17 janvier 2019 | International, Aérospatial

Défense spatiale : les grandes lignes du rapport

Par Yann Cochennec

Les députés Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille viennent de remettre leur rapport sur la stratégie de défense spatiale dont la France doit se doter pour annihiler les menaces actuelles et futures.

La France a décidé de se doter d'une stratégie de défense spatiale et la première étape est ce rapport que les députés Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille viennent de rendre devant la Commission de la Défense et des forces armées. L'incident du satellite espion russe en a été l'élément le plus médiatiquement visible et a servi d'accélérateur à une volonté qui était d'ores et déjà en gestation. Après la militarisation de l'espace, Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille soulignent dans leur rapport "l'arsenalisation de l'espace avec envoi et présence d'armes qui auront vocation à être utilisées dans le cadre d'un conflit".

Le tout dans un contexte qui a changé : apparition de nouvelles puissances spatiales, l'arrivée de firmes privées sur le marché du spatial et la révolution "nano", soit la capacité de produire des satellites de plus en plus petits "pratiquement indétectables, qui peuvent être équipés d'une capacité de brouillage, d'écoute, de prise de contrôle cyber ou de charges explosives". Par conséquent : "défendre nos satellites civils comme militaires dans l'espace, être capable de voir, d'éviter, d'agir et de neutraliser un menace devient dès lors un enjeu de souveraineté nationale et européenne", soulignent Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille.

Pour les auteurs du rapport, cette stratégie de défense spatiale devrait s'orienter autour de plusieurs axes. D'abord en renforçant les moyens de surveillance. Les systèmes de radars GRAVES et SATAM doivent "être complétés par de nouveaux développements" capables de suivre des engins "non-kepleriens" ou "très manoeuvrants et suivant des orbites non habituelles". Solution préconisée : deux nouveaux systèmes de radars de veille en orbite basse installés, l'un en métropole, l'autre en Guyane. Les rapporteurs préconisent aussi la mise en place "d'un système de surveillance des orbites géostationnaires" avec l'achat de trois télescopes supplémentaires (Polynésie, Nouvelle Calédonie) en plus du système TAROT du Cnes. "La surveillance de l'espace devra aussi pouvoir s'effectuer depuis l'espace : emport de capteurs d'approche sur nos satellites, mise en orbite de satellites patrouilleurs, surveillance de nos satellites par un petit satellite de type "chien de garde".

Deuxième axe : la capacité de neutraliser une menace dans l'espace. Les deux parlementaires préconisent, plutôt que l'usage de missiles anti-satellites, de développer de nouvelles technologies : laser ionique "affectant les capteurs qui équipent les voies haute résolution visibles du satellite en le rendant momentanément inopérant, laser classique permettant de détruire chirurgicalement un équipement donné d'un satellite; moyens cyber pour brouiller ou détourner un satellite, bras articulés montés sur un satellite ou une mini-navette permettant d'arrimer un satellite hostile, de le dévier de son orbite et de l'envoyer vers les confins du système solaire.

Enfin, pour être en capacité de poursuivre les missions "en cas de neutralisation de nos propres satellites", les auteurs proposent les dispositions suivantes : développement de constellations de satellites, "développement de moyens de lancement très rapides de fusées emportant un satellite à partir de drones spéciaux de type ALTAIR développé par l'Onera ou de type Pegasus de Dassault", développement "de pseudo-satellites de haute altitude capables de rendre des services équivalents à un satellite de basse altitude", de type Stratobus de Thales Alenia Space ou Zephyr d'Airbus Defense & Space.

Pour mettre en place cette stratégie, le rapport propose la création d'une "Force spatiale" sous l'autorité directe du Chef d'état-major des Armées ainsi que d'une "Haute Autorité de Défense Spatiale" placée directement sous l'autorité du Premier Ministre en lien direct avec le ministre des Armées.

http://www.air-cosmos.com/defense-spatiale-les-grandes-lignes-du-rapport-119321

Sur le même sujet

  • BAE Systems Leverages Industrial Network As Ramp-Up Of Armored Vehicle Production Approaches

    14 novembre 2018 | International, Terrestre

    BAE Systems Leverages Industrial Network As Ramp-Up Of Armored Vehicle Production Approaches

    Loren Thompson In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, production of heavy armored vehicles like tanks and troop carriers almost became a lost art in America. The Army and Marine Corps repeatedly deferred development of new vehicles, leaving industry with little work besides upgrading combat systems developed during the Reagan years. As a result, there are only two integrated manufacturing sites left where new heavy vehicles can be produced -- one for tanks, the other for almost everything else. I wrote about the nation's sole surviving tank plant on November 2. Today's piece is about the plant where almost everything else is produced -- the sprawling BAE Systems manufacturing complex at York, Pennsylvania. BAE Systems is a contributor to my think tank and a consulting client, so I have a fairly detailed understanding of what goes on there. At the moment, York is in the midst of a renaissance, having recently won orders for a new Army troop carrier and a new Marine amphibious vehicle. It is also upgrading the Army's Bradley fighting vehicle and Paladin self-propelled howitzer. The company is investing heavily in new machining systems and other capital equipment to sustain an expected surge in output, and is hiring hundreds of workers who must be trained to a high level of proficiency in specialized skills such as the welding of aluminum armor. This is all good news for the local economy, but to a large degree what BAE Systems is doing at York involves building back capacity that was lost during the Obama years. BAE Systems has been highly successful at booking new business in the armored-vehicle segment of the military market as Army and Marine leaders have become increasingly worried about their reliance on Cold War combat vehicles. An industrial-base study released by the White House in September stated that over 80% of new armored-vehicle production for the two services will occur at York. The study speculated that all the new work might stress the production capabilities of the site. However, that issue was thoroughly analyzed by the Army before it awarded recent contracts for Paladin howitzer upgrades and a new Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle to replace Vietnam-era troop carriers in its armored brigades. The Army found no significant capacity constraints so long as BAE makes suitable investments and hires skilled workers. The findings of the Army's industrial-base analysis are not reflected in the White House report. Here are a few reasons why capacity concerns are overblown. First, although York is the final assembly point for diverse armored vehicles, it is only one part of a nationwide manufacturing network on which BAE Systems relies to produce combat vehicles. The company operates other manufacturing facilities in Alabama, Oklahoma and South Carolina, including one of the nation's largest integrated forges for producing track components. It also works closely with Army depots (as does the tank plant), and has a supplier network containing over a thousand industrial partners. Second, preparation of the White House report predated release of some details concerning how BAE Systems plans to invest in robotic welding, advanced machining technology and other cutting-edge capital equipment. The combination of these investments and programs with schools near manufacturing sites to train the necessary workforce will provide BAE Systems with more production capacity than it requires to address projected levels of demand. Third, the current level of production capacity at York is the inevitable result of uneven demand from U.S. military customers over the last decade. The White House report identifies lack of stable funding as a key factor explaining the fragility of the military supplier base, but fails to explicitly make the connection in explaining why York is facilitized to its current capacity level. BAE Systems is now investing heavily to meet future demand, but it is understandably wary about building capacity much beyond what it expects to need. The latter factor is critical in understanding why there are only two sites left in America capable of integrating heavy armored vehicles. There were many more in the past when high levels of demand were sustained for decades, but industry can't carry capacity indefinitely if no customer is prepared to fund the resulting costs. The reason the workforce assembling Abrams tanks at the Ohio plant dwindled to less than 100 personnel during the Obama years was that nobody was buying tanks. This is not a hard connection to grasp. York has some advantages over the tank plant because it produces a diverse array of vehicles for multiple customers, and the industrial skills required are fungible across its portfolio. But if the Army or Marine Corps were to trim their production objectives for ground vehicles as they have repeatedly over the last decade, it is inevitable that production capacity will adjust to match the reduced level of funding. That's how an efficient industrial base works: supply matches demand. At the moment, the York plant is generating products that satisfy all customer technical standards. There are no outstanding issues -- which is a good thing, because BAE Systems and its legacy enterprises have been the sole providers of Marine amphibious vehicles since World War Two and today manufacture a majority of the combat vehicles in the Army's armored brigades. Company executives do not anticipate problems as they gradually ramp up to two shifts per day at the site. But the point they stressed to me is that York is the central node of an industrial network scattered across the nation, and there is adequate capacity going forward not only to meet expected demand, but also to cope with potential surges. The company estimates that combined demand from the Army and the Marine Corps will be the equivalent of one-and-a-half armored brigades worth of equipment per year, and that should be easily manageable within the limits imposed by planned capacity. They are confident the company can deliver what warfighters need, when they need it. https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/11/13/bae-systems-leverages-industrial-network-as-ramp-up-of-armored-vehicle-production-approaches

  • 3-D Scanning Technology Makes Splash at NNSY Thanks to Partnership with Puget Sound

    1 août 2019 | International, Naval

    3-D Scanning Technology Makes Splash at NNSY Thanks to Partnership with Puget Sound

    By Kristi Britt, Public Affairs Specialist, PORTSMOUTH, Va (NNS) -- Although they have only worked at Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNSY) for less than 10 months, two employees are already involved in the future of innovative technologies in America's Shipyard. Code 268 Engineering Technician Jason Ewick and Code 2340 Assist Shift Test Engineer (ASTE) Joey Hoellerich were brought into the NNSY Technology and Innovation (T&I) Lab, a group dedicated to bringing the real ideas and technologies of the shipyard to the forefront. With their arrival to the team, both were given the unique opportunity to share knowledge with Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PSNS&IMF), using laser scanning to provide accurate measurements for shipboard work. “The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) was at NNSY in years past, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) brought Puget Sound representatives to our shipyard to use their laser scanning technology to cut off all added material from four sponsons onboard the vessel,” said NNSY T&I Lab Lead Dan Adams. Sponsons are the projections extending from both sides of the watercraft to provide protection, stability, mounting locations, etc. “During the time, we observed the process and wanted to learn what we could from our sister shipyard team.” The team from PSNS&IMF returned to NNSY to give guidance on the process, with Code 290 representative Dan Hager, and Shop 11 Mold Loft representatives Jason Anderson and Jeremiah Swain taking charge in sharing what they knew to Ewick and Hoellerich. “The team from Puget was absolutely amazing and shared the ins and outs of the 3-D scanning technology with us,” said Ewick. “I had done laser scanning work in the private industry but it was my first time tackling something like this. Hager, Anderson, and Swain guided us through each step, sharing as much knowledge as they could with us about two different processes we could use to get the results we needed.” The first process is photogrammetry, where you place targets an inch apart on a desired object or space for scanning. Once complete, you take multiple photographs which are then compiled into a software to build the 3-D model. The second process is the 3-D laser scanning, which requires more space for a larger read. The targets would be placed and then someone would operate the laser tracker and scanner from the pier to get the scan needed. Once completed, the 3-D model would be compiled in the software for use. With the knowledge provided by PSNS&IMF and USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) in drydock, Ewick and Hoellerich were ready to tackle the process for NNSY. “We began at Colonna's Shipyard in Norfolk where the sponsons are being produced,” said Ewick. “We use the scanning technology to analyze where the sponson would meet the shell of the ship. It helps provide an accurate measurement for our workers when it comes to installation and repair.” Next up was scanning after the pieces were installed. At this time three of the four sponsons have been installed onboard the Bush. “The two forward sponsons were scanned using photogrammetry,” said Ewick. “It was a first for us and required coordination across various shops and codes throughout the shipyard.” The Pipefitter Shop (Shop 56), The Optical Diesel Mechanics (Shop 38), the Shipfitter Shop (Shop 11), the Shipyard Operations Department (Code 300), and partners at Puget all played a part in this evolution. “It was a collaborative effort and we were able to be successful thanks to our shipyard family coming together to make it happen.” This process was a first for NNSY and a first for using the software directly in the drydock instead from piers and barges. “It's amazing to see something come together like this, especially when you think that we were two blank slates coming into the project,” said Hoellerich who had no prior experience working with 3-D scanning and metrology before joining the lab. “We were able to partner with our sister shipyard and work with shops and codes that I never thought I'd be able to do when I first joined the ranks of NNSY. Being able to gain that knowledge from our shipyard family and utilize what we've learned in the field is something those of us working in innovation live for.” The team will be completing the rear scans for the Bush in the future and hope to continue to perfect the process. In addition, they hope to continue to work with other shipyard entities to further expand on the technologies of the future. “This partnership has been a major success for us and we hope to continue to build those relationships with the other shipyards and beyond,” said Hoellerich. “We can all learn from each other and build from each other's experiences. We all share a mission and together we can succeed.” Ewick added, “we've also begun expanding more ways we can use the scanning technology at our shipyard. For example, we are looking into a future project where we scan inside the ship and build a path for extracting heavy equipment from within as to avoid interferences. We've seen more interest from others within the shipyard since we began to do work with this technology, seeing what ways it could help improve what we do here. That's what innovation is all about, taking those first steps in seeing what works. Even if what you try doesn't pan out, at least you gave it a shot. But you'll never know if it works or not unless you take that step. Don't be scared to try out something new.” For more information regarding innovation, contact the NNSY T&I Lab at 757-396-7180 or email the REAL Ideas program at NNSY_REALIdeas@navy.mil. https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=110422

  • Questions about US Navy attack sub program linger as contract negotiations drag

    19 août 2019 | International, Naval

    Questions about US Navy attack sub program linger as contract negotiations drag

    By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy is months behind schedule getting its latest batch of Virginia-class attack subs under contract, and no resolution appears imminent — leading to mounting concerns that delays on the Virginia will affect the Navy's top acquisition priority, the Columbia-class submarine. The contract for the 10-ship Block V Virginia-class attack submarine was supposed to be signed in April, but Navy and industry sources say that there has been a lot of talk and little agreement between the service and the two shipbuilders, General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Newport News. Intended to integrate acoustic upgrades and an 84-foot section for additional strike missile tubes, the delayed contract for the Block V Virginias have instead turned into just the latest warning sign that all is not well in Virginia-land, as schedules have slipped and at least one of the builders is now bleeding profits. Furthermore, it's unclear what the Navy's buying profile for Block V will be, which is subject to both contract negotiations and Congressional action on the fiscal year 2020 budget. The anxiety over Virginia delays, however, are less about Virginia, which is still a strong performing program — especially when compared with other programs such as the Ford-class carrier — but are more driven by the potential for compounding issues bleeding over into the Columbia-class. Both submarines will be drawing on the same workforce and supplier base, which is already showing signs of strain. The Navy says the delays are part of ongoing negotiations and that the schedule should not be affected further since the Navy has already contracted for long-lead time materials, but with the first Columbia expected to be ordered in 2021, the service is facing the reality that it lacks a clear idea of the future of the Virginia program when it is preparing to launch Columbia. The delays center on the integration of the Virginia payload module and just how many the Navy intends to buy. Until this year, the public plan was for Virginia Block V to be a 10-ship class, where the first boat would integrate the acoustic upgrades but the follow-on boats would all integrate the VPM, which is designed to triple the Virginia's Tomahawk payload capacity to 40 per hull. When the Pentagon's 2020 budget request dropped in March, the plan changed, with the total buy expanded to 11 hulls with eight VPM boats. But according to sources who spoke to Defense News, the builder was laying the groundwork for the original plan, which the Navy had already purchased long-lead material toward. The confusion over just how many VPMs the Navy intends to buy has been a major sticking point in the negotiations, with sources telling Defense News that the number of VPMs could still end up as either eight or seven, or potentially even fewer. Complicating matters further is that Congress has yet to weigh in on the fate of the 11th Block V boat, which would mean buying three Virginia's in one year, and some on Capitol Hill have voiced skepticism that the industrial base can support that The Navy's top acquisition official, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Acquisition and Development James Geurts, is working toward a solution that will balance the needs of the Navy and the needs of the builders, his spokesman said. Geurts "continues to work closely with the program team and industry on negotiating a Block V Multi-Year procurement contract that will be affordable, executable and supports the industrial base,” said Capt. Danny Hernandez. “He wants to ensure we are maximizing the use of taxpayer dollars while at the same time striving for an acceptable level of design and program risk. “Additionally, during this period, the Navy is continuing to fund the shipbuilder for long lead time materials and pre-construction efforts to ensure submarine work continues at the shipyards and with the supplier base.” ‘Worst of Both Worlds' With uncertainty looming about the future of the Virginia class, questions remain about whether that will bleed into Columbia, creating schedule risk that Navy leaders have said for years was untenable. Congress has sought to ease the strain on the supplier base by offering money to help smaller vendors expand to meet demand. And in March, Geurts announced that he was standing up a new program executive officer for Columbia, citing the need to be proactive with any problems that might arise from the competing demands on the industrial base. “These yards are integrated,” defense analyst Dan Goure, a former Bush Administration official who now works for The Lexington Institute, said in an April interview. “When you start messing with the other program on a short-notice basis, you risk the yards being able to deliver on time and at cost for multiple programs. “In a sense you risk the worst of both worlds: You risk further perturbations in the Virginia class, and at the same time risk not being able to get Columbia out on time.” Both General Dynamics and Huntington Ingalls said in earnings calls they expect the Block V contract to be signed by the end of the year. Delays The setbacks seem to be compounding for the Virginia program. Welding issues on missile tubes destined for the Virginia Payload Module and the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program have eaten into the schedule margin for both programs. And issues with the supplier base as well as the labor force have caused schedule delays. Industry sources who spoke to Defense News said growing the Virginia-class program from one submarine per year to two submarines per year, which started with the budget in FY11, has put increasing strain on a diminished submarine supplier base, which has put pressure on schedules as the shipyards wait for parts. Huntington Ingalls has dropped 23 percent of its profit margin on the Virginia-class program, according to a second-quarter earnings report analyzed by defense business analyst Jim McAleese. In an earnings call, Huntington Ingalls executives seemed to blame the drop on the schedule delays. Two sources familiar with the issue said profit loss stemmed from labor force issues that resulted from a year-long delay in the Navy contracting for the carrier George Washington's mid-life refueling and overhaul. The delay caused Ingalls to lay off about 1,200 employees, which drew off workforce from the Virginia program because of labor union rules that say that the most recent hires must be laid off first. Those rules forced Huntington Ingalls Industries to lay off workers who were working on the Virginia program, who in turn were then snapped up by other yards; Huntington Ingalls Industries then had to train new employees for the Virginia work. Defense News reported in March that class-wide, Virginia is looking at four-to-seven month delays for delivery, which drives up labor costs. Huntington Ingalls Industries chief financial officer Chris Kastner said on the call that getting the Virginia program back on schedule is a top priority. “Especially when you're a in a serial production line like we are with the Virginia-class,” Kastner said. “If you start to have issues with schedule it does start to affect the synchronization of the line. “We've been working pretty hard to reset that this year, given kind of where we started last year fourth quarter and we made great progress on that." https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/08/16/questions-about-us-navy-attack-sub-program-linger-as-contract-negotiations-drag/

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