 new Boeing F-15s, Lockheed Martin F-16s or even the Navy's Boeing F/A-18E/Fs. Hindsight suggests the disclosure may have been intended as a negotiating ploy with Lockheed over F-35 prices, but the idea clearly never died. Indeed, the Air Force signed an order in July 2020 for the first eight of “at least” 144 Boeing F-15EXs, replacing an aging fleet of F-15C/Ds. By 2018, those F-15C/Ds already had outlived their original service-life estimates as victims of the Defense Department's decision in 2010 to truncate production of the Lockheed F-22 after 185 deliveries. With only a longeron replacement necessary to maintain structural integrity, the Air Force still was planning to keep the F-15 C/D fleet in service for at least another decade until a next-generation fighter became available. But then the Air Force discovered another major structural flaw: The entire fleet required new wing skins to remain airworthy. Rather than invest in a major structural refit, the Air Force announced plans in 2019 to retire the fleet. But the manner of the F-15C/D replacement plan came as a shock. Breaking from a two-decade-old strategy to buy only stealthy fighters, the Air Force decided to bypass the F-35A and order F-15EXs instead. With cockpit, flight-control and wing upgrades mostly funded by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the Air Force developed a new, long-term role for a fourth-generation fighter. Such a role already had been envisioned behind closed doors by a new organization on the Air Staff. Created in January 2018 as an internal think tank, the Air Force Warfighting Integrating Capability (AFWIC) office had torn up the long-standing assumption that only stealthy fighters could perform a useful role. By the end of 2018, the AFWIC's team of analysts had adopted a new fighter road map, according to a source. The road map envisioned a “great power” war. The principal role for each F-35A was to launch two stealthy cruise missiles—Lockheed AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM)—from just inside defended airspace. That “kick-down-the-door” pairing would be combined with mass launches of multiple JASSMs each from F-15Es and F-15EXs, the source said. Other missions—namely, defensive counter-air and homeland defense—could be performed by the F-35. But other aircraft such as F-15EXs and F-16s also could be used. Driven by this new appreciation for a portfolio of fighter capabilities, the AFWIC team also reconsidered how many of each type would be needed. No fighter program escaped scrutiny, including the long-standing Air Force commitment to acquire 1,763 F-35As. AFWIC's fighter road map by the end of 2018 had capped F-35A deliveries at about 1,050 jets, the source said. Although that cap implies a 40% cut to the original plan for the F-35A, no change to the program of record was necessary, the source said. The Air Force has ordered 451 F-35As so far, according to the Aviation Week Network Military Fleet database. If new aircraft orders are maintained at a rate of 2-2.5 squadrons a year—48-60 jets—for the foreseeable future, the Air Force is at least 10 years away from hitting the 1,050 cap in AFWIC's fighter road map. In the meantime, the Air Force faces other decisions about whether to invest in more fourth-generation fighters, F-35As or next-generation aircraft. The Air Force still operates 232 Block 25 and Block 30 F-16C/D jets, which were delivered in the mid-1980s, according to the Military Fleet database. Air Force officials have said they expect to make a fleet replacement decision for these so-called “pre-block” F-16s in 4-7 years. When the Air Force established the program of record for buying 1,763 F-35As, the plan assumed replacing all of those pre-block F-16s. As a replacement decision enters the Pentagon's five-year budgeting horizon, however, Air Force officials have been more flexible. Last February, the head of Air Combat Command, who was then Gen. Mike Holmes, said low-cost, attritable aircraft would be considered for the pre-block F-16 replacement in the 2024-27 time frame. The fighter road map completed by AFWIC in 2018 considered the F-16 Block 70/72 and a potential fighter version of the Boeing T-7 as candidates for light-fighter sales to foreign militaries, the source said. “The trade space in the fighter road map is real, and the trade space is a combination of payload, range, speed and survivability,” the source said. “And I don't need all of one thing. I need a portfolio of things.” Over the past decade, the same debate has raged within the air forces of other countries, particularly for those that cannot afford to operate more than one type of fighter. The F-35 has fared well in those decisions. Among countries that have been offered the F-35, only Germany has rejected the stealth-fighter option so far. That record will be put to the test next year against a backdrop of national economic pressures imposed by the costs of the COVID-19 pandemic. Switzerland, Finland and Canada are evaluating proposals. A year-long political crisis in Israel delayed plans to order either F-15EXs or more F-35As, or both. A resolution to the country's presidential election was not reached until after the COVID-19 pandemic arrived in Israel, to consume the attention of decision-makers. In other countries with a fighter aircraft-design capability, the debate over spending on tactical aviation includes a third dimension. Following several years of study and analysis, the next generation of designs is beginning to assume a tangible form. This is especially true in the U.S. defense industry. In a startling, mid-September announcement, Will Roper—assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, technology and logistics—declared the service had developed, built and flown a flight demonstrator for the Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program. Roper's announcement was light on details, including the time frame of the flight, details of the aircraft design and the status of the program now. But the concept of the need for an NGAD flight demonstrator was suggested in September 2019 by Gen. David Goldfein, who was then chief of staff of the Air Force. Several months before, the Air Force released a five-year budget plan that included a $6.6 billion funding cut for the NGAD program, a roughly 50% reduction compared to spending levels over the same period from only a year before. The spending cut made it unclear what had become of a notional concept popularized in 2015 and 2016 by U.S. defense contractors of a “sixth-generation fighter,” featuring a supersonic aircraft design lacking vertical tails and carrying advanced weapons such as an embedded high-energy laser for shooting down incoming missiles. Instead, the Air Force's leaner spending plan for the NGAD in 2019 supported a different concept for a next-generation fighter. Rather than a standalone aircraft that could, much like the F-35 and F-22 design requirement, prosecute a mission by itself with a diverse array of sensors to detect and identify targets in the air or on the ground in any weather, along with all of the munitions necessary to destroy those targets, the Air Force increasingly has emphasized adopting a family of systems to “close the kill chain.” The sensing and munition capabilities would be distributed among multiple aircraft that often must collaborate to complete a mission. At the same time, the Air Force is investing in several new technologies related to air dominance. A Next-Generation Adaptive Propulsion program aims to deliver an advanced new turbofan engine in fiscal 2025, with GE Aviation and Pratt & Whitney developing rival designs. A new family of unmanned aircraft systems designed to augment or operate independently of crewed fighters is being developed under the Air Force Research Laboratory's Skyborg program. In his remarks in September 2019, Goldfein said the NGAD program now is focused on maturing five different technologies that the Air Force does not intend will come together on a single platform. A prototype aircraft, he said, was necessary to demonstrate those technologies in flight. In Europe, progress is being made toward a next-generation fighter. By August 2021, France, Germany and Spain expect to conclude Phase 1A of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) demonstrator program, with the goal of defining a wide range of technologies that will be carried into a flight demonstration scheduled to begin under Phase 1B at the end of 2026. A collaboration among the UK, Sweden and Italy under the Team Tempest consortium will enter 2021 with renewed support. A long-awaited defense review in London finally was published in November showing support for the Future Combat Air System Technology Initiative under a £1.5 billion ($2 billion) fund for military research over the next four years. Tens of billions more will be needed to complete development of the NGAD, FCAS and Tempest over the next two decades, even as Western governments continue to split modernization investments among three fourth-generation fighters—the Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter and Saab JAS 39E/F Gripen—and the F-35. Maintaining the right balance of spending in each category will consume the debate over fighter aircraft decisions on the horizon. https://aviationweek.com/aerospace-defense-2021/defense-space/three-generations-fighters-compete-limited-resources

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  13 novembre 2019 | International, Naval

  Report slams Norwegian Navy for training, safety shortfalls in the run-up to frigate sinking

  By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON – The bridge watch team on the stricken Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad was distracted, inadequately trained and failed to take adequate precautions while transiting close to land, according to an accident report released Friday by the Norwegian government. The watch standers on Helge Ingstad, which collided with the Maltese-flagged tanker Sola TS and subsequently sunk outside Sture Terminal near the mouth of the North Sea, were busy conducting a watch turnover and attempting to conduct training during the navigation in the channel, which it was conducting at 17-18 knots. “The Navy lacked competence requirements for instructors. The Navy had assigned the officer of the watch a role as instructor which the officer of the watch had limited competence and experience to fill,” the report reads. “Furthermore, the Navy had not given the officer of the watch assistant sufficient training and competence to operate important bridge systems while training the officer of the watch assistant trainee at the same time.” The Norwegian publication VG reported last December that the ship's captain, Capt. Preben Østheim, was asleep in his cabin during the transit through the strait near Sture, which is less than three miles across at its narrowest point. The report, which also faulted the tanker for failing to mitigate potential risks and the vessel traffic control service for inadequate monitoring, takes special aim at the Navy for a lack of qualified navigators, and for short-changing the training of junior officer, leaving bridge watch teams underqualified. “As a consequence of the clearance process, the career ladder for fleet officers in the Navy and the shortage of qualified navigators to man the frigates, officers of the watch had been granted clearance sooner, had a lower level of experience and had less time as officer of the watch than used to be the case,” the report found. “This had also resulted in inexperienced officers of the watch being assigned responsibility for training. The level of competence and experience required for the lean manning concept (LMC), was apparently not met.” The accident report shows that the bridge team confused the Sola TS for a stationary object on land, and because the watch standers were distracted with training, they were not fully engaged with monitoring the communications on the radio. “A more coordinated bridge team with more information sharing would have been more capable of detecting the tanker sooner,” the report said. “Achieving good teamwork is particularly challenging in the case of bridge teams whose members are constantly being replaced. “Furthermore, the bridge team was part of a culture characterized by great confidence in each other's skills, and this may have contributed to the perception of them being in full control of the situation and thus less vigilant and sensitive to weak signals of danger.” The report is part one of a two-part report and only encompasses the actions that led to the collision. Further findings about the actions after the collision will be released as part of a second report to be released later. ‘Not Particularly Demanding' According to the report, the transit through the body of water known as the Hjeltefjord “was not considered particularly demanding, as the fairway is open and offers a good view all around,” the report found, which likely contributed to a sense of complacence among the crew. That echoes the sentiments of the Capt. Østheim, who told VG he didn't think he needed to be on the bridge during that transit. “After 12 years at sea, I know the coast as my own pocket, so I know exactly when I need to be on the bridge and when I can rest,” Østheim told VG. There is generally little traffic through the channel and there is no traffic separation scheme. The Sola TS, which the report said was likely creating some visual confusion for Ingstad's watchstanders because of its illuminated deck lights at night, announced it was underway on the radio during the exact time that Ingstad's watchstanders were turning over, likely causing them to miss the transmission, the report reads. “At the same time as Sola TS notified of her departure from the Sture Terminal, the watch handover between the officers of the watch started on HNoMS Helge Ingstad, while the officer of the watch trainee continued to navigate the frigate,” the report reads. “During the watch handover, the officer of the watch being relieved and the relieving officer of the watch observed an object at the Sture Terminal, to starboard of the frigate's course line. The ‘object' was observed both visually and on the radar display in the form of a radar echo and AIS symbol. The two officers of the watch discussed, but did not clarify, what the ‘object' might be. “Both officers of the watch had formed the clear perception that the ‘object' was stationary near the shore and thus of no risk to the frigate's safe passage.” The situation was made even more perilous by the fact that Ingstad did not have its Automatic Identification System on, which would have notified traffic service and Sola TS of Ingstand's location. Traffic Service lost track of Ingstad because operators had their displays zoomed in too far, the report found. Collision As the Ingstad came closer to the terminal, the Sola TS, which the officer was convinced was a stationary object by the terminal, was appearing on radar to have made some distance between the pier and the water, but the officer was still not sure it wasn't a stationary object becoming more clear on the radar screen because Ingstad was closer to it. “A more experienced officer of the watch would probably have had greater capacity to pick up on weak signals of danger and be better equipped to suspect that his/her own situational awareness suffered from misconceptions,” the report read. “The officer of the watch thought, however, that the course had to be adjusted slightly to port to increase the passing distance to the ‘object'.” In the minutes before the collision, the Sola TS established contact with Ingstad's officer of the watch to get them to take an avoidance maneuver by turning to starboard. But the watch still thought that the Sola was a stationary object and that turning to starboard would run into it. “When HNoMS Helge Ingstad did not alter course, the master on Sola TS ordered ‘stop engines' and, shortly afterwards, the pilot ordered full speed astern on the engines,” the report read. “These two measures were carried out only short time before the collision, and were therefore without material effect. “When the officer of the watch on HNoMS Helge Ingstad understood that the ‘object' giving off light was moving and on direct course to collide, it was too late to avoid the collision.” ‘I don't feel shame' The decision of the captain to not be on the bridge or, at the very least, to have posted a special navigation detail with the ship so close to land is perplexing, said retired U.S. Navy cruiser skipper Capt. Rick Hoffman, a career surface warfare officer. “If I'm within five miles of land I'm going to have some kind of navigation detail posted,” which in the U.S. Navy means a team of more qualified watch standers, extra lookouts and more than likely either the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer or both, would be on the bridge overseeing the watch. It's further perplexing as to why the officer of the deck, or officer of the watch, was conducting training during a transit so close to land, Hoffman said. “[The officer of the deck should be] looking out the window and completely focused on the transit,” he said. “We would not use that as a training opportunity. The OOD and the Conning Officer has no other task.” However, Østheim told VG in December he has no regrets about his actions, though he accepts that he was overall responsible for the ship. “I don't feel any shame,” he said. “As the ship's chief, I of course have the overall responsibility for the ship and its crew. It's extremely sad that this happened. It's an accident that should not happen, but I don't feel any shame.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/11/12/safety-report-slams-the-norwegian-navy-for-training-safety-shortfalls-in-the-runup-to-frigate-sinking/

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  1 août 2018 | International, Aérospatial

  Despite Trump’s Rhetoric, U.S. Defense Firms Pitch Moving Production To India

  As big defense firms line up to pitch their fighter planes to India, the government of Narendra Modi is demanding they build in India, something that might be at odds with the Trumpian America First philosophy. By PAUL MCLEARY WASHINGTON: The Trump administration has cleared the decks for what promises to be a huge increase in technology and weapons exports to India, putting the country on the same footing as members of NATO, and allies like Japan and Australia, when it comes to favored export status. While the new status may pave the way for major U.S. defense firms to lock up multi-billion deals with the Indian government, those deals would likely come with the stipulation that production be moved to India, something American defense giants like Lockheed Martin and Boeing have promised to do, even if it runs counter to the Trump administration's focus on creating more manufacturing jobs at home. Such offsets, as they are known in the arms export business, are a staple of such deals and are a crucial part of negotiations. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross made the announcement yesterday as part of the US government's continuing efforts to draw closer to Delhi, partly as a bulwark against Chinese expansionism in the region. Granting India Strategic Trade Authorization status also comes as the Indian military is considering spending tens of billions of dollars on drones, fighters and helicopters made by U.S. defense manufacturers. Ross, speaking at a U.S. Chamber of Commerce event, said the move reflects India's efforts to abide by multilateral export rules, and “provides India greater supply chain efficiency, both for defense, and for other high-tech products.” India's ambassador to the United States, Navtej Sarna, added that it is a sign of trust in India's “capabilities as an economy and as a security partner, because it also...would allow the transfer of more sensitive defense technologies,” and “fleshes out our defense partnership in a big way.” But the new trade status can only do so much, and India's decades-long reliance on Russian weaponry over U.S. or European equipment is something that shows no sign of changing anytime soon, a fact that rankles many on Capitol Hill. In Washington, the House recently passed its version of the 2019 NDAA, which granted Defense Secretary James Mattis' request to waive sanctions on partner countries that have bought Russian arms in the past, but the Senate has yet to take up the bill, and is expected to vote on it some time next month. The waivers, Mattis said in a series of letters to lawmakers, would allow the Pentagon to forge closer ties with countries like India, Vietnam, and Indonesia, by not penalizing them for having Russian equipment, even as they move closer to the U.S. But the chronically chaotic state of the Indian military's acquisition practices also presents significant hurdles, according to experts. Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, former deputy chief of the defense staff in the Indian Ministry of Defense told an audience at the Stimson Center in Washington that the Indian government and military often seek to simply to “fill in technological gaps” they believe they have, rather than building strategically. “Their procurement is a mess. They're not joint. They're risk adverse. They've just got a ton of problems,” one former White House official, who asked to speak anonymously, told me. “Broadly, in procurement they have tried in the post-Cold War era to diversify their procurements as a political sop to potential partners,” he said. “They start to move more through the pipeline than they can actually pay for, and they end up building this very motley force in a way that's not always coherent.” As it stands, the United States accounts for about 12 percent of India's defense imports, a number which is expected to grow 6.2 percent annually through 2023, according to a recent study by Avescent, a consulting firm. The Indian defense budget, at more than $53 billion, is the fifth-largest in the world, and as the Avascent analysis noted, it “is also one of the most competitive,” as local companies battle it out, along with a mix of Russian, French, Israeli, and American firms. The air force, for example, flys Russian MiG and French Rafale fighters, along with American C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft and Israeli Heron drones. In recent years, France has emerged as the big winner in several hard-fought awards, inking an $8.6 billion contract for 36 Rafale fighter aircraft in 2016 — which will serve as India's primary nuclear delivery aircraft — and a deal for six Scorpene-class submarines for $4.6 billion in 2005. As part of the government's “Make in India” initiative, most of the work on the subs will be done at the Mazagon dockyard in Mumbai. But Russia isn't going anywhere. Moscow is on the verge of finalizing a $3.2 billion contract for four S-400 surface-to-air missile systems with India, part of about $12 billion worth of Russian arms deals in the works with the Indian government. The two countries are also close to finalizing a $1.1 billion deal for 48 additional Mi-17-V5 military transport/utility helicopters, with final signatures expected during Russian President Vladimir Putin's October visit to India. According to local reports, the contract will mandate that 30 percent of the work be done by the Indian defense industry, as part of the Modi government's push to build up the Indian manufacturing sector. The helicopters joint U.S.-made Chinooks and Apaches in the country's rotary-wing fleet. The Indian government says that it doesn't have a problem with such a mix and match approach, however, even if it does complicate supply chains. Currently, the big contract up for an award is the Indian Air Force's requirement for 110 aircraft, expected to be worth as much as $15 billion. Boeing has announced it would join with Indian firms Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Mahindra Defense Systems to manufacture its F/A-18 Hornet in the country if it wins the contract, and Lockheed Martin has pledged to move its entire F-16 production line to India from Greenville, S.C., to India, potentially at the expense of 250 South Carolina jobs. “The F-16 gives the Indian industry a unique opportunity to be at the center of the world's largest fighter aircraft ecosystem,” Lockheed exec Vivek Lallsaid earlier this year in his pitch, adding that the company was ready to equip the jets with the same target tracking device currently on the F-35, as well as a helmet-mounted tracking system and a new radio data link system. Swedish defense giant Saab Group is also in the running for the fighter deal, and has announced it is ready to do a “full” technology transfer of its Gripen-E fighter jet production to India if it wins the competition. Boeing, in conjunction with Indian manufacturer Tata has already moved part of its Apache helicopter fuselage manufacturing to India, and the factory will eventually be the sole supplier of the part for Boeing's worldwide sales. The promise was one of the keys to the company winning the $3.1 billion deal in 2015 for 22 Apache and 15 Chinook helicopters. While the deal for the fighter planes shakes out over the coming months, the competition is merely one part of a larger American push, which included a recent visit by the Pentagon's top weapons buyer, Ellen Lord, and the upcoming “two-plus-two” meeting between defense minister Nirmala Sitharaman, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and their American counterparts, James Mattis and Mike Pompeo. And in a jab at the Russians, Indian officials announced this week that they would be replacing their Russian-made Pechora air defense systems around the capital in a $1 billion deal to buy the NASAMS-II, manufactured by Kongsberg and Raytheon. https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/despite-trumps-rhetoric-u-s-defense-firms-pitch-moving-jobs-to-india/