3 mars 2024 | International, Aérospatial
Thailand’s Air Force unveils new wish list, eyeing new jets and drones
Counter-drone systems and new fighter jets are also among the most pressing concerns.
13 novembre 2019 | International, Naval
Report slams Norwegian Navy for training, safety shortfalls in the run-up to frigate sinking
By: David B. Larter
WASHINGTON – The bridge watch team on the stricken Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad was distracted, inadequately trained and failed to take adequate precautions while transiting close to land, according to an accident report released Friday by the Norwegian government.
The watch standers on Helge Ingstad, which collided with the Maltese-flagged tanker Sola TS and subsequently sunk outside Sture Terminal near the mouth of the North Sea, were busy conducting a watch turnover and attempting to conduct training during the navigation in the channel, which it was conducting at 17-18 knots.
“The Navy lacked competence requirements for instructors. The Navy had assigned the officer of the watch a role as instructor which the officer of the watch had limited competence and experience to fill,” the report reads. “Furthermore, the Navy had not given the officer of the watch assistant sufficient training and competence to operate important bridge systems while training the officer of the watch assistant trainee at the same time.”
The Norwegian publication VG reported last December that the ship's captain, Capt. Preben Østheim, was asleep in his cabin during the transit through the strait near Sture, which is less than three miles across at its narrowest point.
The report, which also faulted the tanker for failing to mitigate potential risks and the vessel traffic control service for inadequate monitoring, takes special aim at the Navy for a lack of qualified navigators, and for short-changing the training of junior officer, leaving bridge watch teams underqualified.
“As a consequence of the clearance process, the career ladder for fleet officers in the Navy and the shortage of qualified navigators to man the frigates, officers of the watch had been granted clearance sooner, had a lower level of experience and had less time as officer of the watch than used to be the case,” the report found. “This had also resulted in inexperienced officers of the watch being assigned responsibility for training. The level of competence and experience required for the lean manning concept (LMC), was apparently not met.”
The accident report shows that the bridge team confused the Sola TS for a stationary object on land, and because the watch standers were distracted with training, they were not fully engaged with monitoring the communications on the radio.
“A more coordinated bridge team with more information sharing would have been more capable of detecting the tanker sooner,” the report said. “Achieving good teamwork is particularly challenging in the case of bridge teams whose members are constantly being replaced.
“Furthermore, the bridge team was part of a culture characterized by great confidence in each other's skills, and this may have contributed to the perception of them being in full control of the situation and thus less vigilant and sensitive to weak signals of danger.”
The report is part one of a two-part report and only encompasses the actions that led to the collision. Further findings about the actions after the collision will be released as part of a second report to be released later.
‘Not Particularly Demanding'
According to the report, the transit through the body of water known as the Hjeltefjord “was not considered particularly demanding, as the fairway is open and offers a good view all around,” the report found, which likely contributed to a sense of complacence among the crew.
That echoes the sentiments of the Capt. Østheim, who told VG he didn't think he needed to be on the bridge during that transit.
“After 12 years at sea, I know the coast as my own pocket, so I know exactly when I need to be on the bridge and when I can rest,” Østheim told VG.
There is generally little traffic through the channel and there is no traffic separation scheme.
The Sola TS, which the report said was likely creating some visual confusion for Ingstad's watchstanders because of its illuminated deck lights at night, announced it was underway on the radio during the exact time that Ingstad's watchstanders were turning over, likely causing them to miss the transmission, the report reads.
“At the same time as Sola TS notified of her departure from the Sture Terminal, the watch handover between the officers of the watch started on HNoMS Helge Ingstad, while the officer of the watch trainee continued to navigate the frigate,” the report reads.
“During the watch handover, the officer of the watch being relieved and the relieving officer of the watch observed an object at the Sture Terminal, to starboard of the frigate's course line. The ‘object' was observed both visually and on the radar display in the form of a radar echo and AIS symbol. The two officers of the watch discussed, but did not clarify, what the ‘object' might be.
“Both officers of the watch had formed the clear perception that the ‘object' was stationary near the shore and thus of no risk to the frigate's safe passage.”
The situation was made even more perilous by the fact that Ingstad did not have its Automatic Identification System on, which would have notified traffic service and Sola TS of Ingstand's location. Traffic Service lost track of Ingstad because operators had their displays zoomed in too far, the report found.
Collision
As the Ingstad came closer to the terminal, the Sola TS, which the officer was convinced was a stationary object by the terminal, was appearing on radar to have made some distance between the pier and the water, but the officer was still not sure it wasn't a stationary object becoming more clear on the radar screen because Ingstad was closer to it.
“A more experienced officer of the watch would probably have had greater capacity to pick up on weak signals of danger and be better equipped to suspect that his/her own situational awareness suffered from misconceptions,” the report read. “The officer of the watch thought, however, that the course had to be adjusted slightly to port to increase the passing distance to the ‘object'.”
In the minutes before the collision, the Sola TS established contact with Ingstad's officer of the watch to get them to take an avoidance maneuver by turning to starboard. But the watch still thought that the Sola was a stationary object and that turning to starboard would run into it.
“When HNoMS Helge Ingstad did not alter course, the master on Sola TS ordered ‘stop engines' and, shortly afterwards, the pilot ordered full speed astern on the engines,” the report read. “These two measures were carried out only short time before the collision, and were therefore without material effect.
“When the officer of the watch on HNoMS Helge Ingstad understood that the ‘object' giving off light was moving and on direct course to collide, it was too late to avoid the collision.”
‘I don't feel shame'
The decision of the captain to not be on the bridge or, at the very least, to have posted a special navigation detail with the ship so close to land is perplexing, said retired U.S. Navy cruiser skipper Capt. Rick Hoffman, a career surface warfare officer.
“If I'm within five miles of land I'm going to have some kind of navigation detail posted,” which in the U.S. Navy means a team of more qualified watch standers, extra lookouts and more than likely either the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer or both, would be on the bridge overseeing the watch.
It's further perplexing as to why the officer of the deck, or officer of the watch, was conducting training during a transit so close to land, Hoffman said.
“[The officer of the deck should be] looking out the window and completely focused on the transit,” he said. “We would not use that as a training opportunity. The OOD and the Conning Officer has no other task.”
However, Østheim told VG in December he has no regrets about his actions, though he accepts that he was overall responsible for the ship.
“I don't feel any shame,” he said. “As the ship's chief, I of course have the overall responsibility for the ship and its crew. It's extremely sad that this happened. It's an accident that should not happen, but I don't feel any shame.”
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20 novembre 2020 | International, Terrestre
Turkey in talks with South Korea to salvage Altay tank program
By: Burak Ege Bekdil ANKARA, Turkey — Turkish procurement and military officials as well as teams from a private manufacturer have been negotiating with a South Korean company to recover a program riddled with delays for the production of the country's first indigenous new-generation main battle tank. “This program has faced major delays due to failed access to significant components like the engine, transmission and armor,” a procurement official told Defense News. “I am not in a position to give a date for the start of serial production. All I know is we are trying hard to get it moved ahead.” In 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's office included the Altay tank as part of the military's 2020 inventory in a government document. In an October 2019 speech, Ethem Sancak — a senior shareholder in BMC, which makes the Altay — said the tank would be fielded within 24 months. It now appears that prediction was too optimistic. The presidential office's 2021 investment program, released earlier this month, does not even mention the Altay, let alone the tank entering service. According to a source with knowledge of the Altay program, BMC has been in talks with Hyundai Rotem to solve problems surrounding missing foreign technology for the Altay, which Turkish officials often portray as a fully national, indigenous Turkish tank. The South Korean company previously built public transportation and Bosporus crossing systems in Istanbul, Ankara and Adana as well as light rail systems in Istanbul and Izmir. “We are hoping our talks will eventually sort out the problems regarding the power pack — [the engine and transmission — that] we will use in the serial production cycle,” the source told Defense News. “We are probably talking about another couple of months of talks before we know which way we are headed.” He added that BMC is in indirect talks, through Hyundai Rotem, with two South Korean defense technology concerns: engine-maker Doosan and S&T Dynamics, which produces automatic transmissions. “Ideally a Doosan-S&T power pack will power the Altay if we can iron out differences and licensing issues,” he said. South Korea has experienced similar problems with its program for the mass production of the K2 Black Panther tank. Its deployment by the Army faced delays due to problems concerning the engine and transmission. The first 100 units were built with a Doosan 1,500-horsepower engine and an S&T Dynamics automatic transmission. Under a second contract, tanks began to be delivered in late 2016. But after S&T Dynamics' transmission failed durability tests, South Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Administration announced the second batch would have a “hybrid” power pack consisting of the locally developed engine and the German RENK transmission system. “How the Turks can make use of a proven engine and a failed transmission remains to be seen,” said a London-based Turkey expert, who spoke on condition of anonymity. Turkey had hoped to power the Altay with the German MTU engine and RENK transmission, but talks with German manufacturers over the past couple of years failed due to a federal arms embargo on Turkey. Germany is one of a number of European governments that have limited exports to Turkey over its involvement in the Syrian civil war. A similar problem concerns the Altay's planned armor. Turkey was hoping a French armor solution would be continue to be available following an initial batch of 40 units. But recent political tension between the two countries over hydrocarbon explorations off Cyprus has put this in jeopardy. The source with knowledge of the Altay program said the armor will now be locally produced under a public-private partnership. The Altay program dates back to the mid-1990s, but it wasn't until November 2018 that the Turkish government awarded the tank's multibillion-dollar contract to BMC. In a competition, the firm defeated Otokar, which had already produced four Altay prototypes under a government contract. The contract involves the production of an initial batch of 250 units, life-cycle logistical support, and the establishment by the contractor of a tank systems technology center and its operation. As part of the contract, BMC will design, develop and produce a tank with an unmanned fire control unit. The contract said the first Altay tank is to roll off the assembly line within 18 months. Opposition parties in parliament have slammed the government over delays, but procurement officials claim the 18-month clause will apply after the first unit's production begins. The Altay program is broken into two phases: T1 and T2. T1 covers the first 250 units, and T2 involves the advanced version of the tank. Turkey also plans to eventually produce 1,000 Altays, to be followed by an unmanned version. The deal has proved politically controversy, particularly after the Erdogan administration leased for free a military-owned tank and turret factory by the Marmara Sea to BMC for a period of 25 years. The move prompted cries of nepotism, as BMC shareholder Sancak was a senior member of Erdogan's Justice and Development Party at the time. Ozgur Eksi, an independent defense analyst, questioned the choice of assigning a factory by the sea for tank production. “In the event of war, the Altay factory could be an easy target for the enemy fire,” he said. “This program could have been much better planned from a strategic point of view.” Nevertheless, Eksi added, “there is a political determination to get the Altays into the Army's inventory. Sooner or later, production will start.” https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2020/11/19/turkey-in-talks-with-south-korea-to-salvage-altay-tank-program/
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24 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - November 23, 2020
AIR FORCE Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Clearfield, Utah, has been awarded a $185,700,000 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for the A-10 Aircraft Structural Integrity Program Legacy VII. This contract provides for sustaining engineering services of A-10 aircraft. Work will be performed in Clearfield, Utah, and is expected to be completed Nov. 22, 2030. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition. Fiscal 2021 operation and maintenance funds in the amount of $6,480,694 are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, is the contracting activity (FA8202-21-D-0001). L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace LLC, Madison, Mississippi, has been awarded a $65,603,271 firm-fixed-price contract for contractor operated and maintained base supply of the Air Education and Training Command fleet of 178 T-1A Trainer aircraft. Work will be performed at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; Laughlin AFB, Texas; Vance AFB, Oklahoma; Columbus AFB, Mississippi; and Pensacola Naval Air Station, Florida, and is expected to be completed Nov. 30, 2021. This award for Option Three is the result of a competitive acquisition and three offers were received. Fiscal 2021 operation and maintenance funds in the amount $17,946,903 are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, is the contracting activity (FA8106-18-C-0001). Lockheed Martin Corp., King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, has been awarded a $34,939,734, cost-type modification (P00014) to contract FA8219-20-C-0001 for Mk21A technology maturation and risk reduction (TMRR) research and development for reentry vehicles (RVs). The contract modifies the TMRR prototype flight test plan, to now include preparations for a second flight test and development of two prototype RVs with telemetry capability in order to further mature technology. Work will be performed in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, and is expected to be completed Oct. 21, 2022. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds are being used with no funds being obligated at the time of award. Total cumulative face value of the contract is $151,943,606. The Air Force Nuclear War Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, is the contracting activity. AT2 LLC, Severn, Maryland, has been awarded a $15,751,876 firm-fixed-price modification (P00017) to contract FA4890-18-C-0008 for Air Combat Command and Air Force Global Strike Command Primary Training Ranges operation and maintenance (O&M) support services. This contract provides for O&M of range threat, scoring and feedback systems. Work will be performed at Dare County Range, North Carolina; Poinsett Range, South Carolina; Grand Bay Range, Georgia; Avon Park Range, Georgia; Snyder Range, Texas; Belle Fourche Range, South Dakota; Holloman Ranges, New Mexico; and Mountain Home Ranges, Idaho. Work is expected to be completed Dec. 31, 2021. Fiscal 2021 O&M funds in the amount of $15,044,766 are being obligated at the time of award. Headquarters Air Combat Command, Joint Base Langley‐Eustis, Virginia, is the contracting activity (FA4890‐18‐C‐0008). Lockheed Martin Corp., King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, has been awarded a $14,068,093 cost-plus-fixed-fee modification (P00022) to contract FA8620-14-C-4022 to develop, integrate and lab test detection, removal and characterization operations. Work will be performed in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, and is expected to be completed Nov. 30, 2023. This contract was the result of a sole-source acquisition and one offer was received. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $1,699,000 are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, has been awarded a $9,326,062 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the Long Range Systems Division seeking to integrate the Navy Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range (AARGM-ER) into the F-35. The AARGM-ER is a Navy weapon that will provide the F-35A advanced suppression of enemy air defenses/destruction of enemy air defenses capability. This contract includes one contract line item number and is the result of a sole-source acquisition. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the full amount are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is the contracting activity (FA8682-21-C-2000). CORRECTION: The Nov. 13, 2020, announcement of a $9,703,375 contract modification awarded to Raytheon Missile Systems Co., Tucson, Arizona, included an incorrect modification number. The number of the modification to contract FA8675-20-C-0033 for Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) production baseline rocket motors is P00008, not P00007. NAVY AAR Government Services Inc., Wood Dale, Illinois, is awarded a $148,357,084 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. This contract provides contractor logistics support required for operating and maintaining the C-40A aircraft, aircraft subsystems, appliances and support equipment, including depot-level, main operating base and supply support and commercial line maintenance. Work will be performed in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (40%); Fort Worth, Texas (16.5%); Jacksonville, Florida (9%); North Island, California (9%); Oceana, Virginia (9%); Whidbey Island, Washington (9%); and Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii (7.5%), and is expected to be completed in December 2025. No funds will be obligated at the time of award. Funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. This contract was competitively procured via electronic request for proposal; three offers were received. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity (N00019-21-D-0004). Lockheed Martin Space, Titusville, Florida, is awarded a $108,778,290 cost-plus-incentive-fee and cost-plus-fixed-fee modification (P00002) to exercise options under previously awarded contract N00030-20-C-0100 for Trident II (D5) missile production and deployed systems support. Work will be performed in Denver, Colorado (25%); Cape Canaveral, Florida (23.5%); Borgo San Dalmazzo, Italy (12%); Sunnyvale, California (9.7%); Hoffman Estates, Illinois (4.3%); Titusville, Florida (3.4%); Melbourne, Florida (2.6%); Berlin, Connecticut (1.8%); Modesto, California (1.3%); Bangor, Washington (1.1%); Kings Bay, Georgia (1.1%); Clearwater, Florida (1%); and other various locations (less than 1% each, 13.2% total). Work is expected to be completed Sept. 30, 2025. Fiscal 2021 weapons procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $94,943,006; fiscal 2021 other procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $10,176,348; United Kingdom funds in the amount of $3,618,936; and fiscal 2021 operation and maintenance (Navy) funds in the amount of $40,000 are being obligated on this award, $40,000 of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract is being awarded to the contractor on a sole-source basis under 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1) and was previously synopsized on the Federal Business Opportunities website. The Strategic Systems Programs, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. Lockheed Martin Corp., Rotary and Mission Systems, Orlando, Florida, is awarded a $9,574,093 modification (P00047) to previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contract N68335-17-C-0253. This modification exercises an option to provide the second phase of interim contractor support for fleet Repair of Repairables (RoR), non-fleet RoR and installation RoR support for the Common Aviation Support Equipment program office. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida, and is expected to be completed in March 2021. Fiscal 2021 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $2,335,259; and fiscal 2021 working capital (Navy) funds in the amount of $727,619 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey, is the contracting activity. ARMY Carahsoft Technology Corp., Reston, Virginia, was awarded a $38,611,275 firm-fixed-price contract for a one-time license buy for SAP software. Bids were solicited via the internet with three received. Work will be performed in Reston, Virginia, with an estimated completion date of Nov. 30, 2021. Fiscal 2021 other procurement (Army); operation and maintenance (Army); and Army working capital funds in the amount of $38,611,275 were obligated at the time of the award. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, is the contracting activity (W52P1J-21-F-0042). Great Lakes Dredge & Dock LLC, Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois, was awarded a $15,844,050 firm-fixed-price contract for maintenance dredging. Bids were solicited via the internet with two received. Work will be performed in St. Mary's, Georgia, with an estimated completion date of June 5, 2021. Fiscal 2020 operation and maintenance (Defense) funds in the amount of $15,844,050 were obligated at the time of the award. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida, is the contracting activity (W912EP-21-C-0002). McCarthy HITT - Next NGA West JV, St. Louis, Missouri, was awarded an $8,982,180 modification (P00012) to contract W912DQ-19-C-7001 for a resident management system. Work will be performed in St. Louis, Missouri, with an estimated completion date of April 24, 2023. Fiscal 2020 military construction (Defense wide) funds in the amount of $8,982,180 were obligated at the time of the award. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City, Missouri, is the contracting activity. *Small business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2425497/source/GovDelivery/