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  1 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR

  Space Development Agency orders its first satellites

  Nathan Strout WASHINGTON — The Space Development Agency has selected Lockheed Martin and York Space Systems to build the satellites for the first tranche of its transport layer ― an on-orbit mesh network that is key to the Pentagon's plans to connect on orbit sensors with terrestrial shooters ― the agency announced Aug. 31. Each company will build 10 satellites for SDA, though at vastly different prices. While York Space Systems will receive $94 million to build its 10 satellites, Lockheed Martin will receive $188 million for the same number. According to SDA Director Derek Tournear, that difference reflects the agency's firm-fixed-price contract approach to this solicitation, where they asked companies to give them a price point to meet SDA's detailed specifications. “We have two providers roughly providing the same thing at different prices. How does that work? It works simply as we put out a solicitation that gave requirements and gave a schedule, and we asked for firm-fixed-price bids based on those requirements and schedule,” explained Tournear in a media call following the announcement. “We had several providers that bid that came back with a range of different technical solutions and a range of prices. “We awarded them based completely on the technical merit and what we thought was their ability to be able to make schedule and provide a solution, and then price was factored into that,” he added. “That's what led York and Lockheed Martin to come out on top.” The satellites will comprise Tranche 0 of the agency's planned transport layer, a constellation of satellites that can transfer data globally through optical intersatellite links. Tournear has previously noted the space-based mesh network will form the space component to the Defense Department's Joint All-Domain Command and Control enterprise, or JADC2. “The transport layer, which is what the draft [request for proposals] and the industry day was talking about today, is going to be the unifying effort across the department. That is going to be what we use for low-latency [communications] to be able to pull these networks together, and that, in essence, is going to be the main unifying truss for the JADC2 and that effort moving forward. That is going to be the space network that is utilized for that,” Tournear explained in April. Six of the 20 satellites will have Link-16 transmitters, allowing them to connect to warfighters through the military's tactical network. The contracts include on-time delivery of space vehicles and paths to optical intersatellite link interoperability. Work is expected to kick off within 30 days, said Tournear. While Tranche 0 will be made up of just 20 satellites in low Earth orbit, SDA plans to add more satellites every two years as part of a spiral development approach. The transport layer will serve as the base for the new multi-layered National Defense Space Architecture, which will be made up of hundreds of interconnected satellites serving a number of missions — including tracking hypersonic weapons and providing beyond-line-of-sight targeting--primarily from low Earth orbit. SDA plans to launch Tranche 0 into orbit in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2022. “We're looking about this time in exactly two years, we will be launching 20 satellites from two different performers to make up the nucleus of our Tranche 0 transport layer,” said Tournear. According to the May 1 contract solicitation, the agency has six goals for its Tranche 0 transport layer: Demonstrate low-latency data transport to the war fighter over the optical cross link mesh network. Demonstrate the ability to deliver data from an external, space-based sensor to the war fighter via the transport layer. Demonstrate a limited battle management C3 functionality. Transfer Integrated Broadcast System data across the mesh network to the war fighter. Store, relay and transmit Link 16 data over the network in near real time. Operate a common timing reference independent of GPS. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/08/31/space-development-agency-orders-its-first-satellites/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2009.01.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief

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  10 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Losing Market Share And Damaging National Security Due To Anachronistic Drone Policy

  Dave Deptula Contributor Adherence to an obsolescent approach to the international nuclear non-proliferation export guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is hurting the United States (U.S.) both commercially and from a national security perspective. In a nutshell, the MTCR treats large drones as if they were nuclear missiles—which they are not. As a result, this self-imposed restriction not only limits the sale of large U.S. drones to our friends and allies but pushes them into the arms of foreign suppliers some of whom are potential adversaries. The result is a series of negative consequences for the U.S. When the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute released its annual report on global arms transfers earlier this year, it was a good news story for the U.S. From 2015-2019, the U.S. accounted for 36 percent of major global arms sales, a 23 percent increase in volume over the previous five-year period and 76 percent more than its next closest competitor—Russia. The dominant position the U.S. finds itself in is a testament to both the quality of U.S. defense equipment, which is typically accompanied by robust training, sustainment, and support packages, as well as the mutual desire of the U.S. and its partners and allies to develop and maintain strong defense relationships. However, one important segment of the defense market where this pattern does not hold are large military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). This is not due to a lack of capability—the U.S. remains the world's leader in UAV technology and expertise—nor a lack of demand as by 2029 the international market will account for over 50 percent of the over $10 billion projected to be spent annually on UAVs. Instead, the U.S. has hamstrung itself due to restrictive export policies that equate large UAVs to nuclear missiles. This mismatch between the definitions and controls imposed on UAVs and the reality of how they are actually employed has significantly harmed coalition operations, U.S. relationships with its partners and allies, and the U.S. defense industrial base. It is imperative that the U.S. modernize its UAV export policy. Currently, the MTCR governs the export of U.S. UAVs. Initially formed in 1987, the MTCR is a voluntary agreement intended to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons—and later weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The MTCR defines UAVs capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload more than 300 kilometers one way as Category I systems, the transfer of which “are subject to an unconditional strong presumption of denial.” Although at the time the MTCR was negotiated no UAV exceeded the Category I thresholds, their envisioned use as delivery vehicles for WMD equivalent to cruise missiles precipitated their inclusion in the MTCR. However, since then the development of UAVs evolved as remotely piloted aircraft, not cruise missiles. Unfortunately, export policy has failed to keep pace, resulting in a situation where the export of UAVs is regulated under the same stringent regime as intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. policy failure to adequately remedy this situation creates significant problems for the following reasons. First, current U.S. export policy prevents the U.S. from realizing the full potential of UAVs in coalition operations. Because current policy frequently results in the denial of export requests for U.S. UAVs by close partners and allies, these nations must either resort to indigenous production or to another foreign manufacturer to meet their military requirements. Under the best of circumstances, the result is a lower level of interoperability with U.S. forces than possible had they been able to acquire U.S. UAVs. This hampers the integration of partners that would enable the coalition to be much more effective. The current policy impedes the use of common UAVs critical for success in allied operations. Of greater concern is that much of the unmet demand by friends for U.S. military UAVs is now being fulfilled by China because of the MTCR restrictions. Integrating partners into coalition operations using Chinese UAVs creates significant security risks. This is because China maintains control of the systems necessary to operate their UAVs. This enables them to collect intelligence on coalition operations if allowed access to coalition networks. From the perspective of a U.S. commander, the risk these likely infiltrations pose to security is sufficient to exclude partners operating Chinese UAVs from participating in both U.S. led coalition operations and intelligence sharing agreements. Second, the U.S. denying UAV export requests from nations that are security partners fosters frustration, raises doubts about U.S. commitments, and drive partners to pursue security relationships with China. Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates provide recent examples of solid U.S. partners that have procured Chinese UAVs. Furthermore, these countries are then forced to rely on China for training, sustainment, intelligence processing, and other related services. China's willingness to integrate indigenous industry in joint ventures—another practice restricted by the MTCR—serves to further solidify the ties between China and the partnering nation. Absent a change in U.S. policy, China will continue to expand its UAV market share and associated influence into regions important to the U.S. Third, the associated U.S. loss of global market share of UAV sales weakens U.S. business and the U.S. defense industrial base. Domestic funding for certain UAVs already faced downward pressure in the most recent budget request amidst other modernization priorities. Looking ahead the enormous federal expenditures to address the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic downturn are likely to result in significant cuts to future U.S. defense budgets. Greater access to foreign markets would serve to diversify the customer base of U.S. manufacturers of large UAVs, helping to offset reduced revenue from domestic buyers and keeping commercial production lines. Unfortunately, current UAV export policy precludes this from happening. Declining production rates for large military UAVs threaten to not only to shrink the U.S. aerospace industrial base, but also to undermine its competitive edge. Lacking predictable cash flow and sufficient profit margins, companies that manage to remain in the market will become more reticent to invest significant funds into research and development. Furthermore, the MTCR prohibits co-development and co-production of UAVs, precluding U.S. drone companies from pooling resources and expertise with international partners. The danger is that the U.S. may squander its drone advantage just as international interest in procuring advanced, survivable, multi-mission UAVs ramps up. It would be a tremendous shame if the U.S. finds itself no longer in a leading position and must instead rely on others to develop cutting-edge UAV technologies. Although there is growing awareness of these problems, recent efforts to craft a more reasonable UAV export policy have largely fallen short. Rather than a fundamental shift in policy, the few positive steps taken have been stopgap measures involving workarounds—approving more Category I sales via direct commercial sales rather than foreign military sales—or maneuvering within the confines of the MTCR through attempts to modify UAV definitions such as adding a speed criteria. Instead, as is comprehensively laid out in the Mitchell Institute's most recent policy paper, what is needed is for the Congress to insert language into the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act that explicitly defines UAVs as combat aircraft and subject them to the same export considerations. This would effectively remove U.S. UAV export decisions from the MTCR guidelines. The U.S. has a proven process of adjudicating sales of the most advanced fighter aircraft in the world, including how to configure them to make sales mutually beneficial to the U.S. and its partners. The example of the F-35 is particularly pertinent because technologies approved for export on the F-35 would be restricted by the MCTR if applied to a UAV—the only difference being the pilot of the F-35 is in the aircraft whereas large UAVs are remotely piloted. Given both the high degree of commonality of combat aircraft and UAVs, as well as the proven success combat aircraft sales have in providing partners a formidable deterrent and warfighting capability, improving interoperability among coalition partners, and supporting both U.S. and partner industrial capacity, treating UAVs as combat aircraft for export policy offers the most sensible and effective solution. Change cannot come soon enough. The U.S. has a limited window to re-engage with partners with a stated interest in U.S. UAVs or who are experiencing buyer's remorse with regard to their Chinese UAV partnerships. It is therefore critical that the U.S. normalize its UAV export policy before China can consolidate its gains. The future of warfare increasingly depends on UAV technology. Exporting large U.S. UAVs is vital to effective coalition operations. For too long the MTCR has distorted the balance of national security and economic interests against the fear of nuclear and WMD proliferation. Acknowledging UAVs as what they are—aircraft, not missiles—will enhance U.S. security, improve commercial trade in a growing business sector while preserving the MTCR as an effective means to prevent the proliferation of missiles and their associated technologies. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davedeptula/2020/06/09/losing-market-share-and-damaging-national-security-due-to-anachronistic-drone-policy/#50ce76d51332

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  14 janvier 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Modernisation and Procurement Opportunities in the Global Combat Aircraft Market to Exceed $101 Billion by 2026

  Renewed emphasis on stealth, sensor fusion, MUM-T, and active protection systems will ignite new growth opportunities, finds Frost & Sullivan LONDON, Jan. 14, 2019 /CNW/ -- The global combat aircraft market is set for rapid growth. Geographical instability, territorial and border disputes, and the need to replace ageing fleets with modern fourth-/fifth-generation multirole fighters that have longer ferry range, higher payload capacity, and better survivability against integrated air defence networks are key factors fuelling a phenomenal CAGR of 39.0% to 2026. Frost & Sullivan anticipates planned and perceived modernisation and procurement opportunities in the market to exceed $101 billion and revenues to reach $493.14 billion by 2026. "Geopolitics aside, the combat fleet in many countries such as India, Vietnam, and Malaysia are reaching obsolescence fast and replacements must be procured to ensure that power projection capabilities of these countries are maintained. There is a global renewed emphasis on stealth, sensor fusion, manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) capability, and active protection system upgrades," said Arjun Sreekumar, Industry Analyst, Defence at Frost & Sullivan. "To harness lucrative growth opportunities, players should offer a combination of low-cost platforms, aggressive marketing, and flexible payment mechanisms." For further information on this analysis, please visit: http://frost.ly/331 Growth opportunities from a regional perspective include: Geopolitical issues necessitate new procurement and modernisation in the Middle East in countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates Modernisation of existing systems or procurement of second-hand aircraft rather than pursuing expensive acquisition programs in former Soviet bloc countries and other developing countries with smaller economies or low economic growth Collaborative new platforms planned in Europe (Franco-German next-generation fighter) and the Asia-Pacificregion (Japan and Indonesia) Russia and China modernising quickly and phasing out outdated inventory The United States seeking several upgrade programs for its current combat aircraft inventory to extend service lives into the 2030s, until the F-35 and new fifth-/sixth-generation multirole fighters can be procured "Older generation combat aircraft will find future air combat environments challenging in the face of new air and ground-based sensors and weapons capabilities, increased digitalisation of battlespace, and forces moving towards collaborative network-centric operations," noted Sreekumar. "The installation of new generation electronic countermeasures will be a minimum survival requirement in a rapidly evolving environment." Frost & Sullivan's recent analysis, Global Combat Aircraft Market, Forecast to 2026, covers the global market for new aircraft and upgrades specific to combat aircraft. It lists the key aircraft fielded by different countries based on their mission and types and traces their upgrade evolution. Segments such as strike, fighter, and multirole fighter across fixed-wing aircraft types are assessed with market share and the competitive environment discussed for players such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Dassault Aviation, Saab, Eurofighter Jadflugzeug GMBH, Mikoyan MiG, and Sukho. Revenues are broken down by new procurements, upgrades, regions, and combat aircraft types. About Frost & Sullivan For over five decades, Frost & Sullivan has become world-renowned for its role in helping investors, corporate leaders and governments navigate economic changes and identify disruptive technologies, Mega Trends, new business models and companies to action, resulting in a continuous flow of growth opportunities to drive future success. Contact us: Start the discussion. Global Combat Aircraft Market, Forecast to 2026 MD43_16 Contact: Jacqui Holmes Corporate Communications Consultant E: jacqui.holmes@frost.com Twitter: @FrostADS LinkedIn: Frost & Sullivan's Aerospace, Defence and Security Forum Website: http://www.frost.com/ADS SOURCE Frost & Sullivan https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/modernisation-and-procurement-opportunities-in-the-global-combat-aircraft-market-to-exceed-101-billion-by-2026-855358362.html