eBrief: Drones An “Immediate Threat” – DoD Plans Rapid Acquisition of Counter-UAS Systems

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  6 août 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Air Force moves to enact space acquisition reforms, despite hold up of legislative proposals

  Nathan Strout WASHINGTON - The Pentagon is trying to move ahead with reforms to how it acquires space systems, even as a report outlining significant legislative changes has gotten held up by the Office of Management and Budget. Released in May, the Department of the Air Force report recommends nine specific proposals to improve contracting under the newly established U.S. Space Force. While most of the changes can be undertaken independently by the Department of Defense, three recommendations would require legislative action by Congress. But according to Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration Shawn Barnes, the report has yet to get past OMB, which oversees the President's budget proposals and ensures legislation proposed by agencies is consistent with the administration. “[It's] still not on the hill. I'm a little frustrated by that, but I think we're very close with OMB at this point and I think we're just about there,” said Barnes during a July 30 call with reporters. “There are a couple of sticking points, but I'm not going to talk about those directly here.” Barnes continued on to say that OMB had no issues with the vast majority of the report. And while the Air Force has to wait for legislative action on some recommendations, Barnes said they are already moving ahead with internal reforms, such as establishing a distinct Space Force budget. “We're in the process of figuring out how to implement those actions within the alt-acquisition report that don't require any legislative change, and of the somewhat less than ten of those specific actions, probably six of them are within the Department of Defense's ability to get after. So we're building implementation plans for that,” he said. The most important recommendation in the report, at least according to the Air Force, is budgetary. They want to be able to consolidate Space Force budget line items along mission portfolios, such as missile warning or communications, instead of by platforms, allowing them more flexibility to move funding between related systems without having to submit reprogramming requests to Congress. This was a point of contention between the Pentagon and legislators last year, as the Air Force issued repeated reprogramming requests to secure the funding needed to push up the delivery date of the first Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared satellite. Barnes insisted that managing funding at the portfolio would give the Space Force more flexibility to react to program developments without sacrificing transparency. While funding would not longer be broken out at the program level, it could still be expressed at a lower level, he said. “We would still be breaking it down at a subordinate level but what we would hope is that we would have the ability to still move money from one of those subordinate levels to another, and that's where we can have that transparency,” he explained. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/07/30/air-force-moves-to-enact-space-acquisition-reforms-despite-hold-up-of-legislative-proposals

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  8 octobre 2021 | International, Aérospatial

  Thales dévoile un nouveau type de radar pour la détection précoce des drones hostiles

  Dans le cadre de l'effort mis sur la lutte anti-drone souligné dans la Loi de programmation militaire (LPM) pour la période 2019-2025, Thales dévoile un nouveau radar, le Ground Observer 20 Multi-Mission (GO20 MM), qui sera en mesure d'assurer la « surveillance simultanée des objectifs au sol et des menaces évoluant à basse altitude, avec des capacités exceptionnelles de détection avancée des drones, notamment les microdrones ». Le GO20 MM sera ainsi capable de détecter, poursuivre et classer automatiquement le « spectre complet des menaces ». Un tel radar doit donc permettre de mieux protéger les camps militaires et les convois, notamment gr'ce à sa rapidité de détection et à la classification automatique des drones à long rayon d'action. « Avec des scénarios complexes tels que les conflits asymétriques ou les combats à haute intensité, la capacité de classifier automatiquement et rapidement la menace pour obtenir un tableau précis de la situation constitue un avantage tactique non négligeable », souligne-t-on à Thales. Équipé d'une batterie 6 éléments, ce radar « offre aux forces armées et aux forces spéciales de nombreuses heures de surveillance, dans une totale transparence, et un haut niveau de protection », assure le groupe. Opex360 du 7 octobre

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  22 janvier 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  What new documents reveal about Cyber Command’s biggest operation

  Mark Pomerleau New documents provide insight into the growing pains U.S. Cyber Command faced in building a force while simultaneously conducting operations. The documents, which were released as part of a Freedom of Information Act request from the National Security Archive at George Washington University and later shared with journalists, are a series of internal briefings and lessons from the Defense Department's most complex cyber operation at the time, Operation Glowing Symphony. That operation was part of the larger counter-ISIS operations — Joint Task Force-Ares — but specifically targeted ISIS's media and online operations, taking out infrastructure and preventing ISIS members from communicating and posting propaganda. While Cyber Command described the operation, which took place in November of 2016, as a victory in the sense that it “successfully contested [ISIS] in the information domain,” the documents demonstrate the extent to which the command was still learning how to conduct operations and the exact steps to follow. “Process maturation is something they pull out a lot. Obviously, as CYBERCOM was standing up, it was pulling together plans for how they were going to operate. They actually hadn't operated that much,” Michael Martelle, cyber vault fellow at the National Security Archive, told reporters. “A lot of these frameworks were formed in theory. Now they go to try them out in practice.” Cyber Command leaders have stressed in public remarks for years that the command was building its force while operating. But the extent of those operations has been limited. Officials in recent years have explained that the command didn't undertake many offensive operations. One official said last year he could count on less than two fingers the number of operations, Cyber Command conducted in the last decade or so. One member of Congress said DoD didn't conduct an offensive cyber operation in five years. But when they were in action, in this case with Operation Glowing Symphony, Martelle said the documents show cyber leaders did not anticipate the amount of data they would access. “They actually weren't prepared for the amount of data they were pulling off of ISIS servers ... CYBERCOM was not set up for an operation of this magnitude from day one,” he said. “They had to learn on the fly, they had to acquire on the fly, they had to grow on the fly.” The documents note that Cyber Command's capability development group, is “developing USCYBERCOM data storage solutions.” The capabilities develop group, now known as the J9, serves as the advanced concepts and technology directorate and worked to plan and synchronizing cyber capability development and developed capabilities to meet urgent operational needs. Experts had noted that in the past the CDG/J9 had been stressed in recent years by a limited staff and burdened by developing tools for operational needs, namely Joint Task Force-Ares. Another example of potential growing pains the documents point to was the fact that updates to operations checklists were not made available readily to the team. Finally, the documents note that authorities and processes the command was operating under that the time were restrictive in some cases. “Absent of significant policy changes from [the office of the secretary of defense], USCYBERCOM is limited in its ability to challenge ISIS [redacted]. As a result, USCYBERCOM has [redacted] to achieve our objectives,” the executive summary of a 120-day assessment of Operation Glowing Symphony says. Those authorities and processes have been streamlined by the executive branch and Congress in recent years. Commanders now follow a process that defaults toward action, Maj. Gen. Dennis Crall, deputy principal cyber adviser and senior military adviser for cyber policy, said during an event Jan. 9. He explained the updated process provides continuity, tempo, pace and timing. Ultimately, Martelle noted that the real importance behind Operation Glowing Symphony is that Cyber Command used the experience from those events and Joint Task Force-Ares more broadly as a template for future operations. Cyber Command's top official, Gen. Paul Nakasone, who was also led Joint Task Force-Ares, has noted that the task force laid the foundation for the Russia Small Group, which was created to combat election interference in the 2018 midterms. “This concept of a task force lives on. A lot of that thinking came from what we were doing in 2016,” he told NPR. That task force has now evolved to be more all encompassing covering election threats more broadly. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/cybercom/2020/01/21/what-new-documents-reveal-about-cyber-commands-biggest-operation/